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Abstract 
This study consists of three main projects covering (i) the relationship between disclosure 
quality and earnings management and  (ii) the relationship between corporate governance 
and disclosure quality. Disclosure quality is measures using the IR Magazine Award, the 
forward looking information in the annual report, and the analyst forecast accuracy. Match-
paired samples comprised of the winners and non-winners of the IR Magazine Award during 
the years from 2005-2008 were employed in this study. Simultaneity bias in all projects was 
remedied by the use of a simultaneous system of equation, which was estimated using two-
stage least square regression (2SLS).  
 
This study provides several interesting findings. With regard to the first project, disclosure 
quality and earnings management, it is shown that all disclosure quality proxies are 
consistently reported significant negative relationship with earnings management in the OLS 
regression. However, audit committee characteristics and board characteristics reveal 
insignificant relationship with earnings management, except audit committee meeting which 
reported positive association. Concerning the potential complementary and substitutive 
effect of internal governance and disclosure quality in deterring earnings management, result 
of the interaction terms revealed that there is a complementary relationship between audit 
committee quality and disclosure quality (measured using Investor Relation Magazine Award) 
in deterring earnings management. When disclosure quality and earnings management are 
treated as endogenous, this study reveals that there is a significant bi-directional relationship 
between disclosure quality and earnings management, highlighting that causality can run in 
both directions. This suggests that future research should control for disclosure quality factors 
when examining the impact of corporate governance and earnings management and that the 
potential simultaneity between disclosure quality and earnings management should be 
considered in future models.  
 
With respect to the second project, corporate governance and disclosure quality, this study 
reveals that audit committee effectiveness, board meeting and board independent are 
significantly positively related to disclosure quality (measured using IR Magazine Award and 
the number of forward looking items in the annual report). With regard to the potential 
complementary or substitutive effect between board and audit committee characteristics in 
improving firm disclosure quality, this study reveal that there is a substitutive effect between 
board quality and audit quality in enhancing disclosure quality (measured using analyst 
forecast accuracy). If disclosure quality and board independence are treated as endogenous, 
there is a significant positive bi-directional relationship between them when disclosure 
quality is measured using the number of forward looking items. However, there is a negative 
bi-directional relationship and an insignificant bi-directional relationship shown when 
disclosure quality is measured using analyst forecast accuracy and the IR Magazine Award 
respectively.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Objectives of the study 
 
This thesis is comprised of two main projects. The first project examines the relationship 
between disclosure quality and earnings management, by controlling for internal governance 
mechanisms. Prior literature neglected governance mechanism when examining the link 
between disclosure quality and earnings management (e.g. Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009; Jo 
and Kim, 2007; Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2006; Riahi and Arab, 2011). In addition, the first 
project also examines the potential complementary or substitutive relationship between 
internal governance and disclosure quality in deterring earnings management, and it also 
investigates the potential simultaneity relationship between disclosure quality and earnings 
management.1 
 
In the second project, the present study complements previous research in this area in 
several ways. Firstly, it examines the impact of audit committee characteristics and board 
                                                          
1
 Although prior studies on internal governance mechanism and earnings management are quite extensive 
(refer to Chapter 3 for a literature review), studies examining the effect of disclosure quality on earnings 
management are lacking. Several prior studies share this concern, including Healy and Wahlen (1999), Lapointe-
Antunes et al.(2006) and Jo and Kim (2007). Jo and Kim (2007, p. 587) state that “developing the theoretical 
framework that explains the relation between information disclosure and earnings management will enhance 
our understanding of why firms disclose in general”. Lapointe-Antunes et al., (2006, p. 468) claim that the 
majority of prior literature concentrated on the effect of disclosure quality on “cost of capital, cost of debt, firm 
performance or analyst forecast accuracy”; there has been no research on disclosure quality and earnings 
management for a considerable length of time.  
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characteristics on disclosure quality. In this instance, corporate governance is expected to 
reduce information asymmetry, because the agent will provide a high quality of information 
to the principal when conflict of interest is low (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). Secondly, it 
investigates the potential complementary or substitutive relationship of audit committees 
and boards of directors in improving disclosure quality, as highlighted by Brickley and 
Zimmerman (2010) and Brown et al., (2011) given that governance mechanisms are 
interlinked and share the same function in providing monitoring of firms, which reduces the 
agency cost. Thirdly, it takes into account the potential bi-directional relationship between 
board independence and disclosure quality by using a simultaneous system of equations. This 
is particularly important since prior literature offers inconclusive and conflicting findings with 
regard to the research on corporate governance and disclosure quality because of the 
endogeneity and causality issues that plagued in their studies (Brickley and Zimmerman, 
2010; Armstrong et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2011).  
 
1.2 General contributions 
 
The present study may be of benefit to several groups of market participants: 
 
1.2.1 Investors 
 
This study will help investors with their decision-making processes. In line with Kent et al. 
(2010), the present study demonstrates that corporate governance does not always help to 
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reduce discretionary accruals. In this instance, for investors to rely on corporate governance 
in making investment decisions might be insufficient. The study suggests that, as well as 
focusing on corporate governance factors, investors should also concentrate on firms’ 
disclosure quality, which is shown to be helpful in reducing managers’ propensity to 
manipulate earnings. 
 
1.2.2 Regulators 
 
This study shows that high disclosure is associated with lower earnings management in firms 
with weak governance. In the light of these findings, regulators should focus more on how to 
improve firms’ disclosure; more explicit rules on disclosure can deter earnings management 
better than corporate governance. Regulators should encourage firms to provide higher-
quality disclosure, related to forward-looking information and capital market disclosure, given 
their importance to the financial analyst in predicting companies’ future earnings. This study 
also indicates that current corporate governance practices by audit committees and boards of 
directors are unable to solve earnings management problems in firms; hence it suggests that 
regulators need to review their reliance on current corporate governance codes in the light of 
their costs and benefits.  
 
1.2.3 Researchers 
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Researchers could benefit from this study since there is very little research in this area, 
especially from the UK perspective. The study provides empirical evidence on the potential of 
disclosure quality to reduce managers’ propensity to manipulate earnings, by controlling for 
corporate governance variables. The complementary or substitutive relationship between 
disclosure and corporate governance to reduce earnings management is discussed; and  the 
study identifies the factors that contribute to higher disclosure quality.  
 
1.2.4 Corporations 
 
This study concludes that high disclosure quality outperformed internal governance in 
mitigating earnings management. Therefore, it brings to the attention of accountants and 
corporations the fact that high disclosure quality will reduce managers tendency to 
manipulate earnings. It also stresses that high disclosure quality is beneficial to firms in 
improving earnings. Hence, corporations should enhance the quality of information to gain 
the trust of investors. Moreover, given that internal governance mechanisms are found to be 
weak in curbing earnings management, firms have to learn how to improve their governance 
processes. It is important to note that compliance to the code per se might fail to produce 
positive effects without efforts to ensure its effectiveness.  
 
1.2.5 Academics 
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The findings from this research can be used to educate accounting students (the future 
accountants) about the importance of disclosure and its benefits, discouraging them from 
becoming involved in earnings management and instead promoting ethical reporting and 
transparency.  
 
1.3  Definitions 
 
1.3.1 Disclosure Quality 
 
Disclosure can be defined as the release by a firm of information, which may be financial or 
non-financial; qualitative or quantitative; mandatory or voluntary; disseminated through 
formal or informal channels (Gibbins et al., 1990, p. 122). Although this definition of 
disclosure is general and ambiguous, in practice, defining disclosure quality is multifaceted 
and inconclusive. Gray and Skogsvik (2004, p. 793) explain that “voluntary disclosure 
supposedly provides information which goes beyond the requirements inherent in company 
law and the prevailing accounting standards”. This definition is vague in the sense that the 
distinction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure is also subject to serious debate in 
literature on disclosure. Singhvi and Desai (1971) define disclosure quality as “completeness, 
accuracy and reliability” (p. 131). More recently Brown and Hillegeist (2003, p. 5) define 
disclosure quality as “the precision, timeliness, and quantity of information provided”.  
 
According to Kent and Stewart (2008, p. 651), “more extensive disclosures are likely to be 
more informative than brief disclosures and are, therefore, an indicator of greater 
transparency”. In the same vein, based on the argument of Botosan (2004) that quantity and 
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quality are inseparable and hard to measure, Beretta and Bozzolan (2008, p. 335) claim that 
“the extent of disclosure (i.e. quantity) is an adequate measure of the quality of disclosure”. 
 
Although prior studies identify several important key words in describing disclosure quality 
(such as completeness, accuracy, reliability, precision, timeliness), it is argued that definitions 
are basically derived from the underlying theoretical assumptions used in research; so it is 
not necessarily true that “one size fits all”. Different research methodologies, variable 
constructs and disclosure themes used in disclosure research lead to different definitions of 
disclosure. Cooke and Wallace (1989, p. 51) highlight the fact that identifying disclosure 
quality is highly subjective and does not share the same characteristics as defining, for 
example, the quality of a car. The complexity of describing disclosure quality is also echoed by 
Debreceny and Rahman (2005) who suggest that there is no perfect definition of disclosure 
quality. It is also supported by the claim of Beretta and Bozzolan (2008, p. 341) that 
disclosure quality is “impossible to define”.3 For the purpose of this study, disclosure quality 
is defined, following Singhvi and Desai (1971, p.131) as “completeness, accuracy and 
reliability”. In protecting shareholder value, agency theory and signalling theory assume that 
a complete, accurate and reliable disclosure should be provided to reduce information 
asymmetry, solve agency problems and reduce agency cost.4 This confirms that the definition 
of disclosure quality of Singhvi and Desai (1971) is in line with the aim of agency theory, 
                                                          
3
 Hassan and Marston (2010) point out that other forms of disclosure from internal sources (e.g. conference 
calls, interim reports, investor relations) and from external sources (e.g. analyst reports, media) are 
complementary to the annual reports provided by the firms.  
4
 Most of the regulatory provisions related to disclosure and corporate governance are in line with the central 
aim of agency theory - to protect shareholder value (e.g. The UK Corporate Governance Code, Sarbanes Oxley 
Act, Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange).  
20 | P a g e  
 
maximising shareholders’ value.  
 
1.3.2 Earnings Management  
Prior studies employ various definitions of earnings management. Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 
368), define earnings management as “…when managers use judgement in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”. The present study accepts and uses 
this definition as it is in line with the assumption of agency theory that earnings management 
is an agency cost detrimental to shareholders.  
 
While Scott (2003, p. 369, as cited in Ronen and Yaari, 2008, p. 26) defines earnings 
management as “the choice by a manager of accounting policies so as to achieve specific 
objective[s]”, Phillips et al. (2003, p. 493) state that earnings management “is accomplished 
through managerial discretion over accounting choices and operating cash flows”. Yet 
another definition is given by Giroux (2004, p. 2): “…earnings management includes the whole 
spectrum, from conservative accounting through fraud, a huge range for accounting 
judgement, given the incentives of management”.  
 
Definitions of earnings management provided by prior literature mostly suggest that earnings 
management is harmful rather than beneficial. Ronen and Yaari (2008) classify definitions of 
earnings management as white, grey or black as in the table below:  
21 | P a g e  
 
 
Table 1-1: Alternative definitions of earnings management 
 
White Grey Black 
Earnings management is 
taking advantage of the 
flexibility in the choice of 
accounting treatment to 
signal the manager’s private 
information on future cash 
flows 
Earnings management is 
choosing an accounting 
treatment that is either 
opportunistic (maximising the 
utility of management only) 
or economically efficient 
Earnings management is the 
practice of using tricks to 
misrepresent or reduce 
transparency of the financial 
reports 
Ronen and Sadan (1981), 
Demski et al. (1984), Suh 
(1990), Demski (1998), 
Beneish (2001), Sankar and 
Subramanyam (2001) 
Fields et al. (2001), Scott 
(2003) 
Schipper (1989), Levitt 
(1998), Healy and Wahlen 
(1999), Tzur and Yaari (1999), 
Chtourou et al. (2001), Miller 
and Bahnson (2002) 
Source (verbatim): Ronen and Yaari (2008, p. 25) 
 
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) when defining earnings management argue that earnings 
management is performed to “mislead” the users of accounting information, while Ronen and 
Yaari (2008, p. 371-372) point out that earnings management is carried out by the means of 
accrual, which is the different between revenues and cash. The assumption that earnings 
management is an opportunistic behaviour of managers is another reason why the present 
study accepts the definition given by Healy and Wahlen (1999).  
 
1.3.3 Corporate Governance  
 
Most of the definitions of corporate governance supplied by prior literature are concerned 
with protecting the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. Taking the stakeholder’s 
viewpoint, Solomon (2007, p. 14) defines corporate governance “as the system of checks and 
22 | P a g e  
 
balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge 
their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of 
their business activity”, while Dahya et al. (1996, p. 71) describe corporate governance as 
‘‘the manner in which companies are controlled and in which those responsible for the 
direction of companies are accountable to the stakeholders of these companies’’. In a similar 
vein, according to Donelly and Mulcahy (2008, p. 416), “[c]orporate governance is a set of 
control mechanisms that is specially designed to monitor and ratify managerial decisions, and 
to ensure the efficient operation of a corporation on behalf of its stakeholders.”  
 
Alternatively, in line with the focus on defending shareholders’ interests, corporate 
governance can be defined as “… ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737). Larker 
et al. (2007, p. 964) define corporate governance as “the set of mechanisms that influence 
the decisions made by managers when there is separation of ownership and control”, while 
Armstrong et al. (2010) define it as “the subset of a firm’s contracts that help align the actions 
and choices of managers with the interest of shareholders” (p. 181). The UK Corporate 
Governance Code of 2010 states that “The purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate 
effective, entrepreneurial and prudent management that can deliver the long term success of 
the company” (p. 1). The Code also defined corporate governance in line with the 
shareholders interest as (p. 2):  
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards 
of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in 
governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an 
appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting 
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the company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s 
actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting (emphasised 
added).  
 
 
Given that agency theory is fundamental to explaining corporate governance, in this setting, 
the present study defines corporate governance similar to the UK Corporate Governance 
Code 2010. Nevertheless, the present study also relies on Solomon (2007) who argues that 
shareholders’ interests can also represent all stakeholders’ interests. In other words, it is 
assumed that protecting shareholders’ interests is universal and can be generalised to other 
stakeholders as well.  
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows:  
 
Chapter Two presents the theoretical framework used in literature on voluntary disclosure. 
The chapter discusses managers’ opportunistic behaviour in manipulating earnings and 
distorting disclosure quality, as well as the potential remedies, in the light of agency theory., 
Other issues relevant to disclosure quality, earnings management and corporate governance 
are also presented in this chapter. Chapter Three focuses on the first project that looks at 
disclosure quality and earnings management. The literature review, hypothesis development 
and research methodology are described in detail. Chapter Four presents the findings from 
the statistical analysis.  
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With regard to the second project, the literature review, hypothesis development and 
research methodology for corporate governance and disclosure quality are covered in 
Chapter Five. The findings from project 2 are explained and discussed in Chapter Six.  
 
The conclusions are presented in Chapter Seven, together with discussion of the limitations of 
the current work. Its contribution to the literature and suggestions for future work are 
elaborated in this chapter. An appendix supplies other, complementary information related to 
(i) analysis of residuals and (ii) normality, heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity tests for 
both the first and second projects as well as other related information.  
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2 Theoretical Framework on Disclosure Quality, Earnings 
Management and Corporate Governance 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical assumptions for (i) disclosure quality and earnings 
management and (ii) corporate governance and disclosure quality. The motivation for this 
study originates from evidence of the incentives for increased disclosure, such as increases in 
market liquidity and the cost of capital, in prior literature. However, firms cannot expect to 
enjoy all the benefits of increased disclosure if the information that they provide is flawed. 
From an agency theory perspective, disclosure is one of the monitoring agents that aim to 
mitigate the agency cost in the principal-agent relationship (Hope and Thomas, 2008; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Given that the principal-agent relationship leads to an agency problem, 
information asymmetry and conflict of interest, managers have incentives to engage in 
earnings management and to provide a low quality of disclosure.  
 
With regard to the problem of earnings management, the present study acknowledges the 
potential of internal governance mechanisms (e.g. Xie et al., 2003) and disclosure quality (Jo 
and Kim, 2007) in deterring earnings management. Concerning disclosure quality, prior 
literature also recognises the potential of internal governance mechanisms for improving 
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disclosure quality (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Nelson et al., 2010). 
Given that corporate governance mechanisms are costly to implement, it is important to 
understand whether they are complementary or substitutive in relation to each other. In 
addition, the potential endogeneity problems in disclosure quality, in earnings management, 
in board independence and in corporate performance will also considered in the current 
study.  
 
2.2 Economic consequences and benefits of increased disclosure 
 
High disclosure quality benefits firms in many ways. One of the economic consequences of 
increased disclosure is the ability to increase stock liquidity (e.g. Brown and Hillegeist, 2007; 
Brown et al., 2004). 5 In general, stock liquidity is viewed as important because it is associated 
with the current earnings and carries a predictive value in signalling future earnings (Sadka, 
2011). Therefore, from management point of view, high stock liquidity is crucial because it 
signals that the firm is performing well in comparison to their peers. Moreover, high stock 
liquidity increases the stock price. Lang and Maffett (2011) document that liquidity 
uncertainty is decreased with disclosure quality. In a related vein, Ng (2011) reports an 
inverse relationship between disclosure transparency and liquidity risk (which is measured 
using liquidity beta). Extending the research of Lang and Maffett (2011) and Ng (2011), 
focusing on the global financial crisis during 2008-2009, Sadka (2011) finds that investors 
tend to buy or hold the shares of firms that provide high disclosure quality and to sell the 
                                                          
5
 The global financial crisis in 2008-2009 has reignited research on disclosure quality and market liquidity (e.g. 
Ng, 2011; Lang and Maffett, 2011 and Sadka, 2011). The 2008-2009 financial crisis lead turmoil in the financial 
institutions of the UK 
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shares of firms that provide low disclosure. Overall, much of prior literature documents that 
disclosure quality has a significant positive impact on share liquidity  
 
Moreover, extensive studies have also suggested that high disclosure reduces the cost of 
capital. One strand of research has documented that there is a negative association between 
disclosure quality and the cost of capital (Kim and Shi, 2011; Botosan, 1997; Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002; Lev, 1992; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Using management earnings 
forecasts as a proxy for voluntary disclosure, Kim and Shi (2011) find that bad news forecasts 
increase the cost of capital, while good news forecasts cause no changes to the cost of 
capital. Kim and Shi (2011) suggest that the cost of capital does not respond to good news 
forecasts because investors presume that they do not provide credible information. A study 
by Francis et al. (2008) reveals an inverse relationship between voluntary disclosure 
(measured using the number of conference calls made by firms and management earnings 
forecasts) and the cost of capital; but this relationship disappears after they control for 
earnings quality. Using corporate social responsibility (CSR) information as a proxy for 
voluntary disclosure, Dhaliwal et al. (2009) report that firms with a greater CSR disclosure 
achieve a lower cost of capital than that of their counterparts. They also demonstrate that a 
high level of CSR disclosure increases institutional shareholder ownership, improves analyst 
coverage, enhances analyst forecast accuracy and reduces analyst forecast dispersion. 
 
Another benefit of disclosure stems from its potential for improving a firm’s share price. Lang 
and Lundholm (2000) report that firms that are more consistent in their disclosure policy 
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before security offerings are likely to be less vulnerable to the risk of price volatility during 
announcements when compared to firms with fluctuating trends in their disclosure policy. 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) also report that firms that tend to hype up their stock before 
security offerings will suffer continuous negative returns, while firms that maintain 
unwavering disclosure practices are more protected against this risk. Based on 35 listed 
pharmaceutical firms in the UK, Dedman et al. (2008) find that managerial disclosures on the 
product development process in the late stages have a greater impact than the type of 
earnings disclosure in respect to the share price. Jo and Kim (2007) demonstrate that firms 
with high disclosure frequency perform better following a security offering, whilst their 
counterparts are indirectly punished by the capital market by having a relatively lower stock 
return. These facts accord with the findings of Ruland et al. (1990) who highlight that issuing 
capital is a powerful motivation for managers to change their disclosure policy patterns. 
 
Furthermore, prior literature suggests that a firm’s efforts to develop sound disclosure 
policies will be rewarded by the capital market (e.g. Choi, 1973; Healy et al. 1999). They will 
also reduce the cost of debt (e.g. Sengupta, 1998); increase institutional ownership, analyst 
following and stock liquidity (e.g. Healy et al. 1999); improve their reputation (e.g. Espinosa 
and Trombetta, 2004), enhance their performance (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 2000), avoid 
crisis and failure (e.g. Tadesse, 2006) and reduce uncertainty about future earnings (e.g. 
Lundholm and Myers, 2002). Healy and Palepu (2001) outline three main economic 
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consequences from increased disclosure: (i) increased liquidity,6 (ii) reduced cost of capital 
and (iii) increased market intermediaries. Another strand of research demonstrates that high 
disclosure quality promotes lower information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders (e.g. Petersen and Plenborg, 2006; Brown, Hillegeist and Lo, 2004; Coller and 
Yohn, 1997; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). This subsequently 
increases the share price (Welker, 1995; Healy et al., 1999) and reduces earnings 
management (e.g. Jo and Kim, 2007; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006).  
 
In a related vein, it has been argued that a high disclosure environment is associated with the 
stability of the capital market setting. Choi (1974, p. 15) states, “the consensus among some 
Americans is that increased disclosure helps to make the capital markets both operationally 
and allocationally efficient”. Efficient capital markets will be a centre of attraction for 
investors and analysts, resulting in more confidence from market players to invest in the 
company. While Choi (1974) puts forward that high quality reporting is crucial in ensuring the 
proficiency of capital markets, Espinosa and Trombetta (2004) report that high disclosure 
helps to enhance a firm’s reputation. Taken together, these provide evidence to support the 
view that firms with excellent disclosure will be more prominent in established market 
settings when compared to firms with a low quality of disclosure.    
 
Despite the numerous benefits of disclosure, it is important to note that firms are not able to 
enjoy all of these benefits if they provide flawed information to the market. Because 
                                                          
6
 Lev (1988) points out that market liquidity can also be used as a proxy for information asymmetry. Hence, high 
disclosure quality has the potential to reduce information asymmetry, resulting in higher market liquidity.  
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disclosure is costly, the availability of a firm’s information is largely dependent on managerial 
discretion, which itself may be subject to managers’ personal aims and concern for personal 
benefit. Thus, it is important to understand why firms (sometimes) fail to provide optimal 
disclosure and what influences managers to provide flawed information.   
 
2.3 Managerial disclosure decisions 
 
From the management point of view, managers have incentives to provide high disclosure, to 
hide or withhold a firm’s information or to manipulate the timing of a firm’s disclosure. Based 
on the prior literature, Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 420-425) form six hypotheses to explain 
managerial disclosure decisions:  
(a) Capital market transactions hypothesis – managers increase disclosure to reduce 
information asymmetry, which subsequently reduces the cost of capital and cost 
of debt.  
(b) Corporate control contest hypothesis – managers disclose information to maintain 
career status and/or security in the company.   
(c) Stock compensation hypothesis – managers with stock option based compensation 
tend to make disclosure that potentially increases the share price.  
(d) Litigation cost hypothesis – (i) managers avoid delaying disclosure due to a fear of 
shareholder litigation and (ii) managers tend to conceal forward looking 
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information due to a fear of shareholder litigation in the case of the forward 
looking information being inaccurate. 7  
(e) Management talent signalling hypothesis - managerial disclosure on a firm’s ability 
to “anticipate future changes in the firm’s economic environment” will increase 
the firm’s value.  
(f)  Proprietary cost hypothesis – the fear of disclosing information to competitors 
leads managers to conceal it.  
 
Positive accounting theory explains that a manager’s disclosure decision can be explained in 
terms of (i) the bonus plan hypothesis, (ii) the debt equity hypothesis and (iii) the political 
cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). With regard to the bonus plan hypothesis, 
managers with bonus plan compensation tend to choose accounting methods that can 
increase earnings, which is one of the benchmarks of a firm’s performance. The debt equity 
hypothesis posits that firms with high debt tend to choose accounting methods that will 
increase earnings in order to mitigate high debt in the eyes of shareholders. Concerning the 
political cost hypothesis, firms that are under regulatory, government or political scrutiny 
                                                          
7
 Note that Rule 10-b5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act in the US provides a legal provision for investors 
to sue firms that are involved in fraud by deception or by omission of disclosure information. However, it is 
widely known that shareholder litigation in the US is more pronounced than in the UK. Hence, the present study 
assumes that managers in the UK do not fear being sued when disclosing forward looking information. In other 
words, forward looking information in the UK is presumed to be more credible than in the US. Moreover, 
Athanasakou and Hussainey (2010) argue that forward looking information is qualitatitive in nature and that it, 
therefore, reduces the risk of shareholder litigation. 
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tend to choose income decreasing methods in order to avoid tax or reduce political cost 
pressures. 8 
 
With regard to the incentives for disclosure, Hermalin and Weisbach (2008, p. 1) explain, 
We argue that disclosure is a two-edged sword. On one side, disclosure of information permits 
principals to make better decisions. On the other, it can create or exacerbate agency problems: 
The release of information has the potential to harm agents (e.g. management) either through 
the actions it might induce the principals to take (e.g. dismiss the agent) or because they care 
about how they or the enterprise is perceived (e.g. the agents have career concerns or hold 
equity in the firm). Consequently, agents can be led to pursue actions that are not in the 
principals’ interests. 
 
 
Note that the motivation of managers to disclose information can be classified into two main 
categories. First, managerial disclosure decisions are made for the purpose of reducing 
information asymmetry between agent and principal, hence reducing the cost of capital (i.e. 
capital market transaction hypothesis).9 Second, a manager’s disclosure decisions are derived 
from various disclosure incentives that are substantially related to their personal benefit (i.e. 
Corporate control contest hypothesis, stock compensation hypothesis, litigation cost 
hypothesis). In this instance, managers will disclose information that is potentially beneficial 
to them and will hide information that not beneficial to them. Managerial disclosure may also 
instil managers with a tendency to become involved in earnings management. Forecasting 
disclosure is controversial with this sort of issue. While managers may release management 
earnings forecast as one form of voluntary disclosure, prior research also reveals that 
                                                          
8
 Meyer et al. (2000) reported that pharmaceutical industry tend to choose income decreasing method to reduce 
earnings after government announce the aim to reduce the cost of medicine.  
9
 There is abundant literature suggesting a negative relationship between disclosure and information asymmetry 
(e.g. Welker, 1995; Brown et al., 2004; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007; Peterson and Plenborg, 2006; Cheng et al. 
2006).  
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managers manipulate earnings to meet or beat management forecasts. The same bias occurs 
in the case of analyst forecasts. In particular, meeting or beating earnings forecasts is 
beneficial for a firm because it will be rewarded by the market, while failure to meet forecasts 
suggests that management is underperforming. 10 From another perspective, managers may 
also disclose more information in order to mitigate earnings management so that it becomes 
less obvious to shareholders.  
 
Opportunistic managerial behaviour in disclosure choice is inherently influenced by 
shortcomings in the agency relationship. Specifically, the separation of ownership and control 
lead to agency problems (i.e., information asymmetry and conflict of interest) in the principal-
agent relationship. The next section discusses how agency theory relates to agency problems.  
 
2.4 Disclosure and agency theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define the agency relationship as “a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent”. In this context, the agent refers to the managers and the principals are the 
shareholders. In the principal-agent relationship, agents are responsible for making decisions 
on behalf of shareholders and they must exercise their duty to the best of their ability in such 
a way as to maximize the shareholders’ wealth and to fulfil their expectations.  
                                                          
10
 Lang et al. (2011) and Lang and Marfett (2011) use discretionary earnings management as a proxy for 
disclosure transparency, hence it is not surprising to see overlapping motives for disclosure and earnings 
management.  
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The agency relationship contributes to the problems of conflict of interest and information 
asymmetry. Conflict of interest occurs when an agent acts to fulfil their own personal interest 
when making economic decisions while ignoring the implications for shareholders. In essence, 
information asymmetry represents the gap between the amount of information held by 
management and that held by market participants (Fields et al., 2001, p. 257). While 
managers work in the firm every day and are knowledgeable about all business transactions 
and affairs, stakeholders depend on periodic sources of information, such as the annual 
reports and interim reports that managers give to them to enable them to understand the 
firm’s activities.11 Therefore, the degree of information asymmetry will be higher if the quality 
of information is low and stakeholders will be poorly informed about the business.  
  
Agency theory assumes that people in the market are rational. Managers, shareholders, 
creditors, analysts, governments and all other market players think rationally in making 
economic decisions tend to make decisions that will enhance their welfare. Therefore, 
managers tend to become involved in opportunistic behaviour (i.e. earnings management and 
flawed disclosure) that potentially increases a firm’s agency cost.  
 
Since agency relationships suffer from the problems of conflict of interest and information 
asymmetry, an optimal solution should be discovered to control such problems. Healy and 
Palepu (2001, p. 409) outline several solutions to the agency problem. First, appropriate 
                                                          
11
 Investors use firm’s disclosure to monitor manager’s behavior by scrutinising whether managerial decisions 
are optimal in improving firm’s performance (Healy and Palepu, 2001, as cited in Hope and Thomas, 2008).  
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contractual incentives must be developed to reduce conflict of interests. Second, the 
monitoring function of the board of directors is effective in observing and controlling 
managerial behaviour on behalf of the shareholders. Third, capital market players, including 
financial analysts and rating agencies, are responsible to act as whistleblowers in the case of 
any wrongdoing. This implies that collaboration and effort in internal and external 
governance processes are important in solving agency problems.   
 
Within agency theory, disclosure quality is viewed as one form of monitoring mechanism used 
by investors. It has the potential to reduce the gap of information asymmetry between an 
agent and the managers and may, therefore, be effective in lowering agency cost in the firms 
(e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Huang and Zhang, 2008; Junker, 2005). In other words, 
disclosure is recognised as one of the possible solutions to the agency problem (Eng and Mak, 
2003). The role of the financial analyst is important as an intermediary, disseminating 
company information to both shareholders and stakeholders in order to ensure that lower 
information asymmetry is achieved. Well informed investors are expected to scrutinize firms 
on the basis of the information provided to them and this subsequently reduces the agency 
cost (Junker, 2005; Huang and Zhang, 2008).  
 
Given that disclosure is effective in limiting agency cost (Huang and Zhang, 2008), agency 
theory has been widely used in the prior literature to explain variations in disclosure quality 
that are due to managerial disclosure decisions. Agency theory has also been previously 
employed in describing corporate governance and earnings management phenomena.  
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An example of this is provided by Eisenhardt (1989) who claims that, “…since information 
systems inform the principal about what the agent is actually doing , they are likely to curb 
agent opportunism because the agent will realize that he or she cannot deceive the principal” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 60). In other words, when disclosure quality is high, investors will be 
better informed about a company’s activities, thus managers will be reluctant to manipulate 
earnings (Jo and Kim, 2007). 
 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 71) also concluded that agency theory can be used within the research 
studies “…that relate to information asymmetry (or deception) in cooperative situations”. 
Previously, she put forward the idea that agency theory can provide a theoretical perspective 
for studies on the conflict of interest between agent and principal. In a similar vein, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) suggest that the board of directors has a role as one of the monitoring agents 
in aligning manager and shareholder interests. Given that the present study is designed to 
examine disclosure quality (which is associated with information asymmetry in principal-
agent relationships), earnings management (which is about misleading information) and 
corporate governance (which mainly deals with how to reduce the conflict of interest in 
principal-agent relationship), agency theory is found to be the most relevant theory for the 
purposes of the study. 
 
Although agency theory views disclosure as one of the mechanisms by which information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders is reduced, Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 406) 
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point out that “corporate disclosure can also be directed to stakeholders other than 
investors”. In a related vein, Solomon (2007) argues that 
[T]heoretical frameworks suggesting that companies should be accountable only to their 
shareholders are not necessarily inconsistent with theoretical frameworks which champion 
stakeholder accountability. The reason underlying this argument is that shareholder’s interest 
can only be satisfied by taking account of stakeholder interest. (Solomon, 2007, p. 14). 
 
This implies that, systems based on agency theory tend to protect the interests of both 
shareholder and stakeholder at the same time. A managerial disclosure decision not only 
offers lower information asymmetry to the shareholder in particular but also to other market 
players in general.  
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Table 2-1: Agency theory overview 
 
Key idea Principal-agent relationship should reflect efficient organisation of 
information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of Analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumption Self interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion 
Organisational assumption Partial goal conflict among participants, efficiency as the effectiveness 
criteria, information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information Assumption Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting Problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection), risk sharing 
Problems Domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing 
goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, regulation, leadership, 
impression management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing). 
Source: Verbatim from Eisenhardt (1989, p. 59).  
 
 
2.5 Managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management 
 
Agency theory views earnings management activity as a result of the misalignment of interest 
between agent and principal that ultimately leads to the agency cost (Davidson et al. 2004). 
The principal and agent relationship is surrounded by the problem of moral hazard (Ronen 
and Yaari, 2008). Most prior studies acknowledge that earnings management is opportunistic 
rather than beneficial (e.g. Siregar and Utama, 2008; Yu, 2008 Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Balsam et al., 2002; Yu, 2008).  
 
Managers are motivated to manipulate earnings for a number of reasons. Prior research 
documents that managers were found to manipulate earnings in order to hype the stock price 
especially before initial public offerings (Friedlan, 1994) and prior to seasoned equity offerings 
(Jo and Kim, 2007; DuCharme et al., 2004; Teoh et al., 1998; Rangan, 1998). Furthermore, 
previous investigations have suggested that managers manage earnings in such a way as to 
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avoid reporting losses (Bustaghlar and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Charoenwong and 
Jiraporn, 2009) and to smooth earnings volatility (Cormier et al., 2000). It is also reported that 
managers manipulate earnings for personal benefit and remuneration, i.e. when an options 
grant is near (Baker et al., 2009), to avoid debt agreement violation (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994) and to influence contractual outcomes from import relief (Jones, 1991).  
 
Prior literature shows that forecasting activities can also be a motive for earnings 
management (e.g. Kasznik, 1999; Hunton et al., 2006; Cormier and Martinez, 2006; Degeorge 
et al., 1999; Burgstahler and Eames 2003). Studies have shown that managers become 
involved in earnings manipulation in order to meet the earnings forecasts of financial analysts 
(e.g. Dhaliwal et al., 2004; Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009). Managers have successfully met 
analyst forecasts by manipulating the effective tax rates (Dhaliwal et al., 2004) or the accruals 
(Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009).  
 
To date, numerous examples in the literature support the notion that earnings management 
is opportunistic (e.g. Jones, 1991; Teoh et al., 1999; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Contrastingly, a 
smaller body of literature claims that earnings management is beneficial because it is not 
harmful to a firm’s value (e.g. Jiraporn et al., 2008). Thus, it is crucial to identify the motives 
for earnings management behaviour by managers. According to a range of earnings 
management literature, common features of earnings management motives include (i) 
misleading users of accounting information or (ii) increasing a manager’s personal benefit. 
Prior literature argues that inflated earnings potentially reduce the earnings informativeness, 
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impairing the earnings and stock price correlation. Given that the earnings are correlated to 
the share price (Su, 2003; Easton and Harris, 1991; Chan and Seow, 1996; Alford et al., 1993; 
Easton and Zmijewski, 1989), inflating earnings will result in an incremental increase in the 
share price (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Consequently, investor’s decision making is influenced 
by inaccurate earnings; stock price may be overvalued, resulting in the misallocation of 
resources in the capital market. Therefore, it is not surprising to find an abundance of 
literature that assumes that earnings management is detrimental. 12 Nonetheless, it is 
important to note that managers also consider cost and benefit trade-offs before engaging in 
earnings management (Fields et al. 2001).  
 
Seeking to overcome the problem of earnings management, prior literature suggests that 
earnings management behaviour depends on the extent of disclosure quality (Jo and Kim, 
2007; Riahi and Arab, 2011). Some studies (e.g., Xie et al. 2003; Kent et al. 2010) view internal 
corporate governance as a credible tool for deterring earnings management. In light of this, 
the present study assumes that disclosure has high potential as a monitoring mechanism for 
reducing earnings management, while at the same time controlling for the monitoring effects 
of a firm’s internal governance practices.  
 
  
                                                          
12
 Some studies find that firms which alter discretionary accruals before security offerings eventually suffer a 
lower and abnormal stock return (e.g. Teoh et al.., 1998; Rangan, 1998) as well as being more vulnerable to 
lawsuits (e.g. DuCharme et al.., 2004).  
41 | P a g e  
 
2.5.1  Disclosure as a monitoring mechanism 
 
Disclosure is one of the monitoring tools that are used by investors to develop an 
understanding of how managers manage resources and to judge a company’s decisions. 
Disclosure bridges the gap of the information between agent and principal. Investors are not 
able to monitor managers’ behaviour and performance without a firm’s private information. 
Disclosure is one of the monitoring tools that control managers’ opportunistic behaviour 
(Bushman and Smith, 2000). Hence, disclosure is effective in reducing agency cost. Investors 
need information from management so that they can monitor the firms and make 
connections between each managerial decision and its outcome (Healy and Palepu, 2001, as 
cited in Hope and Thomas, 2008, p. 616). Following on from the work of Jo and Kim (2007) 
and Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006) the present study intends to examine the implications of 
disclosure quality in respect to deterring earnings management.  
 
2.6 Managers’ incentives to distort disclosure transparency 
 
A manager’s disclosure decision may be influenced by the intention to reduce information 
asymmetry. However, as previously discussed, managerial disclosure can also be influenced 
by personal motives. Various managerial incentives for disclosure might significantly impair 
the credibility of disclosure.13 Furthermore, given that managers comprise a group of highly 
capable employees, they are supposed to be not only talented in running a company’s 
operations but also highly skilled in manipulating disclosure information (Subrahmanyam, 
                                                          
13
 Section 1.3 of this chapter discuss in detail about the incentives of managers disclosure decision.  
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2005). Consequently, the credibility of increased disclosure is questionable (Healy and Palepu, 
2001).  
 
According to Subrahmanyam (2005), managers are able to channel their intellect (cognitive 
ability) towards successfully providing untrue or inaccurate information to users of 
accounting information. In his theoretical research, he suggested that such behaviour could 
also be identified by analysts with a correspondingly high intellect (cognitive ability). 14  
 
Due to imperfect market conditions, managers have incentives to trade-off the benefit and 
cost of voluntary disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001, p. 411). Heitzman et al. (2011) point out 
that all disclosure incentives are only related to voluntary disclosure because voluntary 
disclosure is subject to managerial cost benefit analysis, is immaterial in nature and is not 
compulsory. Therefore, the reliability of voluntary disclosure is an issue, given that it is 
subject to the manager’s discretion and that it is largely influenced by various incentives 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). As previously discussed above, a manager’s disclosure decisions are 
not merely made to reduce information asymmetry, but are also influenced by considerations 
of specific personal benefits or outcomes. Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that verification 
by market intermediaries (e.g. auditors and analysts) and the involvement of regulators are 
necessary to ensure that voluntary disclosure is credible.   
 
                                                          
14
 Subrahmanyam (2005) noted that high cost of searching information will occur by analyst if managers utilized 
their cognitive ability to provide misleading disclosure. Hence, he argued that the manipulated disclosure by 
managers will subsequently increase share liquidity, but at the expense of larger information asymmetry gap 
between managers and users of accounting information.  
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Prior studies suggest that a firm’s disclosure can be improved through the practice of sound 
corporate governance (e.g. Nelson et al., 2010; Kent and Stewart, 2008). Healy and Palepu 
(2001) point out that the reliability of disclosure can be improved through the intervention of 
regulators and financial analysts15. Hence, in light of the argument that analysts may be useful 
in monitoring the credibility of a firm’s disclosure, the present study relies on three disclosure 
quality proxies that are related to analysts: the IR Magazine Award and the quantity of 
forward looking information in the annual report as well as the accuracy of the analyst 
forecasts.  
 
2.6.1  Mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
 
The classification of mandatory and voluntary disclosure is controversial because the cut-off 
criteria for these two types of disclosure are subject to academic debate. In explaining 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure, Hassan and Marston (2010, p.7) point out that  
Mandatory disclosure is information revealed in the fulfilment of disclosure requirements of 
statute in the form of laws, professional regulations in the form of standards and the listing rules 
of stock exchanges. Voluntary disclosure is any information revealed in excess of mandatory 
disclosure. Also, voluntary disclosure can include disclosure recommended by an authoritative 
code or body such as the operating and financial review in the UK. In addition, disclosure can vary 
between firms with respect to timing (for example, annual reports vs. quarterly reports); items 
disclosed (for example, quantitative vs. qualitative information); and types of news (for example, 
good vs. bad news disclosures). 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Though Healy and Palepu (2001) opined that regulators and analyst roles are crucial in improving disclosure 
quality, it is also agreed that regulatory and legal provisions so far (probably) need to be reviewed because the 
they are not always helpful in enhancing disclosure credibility. Ronen and Yaari (2001) find that Rule 10-b-5 of 
the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act does not successful in preventing managers from providing untrue 
information. 
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The above statement is consistent with Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009), Marston and Shrives 
(1991) and Cheng et al. (2006), who note that mandatory disclosure requirements are 
essentially regulatory driven. According to Cheng et al. (2006, p. 34), “While a commitment to 
increased disclosure raises overall disclosure, the level of mandatory disclosure is still based 
on regulatory requirements and any disclosure above these requirements is subject to 
managerial discretion”. Heitzman et al. (2010, p. 110) outline two important features of 
mandatory disclosure: (i) it is material for investors in making economic decisions and (ii) it is 
compulsory to disclose by the managers. Heitzman et al. (2010) further argue that the 
compulsory requirements of mandatory disclosure desensitise it from cost and benefit trade-
offs and other incentives for managerial disclosure. In other words, all information that is 
immaterial and/or not disclosed under compulsory requirements may be connected to 
managerial discretion that is driven by cost and benefit analysis and largely depends on the 
motives for the managerial disclosure decision (Heitzman et al., 2010).  
 
In the light of the above discussion, some other studies suggest that not all types of disclosure 
are effective in reducing the cost of capital. Bertomeu et al. (2011), for instance, report that 
mandatory disclosure is more effective than voluntary disclosure in reducing the cost of 
capital. Kothari et al. (2009) reveal that disclosures made via the business press reduce the 
cost of capital, stock volatility and the dispersion of analyst forecasts. Nevertheless, in their 
study, disclosures made by management and analysts are viewed as less credible, hence no 
significant association is found between the cost of capital and bad news or good news.  
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2.6.2  Good news vs. bad news 
According to Aboody and Kasznik (2000), managers view good news as more beneficial to 
them than bad news. Thus, managers tend to delay bad news or to conceal it from the 
public.16 This is supported by Hutton et al. (2003) who claim that bad news is potentially 
harmful to share prices although good news does not always significantly improve a firm’s 
share price. Prior literature also proposes that bad news disclosures are helpful in adjusting 
overvalued share prices. Given that managers have an incentives to provide flawed 
information, it is important for the researcher to examine the impact of good news and bad 
news on the capital market.17  
 
2.6.3  Corporate governance as a monitoring mechanism  
 
A firm’s governance attributes are supposed to be effective in enhancing the quality of 
earnings and their disclosure by acting as a monitoring mechanism. The managers’ conflicts of 
interest are mitigated through governance attributes, which have the potential to control and 
monitor the board. Managers will be more inclined to provide credible disclosure and 
financial reporting when the interests of agents and shareholders are aligned (e.g. Maher and 
Andersson, 2000; Kanagaretnam et al., 2008; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Linck et al., 2008). 
With respect to disclosure quality and board characteristics, prior literature explains that 
                                                          
16
 In reality, managers tend to hide bad news such as losses and reductions in sales. In a recent accounting 
scandal involving Olympus (which was known to public during the end of 2011) it came to light that managers 
hid losses of approximately USD1.3 billion during the 1990s.  
17
 The present study realizes the differentiation of the effects of both good news and bad news on the capital 
market. However, this topic is beyond the scope of the thesis. Moreover, the techniques that are used so far are 
still unable to accurately determine what is bad news or good news, given that the identification of both are 
highly subjective. This is worthy of exploration in future research.  
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disclosure transparency can be categorised as an external governance mechanism (Holm and 
Schøler, 2010), while board and audit committee characteristics fall under the category of 
internal governance (Brick et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2011). 
 
Moreover, Brickley and Zimmerman (2010, p. 236) highlight the importance of both internal 
and external governance for understanding the incentives for managerial disclosure 
decisions:  
To better understand the incentives of the top-level decision makers, one must look beyond 
compensation policy and shareholder/ board monitoring. Multiple parties and mechanisms 
(including, auditors, regulators, credit rating agencies, stock analysts, courts, the media, 
monitoring by banks and other creditors, regulation, the market for corporate control, product 
market competition, and corporate policies relating to takeovers) influence the behaviour of 
the top-level decision makers in the corporation. Some of these mechanisms are 
complements, while others are substitutes.  
 
 
2.6.4  Internal governance18  
 
2.6.4.1  Board of directors 
 
The central premise of corporate governance focuses on the affirmative duties of the board 
of directors in ensuring that all economic decisions are in the best interests of the 
shareholders (Monks and Minow, 2004, p. 195). Boards of directors play important roles in 
monitoring, in providing professional advice and in providing networking connections within a 
firm’s governance process (Ronen and Yaari, 2008, p. 236; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Raheja, 
                                                          
18 Internal governance mechanisms are numerous, which includes board of directors, audit committee, 
compensation committee, internal control and others. However, the present study focuses on board of directors 
and audit committee given that both of them has been viewed as major components in the internal governance 
process.  
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2005). “Broadly speaking, the monitoring function requires directors to scrutinize 
management to guard against harmful behaviour, ranging from shirking to fraud” (Linck et al., 
2008, p. 311). When conflict of interest is low, managerial disclosure is aimed at mitigating 
the problem of information asymmetry between internal and external parties.   
 
2.6.4.2  Audit committee 
 
The audit committee is viewed as one of the most important subcommittees in a company 
because it governs a firm’s financial disclosures and financial affairs. 19 As such, the UK 
Corporate Governance Code sets out a specific provision code, drawn from the Higgs Report, 
with regard to audit committee governance practice. 20 With such criteria in place, it is 
expected that audit committee members can perform their duties effectively.  
 
2.6.4.3  External governance 
 
Brown et al. (2011) point out that external governance is comprised of (i) the financial 
analysts, (ii) the substantial shareholders and (iii) the auditors. External governance 
mechanisms are external parties that also provide direct or indirect monitoring. The present 
study acknowledges the potential contribution that is made by the external governance 
                                                          
19
 This is not intended to undermine the function of other subcommittees in a company. Each subcommittee in a 
firm has unique responsibilities in the firm’s governance system. The UK Corporate Governance Code outlines 
the expected roles and function of each subcommittee in a company. The present study focuses on audit 
committees because their characteristics are highly correlated to the main themes of the study: disclosure 
quality and earnings management. Future research should consider the effect of other subcommittees (e.g. 
nomination, remuneration and internal control committees) on a firm’s governance process.   
20
 The Smith Report (2003) recommends that (i) all audit committees are composed entirely of independent 
directors, (ii) at least one member has financial expertise, (iii) committees are comprised of at least three 
members and (iv) committees meet not less than three times a year.  
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mechanisms listed above and has attempted to control for these components in the model. 
Detailed discussion is provided in the relevant chapters (i.e. Chapter Three and Chapter Five).  
 
2.7 Corporate governance as monitoring tool to reduce information asymmetry and 
conflict of interest  
 
On the one hand, corporate governance has been viewed as potentially effective in reducing 
information asymmetry and conflict of interest (e.g. Donelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2007). Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) find that information asymmetry is negatively 
related to the percentage of independent directors on the board, the frequency of board 
meetings and board and officer ownership, signalling that sound governance practices 
improve the gap of information asymmetry between internal and external parties and 
consequently reduce the agency cost. Their finding is robust after considering the issue of 
endogeneity. 
  
On the other hand, prior research also reveals that sound corporate governance fails to 
mitigate agency conflict (e.g. Lasfer, 2002; Dey, 2008). Dey (2008) documents that sound 
governance practices related to the board of directors and audit committee are significantly 
and positively associated with agency conflict. In the light of her findings, Dey (2008) 
concludes that sound corporate governance and agency conflict are complementary to each 
other. Thus, it is important to note that the ability of corporate governance to mitigate 
agency conflict and to reduce information asymmetry is unclear.  
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This discrepancy could exist because each corporate governance component contributes to 
the reduction in information asymmetry to a different extent (Klein et al., 2005). Holm and 
Schøler (2010) report that the importance of disclosure and board independence in reducing 
information asymmetry is predominantly determined based on the ownership structure and 
the environment in which the firm operates. Specifically, they document that disclosure 
transparency outperformed independent director presence in firms with exposure to the 
international market.  
 
2.8 The complementary or substitutive links between corporate governance 
mechanisms 
 
2.8.1  Disclosure and internal governance mechanisms: are they complementary or 
substitutive?21  
 
As discussed in the previous section, both disclosure and corporate governance have 
potential predictive ability in respect to reducing managers’ propensity to manipulate 
earnings. They share the same characteristics as monitoring tools when it comes to reducing 
agency problems, potentially reducing the agency cost. In other words, both corporate 
governance and disclosure quality is potentially useful in addressing the same problems in 
agency relationships. Nonetheless, because optimal disclosure is costly and hard to achieve 
(Hassan and Marston, 2010; Core, 2001) and sound governance systems are also subject to 
the cost and benefit trade-off (Boone et al. 2007; Linck et al., 2008; Vafeas, 2005), it is 
important to understand whether disclosure and governance have a complementary or 
substitutive relationship in respect to constraining earnings management. “Without 
                                                          
21
 To be specific, the issue of complementary or substitutive links between disclosure quality and internal 
governance mechanisms is related to Project 1, disclosure quality and earnings management.  
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additional assumptions, it is even impossible to tell whether two governance design features 
are complements or substitutes from the sign of their cross-sectional correlation” (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom, 1994, as cited in Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010, p. 240).22 In addition, Grüning 
(2010) concludes that disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms complement each 
other to a different extent when it comes to enhancing a firm’s value. Furthermore, Zhu 
(2009) demonstrates that disclosure and corporate governance are both complementary and 
substitutive to each other depending on the types of disclosure requirements in each country. 
Specifically, Zhu (2009) reveals that (i) a complementary relationship is indicated between 
corporate governance and disclosure in reducing the cost of capital in countries with strong 
disclosure requirements, while (ii) substitutive effects are found between corporate 
governance and disclosure in reducing the cost of debt in countries with weak disclosure 
requirements. 23 
 
Given that optimal disclosure and corporate governance are costly (Grüning, 2010), there is 
flexibility for managers to make choices and to use the desired monitoring mechanisms that 
best suit a firm’s needs and capacity (Holm and Schøler, 2010) This indicates a substitutive 
relationship between disclosure and corporate governance.   
 
                                                          
22
 Detailed explanations of the potential complementary or substitutive effects for disclosure quality and internal 
governance mechanisms are provided in Chapter Three, while those for board and audit committee are provided 
in Chapter Five.  
23
 The present study does not control for disclosure requirement factors, given that it is based on single country 
while Zhu’s (2009) study is based on firms from 22 developed countries.  
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In his international studies on corporate governance and the cost of capital, Zhu (2009) 
reports complementary relationships between sound governance practices and disclosure 
requirements in reducing the cost of equity capital, but highlights a substitutive link in 
reducing the cost of debt. In another international study, Shen and Chih (2007) focus on the 
association between corporate governance and earnings management by controlling for the 
disclosure index. The findings of an IV regression in Shen and Chih (2007) reveal that firms 
with sound governance tend exhibit lower earnings management, while disclosure also shows 
an inverse relationship with earnings management, suggesting a complementary relationship. 
In their Dutch study, Holm and Schøler (2010) reveal that transparency is more important in 
firms with more exposure to the international market and that corporate governance is more 
important in firms with less exposure to the international market. In their discussion on the 
variation in corporate governance practices, Holm and Schøler (2010, p. 33) claim that “(1) 
corporate governance mechanisms may work differently across corporate governance 
systems; (2) different corporate governance mechanisms may not be a perfect substitute 
within a given corporate governance system; and (3) particular corporate governance 
mechanisms may be more important for some listed companies than for others”. Grüning’s 
(2010) study from Germany reveals that governance and disclosure are positively related to a 
firm’s performance (measured using Tobins-Q), signalling a complementary relationship. 
Based on a UK sample, Mouselli et al. (2011) reveal that there is a positive relationship 
between disclosure quality (measured using forward looking disclosure) and earnings quality 
(measured using discretionary accruals estimated with the modified Jones Model) and that 
both of them are substitutive in influencing stock returns. 
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2.8.2  Board of directors and audit committee: are they complementary or substitutive?24  
 
According to Armstrong et al. (2010), limited research has been conducted examining the 
complementary or substitutive nature of governance variables, hence no proper 
understanding of the complementary or substitutive roles of governance is offered in the 
prior literature. Linck et al. (2008, p. 311) point out that “[a] firm’s optimal board structure is 
a function of the costs and benefits of monitoring and advising given the firm’s 
characteristics, including its other governance mechanisms”. This implies complementary 
relationships between alternative governance factors. Walsh and Seward (1990) point out 
that all internal and external governance factors address the same agency problems; hence, 
they are interlinked and interrelated. Gillian et al. (2006) finds that internal and external 
governance are complementary to each other. An abundance of prior literature explains the 
possible complementary or substitutive relationship between corporate governance variables 
and firm performance (e.g. Weir et al. 2002). Nonetheless, the issue of substitutive and 
complementary relationships has been neglected in research that examines the relationship 
between corporate governance and disclosure quality or between corporate governance and 
earnings management.25 
 
 
2.9 The causality issue 
 
The previous section discussed disclosure and corporate governance as monitoring tools that 
may be effective in curbing earnings management and reducing agency cost, as suggested by 
                                                          
24
 The potential complementary or substitutive relationship between board characteristics and audit committee 
characteristics discussed in this section is explored in Project 2 under corporate governance and disclosure 
quality.  
25
 For the sake of brevity, further explanation of this issue is provided in Chapter Three.  
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agency theory. On the one hand, disclosure quality helps to reduce information asymmetry 
and to increase investor’s and analyst’s understanding when it comes to monitoring 
managerial decisions related to a firm’s performance (Hope and Thomas, 2008). It also 
improves the detection of earnings management (Jo and Kim, 2007; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 
2006; Zhau and Lobo, 2001). On the other hand, corporate governance is potentially effective 
in aligning manager and shareholder interests (Maher and Andersson, 2000) and would be 
helpful in curbing managers’ propensity to manipulate earnings (Lo et al., 2010; Chang and 
Sun, 2009; Jaggi et al., 2009; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Xie et al., 2003; Siregar and Utama, 
2008; Cormier and Martinez, 2006). Therefore, both corporate governance and disclosure are 
monitoring tools that may have complementary or substitutive effects in curbing earnings 
management.  
 
Nonetheless, the monitoring role of corporate governance is goes beyond merely 
constraining earnings management. Kent and Steward (2008), Goodwin et al. (2009), 
Bushman and Smith (2003), Lim et al. (2007), Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) and Roe (2003) 
suggest that sound corporate governance may mitigate conflict of interest problems, 
stimulating better corporate transparency. Their studies hypothesize that corporate 
governance may be effective in promoting higher disclosure quality. Corporate governance 
mechanisms that are comprised of both internal factors (e.g. board of directors and audit 
committee) and external governance factors (e.g. auditors, analysts and institutional 
investors) may be subject to complementary and substitutive effects in respect to improving 
disclosure quality (Brown et al., 2011). Nonetheless, there is a lack of research examining the 
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potential complementary or substitutive link between corporate governance (Brown et al., 
2011). At this stage, the present study considers that there is may be an interrelationship 
between disclosure quality, corporate governance and earnings management.  
 
Moreover, causality could affect the relationship between disclosure quality and earnings 
management. A significant strand of research hypothesizes that the pressure to meet or beat 
analyst forecasts triggers the managerial manipulation of earnings (Iatridis and Kadorinis, 
2009; Bartov et al., 2002; Schwartz, 2002; Brown and Pinello, 2007; Hunton et al., 2006). 
26This suggests that there is the potential for bi-directional relationship between disclosure 
quality (measured using analyst forecast accuracy) and earnings management.  
 
Meeting an analyst forecast has the potential to increase a firm’s value. Forecasting activities 
also imply agency costs that could be detrimental to a firm’s value. Prior studies, including 
Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009) and Hunton et al. (2006), report that managers manipulate 
earnings in order to meet or beat analyst forecasts. This suggests that there is the potential 
for reverse causality between disclosure quality (measured using analyst forecast accuracy) 
and earnings management. 27 
 
  
                                                          
26 “Meeting or exceeding financial analysts' earnings forecasts is an absolute necessity, if a firm is to retain its 
status and prosperity” (Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009, p. 164).  
27
 The present study attempts to overcome the potential simultaneity issue by using a simultaneous system of 
equation based on the 2SLS Regression. This is explained in detail in Chapters Three and Five respectively.  
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2.10 Analyst following and disclosure quality: do they have a complementary or 
substitutive relationship? 
 
If analysts have the potential to reduce agency cost, they also have the potential to increase 
it. Hugon and Muslu (2010, p. 42) point out that analysts have incentives to overrate good 
news and to underrate bad news. The role of an analyst as a monitoring agent or as a 
pressure agent in respect to a firm’s disclosure policy is inherently unclear (Yu, 2008). 
Although increased disclosure has the potential to be effective as a monitoring mechanism 
and to reduce earnings management (Jo and Kim, 2007; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006; Iatridis 
and Kadorinis, 2009), analyst following has been viewed as another monitoring tool that 
reduces managers’ propensity to manipulate earnings (Yu, 2008; Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
 
Based on a US sample, Yu (2008) documents that analyst coverage is negatively associated 
with earnings management. In other words, firms with a high analyst following are likely to be 
less engaged in earnings management when compared with firms with a low analyst 
following. Yu (2008) also finds that an inverse relationship between analyst coverage and 
earnings management is maintained after he assumed that residual analyst coverage is 
endogenous, using the IV approach (2SLS).28 The results reveal that analyst monitoring plays 
an effective role in preventing earnings management. Earnings management behaviour will 
be more apparent among capital market players when analysts release information such as a 
firm’s cash-flow forecast (McInnis and Collins, 2006). It has also been shown that analysts 
tend to discount firms that engage in earnings management (e.g. Gavious, 2007; Lin and Shih, 
                                                          
28
 Yu (2008) employs expected change of analyst coverage and a dummy for S&P (1 =  if the company industry is 
listed in the S&P index, 0 = if otherwise) as instrumental variables for residual analyst coverage.  
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2006). Analysts have acted as whistleblowers, disclosing fraud in certain firms such as 
Compaq Computer, Motorola and Qwest Communication International (Dyck et al., 2006). 
Therefore, analysts have the potential to play a role in promoting a firm’s transparency 
(Roulstone, 2003). Both analysts and disclosure practices can effect a reduction in earnings 
management, highlighting that both elements might have a complementary relationship in 
respect to curbing earnings management. 
 
Nonetheless, it is also important to note that analysts might also show a substitutive 
relationship if they (indirectly) collude with managers in earnings manipulation or fraud. With 
regard to the analyst’s role in providing fair reports of firms, like Enron, that are involved in 
accounting scandals, the analyst “can be put in the position of having to worry as much about 
whether a chief executive might find a report offensive as whether as investor might find it 
helpful” (Lashinsky, 2001,). This implies that there is a conflict of interest in the relationship 
between analysts and investors.  
 
Moreover, according to Ronen and Yaari (2008, p. 199), analysts are under pressure from 
their employers to provide favourable reports for certain firms that they cover. In addition, an 
analyst’s independent judgement might be impaired by the close relationship with 
management that comes about during the process of collecting a firm’s private information 
(e.g. through frequent meetings during conference calls or analyst briefings). As a result, 
analysts can also be viewed as weak monitors that fail to exercise independent judgement 
due their dependence on management (with whom they need to maintain good relations) as 
57 | P a g e  
 
their main source of information (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Therefore, analyst opinions and 
recommendations may be biased and detrimental to the capital market and to investors in 
particular. In support of this view, Drake et al. (2011) shows that analysts release positive 
recommendations for the firms with high growth, high accrual and low book-to-market value 
firms.  
 
2.10.1 One way causality or simultaneity? 
 
On the one hand, analysts are viewed as important intermediaries in the capital market that 
are effective in improving the extent of a firm’s disclosure quality (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 
2001). A large analyst following demands greater quality of disclosure from managers. Lang 
and Lundholm (1993), in their US study, find positive associations between disclosure quality 
and analyst following when they employ AIMR Ratings as a proxy for disclosure quality. 
Marston (2008) reports that a high analyst following is positively associated with higher 
investor relation activities in UK firms. In a seminal work from Australia, Chang et al. (2008) 
consider analyst following to be one of the control variables that can influence disclosure 
quality, which is measured using investor relation information that is publicly available online. 
Yu (2008) argues that analysts function as monitoring agent, motivating firms to supply 
accurate information to users. Some studies also document that high analyst coverage is 
associated with lower information asymmetry (e.g. Houston et al., 2006; Easley et al., 1998) 
and that managers view analysts as one of the influential determinants in respect to their 
share prices (Graham et al., 2005).  
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On the other hand, disclosure quality is viewed as one of the main factors that determine the 
amount of analyst coverage. Yu (2010) finds that firms with better governance disclosure 
have higher analyst forecast accuracy and lower analyst forecast dispersion, and that they 
attract a higher analyst following. Simpson (2010) suggests that regular non-financial 
disclosure on key performance indicators is useful to analysts when they make forecasts. 
Boubaker and Labégorre (2008) reveal that analysts are attracted to cover firms with lower 
concentrated ownership, where greater transparency is promised. Firms that provide greater 
disclosure quality are more favourable in the eyes of analyst than firms that offer poor 
disclosure quality or firms that only comply with mandatory disclosure requirements (Gelb 
and Zarowin, 2002). Aerts et al. (2008) find that higher analyst forecast accuracy is achieved in 
firms with better disclosure environments. Hirst and Hopkins (1998) claim that analyst 
evaluations depend on the information released by management. Given that a higher quality 
of disclosure helps analysts to collect, analyse and disseminate a firm’s private information, it 
is not surprising to see a strong body of literature supporting the view that analysts prefer to 
cover firms with high quality disclosure (e.g. Bushman et al., 2004; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; 
Lang and Lundholm, 1996).  
 
Based on these two strands of competing evidence, it is argued that the relationship between 
disclosure and analyst following is not straightforward. It is implied that disclosure quality and 
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analyst following may have a simultaneous relationship. In other words, analyst following is a 
relevant proxy for a firm’s disclosure quality (e.g. Louis and Robinson, 2005). 29 
 
2.11 Endogeneity 
 
2.11.1 What is endogeneity? 
 
Endogeneity occurs when independent variables are correlated to error terms (e.g. Roberts 
and Whited, 2011; Li, 2011). Endogeneity is comprised of three main elements: (i) omitted 
variables, (ii) simultaneity and (iii) measurement error (e.g. Li, 2011; Roberts and Whited, 
2011; Brown et al., 2011). With respect to omitted variable problems, they can be mitigated if 
“unobservable determinants of” independent variables are controlled in the model (Li, 2011, 
p. 9). Concerning simultaneity, most of the prior literature suggests the use of a simultaneous 
system of equation (e.g. Cornett et al., 2008; Farooque et al., 2010) or an instrumental 
variable regression (e.g. Li, 2011; Yu, 2008; Brown et al. 2011). Measurement error, which is 
defined as the “discrepancy between the true variable of interest and the proxy” (Roberts and 
Whited, 2011, p. 13) could be mitigated by the use of a valid measurement for a specified 
proxy. 
 
Farooque et al. (2007a) explain that the interaction between independent (X) and dependent 
variables (Y) could occur in one of three circumstances: (i) direct relationship, where X might 
                                                          
29
 It is important to examine the potential for simultaneity in the relationship between disclosure and analyst 
following using a simultaneous system of equation. However, this issue is beyond the scope of the present study 
and is recommended for future research. Due to limited data, the present study only covers the potential co-
determination between (i) disclosure quality and earnings management and (ii) board independence and 
disclosure quality as well as (iii) disclosure quality, board independence and earnings management. 
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have a negative or positive relationship to Y; (ii) reverse causality, where Y is negatively or 
positively related to X and (iii) simultaneity or bi-directional relationships, where both X and Y 
are negatively or positively related at the same time (simultaneously). Failure to control for 
the components of endogeneity will lead to inconclusive findings. For example, if a model is 
affected by endogeneity, researchers would find that Y is significantly and positively related 
to X. But, after controlling for the confounding effects of endogeneity, Y might have negative 
relationship or insignificant influence on X and the reported result would be biased.  
 
2.11.2 How to solve the problem of endogeneity 
 
Several options for solving endogeneity problems are discussed in the prior literature: 
(i) Lagged dependent variables 
Li (2011) suggests that incorporating lagged dependent variables as one of the regressors 
is partially useful in controlling endogeneity that is caused by simultaneity. Several studies 
use this method, including Li (2011) and Weir et al. (2002). In examining the relationship 
between the chief executive officer (CEO) compensation gap and performance (measured 
using Tobin’s Q), Li (2011) employs lagged Tobin’s Q (t) as one of the regressors on the 
right side of the equation while the left side of equation (the dependent variable) is 
Tobin’s Q (t+1). Following Klein (1998), Weir et al. (2002) include lagged dependent 
variables (lagged Tobin’s Q) as one of the regressors in the model when examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance (measured using Tobin’s Q).  
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(ii) Lagged independent variables 
Prior studies also employ lagged independent variables as a solution to the simultaneity 
issue. Doucouliagos et al. (2007), for example, included lagged data for performance in 
the model, when examining the relationship between performance and remuneration. 
According to Li (2011), the lagged independent variable method can be used for solving 
simultaneity, but it is not able to solve omitted variables or measurement error problems. 
Lagged independent variables are included because lagged data is expected to be highly 
correlated with the contemporaneous data, but potentially less correlated to the error 
terms.30  
 
(iii) Year and industry dummy and firm fixed-effects or random-effects 
Incorporating year and industry dummies helps to solve the problem of omitted, which is 
one of the main causes of endogeneity. In the case of panel data, fixed-effect or random 
effects are also useful in controlling for firm variation (Li, 2011; Roberts and Whited, 
2011). Examples of prior studies that employ this method include Farooque et al. (2010) 
and Yermack (1996).  
 
(iv) Two-stage least square regression (2SLS) 
According to Weir et al. (2002), “there are a number of techniques available to deal with 
the issue of simultaneously determined relationships. One method is to use two-stage 
least squares” (p. 539). There is plentiful research on corporate governance and 
                                                          
30
 This statement is controversial, especially when it is related to disclosure and corporate governance data that 
is subject to a stickiness issue.  
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performance that employs 2SLS to control for endogeneity (e.g. Weir et al., 2002; 
Farooque et al., 2010). 2SLS is comprised of first stage and second stage regressions. The 
first stage regression is where the endogenous variables (dependent variables) are 
regressed on their determinants according to the prior literature. Then, the fitted value or 
predicted value is created for the endogenous variables. After that, the second stage 
regression takes place: the fitted value or predicted value is used to replace the 
endogenous variable in the equation. 
 
(v) Instrumental variables regression (IV regression)31 
Li (2011), Brown et al. (2011) and Roberts and Whited (2011), suggest an IV Regression as 
a remedy for simultaneity problems. Examples of studies that use IV regression in solving 
reverse causality issue include Yu (2008) and Li (2011). The IV Regression, which is 
estimated based on 2SLS, is undertaken in two stages. In the first stage, the endogenous 
variable is regressed with the all exogenous variables and the instrumental variables32. 
The fitted value or predicted value is then calculated. The predicted values of endogenous 
variables will then be used in the second stage of the regression to replace the current 
endogenous variable data.33  
 
                                                          
31
 The IV regression can be performed in STATA using the ivregress command. STATA will automatically disclose 
the second stage regression only, while the first stage will only appear upon request (if the report first stage 
regression option is ticked) in the reporting interface.  
32
 The general rules are that the instrumental variables chosen must be highly correlated with the endogenous 
variables, but not correlated to the error terms. Moreover, to ensure that that the instrumental variables used 
are valid, they need to pass several post-estimation tests.  
33
 For explanations that are more detailed refer to Brown et al. (2011) and Li (2011). 
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(vi) Others 
The General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation is another useful tool to control for 
endogeneity (e.g. Li, 2011). Li (2011) explains that the highest percentage of simultaneity 
problems could be solved using GMM estimation alone. Nonetheless, GMM is suitable for 
larger sets of data (e.g. 2000 firms) and it is not employed in this study.  
 
Roberts and Whited (2011) claim that match-paired samples can also be used to control 
for endogeneity, given that they control for unobserved company variations such as firm 
size, industry and year.  
 
2.11.3 Dealing with endogeneity  
 
Following the example of prior literature, the present study deals with endogeneity in the first 
project on disclosure quality and earnings management by: 
(a) Incorporating lagged ROA in the earnings management equation 
(b) Incorporating internal governance mechanisms in the model to avoid model 
misspecification  
(c) Controlling for year and industry effects 
(d) Using match-paired samples which control for unobserved variations  
(e) Including a set of comprehensive and relevant control variables in the model 
(f) Allowing for the potential simultaneous relationship between disclosure quality 
and earnings management by developing a simultaneous system of equation using 
the 2SLS regression  
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Concerning the second project, corporate governance and disclosure quality, this study: 
(a) Controls for year and industry effects 
(b) Incorporates a set of relevant control variables 
(c) Uses match-paired samples which control for unobserved variations  
(d) Allows for the potential simultaneous relationship between disclosure quality and 
board independence by developing a simultaneous system of equation using the 
2SLS regression  
 
With regard to the third project, co-determination between disclosure quality, earnings 
management and board independence, the present study: 
(a) Controls for year and industry effects 
(b) Incorporates a set of relevant control variables 
(c) Uses match-paired samples which control for unobserved variations  
(d) Considers the potential bi-directional relationship between (i) disclosure quality, 
earnings management and board independence and (ii) disclosure quality, 
earnings management, board independence and corporate performance by 
developing a simultaneous system of equation 
 
2.11.4 Disclosure and information asymmetry 
 
The relationship between disclosure quality and information asymmetry is controversial. On 
the one hand, the notion that disclosure may be useful in reducing information asymmetry 
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has been widely acknowledged (Ronen and Yaari, 2001). Prior studies reveal that there is a 
negative association between disclosure quality and information asymmetry (e.g. Welker, 
1995; Coller and Yohn, 1997; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007; Brown et al., 2004; Heflin et al., 
2005).34 In other words, a high quality of reporting reduces information asymmetry, 
suggesting that investors are better informed about a company’s financial affairs and 
performance. Theoretical models (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; 
Dye, 1985) also support the exogenous inverse relationship between disclosure quality and 
information asymmetry.  
 
Using bid-ask spreads to represent information asymmetry and AIMR ratings as a proxy for 
disclosure, Welker (1995) documents evidence that disclosure quality interacts negatively 
with information asymmetry. Moreover, the liquidity of the equity market significantly 
improves in parallel with the increasing function of disclosure. In their seminal work, Coller 
and Yohn (1997) empirically examine the link between management earnings forecasts and 
                                                          
34
 Although an abundance of studies reports negative associations between disclosure and information 
asymmetry, the present study recognizes that some other studies (e.g. Chang et al. 2008) conclude that the 
relationship between disclosure and information asymmetry is not yet very clear, due to endogeneity in previous 
studies (e.g. there is potential for reverse causality bias). It is widely recognized that an inverse relationship 
between disclosure quality and information asymmetry is expected (e.g. Welker, 1995; Brown and Hillegeist, 
2007; Brown et al., 2004; Heflin et al., 2005). Findings from Chang et al. (2008) should not undermine the 
potential for a negative link to be made between disclosure quality and information asymmetry. Moreover, 
some drawbacks are noted in the case of the Chang et al. (2008) study. It is noted that, although Chang et al. 
(2008) rerun the regression using 2SLS in order to consider the reverse causality issue, they fail to control for 
industry effect in their model and this leads to model misspecification. Chang et al. (2008) should have 
incorporated industry dummies because their results may have been different if the industry effect was taken 
into account. It is also important to highlight that Chang et al. (2008) report a significant negative relationship 
between investor relation disclosure and information asymmetry in their OLS regression. Li (2011) and Roberts 
and Whited (2011) suggest that year and industry effect is potentially useful to control for omitted variables that 
cause the endogeneity issue. The methodological shortcomings of the Chang et al. (2008) study should be 
overcome in order to come up with findings that are more conclusive. The findings of Chang et al. (2008) cannot 
be extrapolated to all settings and should not undermine other research that finds negative links between 
disclosure and information asymmetry.  
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information asymmetry. Based on 179 match-paired samples in the US market, they 
discovered that the information asymmetry for firms that release earnings forecasts is lower 
than that for their counterparts immediately after the information about management 
earnings forecast is released to the market. From the US, based on 2432 firm-year 
observations from 1986 to 1996, Brown and Hillegeist (2003) report a consistent negative 
relationship between disclosure quality and information asymmetry and their result is robust 
across all subcomponents in the AIMR Ratings score. Another US study by Brown et al. (2004) 
demonstrates that investors in firms with frequent conference calls enjoy lower information 
asymmetry than firms with less frequent conference calls.35  
 
From the Singapore capital market, using bid-ask spread as a proxy for information 
asymmetry and disclosure index as a proxy for voluntary disclosure score, Cheng et al. (2006) 
report a significant negative relationship between voluntary disclosure items and bid ask 
spread, revealing that lower information asymmetry has been achieved by means of 
disclosure.  
 
In order to describe the relationship between voluntary disclosure and information 
asymmetry, Peterson and Plenborg (2006) investigated a sample of 36 listed firms in 
Denmark. They measured disclosure quality using 62 voluntary disclosure index items, which 
were comprised of information related to strategy, competition and outlook, production, 
marketing strategy and human capital. They document that the negative relationship 
                                                          
35
 Brown and Hellegist (2003) and Brown et al. (2004) measure information asymmetry following Easley et al. 
(1997).  
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between voluntary disclosure and bid-ask spread was confirmed, suggesting that high 
voluntary disclosure is associated with lower information asymmetry.  
 
On the other hand, some studies reveal that high disclosure quality fails to reduce 
information asymmetry. Kim et al. (2011) provide indirect evidence that the reconciliation 
disclosure that was previously imposed on cross-listed firms has no effect on information 
asymmetry, given that it shows no statistical effects on market liquidity or the cost of capital. 
This corroborates the findings of Chang et al. (2008) who found that investor relation 
activities fail to reduce information asymmetry, even after endogeneity factors are accounted 
for. Researchers have been unable to draw specific conclusions about the relationship 
between disclosure and information asymmetry. 
 
Demands for disclosure are substantially influenced by information asymmetry between 
agents and principals (Brown et al., 2004; Healy and Palepu, 2001). From the theoretical 
viewpoint, information released by an agent is a monitoring tool that can be used by a 
principal to judge whether the agent’s decision is related to an increase in a firm’s 
performance or not (Healy and Palepu, 2001, as cited in Hope and Thomas, 2008).  
 
Theoretically, the negative relationship between disclosure quality and information 
asymmetry is observed based on the outcome of an investor’s economic decisions (Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985). Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argue that when adequate information is 
delivered to investors they use it to make decisions whether to buy, sell or hold stock. These 
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economic decisions are crucial because they affect investors’ economic welfare and they have 
an impact on the effectiveness of the capital market in general. In this regard, Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) suggest that informed investors are those who are capable of efficiently 
processing and applying the information that is delivered to them. If an investor’s economic 
decisions are accurate and lucrative, it shows that they are well-informed, signalling that a 
lower degree of information asymmetry has been achieved.  
 
Moreover, standard setters have an effective role in promoting low information asymmetry 
by determining accurate accounting standards. Arnold (1998) argues that the responsibility of 
financial accounting is to reduce information asymmetry between firms and the users of their 
information. He suggests that the role of the regulator is to reduce the problem of 
information asymmetry by “specifying the criteria that should govern general aspects of 
disclosure and also by requiring the specific disclosure of certain items” (Arnold, 1998, p. 
775). In a similar vein, Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that the credibility of disclosure is 
improved by collaboration between “regulators, standard setters, auditors and other capital 
market intermediaries” (p. 406).  
 
Compliance with sound accounting standards has been proven to be a strong positive 
influence on the quality of reporting (Ball et al., 2003) while, simultaneously, improving the 
accuracy of analyst forecasts (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001). Since analyst forecast dispersion 
can reflect the gap of information asymmetry (Lang and Lundholm, 1996), the adoption of 
high accounting standards will help to maintain lower levels of information asymmetry. In 
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other words, if information asymmetry is low, analyst forecasts are expected to be more 
concentrated and accurate. Therefore, it is worth noting that the role of standard setters in 
determining best accounting standards is crucial because it affects the level of information 
asymmetry.   
 
A higher quality of disclosure is expected to reduce the frequency, intensity, cost and efforts 
on the part of investors to collect private information (Brown and Hillegeist, 2003). Brown 
and Hillegeist (2003) claim that a high disclosure quality and the timely release of information 
(including forward looking information) is vital in ensuring that users are fully informed, 
reducing users’ capacity to discover a firm’s private information.  
 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) find that trading by uninformed investors increases with 
disclosure quality, suggesting that trading by informed investors does not necessarily depend 
on firm disclosure. In this regard, Brown and Hillegeist (2003) argue that informed investors 
are risk averse. Trading by uninformed investors functions as a mechanism to balance the 
capital market, hence the amount of trading by uninformed investors is considerably larger 
than that of informed investors. This implies that a high disclosure environment is beneficial 
to the capital market. A higher disclosure transparency promotes lower information 
asymmetry and significantly increases an investor’s welfare (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985).  
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2.11.5 Disclosure and agency cost 
 
From the point of view of agency theory, conflict of interest and information asymmetry are 
the two main problems in the principal-agent relationship (Belkaoui, 2001). Agency problems 
lead to agency cost, which functions to reduce the conflict of interest among agents and the 
degree of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders as well as to control 
managers’ behaviour. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that agency costs are comprised of 
“monitoring costs”, “bonding costs” and “residual loss”.36  
 
Agency theory implies that high disclosure quality is effective in reducing agency cost through 
monitoring activities (Grüning and Ernstberger, 2010; Huang and Zhang, 2008; Junker, 2005). 
Several prior studies document that high disclosure quality is associated with lower agency 
cost (e.g. Huang and Zhang, 2008; Leuz et al., 2003).  
 
In their international comparative studies from 2008, Huang and Zhang focus on the impact of 
disclosure on agency cost using the “monitoring hypothesis”. Based on a sample of 951 firms 
from 38 countries, they find that high disclosure is associated with lower minority 
expropriation risk and that it subsequently increases a firm’s market value. In this instance, 
Huang and Zhang (2008) highlight that cash has been used optimally in firms with high 
disclosure, reducing the likelihood of agency cost being incurred.  
                                                          
36
 According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), monitoring cost refers to the cost related to monitor agent 
behavior, while residual loss is the cost incurred due to misalignment of interest between agent and principal. 
With respect to bonding cost, it can be defined as “the costs that the manager takes upon himself to reduce 
agency conflict; that is, efforts undertaken at the expense of his own utility” (Depken et al., 2006, p. 11).  
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To describe the link between earnings management (low disclosure quality) and investor 
protection, Leuz et al. (2003) employ a sample of 70,995 firm-years in 31 countries. They find 
that companies with high earnings management (low disclosure quality) suffer higher agency 
costs. In other words, the interests of minority shareholders were not well protected in the 
firms that were involved in earnings management when compared to their counterparts. 
Moreover, they show that the firms that are involved in earnings management provide low 
quality of disclosure and normally operate in a weak regulatory environment.  
 
Although prior literature has proved empirically and theoretically that high disclosure quality 
is associated with lower information asymmetry (as discussed previously), it is important to 
highlight that the role of financial analysts in disseminating a firm’s disclosure to the public is 
very important and ensures that low information asymmetry is achieved. The next section 
deals with the role of financial analysts as an information intermediary, from the agency 
theory point of view.  
 
2.11.6 Disclosure and financial analysts 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 354) point out that financial analysts play a crucial role in 
reducing agency cost by scrutinising a firm’s activities and reporting to the shareholders who 
pay them. They also highlight that this cost has not previously been classified as a monitoring 
cost. Financial analysts are accounted for within agency theory, in the sense that they 
function as monitoring agents who reduce information asymmetry between principals and 
agents.  
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Some research has highlighted that an analyst’s role in disseminating a company’s 
information to the public is effective in reducing the information asymmetry between agents 
and principals from an agency theory perspective (e.g. Ali et al. 2008; Roulstone, 2003).  
 
In their work on 72 French firms, Ali et al. (2008) empirically examine the relationship 
between analyst coverage, minority expropriation risk and share liquidity from 2001 to 2004. 
They find that analysts are capable of increasing share liquidity by disseminating information 
to market players in the presence of minority expropriation risk. Using bid-ask spread and 
effective spread as proxies of share liquidity, they conclude that these findings outline the 
credibility of analysts when it comes to handling the agency problem in the presence of 
minority expropriation risk.  
 
Assuming that analysts are effective agents in reducing the gap of information asymmetry, 
Roulstone (2003) investigates the influence of analyst following and forecast bias on market 
liquidity. Analysing the US data in 1995, he reveals that high analyst following (high forecast 
bias) will increase (decrease) market liquidity, signalling that analysts are an effective agent in 
the dissemination of company information to the market. Overall, the empirical evidence has 
indicated that analysts are effective in reducing information asymmetry between agent and 
principal, from an agency theory perspective. Therefore, three measures of disclosure quality 
related to analysts will be employed in this study: the IR Magazine Award, the narrative 
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content of forward looking disclosure in the annual report and the accuracy of analyst 
forecasts.  
 
2.12 Agency theory and earnings management 
 
Because there is a lack of theoretical explanations for earnings management (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008), a substantial number of prior studies associate earnings management behaviour 
with the weaknesses implied by agency theory (e.g. Kent et al. 2010; Jiraporn et al., 2008; 
Davidson et al., 2004). The shortcomings in agency relationships (i.e. information asymmetry 
and conflict of interest) stimulate earnings management behaviour among managers 
(Jiraporn et al. 2008; Davidson et al., 2004). Within the framework of agency theory, earnings 
management has been viewed as a form of agency cost, given that it causes information 
asymmetry and reduces principals’ understanding of a firm’s performance, which 
subsequently influences their investment decisions (Davidson et al., 2004, p. 267). 37 Earnings 
management behaviour can be defined as “residual loss”, according to the definition 
provided by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308). It is a form of agency cost that is incurred 
due to the misalignment of goals between agents and principals. Christie and Zimmerman 
(1994) suggest that earnings manipulation through accounting accruals is a sign of a conflict 
of interest in a manager’s decision making.  
 
                                                          
37
 Although Jiraporn et al. (2008) found that earnings management is beneficial and not detrimental to the 
shareholders value, an important body of literature views earnings management as opportunistic (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999; Jones, 1991; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Kent et al., 2010).  
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Moreover, some research has proved that information asymmetry is positively associated 
with earnings management activities (e.g. Richardson, 1998; Trueman and Titman, 1988). This 
implies that the greater the level of information asymmetry the higher the possibility of 
earnings management activity. Nevertheless, where information asymmetry is relatively low, 
earnings management activities are less likely to be practiced.   
 
In order to justify the proposed positive relationship between information asymmetry and 
earnings management, the environment where the earnings management is more likely to 
occur should be observed. Managers have a tendency to engage in earnings management in 
situations where the shareholders are poorly informed and have limited access to company 
information, which reduces their capacity to monitor managers’ behaviour (Schipper, 1989; 
Warfield et al., 1995). This unhealthy atmosphere between shareholders and managers 
generates opportunities for managers to modify accounting information according to what 
they want. From a theoretical viewpoint, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) document that 
information asymmetry between agent and principal is decreased with voluntary disclosure. 
Therefore, increased disclosure is a possible solution to the problem of earnings 
management, given that it decreases information asymmetry and subsequently reduces 
earnings management.  
 
Overall, since Davidson et al. (2004) view earnings management as one form of agency cost 
and Jensen and Meckling (1976) view disclosure quality as one of the mechanisms mitigating 
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agency cost, the present study employs agency theory to explain the negative relationship 
between disclosure quality and earnings management.  
 
2.13 Agency theory and corporate governance 
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, which stipulates best practice for corporate 
governance structures with an aim to “facilitate effective, entrepreneurial and prudent 
management that can deliver the long-term success of the company” (p. 1), can be explained 
from the point of view of agency theory. According to Mueller (2006), corporate governance 
debates aim to mitigate the agency problem in the principal-agent relationship. Moreover, 
Baek et al. (2009, p. 44) point out that sound governance processes are one of the 
mechanisms that are potentially relevant to reducing agency cost (Baek et al. 2009, p. 44). 
Bathala and Rao (1995) state that corporate governance could act to reduce a manager’s self-
interest in the principal-agent relationship. Low self interest will increase the likelihood of a 
manager giving high quality disclosures to shareholders in order to reduce information 
asymmetry (Kanagaretnam et al. 2007). The monitoring effect of well-informed investors is 
expected to eventually reduce a firm’s agency cost (Grüning and Ernstberger, 2010; Huang 
and Zhang, 2008; Junker, 2005).  
 
Eisenhardt (1989) claims that research that concentrates on aligning the conflict of interest 
between agent and principal is best explained using agency theory. This notion is supported 
by Fama and Jensen (1983) who highlight the important role of the board of directors in 
monitoring agent activities. Moreover, Bathala and Rao (1995) point out that corporate 
76 | P a g e  
 
governance mechanisms such as external directors, managerial ownership and incentives 
have been viewed as an antidote to agents’ conflict of interests, which is one of the central 
problems in the principal-agent relationship. This implies that, agency theory recognizes the 
role that corporate governance plays in aligning both manager and shareholder interests.  
 
2.14 Disclosure and signalling theory 
 
Although this study primarily makes use of agency theory, it is also worth noting that some 
prior studies use signalling theory to explain managerial disclosure decisions (e.g. Hasseldine 
et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Abhayawansa and Abeysekera, 2009). According to signalling 
theory, a manager discloses information in order to reduce information asymmetry (Spence, 
1973; Álvarez et al., 2008, p. 597) and to signal to outsiders that a firm is performing better 
than its peers (Miller, 2002). Signalling theory also posits that, in making decisions, investors 
rely on the information delivered by firms (Abhayawansa and Abeysekera, 2009), highlighting 
that the credibility of information is crucial in ensuring lower information asymmetry 
(Hughes, 1986). Nonetheless, it is also possible that underperforming firms provide sound 
disclosure in order to mitigate underperformance. This challenges the notion of signalling 
theory itself. In this regard, “A good firm can distinguish itself from a bad firm by sending a 
credible signal about its quality to capital markets. The signal will be credible only if the bad 
firm chooses not to mimic the good firm by sending the same signal” (Bhattacharya and 
Dittmar, 2001, p. 1).  
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Morris (1987, p. 51) claims that in order to ensure that information signalling from firms is 
effective in reducing the information asymmetry the signalling costs “must be borne by the 
agent so that he has an incentive to signal truthfully”. However, there is no guarantee that 
managers will provide accurate information despite bearing the signalling cost. This is 
because, managers’ disclosure decisions are also determined by the “marginal benefit to be 
gained from reducing the information asymmetry in the market” (Abhayawansa and 
Abeysekera, 2009, p. 297).  
 
Prior literature offers several solutions to the problem of information asymmetry. Hughes 
(1986) points out that in order to ensure that the information disclosed by firms is credible 
the investment banker (underwriter) should act as an intermediary, monitoring the quality of 
the information. Abhayawansa and Abeysekera, (2009) highlight the role of the sell-side 
analyst in reducing information asymmetry by effectively disseminating a company’s 
information to the capital market players.  
 
Employing signalling theory as a ground theory, a theoretical work by Cheung and Lee (1995) 
suggests that being listed in reputable foreign exchanges (e.g. the New York Stock Exchange) 
signals a firm’s high level of disclosure and increases its  opportunity to be listed in other 
stock exchanges. Other studies that use signalling theory include Chiang (2005), who showed 
that high firm transparency signals sound firm performance. Hussainey and Aal-Eisa (2009) 
demonstrate that voluntary disclosure of narrative forward looking information is superior to 
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dividend information in respect to reducing investor uncertainty about future earnings. They 
conclude that the disclosure signalling hypothesis is confirmed.  
 
2.14.1 The similarity between agency theory and signalling theory 
 
Agency theory and signalling theory are partially overlapped in the sense that both theories 
relate to information asymmetry between firms and investors. Both theories suggest that 
promoting disclosure quality is crucial in reducing information asymmetry (Álvarez et al., 
2008; Morris, 1987) with the aim of reducing agency problems, which in turn prevents the 
occurrence of agency cost. Morris (1987, p. 53) summarises the similarity between agency 
theory and signalling theory: 
Rational behaviour is common to both theories; information asymmetry is implied by positive 
monitoring costs in agency theory; quality can be defined in terms of agency theory variables; 
and signalling costs are implicit in some bonding devices of agency theory. Therefore, agency 
theory and signalling theory are consistent.  
 
As there is common ground between these two theories, signalling theory will also be used in 
the present study. Given that the concept of agency cost complements the link between 
disclosure quality (as a monitoring mechanism that can reduce agency cost), earnings 
management (one form of agency cost) and corporate governance (one of the monitoring 
mechanisms that can reduce the agency cost), agency theory provides the main theoretical 
grounding for the present study.  
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2.15 Disclosure Quality Measurement  
There are three types of commonly used measurement of quality disclosure within previous 
studies namely the disclosure index, the annual report awards and the management earning 
forecast. A less popular method, namely the volume or quantity method was also used by 
several prior studies. In this instance, researchers are calculating the number of pages or 
counting the number of sentences and words in a particular segment of information to access 
the disclosure quality. Staden and Hooks (2007) for example have used this method as one of 
the alternatives to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure by New Zealand firms. 
Nevertheless, since this method is very rare and uncommonly used by past researchers, this 
present study will exclude this method from discussion. One would possibly use this method 
if they want to measure the quantity of disclosure, not the quality of disclosure. Since this 
present study will focus on the extent of disclosure quality in general, only the widely used 
measurement of disclosure quality will be examined. In this study, the literatures which 
employ the disclosure index, disclosure awards, management earnings forecasts and analyst 
forecast accuracy as a measurement of disclosure quality will be discussed. Each particular 
measurement of disclosure quality will be examined and all possible noise and bias will be 
explained in this section.  
 
(a) Disclosure Index 
This section reviews some important studies that employed the disclosure index as a proxy of 
disclosure quality in corporate annual reports. Basically, the main approach that has been 
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used in these studies was initialised by selecting a group of items that will represent the 
disclosure index which will then be used to screen the annual report.  
 
The disclosure indexes consists of the mandatory disclosure (e.g. Arnold and Matthews, 2002) 
and/or voluntary disclosure (e.g. Botosan, 1997), which depends on the requirements in the 
country where the firms operate, the types of additional voluntary information, as well as the 
motives of the study conducted by the researcher. Most of the prior literature used voluntary 
disclosure index to measure the extent of disclosure quality (e.g. Boesso, 2003; Lapointe-
Antunes et al., 2006; Botosan, 1997; Barako et al., 2006; Meek et al., 1995; Chau and Gray, 
2002). In assessing the quality of disclosure, the mandatory disclosure will be taken out of the 
list of the disclosure index by prior studies because it can be viewed as the minimum 
disclosure requirement imposed by the regulators in that particular country (e.g., Hossain et 
al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Barako et al., 2006; Chau and Gray, 2002; Raffournier, 1995). In 
addition, since all big firms are mostly audited by the big four external auditors, thus they 
must comply with all requirements provided by the exchange or standard setters. Moreover, 
the compliance of listed firms with mandatory disclosures is clearly stated in the listing rules 
or listing requirements and all firms must follow the rules on a compulsorily basis.  
 
Past research has normally developed the disclosure index using several steps. First, the item 
in the disclosure index was compiled from extensive past literatures (e.g. Lapointe-Antunes et 
al., 2006; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Boesso, 2003; Meek et al., 
1995). The selection of items to be included in the index also must be chosen very carefully. 
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Some of them scrutinised the annual reports of large firms in a particular country under study 
to obtain/ understand the patterns of the additional voluntary information that is supposed 
to be included in the disclosure index (e.g. Botosan, 1997; McNally et al., 1982). 
 
Secondly, the disclosure index which consists of voluntary disclosure items will be 
crosschecked with the current accounting standards and any other mandatory disclosure 
requirement in a country. The items that have been found to be disclosed in a mandatory 
fashion will be removed and the list must comprise of voluntary disclosure elements per se 
(e.g. Hossain et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Barako et al., 2006; Chau and Gray, 2002; 
Raffournier, 1995).   
 
Third, the verification of the disclosure index takes place. Some research normally employed 
an independent external examiner to validate the disclosure index. They will choose the 
practitioners or experts in the accounting areas to verify the list of the voluntary disclosure 
index like the certified public accountants (CPA), the partner of the audit firms or the head of 
the stock exchange commission (e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain et al. 1994; 
Hossain et al, 1995; Depoers, 2000; Barako et al. 2006, Singhvi and Desai, 1971). 
Nevertheless, some other studies rely on personal judgement and favours not to validate 
their disclosure index before use (e.g. Chau and Gray, 2002; Raffournier, 1995; McNally et al., 
1982; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006).   
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Fourth, the researcher will decide whether they want to assign a weighting to the disclosure 
index or not. Those who want to employ an un-weighted disclosure index will treat all items 
in the list as equally important and the dichotomous method will be used to score the item 
(Gray, et al., 1992). The firm will get a score of 1 if they disclosed the item and 0 if they have 
not disclosed (e.g. Boesso, 2003; Hail, 2002, Meek et al, 1995; Firth, 1980; Hossain et. al, 
1994). Past studies which intend to assign the weight to each item in the list of disclosure 
index will take additional step in determining the weight. Some of the prior researchers based 
such measures on bank loan officers perceptions or financial analysts’ evaluations as a 
mechanism in constructing the weight of each item in the list (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Buzby, 1974; McNally et al., 1982; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). The disclosure index will be 
sent to the specific respondent for them to rate the items which are highly important or less 
important in making economic decisions. The result from the respondent then will be 
calculated and averaged to determine the weight.  
 
Both weighted and un-weighted disclosure indexes possess niche and unique features that 
are subject to preference and criticism by prior studies. Cooke (1989, p. 182) argues that the 
drawback of weighted disclosure index is the subjectivity involved in assigning the weighting 
value. He claims that un-weighted index is superior as compared to a weighted index 
especially when the studies conducted are concentrated to all groups of users of the annual 
report. This is also supported by Chow and Wong-Boren (1987, p. 536) who declare that a 
weighted index involved high subjectivity since the determination of weighting is dependent 
on the perceptions of the users, and it does not portray the specific information that they 
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really want and desire. Furthermore, Speros (1979, p. 57) seminal work showed that firms are 
systematic and constant in their disclosure policy because if they disclosed important items 
excellently, the same condition will apply to the less important items, thus emphasising that 
the weighting index as something irrelevant and unnecessary.  
 
Therefore, due to the inherent subjectivity problem in attaching the weighting to the 
disclosure index, prior researches are more conservative in their methodology by using both 
weighted and un-weighted disclosure index in their study (e.g., Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; 
Barako et al. 2006) or utilising un-weighted disclosure index per se (e.g., Hossain et al. 1994).   
 
Nevertheless, according to their empirical findings, Chow and Wong-Boren (1987, p. 537) 
suggest that both weighted and un-weighted disclosure index can be used interchangeably as 
their results are largely identical and not statistically significant different. In contrast, Wallace 
and Naser (1995, p. 331) noted that the simple test that they have conducted showed that 
both weighted and un-weighted indices cannot be guaranteed to agree closely in all 
circumstances. The findings by Chow and Wong-Boren (1987, p. 537) and Wallace and Naser 
(1995, p. 331) shown that the utilization of weighted or un-weighted disclosure index may 
produce different results.  
 
Using conventional wisdom, one could expect that an un-weighted disclosure index also must 
be exposed to bias since it treats all items equally important and must be irrelevant because 
there must be circumstances whereby one item would outweigh another. In addition, the 
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disclosure index also contains bias from the researchers’ discretionary judgements and 
evaluations. Barrett (1975) for example based it on his own knowledge and personal skills 
obtained when he worked in the area of international financial statements in constructing the 
disclosure index. Although bias and subjectivity are something unavoidable, all these must be 
carefully addressed and controlled. The bias must be in the satisfactory minimum level and 
overgeneralization should not be manipulated.  
 
Although disclosure indexes are subject to controversy especially on the subjectivity involved 
from researchers’ discretionary as well as the weighted index problem, one should admit that 
disclosure index has its own strength. The complete disclosure index that will be used to 
screen the annual report revealed the extent of the disclosure quality. The disclosure index is 
very comprehensive and robust in nature because it was created based on many sources 
including past literature and annual reports, crosschecked against the mandatory disclosure, 
screened to current announcement by standard setters and validated by experts in the 
accounting field. Moreover, since the disclosure index has been used for more than 45 years 
since Cerf (1961) era as to measure the extent of disclosure quality, it seems that it has 
survived the test of time.  
 
Prior research developed disclosure indexes related to firm’s general information (e.g. 
company history), capital market data (e.g. key financial information), social and 
environmental disclosure (e.g. information about employees, safety and health, 
environmental concern), and corporate governance disclosure (e.g. the quality of corporate 
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governance information provided by the company), forward looking disclosure (e.g. 
information related to the firms future affairs) and others.  
 
This present study will be focused on the forward looking disclosure in evaluating the quality 
of firm’s disclosure given that it is highly favoured by the financial analyst in forecasting the 
firm’s earnings (Barron et al. 1999).  In the same vein, Deegan and Rankin (1997) and Barker 
(1998) found that analysts favour information on the capital market which is forward looking 
in nature, since it is potentially capable to predicting future earnings. 
 
Manual Vs Computerised 
Content method analysis can be performed either using manual (traditional) techniques or 
computerised techniques. In manual content method analysis, the disclosure index will be 
cross-checked with the annual report to detect the specific information that was disclosed by 
the firms. The annual report will be read line by line and the score will be awarded if the 
company discloses the information listed in the disclosure index. Numerous prior literature 
studies have employed this techniques in assessing the quality and quantity of disclosure by 
the firms in their annual report (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Cooke and Haniffa, 2002; Ghazali 
and Weetman, 2006).  
 
Another strand of research employed computerised content method analysis in detecting the 
specific information in the annual report (e.g. Hussainey et. al, 2003; Schleicher et al., 2007). 
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Based on the information that is widely used in the annual report and analyst report, 
Hussainey et al. (2003) developed a list of index comprised of forward looking keywords (e.g. 
accelerate, anticipate, await, confidence, convince, estimate, expect, forecast) that highly 
connected to the forward looking information in the annual report. One type of language 
processing software, namely Nudist N6 has been used to detect the specific forward looking 
keywords published in the firm’s annual report. Hussainey et al. (2003) point out that the 
successful rate of this new methodology in detecting forward looking statements is quite high 
(85.5%) and the results are highly correlated with the manual content method analysis at 
96%, thus signalling that this computerised content method analysis is potentially relevant to 
substitute traditional content method analysis in the near future.  
 
Moreover, they claimed that this new methodology is comparable to the AIMR Ratings in 
evaluating the firm’s disclosure quality that was ceased years ago. Hussainey et al. (2003) also 
declared that this methodology is more accurate and more consistent than traditional 
content method analysis which requires researcher’s evaluation and discretion in scoring the 
firms. Following this, several researches in disclosure quality have employed the methodology 
introduced by Hussainey et al. (2003) in their studies (e.g. Schleicher et al., 2007; 
Athanasakau and Hussainey, 2010).  
 
In a related vein, the utilisation of the computerised content method analysis was also 
introduced by Beattie et al. (2004). Consistent with Hussainey et al. (2003), by using Nudist N6 
software to detect the keywords in the narrative disclosure, they developed a comprehensive 
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framework of both financial and non-financial information based on Jenkins report. Although 
they concluded that this time-consuming computer-aided content analysis will limits the 
number of sample in the study, however, they further argued that these types of procedures 
are superior in terms of validity and “reliability” (p. 233).  
 
Traditional content method analysis requires researchers to dedicate long hours in labour 
intensive reading process (Boesso and Kumar, 2007), hence, the number of samples in the 
study which utilised traditional content method analysis is relatively small (Jo and Kim, 2007). 
Moreover, it suffers from serious subjectivity and validity problems (Grüning, 2007). In this 
stark contrast, Grüning (2006) noted that the superior accuracy of computer-aided content 
method analysis is best to replace traditional content method analysis (as cited in Grüning, 
2007, p. 650). Given that the computerised content-method analysis introduced by Hussainey 
et al. (2003) is valid in the sense that it is similar to the manual content method analysis in 
preciseness and consistencies, and promotes higher reliability in evaluating disclosure quality 
(Beattie et al., 2004) taken together, this present study will detect forward looking 
information in the firm’s annual report using the methodology suggested by Hussainey et al. 
(2003). The development of reliable content method analysis using the computerised 
technique is consistent with Core (2001, p. 452) who proposed that “the improvement in 
disclosure quality also need to be developed by importing techniques in natural language 
processing from fields like computer science, linguistic and artificial intelligence”.  
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Given that the computerised content method analysis is superior as compared to the 
traditional content method analysis in terms of validity and reliability (Beattie et al., 2004; 
Hussainey et al., 2003); this present study will employ the same methodology as introduced 
by Hussainey et al. (2003) in assessing the quality of narrative forward looking disclosure in 
the annual report. 
(b) Disclosure Award 
There are extensive past literatures which employed the award, rating or score of an annual 
report as a measurement of disclosure quality. Lang and Lundholm (1993), Zhau and Lobo 
(2001), Bushee and Noe (2000), Sengupta (1998) and many other US studies on disclosure 
quality used Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) Ratings as a proxy 
of high disclosure. Bushman et al. (2004) for example have employed Center for Financial 
Analysis and Research’s (CIFAR) score which was conducted in 1995 to represent the quality 
of the annual report. Similarly Daske and Gebhardt (2006) have used annual report contests 
published in the Capital, Focus Money, Bilanz, and Trends Magazines in German, Switzerland 
and Austria. 
 
The utilization of a professional measure in determining the firms ratings seem to reduce the 
inherent subjectivity problems in the disclosure index developed by the researcher. The 
award winning processes are normally performed by professional accounting bodies, 
standard setters, journalist, financial analysts and others. Therefore, the professional 
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evaluations and judgements on the firm’s disclosure policy are supposed to be superior as 
compared to the self-developed disclosure index.  
 
Investor Relations (IR) Magazine Awards 
As stated in Chapter 3 (research methodology section), the IR Magazine Award is used as one 
of the proxies for disclosure quality in this current study. The IR Magazine Award is 
particularly different as compared to other awards because the winners is based on the vote 
of the large number of analyst, while other award, such as AIMR Ratings in the US, the 
winners are determined by a group of analyst specialised in certain industry. The 
identification of winners in the case of AIMR Ratings is questionable, in the sense that analyst 
might have a narrow view and prone to vote on firms they engage per se. In the case of 
NACRA award in Malaysia, the winners are determined by a group of panel adjudicators, from 
professional accounting bodies in Malaysia. The drawback of this NACRA award is because 
their winners are determined by indirect users of accounting information (i.e., professional 
bodies), and ignored the capability of financial analyst, which is view as more knowledgeable 
about the value relevant of information provided by the firms. Thus, the IR Magazine Award 
can be seen as more credible as compared to other financial reporting award since the 
winners are determined based on vote cast by analyst. 38 
 
                                                          
38
 Detail explanation and justification about the IR Magazine Awards is provided in the Chapter 3 (research 
methodology section).    
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AIMR Ratings 
Numerous US studies have employed AIMR ratings as a measurement of disclosure quality 
(e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Sengupta, 1998). Nevertheless, this present study is not able 
to utilize AIMR database because the rating was discontinued from 1997 (Core, 2001). The 
AIMR rating was prepared by a panel of adjudicators consisting of a group of analyst which 
specialised in certain areas of industry. There are the three components of disclosure that 
were evaluated. These are annual published information, quarterly and other published 
information, as well as investor relations and related aspects. The score from each 
component will be averaged and will represent the total score for the company (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993, p. 253). 
 
It is important to highlight that AIMR data is also exposed to critics because the evaluation 
was made according to analysts’ judgements. Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 426) argue on the 
AIMR ratings’ credibility specifically related to quality of the analyst feedback, the sample 
selection process and the bias conveyed to the ratings which are virtually unknown. 
Nonetheless, Lang and Lundholm (1993, p. 255) claim that industry analysts are the perfect 
evaluators of the firms disclosure since they are the primary users of the information 
provided by the firms. Furthermore, the responsibility to score the firms was delegated to a 
group of industry analysts, not individual analysts, thus reducing and controlling the bias 
rather than increasing in size.  
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Center for Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) 
If the AIMR rating was focused on firms in the US capital market, the international annual 
report ratings which was published by Center for Financial Analysis and Research’s (CIFAR) in 
1995 covered more than 40 countries worldwide in their analysis – it was based on cross 
sectional data and unfortunately is not available beyond 1995 (Khanna et al., 2004, p. 483). 
 
In determining the score, CIFAR scrutinise around 1000 annual reports of leading firms from 
numerous countries (Bushman et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the CIFAR score is also subject to 
bias from several perspectives. Daske and Gebhardt (2006, p. 468) for example disputed on 
the level of independence of the financial analysts and the bias that they bring in assigning 
the score. In addition, Miller (2004) also highlighted that the index used by CIFAR 1995 is less 
credible because it includes some insignificant items like company telephone numbers. 
Nevertheless, Hope (2003) found that CIFAR data is reliable based on the test that he 
conducted. Moreover, the systematic bias like the financial analysts’ seriousness in answering 
the interview/questionnaire or the level of analysts’ independence are something 
unavoidable and if we try to switch the financial analysts with other users of annual reports 
for example, the same bias will exist (Barrett, 1975). Therefore, the awareness of all these 
biases is important and any conclusion drawn should be carefully interpreted.  
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Other annual report awards 
Besides the AIMR database and CIFAR score, there are also other types of annual report 
contest used by prior researchers. Daske and Gebhardt (2006) for example employed the 
annual report contest held in several European countries. The list of annual report winners 
were published in Capital and Focus Money Magazines in Germany, Bilanz Magazine in 
Switzerland and Trend Magazine in Austria. These types of events were held annually and 
provide longitudinal data that can be used in a study.  
 
The annual report competition has been conducted in Malaysia since 1994, namely the 
National Annual Corporate Report Award (NACRA). The winners of the annual report awards 
received a trophy and certificates of achievement as an appreciation of perseverance in 
enhancing the quality of corporate annual report. This programme is organised by four 
important organizations in Malaysia, that are the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), 
Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), Malaysian Institute of 
Management (MIM), and Malaysian stock exchange, Bursa Malaysia. The same type of 
awards also has been implemented in Hong Kong since 1973 named as Hong Kong 
Management Association (HKMA) Best Annual Report Awards. Other types of award include 
The Investor Relations (IR) Magazine Awards which have been conducted in various countries 
including US, UK, European countries, Hong Kong and Canada for several years and are still 
available until this research is written.  
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Boesso (2003) claimed that The IR Magazine Award is a reliable proxy in evaluating the firms 
overall disclosure policy. The IR Magazine Award is a comprehensive disclosure quality 
measures in the sense that it covers not only the annual report, but also other forms of 
disclosure including analyst briefing/meeting, the firm’s investor relation activities, internet 
reporting and many more. Therefore, besides of employing the disclosure index (which 
comprise of the forward looking keywords) in evaluating the firms disclosure quality, The IR 
Magazine Award will also used in this present study in assessing the extent of the firms 
disclosure policy.  
 
(c) Management earnings forecast 
As an alternative to the disclosure index and awards in determining the quality of disclosure, 
the management earning forecast also has been used by past researchers (e.g. Cox, 1985; 
Waymire, 1985; Lev and Penman, 1990; Penman, 1980; Miller and Piotroski, 2000, 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Considering the advantages of management earning forecasts, 
Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 426) claim that management earnings forecast precision can be 
simply measured using the actual earnings realization. In addition, they also emphasize that 
the timing of disclosure also can be easily identified. Therefore, the process undertaken to 
ensure the accuracy of management earning forecasts does not pose a serious problem. In 
addition, Penman (1980, p. 157) also documented evidence that management earnings 
forecasts can be considered as a relevant information to the firms valuation as well as for 
making economic decisions.       
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Nevertheless, the accuracy and reliability of management earnings forecasts is under 
question by many empirical works (Penman, 1980, p. 133). Stein (1998) highlighted two types 
of noises in management earnings forecasts that are (i) moral hazard problems and (ii) 
adverse selection. In explaining the moral hazard problem, he emphasized that the managers 
have an opportunity to issue bias earnings forecasts in the annual report as to suit their 
needs, wants and desires. Furthermore, the adverse selection also will occur if “investors 
anticipate biased forecasts and rationally discount the information” (Stein, 1998, p. 197).  
 
Keeping aside the aforementioned biases, it is also important to note that the accuracy of 
management earnings forecasts can be manipulated by the firms and managers. Kasznik 
(1999) seminal work confirms that the accuracy of management earnings forecasts are 
influenced by earning management activity, whereby the managers are found to practice 
income decreasing and income increasing methods in achieving the desired earnings figure. 
Therefore, it seems that the utilization of management earnings forecasts as a proxy of 
disclosure quality is something irrelevant because it is exposed to manipulation and 
exploitation by the managers and the firms. Hence, the management earnings forecast will 
not be included as one of the proxy for disclosure quality in this study.  
 
(c) Others 
Besides of management earnings forecast, analyst earnings forecast has also been used as a 
proxy for disclosure quality by prior studies (e.g. Byard et al., 2006; Bhat et al 2008). Although 
analyst forecast accuracy is also subject to similar bias as in management earnings forecast, 
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nonetheless the bias is expected to be lower given that the analyst forecast accuracy, 
however is determined by the financial analyst (i.e., the independent external party) and 
released by several group of analysts, hence is viewed as less bias and more objective than 
management earnings forecast. Some recent study like Lang and Marfett (2011) employ 
analyst following, analyst forecast accuracy and earnings management as a proxy for 
disclosure quality.  
 
2.16 Earnings Management measures 
a. How managers engage in earnings management 
 
Managers can opportunistically manipulate earnings given that there is a space for manager 
to exercise discretionary judgement over the selection of the acceptable accounting choices 
(e.g. Fields et al. 2001; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Teoh et al. 1998). Ronen and Yaari (2008) 
discussed that earnings management can be performed by altering the accruals (the different 
between revenues and cash). Given that the motives of earnings management by managers 
are vary, hence, managers can opportunistically manage earnings in various ways. Jiambalvo 
(1996, p. 40) summarised various approaches to manipulate earnings into two groups namely 
(i) real decision and (ii) pure accounting decisions and (iii) combination of real and pure 
accounting decision.  
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Table 2-2: Alternative approaches to manipulation 
 “Real decisions” (operating, financing and investment decisions undertaken 
primarily to manage earnings as opposed to directly increasing firm value) 
  
 Operating decisions 
 Delay or accelerate research and development expenditures 
 Delay or accelerate maintenance expenditures 
 Delay or accelerate sales 
  
 Financing decisions 
 Early extinguishment of debt 
  
 Investment decisions 
 Sales of securities to affect gains and losses 
 Sales of fixed assets to affect gains and losses 
  
“Pure accounting decisions” (no direct, first-order effect on cash flows)  
 Change in accounting principles (e.g., change to straight-line depreciation) 
 Change in useful life of fixed assets 
 Change in estimate of residual value of fixed assets 
 Change in policy regarding capitalising-expensing repairs 
 Adjust estimate of bad debts expense 
  
Combinations of “real” and accounting decisions 
 Select LIFO and manage purchases 
 Source: Verbatim from Jiambalvo (1996, p. 40) 
 
A variety of earnings management detection techniques put a question mark as to which 
method is outperforming the others. Zhou and Lobo (2001) employ the modified Jones model 
proposed by Dechow (1995) to identify discretionary accruals, while Shaw (2003) utilized a 
model suggested by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) to detect the existence of earnings 
management practices via discretionary accrual. Other studies, such as Lapointe-Antunes et 
al. (2006) select cross-sectional Jones model, while Jo and Kim (2007) adhere to a model 
proposed by Kothari et al. (2005) which concentrated on performance-matched discretionary 
accruals and discretionary current accruals by Rangan (1998) to identify earnings 
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management involvement. One possible explanation for these apparently various techniques 
to detect earnings management behaviour is because earnings management can be 
performed using several methods, thus different methods need to be used as an alternative 
to capture earnings management behaviour.  
 
Schipper (1989, p. 92) argues that “different forms of accrual-based and “real” earnings 
management are not equally easy to discern”. Furthermore, she claims that “…earnings 
management could occur in any part of the external disclosure process, and could take a 
number of forms” (p. 92). This implies that various methods of earnings management 
measures are not able to promise the accurate and precise detection of earnings 
management activity since opportunistic earnings management can occur in many ways.  
 
Young (1999, p. 833) contends that although earnings management can take place in various 
forms such as asset sales, changes in research and development expenditure, accounting 
method change and accruals, yet accruals is still a magnet of attraction among the managers 
to be manipulated since it is less costly as compared to others. In this instance, DeFond and 
Park (1997) supply evidence that managers prefer to employ discretionary accruals to 
perform earnings smoothing actions. This, in turn, shifts the direction of earnings 
management detection to the component of discretionary accrual, besides other techniques 
of earnings management manipulation. In other words, the detection of earnings 
management activity using current methodology is found to be useful and successful in 
accessing the company’s involvement in earnings management behaviour.  
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Moreover, although earnings management can be performed using several methods, the 
techniques to spot earnings management activity also have been developed in such a way 
that has been proven to be robust across all other methods, hence revealing that the current 
techniques of earnings management detection is able to comprehend the pattern of earnings 
manipulation by managers. 
 
Since earnings management detection techniques are varied and complicated, it is important 
to understand them according to their function and classification. In this instance, Goncharov 
(2005) classify earnings management detection techniques into three main categories namely 
simple analytical procedure, neural network procedures and statistical procedures. Among 
these three types of techniques, Goncharov (2005) argues that statistical procedures are the 
most favourable method to be used in the empirical research, while simple analytical 
procedures are commonly used by the auditor in scrutinising the financial statements during 
audit tasks. With regards to neural network, Goncharov (2005) claims that the neural network 
function is as “to distinguish non-fraudulent statement from fraudulent by construction and 
training of the artificial neural networks” (p. 37).    
   
Whilst scrutinising Goncharov’s (2005, p. 37) statement that “statistical procedures are most 
suitable for research purpose”, this present study will undertake a careful examination on the 
types of statistical procedures in determining the best model to be employed as a proxy of 
discretionary accruals.   
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According to Goncharov (2005, p. 39), statistical procedures consist of three main 
components that are cash flow models, accrual models and combine approach. In the midst 
of these three main models, accrual models are the most popular earnings management 
method among the researchers. Goncharov (2005) divides accrual models into two 
components that are aggregated approach which mainly concentrated to accrual (e.g. Jones 
Model, Modified Jones Model) and the disaggregated approach which is focused on other 
earnings management techniques (e.g. bad debt provision and allowances).  
 
Choi et al. (2001, p. 571) highlighted many bias and noise exist in earnings management 
researches especially related to “choices of scaling variables, selection of affected control 
sample and measurement error”. Specifically, the imperfect earnings management detection 
model suffers from measurement error, and this in turn will lead to bias and inaccurate 
results. In this instance, Kasznik (1999, p. 67) states that “any proxy for discretionary accruals 
is a noisy measure of discretionary accruals”. This argument is also consistent with Kothari et 
al. (2005, p. 164) who claim that “accurate estimation of discretionary accruals does not 
appear to be accomplish using existing models”. The uncontrolled biases environment 
combining with the accurate methodology selection will make the hypothesis accidently 
accepted (Choi et al., 2001, p. 577).   
 
To the best of my knowledge, there are more than twenty earnings management detection 
models offered by the prior literature. Most of the prior research will claim that their model is 
the best and outperformed others according to their empirical findings. The contradictory and 
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inconsistent view by the previous researchers put a question mark on which earnings 
management method is the most favourable method. Furthermore, the arguments by Kasznik 
(1999) and Kothari et al. (2005) with regards to the non-existence of a single perfect model 
make the selection process more complicated. In discussing multiple methods in accounting 
research, Cooke (1998, p. 209) contends that “…no one procedure is the best but that 
multiple approaches are helpful to ensure that the result are robust across methods”. 
However, inspired by recent study by Dechow et al. (2010) whom reviewing 300 papers on 
earnings management determinants and consequences, claim that Jones (1991) Model, 
Modified Jones (1995) Model, and Performance-Matched Discretionary Accruals Model by 
Kothari et al. (2005) are the top three in the list of the most commonly used measures for 
earnings management.39 Hence, this study employ Modified Jones (1995) as the main proxy 
for earnings management, while Jones (1991) model and Performance-adjusted discretionary 
accruals will be used as in the sensitivity analysis test.  
 
Modified Jones (1995) Model and Jones (1991) Model 
As mentioned before, Dechow et al. (2010) classified the Jones (1991) Model and the 
Modified Jones (1995) Model are the most popular techniques in detecting earnings 
management. As in Jones (1991), Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Bartov et al., (2001), the 
non-discretionary accruals (NDA) in Jones (1991) model are stated below:  
 
NDAt = α1(1/LTA) + α2(ΔREVt/LTA) + α3(PPEt/LTA) 
                                                          
39
 The benefits and drawbacks of these models are discussed in detail in Dechow et al. (2010) study.  
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Where NDAt is the non-discretionary accrual in the year t divided by lagged total assets, ΔREVt 
represent change in revenue in the year t (current year revenue minus last year revenue) and 
PPEt is the gross property, plant and equipment at the end of t. Jones (1991) divided all 
components with lagged total assets (LTA) to reduce heteroskedasticity. Jones (1991) argues 
that the inclusion of change in revenue and property plant and equipment in the model is “to 
control for changes in non-discretionary accruals caused by changing conditions” (p. 211). The 
coefficient parameters (α1, α2 and α3) are obtained by performing OLS Regression using this 
equation: 
 
TA/LTA =b1(1/LTA) + b2(ΔREVt/LTA) + b3(PPEt/LTA) + et 
 
Where TA is total accrual and e is error term. Later, Dechow et al. (1995) improved Jones 
(1991) model by incorporating ΔRECt (current year receivables minus previous year 
receivables) element in the model. The NDA according to Dechow (1995) version can be 
stated as follow:  
 
NDAt = α1(1/LTA) + α2(ΔREVt - ΔRECt /LTA) + α3(PPEt/LTA) 
 
The effectiveness of Jones (1991) model and Modified Jones (1995) model have been 
documented across other various methods in a variety of sample settings and have been 
strongly recommended by the researchers. For example, Dechow et al. (1995) suggested that 
the modified Jones model is the best earnings management detection measure after 
reviewing its performance across four different sets of sample in their study, in line with 
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Peasnell et al. (2000) and Young (1999). This is also supported by Guay et al. (1996) who 
reports that the Jones and the modified Jones model “appear to have the potential to provide 
reliable estimates of discretionary accruals”. Besides, Goncharov (2005, p. 70) suggests that 
“... the most suitable research instruments are still the Jones-type models”. This, in turn, will 
motivate the researchers to employ the Jones model and modified Jones model as 
discretionary accruals proxies in their studies since these models offer less measurement 
error. In this instance, “cross-sectional versions of the standard-Jones and modified-Jones 
models now dominate the earnings management literature” (Peasnell et al., 2000, p. 315).  
 
Dechow et al. (1995, p. 199) claim that modified Jones (1995) model improve estimation 
parameters by Jones (1991) given that the Jones (1991) model ignored the potential 
discretionary factors of revenue; hence will create a measurement error to the discretionary 
accruals. Furthermore, Young (1999, p. 857) argues that the Jones and modified Jones models 
attempt “to control for non-discretionary accruals related to sales growth and the level of 
depreciable assets”. Therefore, given that Modified Jones (1995) model is more credible than 
Jones (1991) model, it will be employed as a main discretionary accruals proxies in this study.  
 
Performance Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Model 
More recent research by Kothari et al. (2005) used a performance-adjusted discretionary 
accrual model. Kothari et al. (2005) present evidence that their performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals model is more reliable than the Jones and Modified Jones model since 
their model includes a lagged return on assets (LROA) components to control for firm 
103 | P a g e  
 
performance effects. Hence, this present study will also utilise performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals introduced by Kothari et al. (2005) as a third earnings management 
detection model. The performance-adjusted discretionary accrual model offered by Kothari et 
al. (2005) can be stated as follow: 
 
NDAt = α1(1/LTA) + α2(ΔREVt - ΔRECt /LTA) + α3(PPEt/LTA) + LROA 
 
Healy and De Angelo Model 
Although the Jones and modified Jones model is also subject to critique by several studies, 
including McNichols (2000), who denies the effectiveness of these models to detect earnings 
management, the bias and noise brought by other alternative models are even worse. Young 
(1999) for example claims that Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) models are contaminated 
by serious measurement error. On top of that, Young (1999, p. 836) argue that “Healy (1985) 
model is the simplest and most naïve method of estimating discretionary accruals”, thus this 
technique might not be able to capture earnings management engagement by the firms.  
 
Furthermore, Healy’s model offers an assumption that opens critique by other researchers 
whereby this model estimates that “systematic earnings management occurs in every period” 
(Dechow et al. 1995, p. 197). It is obvious that such an assumption is not valid since it does 
not mirror the actual complexity of the business world. Kaplan (1985) argues that the working 
capital accrual will react accordingly with the real economic situation, hence signalling that 
constant estimation of non-discretionary accruals in Healy (1985) assumption is under 
question.  
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With regards to the DeAngelo (1986) model, the assumption that non-discretionary accruals 
are constant over time impairs the credibility of this model. Young (1999, p. 837) argue that 
this “assumption underlying DeAngelo Model is inappropriate for the majority of the firms”. 
This implies that the capability of discretionary the accruals model to absorb the fluctuation in 
the firm’s economic condition is crucial as to as to ensure the robustness of the suggested 
model. In this instance, Dechow et al. (1995, p. 198) argue that “failure to model the impact 
of economic circumstances on non-discretionary accruals will cause inflated standard errors 
due to the omission of relevant (uncorrelated) variables”. Given that these two models are 
less superior than the Jones (1991) Model and Modified Jones (1995) model, the Healy (1985) 
Model and De Angelo (1986) Model are not going to be employed in this present study.  
 
Balance sheet and cash flow approach 
Total accrual is one of the main components in the earnings management calculation. The 
total accrual can be calculated either using balance sheet approach or cash flow approach. All 
components are divided with lagged total assets to reduce heteroskedasticity.  In the balance 
sheet approach, as in Ronen and Yaari (2008, p. 406), total accrual is calculated using this 
formula: 
[Change in current assets – Change in cash] – [Change in current liabilities – Change in 
current maturities of long-term debt – Change in income tax payable] – depreciation and 
amortization expense. 
 
 
While in the cash flow approach, Jo and Kim (2007, p. 572) estimate total accrual as follow: 
 
Earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations – Operating cash flow 
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Hribar and Collins (2002) report that the cash flow approach is superior to the balance sheet 
approach since the later suffers from serious measurement errors. They present evidence 
that the estimation error arising from the balance sheet approach has been transmitted to 
the discretionary accruals (p. 117). Therefore, this mechanical effect would derive the wrong 
findings and conclusion, whereby the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis might be 
significantly influenced by the silent measurement error that exists from the employment of 
the balance sheet approach (Hribar and Collins, 2002). As an alternative to estimating 
accruals, Hribar and Collins (2002)40 suggest the cash flow approach would be a better option 
rather than the balance sheet approach. As such, this present study will employ cash-flow 
approach in calculating the total accruals, rather than a balance-sheet approach.  
 
Since most of the literature  on disclosure quality and earnings management are based on 
single measures of earnings management detection model, to ensure the robustness of the 
result, three earnings management models will be employed – the Jones (1991) model, 
modified Jones model (1995) as well as the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
model according to Kothari et al. (2005). After considering the advantages and disadvantages 
of each earnings management model, these three measures have been chosen due to their 
effectiveness in detecting earnings management. Moreover, the earnings management model 
related to accruals (e.g. Jones, Modified Jones and Performance-Adjusted model) is 
favourable given that it has been shown to be the most popular earnings management 
                                                          
40
 Attempts have been carried out tried to find supporting argument or evidences other than Hribar and Collins 
(2002), but the author regret to inform that the efforts were failed.  
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method among the managers (Dechow et al., 2010; Mohanram, 2003; Perry and Williams, 
1994). 
Table 2-3: Jones-type models 
Panel A: Data modifications 
Model name Author Data 
Time-series models e.g., Jones (1991) Time series data (firm- specific 
regressions) 
   
Cross-sectional models e.g., DeFond/ Jiambalvo 
(1994) 
Panel data (time-series cross-
sectional regression) 
Panel B: Left-hand-side variable modifications 
Model name Author Left-hand-
side variable 
Right-hand-side 
variables 
Total accrual models e.g., Jones (1991) AAt e.g., ΔREVt, PPEt 
Working capital model   
- Teoh et al. model Teoh et al. (1998c) CCAt REVt 
- Margin model Peasnell et al. (2000) CCAt ΔREVt, CRt 
Panel C: Right-hand-side variable modifications 
Model name Author Right-hand-side variables 
Jones model Jones (1991) ΔREVt, PPEt 
Modified Jones model Dechow et al. (1995) (ΔREVt – REC), PPEt 
Cash flow Jones model Shivakumar (1996) ΔREVt, CFOt, PPEt 
Beneish model Beneish (1997) (ΔREVt – ΔRECt), AAt-1, Pt, PPEt 
Accounting process model Garza-Gomez et al. 
(1999) 
CCAt-1, CFOt, CFOt-1, NCCAt-1 
Performance matched model Kothari et al. (2002) (ΔREVt – ΔRECt), ROAt or t-1, PPEt 
Forward looking model Dechow et al. (2003) ((1+k) ΔREVt – ΔRECt), AAt-1, 
GR_Salest, PPEt 
Panel D: Estimation procedure 
Model name Author Estimation procedure 
OLS model e.g.,  Jones (1991) OLS regression 
Kang-Sivaramakrishnan 
model 
Kang and Sivarakrishnan 
(1995) 
Generalised method of 
moments procedure 
   
Source: Verbatim from Goncharov (2005, p. 54) 
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2.17 Corporate Governance Measures 
 
One of the hot topics in corporate governance is related to how it is measures (e.g. Brown et 
al., 2011; Brickley and Zimmerman, 2011). Some studies measure corporate governance using 
individual measures (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006) while some recent studies rely on corporate governance index (e.g. Liu and 
Lu, 2007; Shen and Chih, 2007; Jiang et al., 2008; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bebchuk et al. 
2009).41 Nevertheless, the utilisation of corporate governance index has been widely criticised 
(e.g. Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010; Daines et al. 2010; Brown et al. 2011). Brickley and 
Zimmerman (2010) point out that researchers so far are not knowledgeable enough to 
determine what constitute good or bad governance practice because each corporate 
governance variables are based on different construct, resulting in the wrong classification of 
items in the corporate governance index. Brown et al. (2011, p. 102) point out that corporate 
governance index neglecting the potential substitutive relationship because the scoring 
process is performed based on the assumption that all corporate governance variables are 
complementary. Moreover, they claimed that “the trouble with the construction of 
governance indices is that the methods employed are largely arbitrary, being hampered by 
the fact that we do not have an agreed theory of CG to guide variable construction or to 
indicate which aspects should receive greater weighting”. (p. 104).  
                                                          
41
 Corporate governance index normally developed based on the best practice of corporate governance laid 
down by the regulators. Then, the scoring process is performed by cross checking the index with the firm’s 
governance system. Next, the corporate governance score for each firm is calculated. Because of the labour 
intensive reading is necessary to perform this process, some studies relying on the corporate governance scores 
released by specific regulatory or professional bodies. There are also researches that used Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) to transform corporate governance characteristics into a number of factors (e.g. Larcker et al. 
2007).  
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With the serious methodological shortcoming in hand, it is not surprising to see corporate 
governance literature supplied mixed and contradict results. Of course, there are extensive 
examples related to contradict results in corporate governance research. One simple example 
is the link between independent directors and disclosure. Although most of studies 
hypothesized positive link between external directors and disclosure (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002), some empirical findings offers negative relationship (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003). In this 
regard, Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) also highlighted that increasing percentages of 
independent directors are not always helpful to increase board effectiveness. They claim that 
large percentages of independent directors might not always good for the firms, given that 
they completely dependent on the information supplied to them (where they are in the 
position of less information advantage and less knowledgeable as compared to internal 
directors).  Moreover, Brickley and Zimmerman (2010, p. 239) argue that: 
Adding a director with very similar backgrounds and experience to the board is unlikely to produce 
new insights after reviewing the same material, either for monitoring or advising. This suggests 
that there is no one person who would be an ideal director for all firms, since being ‘‘ideal’’ 
depends on the backgrounds of the other board members and top managers. The ideal next 
director also depends on the specific circumstances facing the firm. Having the ‘‘right mix’’ of 
outsiders can promote productive discussions and monitoring in a confidential setting 
 
In their paper, Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) also discussed about the “six common 
myths in corporate governance” which touches controversial issues in corporate 
governance including the no consensus definitions of corporate governance, the 
indiscernible internal and external governance concept, the explicit roles of 
independent directors, the unidentified of bad and good governance practices, the 
utilisation of governance index as a proxy for sound governance and the  failure to 
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determine the best governance practices based by comparing the one firm governance 
practices with its peer. These suggest that there is a complicated issue in measuring 
corporate governance as discussed by prior literature. Hence, this present study 
decided to use both individual measures and composite measures (i.e., ACQUALTIY and 
ACQUALITYBR) for corporate governance in the present study.  
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3 Disclosure Quality and Earnings Management 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The first project intends to examine how disclosure quality and corporate governance are 
related to earnings management. This topic deserves special attention, given that (i) the 
predictive ability of disclosure and governance to deter earnings management is still 
ambiguous; (ii) the issue of complementary and substitutive relationship between disclosure 
quality and corporate governance to earnings management is still unresolved; (iii) prior 
literature has neglected to control for governance variables when examining the link between 
disclosure and earnings management and (iv) the potential bi-directional relationship 
between disclosure and earnings management has been predominantly ignored in the prior 
literature. While prior studies examine the link between disclosure quality and earnings 
management (e.g. Jo and Kim, 2007; Zhau and Lobo, 2001; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006) and 
corporate governance and earnings management (e.g. Kent et al., 2010; Xie et al., 2003) in 
separate empirical analyses, the present study extends prior literature by examining the 
impacts of both disclosure and governance on earnings management in one model. The 
findings of this project are expected to improve our understanding of the contextual 
relationships and the implications of disclosure and corporate governance choices for 
earnings management behaviour. 
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3.2 The theoretical framework for disclosure quality, corporate governance and 
earnings management 
 
There is a widespread concern in the prior literature with regard to managers’ incentives to 
distort accounting earnings. Managerial incentives to manipulate earnings could be 
predominantly driven by personal motives, especially when earnings are tied to their 
compensation and to rewards such as bonuses, cash compensation or stock options (e.g. 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Healy, 1985; Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; Baker et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, the incentive to engage in earnings management could be imbued with other 
factors that include the desire to beat or meet analyst or management forecasts (e.g. Iatridis 
and Kadorinis, 2009; Kasznik, 1999; Hunton et al., 2006; Cormier and Martinez, 2006; Bartov 
et al., 2004; Payne and Robb, 2000; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Dutta and Gigler, 2002; 
Soffer et al., 2000), given that firms that fail to meet or beat management forecasts will be 
indirectly punished by the capital market players (e.g. Hirst et al., 2003; Matsunaga and Park, 
2001). Managers also inflate earnings to avoid reporting disappointing losses (e.g. Degeorge 
et al., 1999; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Holland and Ramsay, 2003), in order to hype the 
share price during initial public offerings (IPOs) or seasonal equity offerings (SEOs) (e.g. 
DuCharme et al., 2001, Teoh et al., 1998; Rangan et al., 1998), to avoid breaching debt 
covenants (e.g. Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), or due to political pressures and regulatory 
requirements (e.g. Beaver and Engel, 1996; Meyer et al., 2000; Liu et al., 1997; Haw et al., 
2005; Key, 1997: Han and Wang, 1998). Earnings management leads to earnings mispricing by 
the market players and, consequently, distorts the capital market’s information and system.  
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This shortcoming is inherent in the separation of ownership and control that is embedded in 
the agency relationship, which leads to a conflict of interest and information asymmetry 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Prior studies argue that the incentives for managers to commit 
earnings management is dependent on the extent of a firm’s disclosure transparency and 
corporate governance (e.g. Cormier and Martinez, 2006; Shen and Chih, 2007; Jo and Kim, 
2007) and that these are means to overcome the problem. Disclosure and corporate 
governance are monitoring tools that operate within a firm’s governance system and which 
are potentially useful for reducing information asymmetry and, therefore, reducing the 
agency cost (Holm and Schøler, 2010; Hope and Thomas, 2008; Arcot and Bruno, 2011). Given 
that earnings management is one form of agency cost (Davidson et al., 2004), the present 
study assumes that the firms with lower earnings management will have sound corporate 
disclosure and corporate governance.  
 
Agency theory views disclosure as one form of external monitoring mechanism that is 
potentially useful in reducing information asymmetry and, hence, reducing the agency cost 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Evidence from the empirical literature suggests that increased 
disclosure can have two contradictory consequences: (i) it reduces information asymmetry 
(e.g. Peterson and Plenborg, 2006; Welker, 1995; Coller and Yohn, 1997; Brown and Hillegist, 
2003) and (ii) it increases earnings management (e.g. Cormier and Martinez, 2006; Hunton et 
al., 2006; Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009; Kasznik, 1999). However, the latter is conditional upon 
forecasting disclosure, such as the management and analyst earnings forecasts. 
Correspondingly, it is unclear whether disclosure is mitigating or motivating earnings 
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management (Riahi and Arab, 2011), although causality is another main concern that plagues 
the relationship between disclosure and earnings management.  
 
In relation to the predictive ability of corporate governance, agency theory views the 
corporate governance mechanism as one of the classical antidotes that are important in order 
to reduce conflict of interest and information asymmetry (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Ingley et 
al., 2004; Brennan, 2006). An indication of sound internal governance includes a well-
governed board and audit committee, which potentially encourage the reduction of agency 
costs in a firm by means of monitoring activities (e.g. Maher and Andersson, 2000; Mueller, 
2006; Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2007). With respect to the potential of 
corporate governance for deterring earnings management, Kent et al. (2010, p. 175) state 
that: 
Corporate governance mechanisms are also likely to mitigate unintentional accruals estimation 
errors. Sound governance should ensure that necessary controls and sufficient expertise are at 
hand to ensure that accruals estimates are reliably determined. For example, sound 
governance should increase the probability that adequately trained and qualified personnel 
are involved in decision making related to the provision of accounting information to 
management, or to ensure that sufficient controls are in place to detect reporting 
misstatements. 
 
Given that both disclosure and internal governance are subject to a cost and benefit trade-off, 
they may be complementary or substitutive in constraining earnings management. Each of 
the components of corporate governance are interrelated and endogenously chosen, and 
they are largely determined by the relative cost and benefit that they contribute in reducing 
the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Brick et al., 2008, p. 3; Cornett 
et al., 2009). Internal (e.g. board of directors and audit committee) and external (e.g. 
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disclosure) governance variables are expected to provide monitoring services to the firms 
(Brown et al., 2011; Jensen and Smith, 1985; Weir et al., 2003). Therefore, they reduce the 
information asymmetry between agent and principal as well as reducing the related agency 
cost. Each of them contributes, to a different extent, in the reduction of information 
asymmetry and the cost of capital. This suggests that certain governance variables might be 
outperformed by other governance variables in the system (Holm and Schøler, 2010; Brick et 
al., 2008). In light of the above discussion, Holm and Schøler, (2010) conclude that 
“differences in corporate governance mechanisms may be explained by inherent differences 
in corporate governance systems including institutional structures, differences in the 
functioning of seemingly substitution corporate governance mechanism, as well as 
differences in company specific characteristics affecting the appropriateness of given 
corporate governance mechanism” (p. 44). They also point out that the variation in corporate 
governance practices by firms is largely dependent on the unique needs, specific agenda and 
necessity of each firm. This suggests that corporate governance mechanisms are not perfectly 
substitutive for each other. Contrary to this view, Arcot and Bruno (2011, p. 4) conclude that a 
firm’s variation in governance practices is particularly influenced by the desire to “extract the 
private benefit”. Arcot and Bruno (2011) claim that disclosure and corporate governance are 
substitutive; hence, the adherence to either one of these two components are basically 
effective in enhancing corporate performance, given that they demonstrate that a firm’s 
performance is increased with either sound disclosure quality or corporate governance. 
Where the view is held that corporate governance is surrounded by multiple unresolved 
myths (Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010), it is not surprising to see no concrete evidence on 
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either the complementary or substitutive relationship within a specified governance system.42 
Firms also may use their own unique mechanism to mitigate agency cost (Bebchuk and 
Hamdani, 2009; Holm and Schøler, 2010; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Therefore, 
compliance with the corporate governance code is not necessarily effective in curbing 
earnings management (Kent et al., 2010) or increasing performance (e.g. Arcot and Bruno, 
2006b). Due to these complexities, the current study is motivated to investigate the potential 
complementary or substitutive link between disclosure and corporate governance in 
constraining earnings management. Moreover, causality factors will also be taken into 
account using a simultaneous system of equation in order to enable further understanding of 
the direction of the relationship between disclosure and earnings management.  
 
3.3 Literature review on disclosure quality and earnings management 
 
Prior studies on earnings management and disclosure quality are very limited, especially from 
settings outside of the US. Zhou and Lobo (2001), Hunton et al. (2006) and Jo and Kim (2007) 
focus on the US capital market, while Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006) concentrate on the Swiss 
regime. Other research by Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009) is based on the UK context, while 
Bauer and Boritz’s (2009) study is based on a Canadian sample. Recently, Riahi and Arab 
(2011) examined the influence of disclosure and earnings management in Tunisia.  
 
                                                          
42
 Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) extensively explained 6 myths in corporate governance, including its 
definitions, its measurements, what constitutes “bad” and “good” governance and the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms.  
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As well as the lack of evidence, the major drawback of prior research in disclosure quality and 
earnings management lies in the issue of model misspecification. Research in this area has 
neglected the possible predictive ability of corporate governance in deterring earnings 
management (e.g. Jo and Kim, 2007; Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 
2006; Riahi and Arab, 2011; Zhau and Lobo, 2001). As such, research that controls for 
governance variables when examining the association between disclosure quality and 
earnings management deserves merit because it provides evidence on the joint impact of 
corporate governance and disclosure in curbing earnings management. Moreover, except in 
the cases of Zhau and Lobo (2001) and Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006), previous studies paid 
no substantial attention to the endogeneity related to the causality of the relationship 
between disclosure quality and earnings management. Prior research also predominantly 
used contemporaneous data (e.g. Riahi and Arab, 2011; Jo and Kim, 2007; Iatridis and 
Kadorinis, 2009; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006). In these cases, where no lagged data is 
incorporated in the model, they indicate poor efforts to cater for simultaneity. 
 
Another important issue worth mentioning is in regard to the proxies for disclosure quality. 
While Zhau and Lobo (2001) employ AIMR Ratings per se as a proxy for disclosure quality, 
Riahi and Arab (2011) and Jo and Kim (2007) focus on press releases by the firms. Lapointe-
Antunes et al. (2006) rely on a disclosure index and compliance to accounting standards, 
while Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009) focus on voluntary disclosure. While it has been widely 
acknowledged that disclosure quality proxies are subject to bias and measurement error, it is 
critical to use more than one measure in order to see the impact of disclosure choices on 
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earnings management. Accordingly, none of the prior literature in this area has employed 
Investor Relation Awards, forward-looking sentences and analyst forecast accuracy as proxies 
for disclosure quality when examining the link between disclosure and earnings management. 
Although the disclosure quality proxies used in the present study are far from perfect, at least 
they provide some certainty with respect to the firms’ disclosure choices.   
 
Riahi and Arab’s (2011) study of 19 Tunisian firms during the year 1999-2008 demonstrates 
that disclosures that are related to financial decisions and performance are helpful in 
reducing managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings. Specifically, Riahi and Arab (2011) find 
that press releases (a proxy for disclosure transparency) and disclosure of financial 
information shows statistically significant relationship at p<0.01 (coef = -0.004) and p<0.05 
(coef = -0.215) respectively. Non-financial information, however, indicates insignificant 
results. Although Riahi and Arab (2011) control for blockholders and managerial ownership, 
they fail to control for internal governance variables, including board and audit committee 
characteristics that are presumed to be inversely linked to earnings management.  
 
In determining the simultaneity relationship between disclosure quality and earnings 
management, Zhou and Lobo (2001) concentrate on US firms during 1990-1995. In their 
study, disclosure quality is measured using AIMR Ratings, while earnings management is 
estimated using the Modified Jones Model. Zhau and Lobo (2001) tackle causality issues using 
a simultaneous system of equation. Using the earnings management model, they control for 
firm size, leverage, current performance and future performance; while, in the disclosure 
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quality equation, they control for firm size and market adjusted stock return. None of the 
corporate governance variables was used to control for both earnings management and 
disclosure, although the potential of corporate governance for enhancing disclosure and 
curbing earnings management has been widely discussed in the prior literature (e.g. Kent and 
Stewart, 2008; Goodwin et al., 2009; Kent et al., 2010). Several control variables (e.g. audit 
quality, profitability, and corporate governance) were neglected. These shortcomings indicate 
that their models suffer from a serious misspecification bias. As far as their findings are 
concerned, they reveal a negative bi-directional relationship between disclosure and earnings 
management. This implies that causality can run in both directions. Disclosure is negatively 
related to earnings management and earnings management is inversely associated with 
disclosure, at the same time.   
 
Another US piece of research on disclosure and earnings management, Hunton et al. (2006), 
is a quantitative study that relies on a thought experiment in order to identify managerial 
decisions in specific circumstances. Specifically, Hunton et al. expected that managers would 
try to achieve or exceed analyst’s earnings estimates by manipulating the sale of available-
for-sale (AFS) shares held by the firms. Moreover, also it was also predicted that a higher 
quality of disclosure, specifically with regard to earnings, would effectively reduce managers’ 
propensity to exploit the sale of AFS shares in order to achieve or exceed analyst’s earnings 
estimates. Using 62 financial executives and 3 chief executive officers as a sample, Hunton et 
al. (2006) demonstrate that the respondent’s selection of the specific sale of AFS shares was 
to satisfy financial analyst’s earnings estimates. By and large, this implies that earnings 
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management activity is commonly used by financial executives in the US. Furthermore, 
respondents also pointed out that earnings management activity would be easily detected in 
a high disclosure quality environment as compared to low disclosure quality regimes, thereby 
suggesting that high quality disclosures promote lower earnings management activity in the 
US.   
 
Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006) examined the relationship between disclosure quality and 
earnings smoothing as well as the implication of disclosure quality to the value relevance of 
earnings, in the Swiss context. By treating disclosure quality as endogenous, the 3SLS 
regression shows a significant negative relationship between disclosure quality and income 
smoothing. On the other hand, discretionary accruals are positively related to value relevant 
of information, at p<0.01. Nonetheless, in endogenising disclosure quality proxies, it is 
important to note that their study fails to control for board and audit committee 
characteristics in the disclosure quality equation. The influence of board and audit committee 
characteristics is extensively acknowledged by prior studies (e.g. Nelson et al., 2010; Kent and 
Stewart, 2008).  
 
In their 2007 study, Jo and Kim hypothesised that disclosure frequency is inversely related to 
earnings management. Furthermore, it was predicted that consistent disclosure policies 
would help to increase a firm’s performance subsequent to the security offerings. After 
controlling for confounding effects, Jo and Kim (2007) find that there is a negative 
relationship between disclosure frequency and earnings management, and this result is 
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robust across other earnings management measures. Moreover, Jo and Kim (2007) document 
that the firms which increase the disclosure frequency around the time of security offerings 
subsequently show a good performance, according to their market return. This finding implies 
that a firm’s effort to enhance the extent of disclosure prior to security offerings was 
rewarded by higher market returns in the capital market.  
 
In their UK study in (2009), Iatridis and Kadorinis empirically examine the relationship 
between earnings management and voluntary disclosure. Using cross-sectional data for 131 
UK firms during the year 2007, the results reveal that voluntary disclosure is negatively 
related to earnings management at p<0.10. Even though the OLS regression captured 
important variables such as operating cash flow, market value, profitability and leverage, it is 
important to highlight that none of the internal governance mechanisms are listed. Moreover, 
while longitudinal data is probably useful in providing a better understanding of the 
correlation, establishing causality is also important for the purpose of building a better 
picture of the direction of the relationship. In the small part of their study on investor 
protection and earnings management, Shen and Chih (2007) included a disclosure index as 
one of the control variables for earnings management. Using firms from 48 countries as their 
sample, Shen and Chih (2007) report that there is a significant negative relationship between 
disclosure index and earnings management at p<0.01.  Prior studies of firms in the US, 
Switzerland, Tunisia and the UK capital market produce consistent results with regards to the 
role of disclosure policy in constraining managers to engage in earnings management activity. 
However, as mentioned before, none of them provides proper control for internal corporate 
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governance variables in their models. It remains unclear whether disclosure and internal 
governance provide complementary or substitutive effects in deterring earnings 
management, and to what extent they may be influential in reducing information asymmetry. 
Research so far has been unable to answer this important question. In other words, more 
evidence is necessary to enable an understanding of the impact of disclosure and governance 
choices over earnings management, before any comprehensive conclusion is made.  
 
3.4 Literature review on corporate governance and earnings management 
 
Studies on earnings management and corporate governance are undeniably extensive. The 
majority of them are based on the US capital market, and the US has been widely known as a 
highly regulated country (e.g. Chang and Sun, 2009; Xie et al., 2003; Klien, 2002; Niu, 2006; 
Jiang et al., 2008; Bedard et al., 2004; Zhao and Chen, 2008; Park and Shin, 2004; Zhong et al., 
2007; Chtourou et al., 2001). As such, the findings cannot be easily extrapolated to other, less 
regulated environments like the UK. Although prior research on earnings management and 
corporate governance is all-embracing, majority of them failed to control for the confounding 
effects of disclosure proxy when examining the link between corporate governance and 
earnings management, though the predictive ability of disclosure is intriguing according to 
the previous findings.  
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Nonetheless, special particular credit should be given to Shen and Chih (2007) 43, who 
considered disclosure factors in their research. It is also important to note that the corporate 
governance index, which Shen and Chih (2007) used as a proxy for corporate governance, was 
subject to critiques in the prior literature (e.g. Brown et al., 2011).44 Some other studies (e.g. 
Jiang et al., 2008; Liu and Lu, 2007) also rely on the corporate governance index, which has 
been viewed as less credible than the individual measures given that it had been developed 
based on an unreliable construct.45 Having said this, introducing individual measures of 
corporate governance will hopefully be effective in mitigating the endogeneity that, due to 
the omitted variables, provides little certainty in capturing the internal governance systems of 
a firm.   
 
In relation to Shen and Chih’s (2007) study, their proxy for disclosure quality is measured 
using the “transparency of the financial reports and accounting standard” (p. 1003), which is 
largely dissimilar to the one that is used in the present study. Given that disclosure quality is 
hard to measure, and subject to measurement issues, it is crucial to test the model using 
multiple disclosure quality proxies in order to increase the robustness of the findings. To 
overcome this problem, the present study employs three analyst-related measures for 
disclosure quality, namely the Investor Relation Award, the forward-looking disclosure and 
                                                          
43
 The main variable of interest in Shen and Chih (2007) is the corporate governance index, while disclosure 
quality is one of the control variables in their model.  
44
 See Chapter Two for detailed discussion on the critiques of the corporate governance index/composite 
measures.  
45
 See Chapter Two for detailed discussion on the measurement issues of corporate governance.  
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the analyst forecast accuracy. Furthermore, Shen and Chih (2007) focus on large firms per se 
and, hence, their findings cannot be generalised to small firms.  
 
In a separate but related issue, prior studies also provide inadequate control variables for 
predicting earnings management. For example, Shen and Chih’s (2007) studies fall short due 
to the exclusion of audit quality variables, while Kent et al. (2010) fail to control for leverage. 
In a related vein, Xie et al. (2003) ignore both leverage and audit quality variables in their 
model. In light of the above discussion, it is not surprising to see that prior research in 
corporate governance, disclosure quality and earnings management predominantly offers 
conflicting findings, and suffers from model misspecification bias.  
 
Previous research provides two competing views with regard to the effectiveness of 
corporate governance on constraining earnings management. There is a strand of research 
that supports the proposition that corporate governance is beneficial in reducing managers’ 
propensity to manipulate earnings. From the US viewpoint, Chang and Sun (2009) examine the 
impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to earnings informativeness and earnings management. 
Using 106 firms in 2002-2003, they report that audit committee independence is significant in 
constraining earnings management post-SOX, but insignificant pre-SOX. Moreover, they also 
report that audit committee independence, board independence and CEO duality are positively 
associated with earnings informativeness. Their findings support regulatory initiatives in curbing 
earnings management in the US capital market.  
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Xie et al. (2003) examined the association between the characteristics of board, audit 
committee and executive committee and earnings management (estimated using the 
Modified Jones Model).  Using 282 US firms, they document that board independence, audit 
committee expertise and a higher frequency of board meetings and audit committee 
meetings create less incentive for managers to manipulate earnings. Using the government–
score developed by Brown and Caylor (2006) as proxy for corporate governance, Jiang et al. 
(2008) find an inverse relationship between government-score and discretionary accrual. The 
Bedard et al. (2004) study, which used 300 firms in the US during 1996, reports that audit 
committee independence, board independence and audit committee expertise reduce 
upward earnings management; while board size, ownership by non-executive directors, and 
more experienced members on the board reduce downward earnings management.  
 
Another US study, however, provides contradictory results with regard to the predictive 
ability of corporate governance in curbing the earnings management problem. Zhao and Chen 
(2008) document that lower fraud and accruals are associated with a staggered board (which 
is a proxy for weak governance), thus suggesting that strong board governance is not always 
effective in constraining managers’ propensity to manipulate earnings. This is also supported 
by Park and Shin (2004) who document that the composition of independent directors on the 
board is less important than the tenure of external directors who are more influential in 
constraining earnings management. In addition, the Zhong et al. (2007) US study reports a 
positive association between blockholder ownership and earnings management, thereby 
highlighting a complementary relationship. Moreover, although the Chtourou et al. (2001) US 
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study reveals that audit committees which (i) were comprised of all independent directors 
and with at least one financial expert or (ii) were comprised of all independent directors and 
met at least two times a year were associated with lower earnings management. 
Nonetheless, they fail to find any relationship between audit committee independence (as 
suggested by the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999)) and the percentage of independent 
members on the board and earnings management. As such, firms with sound corporate 
governance practices are also prone to earnings management problems.  
 
While the US studies tend to provide mixed results, studies from the UK provide concrete 
support for the monitoring roles of independent directors in a company. Using research and 
development (R&D) expenses manipulation as a proxy for earnings management, Osma’s 
(2008) UK study records that independent director’s roles are important in constraining 
earnings management. This finding is in corroboration with Habbash et al. in their recent 
(2010) study, using FTSE 350 firms. Moreover, Peasnell et al. (2000) report that the presence 
of independent directors is able to mitigate earnings management in firms with negative 
earnings or below-last-year earnings, although an audit committee member is statistically 
insignificant in influencing earnings management.  
 
In Europe, based on 97 firms in Greece, a recent study by Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) 
suggest that board independence is negatively correlated with discretionary accrual. 
However, Piot and Janin (2007) and Osma and Noguer’s (2007) studies fail to find a significant 
relationship between audit committee independence and earnings management in the 
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French and Spanish context, respectively. Nonetheless, it appears that institutional investors 
are more influential in reducing earnings management, as reported by Osma and Noguer 
(2007).   
 
In Australia, it appears that the audit committee provides a stronger effect in reducing 
earnings management, according to previous literature. Kent et al. (2010) examined the 
relationship between corporate governance and innate and discretionary accrual quality. 
They find that audit committee characteristics (i.e., audit committee independence, 
frequency of audit committee meetings and the number of audit committee members) 
outperform board independence in constraining innate and/or discretionary accrual. In fact, 
board independence showed no significant relationships.  Using Jones (1991) and Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) models as proxies for earnings management, Baxter and Cotter (2009) find that the 
existence of an audit committee is essential in reducing earnings management, although they also 
document that other audit committee characteristics (e.g. audit committee independence, audit 
committee size and audit committee meeting frequency) are insignificant in reducing managers’ 
propensity to manipulate earnings. Their study was based on 309 Australian firms in 2001. Benkel 
et al. (2006) reveal that board and audit committee independence are significantly negatively 
associated with earnings management among large firms in Australia when earnings 
management is measured using DeAngelo’s (1986) model. Similar to Benkel et al. (2006), the 
Davidson et al. (2005) Australian study also reports that board independence and audit 
committee independence has a stronger effect on earnings management than audit quality 
and internal control factors.  
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As well as in the US, UK, Europe and Australia, a long line of empirical research on earnings 
management and corporate governance has also been conducted in other countries including 
China, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia. From the Asian perspective, prior 
studies reveal some mixed findings; however, they generally provide supporting evidence for 
the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. In this instance, 
studies from China (e.g. Liu and Lu, 2006) and Korea (e.g. Kang and Kim, 2011) reveal that the 
corporate governance index reduces earnings management. Having independent directors is 
viewed as effective in mitigating earnings management in China’s capital market (e.g. Lo et 
al., 2010), in Hong Kong (e.g. Jaggi et al., 2009) and in Taiwan (e.g. Kao and Chen, 2004), but 
not in the Malaysian context (e.g. Abdul-Rahman and Ali, 2006). Moreover, while board size is 
an important determinant of earnings management in Taiwan (Kao and Chen, 2004), it has no 
significant effect in Malaysian firms (Abdul-Rahman and Ali, 2006). Contrary to the US and 
Canadian studies (e.g. Klien, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Niu, 2006), Abdul-Rahman and Ali (2006) 
find that audit committee independence are insignificant in constraining earnings 
management.   
 
The contribution of corporate governance to deterring earnings management is obscure. 
Variation is detected over corporate governance preferences, which largely depends on the 
country types, their regulatory requirements, and the unique features of each firm as well as 
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the externalities.46 With respect to variation in corporate governance practices, Holm and 
Schøler (2010, p.33) point out that: 
“…three differences should be considered; (i) corporate governance mechanisms may work 
differently across corporate governance systems; (2) different corporate governance 
mechanisms may not be perfect substitutes within a given corporate governance system; and 
(3) particular corporate governance mechanisms may be more important for some listed 
companies than others”.  
 
 
3.5 Literature review on simultaneity between disclosure quality and earnings 
management 
 
Although section 1.3 of this chapter extensively reviewed the empirical and theoretical 
literature which supports an inverse relationship between disclosure quality and earnings 
management, it is also important to note that reverse causality47 and simultaneity can also 
happen in these circumstances. In this regard, empirical literature offers several studies which 
conjecture income smoothing or earnings quality as one of the main determinants of 
disclosure quality. This signals that causality might run in both directions (e.g. Jans et al., 
2005; Shaw, 2003; Francis et al., 2008; Bouer and Boritz, 2009). In one part of their study, and 
contradicting their hypothesis, Jans et al. (2005) report that income smoothing (measured 
using discretionary accrual) was positively related to disclosure quality when disclosure is 
measured using the Belgian Association of Financial Analysts awards. This study used 222 
firm-years during 1997-2002. Nonetheless, one of the drawbacks of the Jans et al. (2005) 
study is that there is no control sample (i.e., the non-winners of the Belgian Association of 
Financial Analyst award) employed in their study. Another US study, namely Shaw (2003) used 
                                                          
46
 Externalities in this context include culture, religion and belief.  
47
 Reverse causality, in this context, means that causality runs from earnings management to disclosure quality, 
while simultaneity, in this context, means that causality runs from disclosure quality to earnings management 
and from earnings management to disclosure quality at the same time.    
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AIMR Ratings as a proxy for disclosure quality; this was similar to Jans et al. (2005). Shaw’s 
(2003) study reveals an inverse relationship between earnings quality and disclosure quality 
at the 0.04 level, which indicates that firms with sound disclosure quality “are more 
conservative in their accrual choices” (p. 1047). Using 677 US firms, the Francis et al. (2008) 
US study reveals that firms with sound earnings quality48 choose to release better disclosure 
quality information than their counterparts, and consequently reduce the cost of capital.  
 
In examining the potential simultaneous link between disclosure quality and earnings 
management using a simultaneous system of equation, Zhau and Lobo’s (2001) US study 
documents a negative bi-directional relationship between disclosure quality and earnings 
management, suggesting that causality can run in both directions. However, Zhau and Lobo 
(2001) fail to control for audit committee and board characteristics and this leads to a serious 
model misspecification issue.   
 
Bauer and Boritz (2011) predict a negative link between absolute discretionary accruals and 
the winning of corporate reporting awards in Canada. They posit that “[h]igher absolute 
discretionary accruals will cause firms to try to hide their increased earnings management by 
being less transparent in their financial reporting and these firms will be less likely to 
participate. Participating firms with lower absolute accruals are more likely to win an award 
since transparency will increase as accruals (earnings quality) decrease (increase)” (Bauer and 
                                                          
48
 Specifically, Francis et al. (2008) focus on (i) the complementary or substitutive link between disclosure and 
earnings quality and (ii) the disclosure and cost of capital. In their study, one of the proxies used for earnings 
quality is the absolute value of abnormal accruals, which has been widely viewed as one of the popular proxies 
for earnings management.  
130 | P a g e  
 
Boritz, 2011, p. 14). They find that winners and nominated groups are performing better than 
firms that are not involved in the competition, and that they are less engaged in earnings 
management when compared with the non-participant group. Bauer and Boritz (2011) claim 
that the participants involved were determined based on earnings quality criteria but that the 
winners were selected based on higher disclosure in their annual report.  
 
In the light of above discussion, it can be concluded that the causality between disclosure 
quality and earnings management remains unclear. While Bauer and Boritz (2011), Shaw 
(2003) and Francis et al. (2008) report negative links between earnings management and 
disclosure quality, Jans et al. (2005) record a positive relationship. In addition to these 
contradictory findings, Zhau and Lobo (2001) report a bi-directional relationship between 
disclosure quality and earnings management. As such, more research that examines causality 
between disclosure and earnings management is crucial to solve the issue.  
 
3.6 Hypothesis development 
 
3.6.1  Disclosure quality and earnings management 
 
Agency relationship is surrounded by the moral hazard problem that stems from 
shortcomings in information asymmetry (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Earnings management 
manifests a diversion of interest between agent and principal in the gap of information 
asymmetry, which potentially diminishes shareholders’ value (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). In 
order to overcome this problem, investors demand better transparency to equip them with 
relevant knowledge in monitoring the firm (Hope and Thomas, 2008; Jensen and Meckling, 
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1976; Huang and Zhang, 2008; Junker, 2005). In spite of this, managers have superior 
knowledge about a firm’s activities and have greater incentives to disclose or to conceal 
private information from the outsiders (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). In this respect, managerial 
incentives for voluntary disclosure are largely subject to managerial discretion and flexibility 
over the cost and benefit trade-off (Heitzman et al., 2010). This could possibly distort the 
quality of accounting information (Healy and Palepu, 2001), given that it is not intended to 
reduce information asymmetry, but may be driven by other personal factors (Field et al., 
2001). In this complex situation, the roles of capital market intermediaries (e.g. analyst, 
auditor and regulators) are imperative in enhancing the credibility of a firm’s disclosure (e.g. 
Subrahmanyam, 2005; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
 
One of the most important capital market players worth mentioning, in the disclosure and 
earnings management context, is the financial analyst. Although the roles of financial analysts 
are complicated in the sense that they may mitigate earnings management by acting as a 
whistleblower or providing relevant monitoring activities (Dyck et al., 2006; Yu, 2008), or they 
may motivate earnings management when issuing cash flow or earnings forecasts (e.g. 
McInnis and Collins, 2006; Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009). Financial Analysts may also 
(indirectly) collude with managers in earnings management cases (e.g. Lashinsky, 2001) or 
issue a positive recommendation in order to maintain a good relationship with the top 
management in the firms that they cover (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). An extensive prior 
literature, however, supports the view that financial analysts are sophisticated users of 
accounting information whose effect is promising in regard to reducing information 
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asymmetry and deterring agency cost (e.g. earnings management). Given that “perfectly 
credible (or completely unbiased) disclosure by the firms is not optimal because it is too 
costly” Core (2001, p. 443), analyst roles could be helpful in detecting disclosure bias, and 
their perception of a companies’ disclosure activities is a reliable proxy for disclosure quality, 
since it controls for endogeneity.  
 
One possible reason for this complexity is due to the fact that analysts work closely with 
management in collecting private information, and this probably impairs their independence 
(Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Prior literature suggests that analyst following improves a firm’s 
disclosure quality (e.g. Marston, 2008; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Chang et al., 2008) and that 
there is a complementary relationship. Nonetheless, substitutive effects can also occur if an 
analyst uses their ability to uncover and interpret information in the presence of a weak 
disclosure environment. Another view suggests that high disclosure quality increases analyst 
effectiveness in disseminating companies’ information (Ali et al., 2008; Roulstone, 2003).  
 
Analysts are undeniably competent, better equipped and knowledgeable when it comes to 
detecting earnings management behaviour (Gavious, 2007) and they are credible judges of a 
firm’s disclosure policy (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Byard et al., 
2006; Balsam et al., 2002) when compared with the average user of a companies’ 
information. This is due to their ability to access (Lang and Lundholm, 1993) and analyse all 
forms of a company’s disclosure. Since most investors are naïve about companies’ disclosure 
(Skinner, 2003) they depend on analysts in order to make investment decisions (Ronen and 
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Yaari, 2008; Clement and Tse, 2003; Byard et al., 2006; O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Walther, 
1997). Transfers of knowledge from analysts to the capital markets reduces information 
asymmetry (Roulstone, 2003; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Ali et al., 2008), and 
analyst recommendation becomes influential on the decision processes of average investors 
(Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Chung and Kryzanowski, 2001) and institutional investors (Walther, 
1997). With knowledge in hand, investors will indirectly punish firms that are involved in 
earnings management (Gavious, 2007; Teoh et al., 1998; DuCharme et al., 2004), given that 
the investors are more proficient in monitoring agent behaviour (Bushman and Smith, 2001) 
after being indirectly informed by the analyst about companies’ earnings management 
activities (Gavious, 2007). In other words, a high disclosure quality environment will limit 
managers’ propensity to manipulate earnings (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006; Fields et al., 
2001; Hunton et al., 2006; Jo and Kim, 2007) because well informed investors are able to 
detect earnings management (McKee, 2005). This, in turn, will help to reduce managers’ 
propensity to manipulate earnings.  
 
Notwithstanding that the present study relies on the ability of disclosure to reduce 
information asymmetry, in building the hypothesis, the uncertain effects of these two 
variables are also acknowledged. While agency theory recognises the roles of disclosure 
quality in mitigating information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Huang and Zhang, 
2008; Junker, 2005), and this proposition is largely supported theoretically and empirically 
(e.g. Dye, 1985; Welker, 1995; Coller and Yohn, 1997 Peterson and Plenborg, 2006; Brown et 
al., 2004; Brown and Hillegist, 2007), some studies fail to provides concrete evidence of the 
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impact of disclosure quality on information asymmetry (e.g. Kim et al., 2011; Chang et al., 
2008). They, therefore, provide an ambiguous link between disclosure quality and 
information asymmetry.  
 
Jo and Kim (2007) point out that when disclosure quality is high, investors will be better 
informed about a company’s activities, thus, they will be able to detect earnings 
management. Hunton et al. (2006) demonstrate that greater comprehensive income 
disclosure reduces managers’ propensity to manipulate earnings. Given that disclosure 
quality functions as one form of monitoring system that can reduce the conflict of interest in 
the agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1973; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Bushman and 
Smith, 2001), low quality of disclosure deters any monitoring function by the investors (Hope 
and Thomas, 2008) and may increase the moral hazard problem (i.e., earnings management 
behaviour) to a significant degree (Jo and Kim, 2007; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006). In other 
words, high disclosure quality will improve investors’ and analysts’ capabilities for identifying 
earnings management, hence, reducing managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings. 
Consistent with the agency theory framework, that assumes that high disclosure quality 
reduces information asymmetry and enables investors and analysts to detect earnings 
management activity, the present study hypothesises that: 
 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between disclosure quality and earnings 
management.  
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3.6.2  Corporate governance and earnings management 
 
With regard to the association between corporate governance and discretionary accruals, 
Kent et al. (2010) posits that: 
Sound governance should ensure that necessary controls and sufficient expertise are at hand 
to ensure that accruals estimates are reliably determined. For example, sound governance 
should increase the probability that adequately trained and qualified personnel are involved in 
decision making related to the provision of accounting information to management, or to 
ensure that sufficient controls are in place to detect reporting misstatements (p. 175).  
 
As such, the incentives to manipulate earnings are prospectively dependent upon the extent 
of corporate governance practices in firms. Several corporate governance variables will be 
considered in the present study, including board characteristics and audit committee 
characteristics.  
 
3.6.2.1  Board independence and audit committee independence 
 
Independent directors on the board and audit committee are viewed as an investor’s most 
important bastion for the protection of their value (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Habbash, 
2010; Jensen and Meckling, 1987). Such a view can be expressed appropriately through the 
lens of agency theory. Agency theory views independent directors as one of the vigilant tools 
for the monitoring of managerial behaviour. Moreover, independent directors are expected 
to create a sense of balance in the board and they are supposed to make a credible 
judgement on a firm’s financial decisions. An independent director’s role on the board and in 
the audit committee is expected to reduce the conflict of interest, hence, resulting in lower 
earnings management opportunistic behaviours (e.g. Klien, 2002; Bedard et al., 2004). Lanis 
and Richardson (2011) find that the firms with a high proportion of independent directors on 
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the board are unlikely to be involved in tax aggressiveness. Beasley (1996) reveals that firms 
with a high proportion of outside directors are less likely to be involved in fraud. Another 
strand of research records that board independence and audit committee independence are 
statistically significant in preventing managers’ opportunistic behaviour (e.g. Kent et al., 2010; 
Xie et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004; Habbash, 2010). The presence of independent directors 
in the firms has resulted in an increase in the share price (e.g. Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; 
Byrd and Hickman, 1992 and Brickley et al., 1994).  
 
With regard to the effect of the involvement of independent directors on earnings 
management, Armstrong et al. (2010, p. 188) argue that:  
Given that inside directors are typically executives of the firm, and that executives are typically 
knowledgeable parties to fraudulent or irregular accounting activities, inside directors are 
unlikely to be effective monitors of fraudulent accounting activities. Outside directors, on the 
other hand, seem less likely to participate in these perverse activities.  
 
Consistent with the views implied by agency theory, the UK Corporate Governance code 
stipulates that half of the board must be comprised of independent directors (excluding the 
chairman). This indicates that the Code views that the minimum requirement of 50% 
independent directors on the board (excluding the chairman) is necessary to the provision of 
adequate monitoring roles in the company. Furthermore, the code also specifies that all audit 
committee members must be composed of independent directors. This suggests that the 
monitoring of financial matters should be performed exclusively by a team of independent 
directors in an audit committee, without any intervention from non-independent directors. 
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Given that an audit committee is in charge of the financial affairs of a company, independent 
directors in audit committees play a significant role in preventing and detecting any 
irregularities in the financial affairs and financial reporting (e.g. Xie et al., 2003). Prior studies 
hypothesise that independent audit committees are associated with lower earnings 
management (e.g. Xie et al., 2003). Carcello and Neal (2003) report that the presence of an 
independent audit committee provides monitoring tools that curb managers’ intentions to 
terminate the services of auditors who issued a going-concern report to the company. 
Nonetheless, their results are mixed. While Xie et al. (2003) and Kao and Chen (2004) report a 
negative relationship between independent directors and earnings management, Park and 
Shin (2004) and Chtourou et al. (2001)49 fail to find any association between board 
independence and earnings management.  
 
Based on agency theory, that suggests that board independence acts as a watchdog over 
firms’ operations and provides monitoring incentives for reducing earnings management 
activity, the present study hypothesises that:   
 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between board independence and 
earnings management 
H1c: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between audit committee independence 
and earnings management 
 
                                                          
49
 Chtourou et al. (2001) fail to find any relationship between the audit committee with all independent directors 
(as recommended by US Blue Ribbon Committee (1999)) and earnings management. 
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3.6.2.2  Board meeting and audit committee meeting 
 
“The number of meetings is an indicator of the effort put in by the directors” (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008, p. 258); hence, it has received significant attention by the regulator. The Smith 
Report (2003) recommends that audit committee meetings be “held to coincide with key 
dates within the financial reporting and audit cycle” and that they should meet not less than 3 
times in a year (The Combined Code 2003, p. 48).50 This indicates that audit committees 
should devote adequate time to the discussion of matters concerning a firm’s financial affairs 
and auditing. They are, therefore, supposed to have the capacity to focus on earnings 
management issues. On top of that, there is a risk that audit committees might overlook any 
irregularities in the financial statement if the number of meetings is low. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to see that Chtourou et al. (2001) find that audit committees that are comprised of 
all independent directors and that are engaged in more than two meetings in a year are 
negatively associated with earnings management. Beasley et al. (2000) also find that having 
fewer audit committee meetings increases the number of fraud cases in US firms.  
 
With regard to board activity, Chen et al. (2006) reveal that fraud is less likely to occur in the 
firms with greater number of board meetings because they have sufficient time to solve a 
firm’s financial problems. In the same way, Vafeas (1999) claims that a higher number of 
board meetings provides sufficient time for directors to exercise their duty and responsibility 
in line with the shareholders’ interest, and subsequently improve a firm’s performance. Xie et 
al. (2003) point out that audit committees and boards that spend more hours on meeting are 
                                                          
50
 In a similar vein, the US Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) recommended that audit committee meetings should 
be conducted not less than four times in a year. 
139 | P a g e  
 
able to exercise greater monitoring functions, so they are more likely to be able to curb 
earnings management. They report that audit and board meeting frequency are inversely 
related to earnings management. Therefore, the present study hypothesises that:  
 
H1d: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between board meeting and earnings 
management 
H1e: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between audit committee meeting and 
earnings management 
 
3.6.2.3 Board size and audit committee size 
 
The UK corporate governance code (2010) suggests that audit committee members must be 
at least comprised of three independent directors. Nonetheless, the Code does not suggest a 
specific number of board members. Paragraph B.1 the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010, 
p. 12) states that: 
The board should be of sufficient size that the requirements of the business can be met and 
that changes to the board’s composition and that of its committees can be managed without 
undue disruption, and should not be so large as to be unwieldy. 
 
 
Given that the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) is an expression of an agency theory 
overview, the Code indicates that a satisfactory number of board members and a large 
number of audit committee members are favourable as it may enable them to offer greater 
monitoring functions, hence, constraining earnings management behaviour (e.g. Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Xie et al, 2003;). A higher number of board members will stimulate a higher 
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number of independent directors on the board, with vast range of experience and knowledge 
(e.g. Linck et al., 2008; Xie et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1999) and, thereby, increase the board’s 
capability in constraining earnings management. Larger boards offer greater manpower, more 
potential effort and various expertises that are potentially useful for maintaining the quality 
of earnings. A large board size is practical because complicated firms’ operations need to be 
monitored by a large number of people (Coles et al., 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, it is also widely believed that a small board is more effective in monitoring a 
firm’s activity (Coles et al., 2008). Prior studies (e.g. Hoitash et al., 2009; Yermack, 1996; Core 
et al., 1999) suggest that a smaller board is favourable to an increase in the firms’ governance 
process. Unlike the large board, the smaller board is not subject to coordination and free-
rider problems (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992); hence, it is not surprising to find that smaller boards 
are effective in increasing a firm’s performance (Yermack, 1996; Loderer and Peyer, 2002). 
Based on 1097 Taiwanese firms, Kao and Chen (2004) report that large board size is 
associated with higher earnings management, and small board size is associated with lower 
earnings management.  
 
Consequently, Ronen and Yaari (2008, p. 245) point out that “The connection between 
earnings management and board size is not straightforward”. By the same token, Xie et al. 
(2003, p. 300) point out that: 
A smaller board may be less encumbered with bureaucratic problems and may be more 
functional. Smaller boards may provide better financial reporting oversight. Alternately, a 
larger board may be able to draw from a broader range of experience. In the case of earnings 
management, a larger board may be more likely to have independent directors with corporate 
141 | P a g e  
 
or financial experience. If so, a larger board might be better at preventing earnings 
management.  
 
 
Given that there is a competing view with regard to the relationship between board size and 
earnings management, in similarity to Xie et al. (2003), the current study makes no prediction 
on the direction of the relationship between audit committee and board size and earnings 
management. In other words, audit committee size and board size can influence earnings 
management in a positive or a negative direction. Therefore, the present study predicts that:  
 
H1f: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive or negative relationship between board size and 
earnings management 
H1g: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive or negative relationship between audit committee size 
and earnings management 
 
3.6.2.4 Audit committee financial expertise 
 
Paragraph C.3.1 of The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) states that “at least one 
member of the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience”. Hence, the 
Code takes the view that financial expertise is essential in the detection of irregularities and in 
maintaining vigilance over a firm’s financial accounting and reporting. Audit committees that 
are equipped with professional accounting qualifications and experience are more capable of 
carrying out the responsibilities that have set out by the Code. For example, one of the main 
audit committee responsibilities, as stated in the Code, is “to monitor the integrity of the 
financial statements of the company and any formal announcements relating to the 
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company’s financial performance, reviewing significant financial reporting judgements 
contained in them” (Para C.3.2, p. 20). It can be concluded that prior literature suggests that 
having an audit committee with relevant financial expertise is helpful in the mitigation of 
financial misstatement (Abbott et al., 2002) and is able to constrain managers’ behaviour by 
reducing earnings management (Chtourou et al., 2001; Carcello et al., 2008; Xie et al., 2003).  
 
Audit committee expertise is also effective in promoting higher accrual quality (Dhaliwal et 
al., 2010) and enables more vigilance with respect to preventing management from carrying 
out the intention of dismissing an auditor that has issued a going concern report (Carcello and 
Neal, 2003). Moreover, Hoitash et al. (2009) document that those firms with audit committee 
members who have a background in accounting and supervisory roles are less likely to release 
the disclosure of material weaknesses. Therefore, the present study hypothesises that:  
 
H1h: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between audit committee expertise and 
earnings management. 
 
3.6.3  Simultaneity between disclosure quality and earnings management 
Although, in the previous section, the present study predicts a negative relationship between 
disclosure quality and earnings management, it is important to note that this might not apply 
in all circumstances. In reality, firms with aggressive earnings management might also tend to 
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provide impressive levels of disclosure to outsiders.51 A manager’s cognitive ability in running 
a complex business operation can also be used to successfully manipulate earnings 
(Subrahmanyam, 2005). Moreover, it is also possible that firms with high earnings 
management tend to disclose less information in order to make earnings management less 
visible and harder to detect. This implies that a simultaneity relationship between disclosure 
quality and earnings management may be indicated. 
 
Zhau and Lobo (2001) point out that there is a potential simultaneity bias in the disclosure 
quality and earnings management relationship. They argue that:  
Our hypothesis that corporate disclosure and earnings management are negatively related is 
based upon the relations of each of these variables to information asymmetry. Whether 
management’s disclosure decision results from its desire to allow itself flexibility to manage 
earnings, or whether management’s ability to manage earnings results from its choice of 
disclosure policy is unclear. Both of these cause and-effect relations are feasible, suggesting 
that corporate disclosure and earnings management decisions are likely to be jointly 
endogenously determined (p. 10). 
 
In a related issue, and in spite of the fact that a negative relationship between disclosure 
quality (measured using analyst forecast accuracy) and earnings management is conjectured 
in the current study, it is also important to highlight that one of the incentives to manipulate 
earnings is to meet or beat analyst forecasts (e.g. Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009; Hunton et al., 
2006)52. It is presumed that reverse-causality or co-determination between disclosure quality 
and earnings management could occur. On top of that, such a complex association is not 
surprising given that endogeneity has been widely known as an endogenous variable (e.g. 
                                                          
51
 For example, Enron and WorldCom won several of disclosure award and at the same time as being involved in 
serious earnings fraud.  
52
 Refer to Chapter Two for detail on the paper that demonstrates a positive relationship between earnings 
management and analyst forecasts.  
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Clinch and Verrecchia, 2011; Brown et al., 2011; Armstrong et al., 2010). Hence, as the next 
hypothesis in this project, the present study predicts that:  
 
H1i: There is a simultaneous relationship between disclosure quality and earnings 
management.  
 
In the light of the above discussion, it is understood that the relationship between disclosure 
quality and earnings management is not straightforward. The possibility of reverse causality 
and co-determination lead to an inconsistent OLS regression. Therefore, when examining the 
possible simultaneity relationship between disclosure quality and earnings management, the 
2SLS regression is applied, as it has also been in Cornett et al. (2009) and Zhau and Lobo’s 
(2001) studies.   
 
3.7 Research methodology 
 
3.7.1 Sample 
 
The list of winners and those firms nominated by the IR Magazine Award was obtained from 
the Investor Perception Study research report, which is produced by the Cross Border Group 
Ltd. In the present study, the winners and first runner-ups for each award in the IR Magazine 
UK Award in the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 were selected to represent firms with a 
high quality of disclosure. The 2nd runner-ups were not selected for the following reasons: (1) 
Since this study  was going to  use a match-paired sample, a selection of control samples with 
multiple criteria might have been problematic when the main sample  would have been large, 
145 | P a g e  
 
therefore, using the winners and 2nd runners up, the determinants of the control sample  
were deemed more feasible and realistic; (2) the number of the sample  was sufficient and 
reasonable for the statistical analysis procedures to be conducted and (3) prior literature on 
disclosure quality normally uses a small sample due to the time consuming and labour 
intensive reading required by the content analysis method.53 Most prior studies use a sample 
of around 100 firms: Ghazali and Weetman, 2006 (87 firms); Haniffa and Cooke, 2002 (139 
firms); Boesso and Kumar, 2006 (72 firms); Eng and Mak, 2003 (158 firms); Chen and Jaggi, 
2000 (87 firms); Raffournier, 1995 (161 firms) and Depoers, 2000 (102 firms). Therefore, the 
sample of 145 match-paired firms (290 firms) is greater than that used in most of the prior 
literature in this area. Although computerised content method analysis was used in this 
present study as a substitute for traditional content method analysis, the use of 
computerised content method analysis also requires the researchers to read line by line, to 
delete unnecessary items in each annual report and to manually transfer the total score for 
each keyword for all firms in the sample. In addition, the present study also used the 
traditional content method analysis that is based on the disclosure index, which is reported 
under the validity test of the forward-looking score in the appendix 6.   
 
It is important to note that, even though the second runner-ups were not selected in our 
sample, in order to maintain consistency, these firms were disregarded as control firms in the 
period under observation. After the selection of the winners and first runner-ups had been 
made, the firms operating in financial and other highly regulated industries were removed 
                                                          
53
 Both computerised and traditional content method analysis generally need careful reading of the text, 
although the latter is undeniably demand greater time consumption over the first.   
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from the sample, since they are subject to specific regulations for disclosure and employ 
different types of reporting for accruals in their business activities. This approach is 
consistent with prior research on earnings management (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Klein, 2002) and disclosure quality (e.g. Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Raffournier, 1995; Depoers, 2000; Chan and Jaggi, 2000). Following this, the control sample 
selection process was performed. 
 
The match-paired sample is favourable in the sense that it controls (although not totally 
eliminates) the confounding effects of certain firm characteristics (e.g. industry, size and 
year), thus reducing the potential for the results to be driven by specific firm characteristics 
(Bartov et al., 2001). Moreover, features of these two different groups (winners and non-
winners) could be clearly observed when the match-paired sample is applied. More 
importantly, the match-paired sample is potentially useful to control for endogeneity (Robert 
and Whited, 2011).   
 
The control sample was comprised of the firms that matched the following criteria: (i) same 
year under observation, (ii) same industry, (iii) closest total assets or (iv) not nominated as a 
winner in the year under observation (according to the IR Magazine Award 2008, 2007, 2006 
and 2005). Consistent with Boesso and Kumar (2007), who use a match-paired sample from 
the IR Magazine Award winners in the US, these stringent criteria were applied to control for 
the year, industry and size effect and to ensure that the firms in the test sample would not be 
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selected as the control sample in other years.54 Given that the IR Magazine Award is 
evaluated based on the previous years’ firm performance in investor relations activities, data 
lagged by one year was used in this study. 55The final sample can be illustrated as below:  
 
Table 3-1: Number of match-paired samples (winners and non-winners of the IR Magazine 
Award during the years 2005-2008) 
 
Year Annual Report IR Award Winners IR Award Non winners 
2005 2004 43 43 
2006 2005 43 43 
2007 2006 42 42 
2008 2007 42 42 
Total  170 170 
 
  
                                                          
54
 The t-test was conducted to check the mean differences for total assets in both winner and non-winner 
groups. Results show that there is a significant difference between the means for these two groups at p<0.01. 
Nonetheless, it is argued that finding a perfect match is nearly impossible. This finding is consistent with the 
Peasnell et al. (2007) study that used US IR AWARD as a proxy for investor relation activities. Specifically, in their 
match-paired sample, they acknowledge that there is a huge significant difference in firm size in the winner and 
non-winner groups at p<0.01. However, it is also worth noting that other criteria, such as industry and year, are 
used in determining the control sample. At least this will help to alleviate the weaknesses in the sample selection 
choice, to a certain extent.  
55
 The present study employed contemporaneous data for earnings management, corporate governance and 
disclosure. We noted that endogeneity, due to simultaneity, can be partially solved using lagged independent 
variables (Li, 2011). Nevertheless, the current study relies on the Brown et al. (2011) study, which shows that 
corporate governance data is subject to a stickiness issue. Therefore, the endogeneous nature of 
contemporaneous data is likewise contaminated in lagged data. It is also acknowledged that the disclosure 
policies of a company are rarely changed. We suggest that future research could compare the effect of using 
both lagged and contemporaneous in disclosure quality and corporate governance research, so that the 
implications of stickiness data could be better explained.  
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Table 3-2: The sample selection process 
 
 IR 2008 IR 2007 IR 2006 IR 2005 
Total Winners and 1st Runner-ups 57 57 57 63 
Financial and Highly Regulated Industries (e.g. Banking 
Industry, Investment company, Investment Entity, Life 
assurance, Off shore investment companies & funds, Real 
estate, Specialty and other finance, Other financial and 
Mining)56 
(15) (11) (11) (16) 
Annual report not available *  (0) (4) (3) (4) 
     
Identified winners 42 42 43 43 
     
Match with Non-Winners (control sample) 42 42 43 43 
Total firms (Pool = 340) 84 84 86 86 
Exclude:      
Industries less than 6 firms** (14)^ (12)^ (14)^ (10)^ 
Total firms (Pool = 290)#  70 72 72 76 
     
Missing data for Analyst Forecast Accuracy (4)^ (2)^ (18)^ (12)^ 
Total firms (Pool = 254)## 66 70 54 64 
* The annual reports of these companies are not available due to (1) merger and acquisitions or (2 )the annual 
report is unavailable/ not found although several trials have been undertaken.  
** Industries with less than six firms represented will be deleted from the sample because it is necessary to 
calculate the coefficient for the earnings management calculation based on industries with six or more firms.  
^ including the respective match-paired firms 
# When no data for analyst forecast accuracy is employed in the model, a pool data comprise of 290 firms was 
used in the regression.  
## When analyst forecast accuracy is used in the model, the pool data comprise of 254 firms were used in the 
regression. 
Notes: Out of 145 match-paired firms, 8 firms (2008 = 2 firms, 2007= 3 firms, 2006= 1 firms, 2005= 2 firms) were 
matched with firms from (a) same year of observations, (b) nearest total assets, (c) not nominated as winners 
during the year under observation (d) different group of industries (due to limited options in the selection of the 
best match-paired firms from the same industry).  
 
Out of 170 match-paired firms, 12 IR Award winners (2008 = 4 firms, 2007= 3 firms, 2006= 2 
firms, 2005= 3 firms) were matched with firms from (a) same year of observations, (b) nearest 
                                                          
56
 Consistent with the prior study in this area (e.g. Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006), financial and highly regulated 
industries are excluded from the sample due to the different nature of reporting accruals in their financial 
reporting.  
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total assets (c) not nominated as winners during the year under observations (d) different 
groups of industries (due to limited options in the selection of the best match-paired firms 
from the same industry). However, an underlying problem is that it is extremely difficult to 
find a perfect match for firms in certain industries (e.g. telecommunication, healthcare and 
technology). The same problem occurred in Huijgen and Lubberinks’ (2005) UK studies, which 
used a match-paired sample in their research on accounting conservatism and litigations. Due 
to limited options in the selection of the perfect match-paired firms in the same industry, and 
following Huijgen and Lubberink (2005), the present study selects firms from different 
industries (as the control sample for 12 of the firms, which is equivalent to 7% of the whole 
sample)57. It is argued that the differing industries of these 7% firms will not introduce bias 
into the result, given that the number of firms affected is considerably small. Moreover, these 
12 firms are similar to their match-paired firms in terms of size and year of observations. 
Hence, the different types of industry could be alleviated by the assumption that they are 
operated in the same economic scale and accounting environment and, thus, have 
homogeneous economic and accounting effects in general.  
 
Some people may argue that the sample must be completely homogenous in nature. The 
inclusion of firms from FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE All Share and a few from AIM All Share might 
create a heterogeneous dataset Nevertheless, it is important to consider several factors 
before any conclusion can be made.  
                                                          
57 In the case the perfect matched pair is not found, the match-paired is search among the firms in the (1) similar 
supersector, or (2) similar industry, or (3) others industry (but nearest to the industry types of the respective IR 
winners).  
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It is widely believed that the sample selected must reflect the whole population under study. 
Therefore, if the sample is only comprised of firms from FTSE 100 and FTSE 250, the result 
would be biased towards large firms and unable to represent the response of the whole 
population. The inclusion of small firms will make the sample universal. Moreover, the match-
paired sample that has been used in this study controlled for the firm’s size, industry and year 
of observations. In this instance, the firms from AIM All Share were matched with other firms 
from AIM All Share. This procedure was performed in order to create balance and reduce bias 
in the sample. Furthermore, additional testing using GLS regression was performed on a 
sample from which the AIM All Share firms were excluded. It is worth noting that the result is 
qualitatively the same, even after the exclusion of small firms in the sample. In addition, the 
number of AIM All Share firms in the sample is very small and insignificant.  
 
Consistent with the industrial classification that is supplied by DataStream & Worldscope, The 
Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) is used to perform the match-paired selection 
process and the earnings management calculation related to the coefficient parameters. The 
ICB comprises four tiers of industry classification: (1) Industries, (2) Supersectors, (3) Sectors 
and (4) Subsectors. It is used by most of the exchanges in the world including the London 
Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange. 
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Table 3-3: The sample distribution according to supersector classification as defined by the 
Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB)  
 
Supersector Number of firms (N=340) 
Consumer goods 29 
Consumer services 75 
Healthcare 22 
Industrials 96 
Oil and gas 30 
Technology 37 
Telecommunication 19 
Utilities 20 
Basic Material 12 
  
Total 340 firms = 170 match-paired firms 
 
Table 3-4: The sample distribution according to supersector classification as defined by the 
Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
 
Industry Number of firms (N=290) 
Consumer goods 24 
Consumer services 75 
Healthcare 13 
Industrials 96 
Oil and gas 30 
Technology 37 
Telecommunication 4* 
Utilities 11 
  
Total  290 firms = 145 match-paired firms 
*There are 6 firms categorised under “telecommunication industry” in the year 2005, hence, these firms are 
entitled to be included in the current study given that the category has enough members to calculate the 
coefficient for earnings management proxy (minimum is 6). All these companies were used to calculate the 
coefficient for “telecommunication industry” in that particular year. Nevertheless, two of these companies were 
matched with firms from other industries that are not included in the analysis (where the number of firms in the 
other industries is below than 6). Hence, to ensure consistency of the matched pairs, these two 
telecommunication companies were excluded from the analysis, leaving only four remaining telecommunication 
firms in the dataset.  
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Table 3-5: Company breakdown based on number of awards receiveda 
 
YEAR TOTAL 
AWARD 
CATEGORIES 
TOTAL 
AWARDED 
COMPANIES 
(NON-
UNIQUE) 
TOTAL 
AWARDED 
COMPANIES 
(UNIQUE) 
 
TOTAL 
AWARDED 
COMPANIES 
(UNIQUE EX-
REG) 
TOTAL 
AWARDED 
COMPANIES 
(UNIQUE EX-
REG, EX-6IND) 
TOTAL AWARDS BREAKDOWN: NO OF UNIQUE 
COMPANIES RECEIVING 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 OR MORE 
AR=1 AR=2 AR=3 AR=4 AR=5 AR>5 
2005 48 96 63 43 38 34 8 0 0 0 1 
2006 50 100 57 43 36 29 8 4 0 1 1 
2007 48 96 57 42 36 33 5 0 1 1 2 
2008 47 93b 57 42 35 30 6 3 2 1 0 
TOTAL AWARD CATEGORIES = Total number of IRAWARD categories per year; TOTAL AWARDED COMPANIES (NON-UNIQUE) =Total non-unique companies 
(IR Award winners and first runner-ups) per year; TOTAL AWARDED COMPANIES (UNIQUE) =Total unique companies (IR Award winners and first runner-ups) 
per year, including firms in highly regulated industries and firms with missing annual reports; TOTAL AWARDED COMPANIES (UNIQUE EX- REG) = Total 
unique companies (IR Award winners and first runner-ups) per year, excluding financial firms and firms with missing annual reports; TOTAL AWARDED 
COMPANIES (UNIQUE EX- REG, EX-6IND) = Total unique companies (IR Award winners and first runner-ups) per year, excluding financial firms, firms with 
missing annual reports and firms in industries with less than 6 firms (for the purpose of calculating the earnings management coefficient); TOTAL AWARDS 
BREAKDOWN = breakdown of the unique companies that received either 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more awards in a year, based on the sample in the total award 
companies unique ex-reg column; Note a = Population comprised of all listed companies and domiciled in the UK; Note b = only one of the awards categories 
is declared the winner (and no information about the first runner up is mentioned].  
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Table 3-6: Company breakdown based on award categories 
 
YEAR SAMPLE A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 
2005-8 170 4 7 7 3 5 4 6 1 4 7 4 4 3 5 4 5 8 2 
2005 43 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 x 0 1 1 x 1 2 0 2 2 1 
2006 43 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 x 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 0 
2007 42 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 2 1 x 1 1 1 0 2 1 
2008 42 1 2 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 1 2 2 0 
YEAR SAMPLE A19 A20 A21 A22 A23 A24 A25 A26 A27 A28 A29 A30 A31 A32 A33 A34 A35  
2005-8 170 4 4 5 5 1 4 7 6 1 8 4 1 4 1 4 1 2  
2005 43 1 1 X x x x 2 2 x 2 1 0 2 1 2 1 x  
2006 43 1 1 2 2 x x 2 2 x 2 1 1 2 x 2 x 2  
2007 42 2 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 x 2 2 0 x x x x x  
2008 42 0 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 x x x x x x x  
YEAR SAMPLE B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 B15 B16 B17 B18 
2005-8 170 8 0 8 8 8 8 8 0 8 0 8 0 6 8 7 8 8 8 
2005 43 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 
2006 43 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 
2007 42 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2008 42 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 
YEAR SAMPLE B19 B20 B21 B22               
2005-8 170 8 6 2 2               
2005 43 2 2 2 x               
2006 43 2 2 X 2               
2007 42 2 2 X x               
2008 42 2 x X x               
YEAR = year of study; SAMPLE = Total unique companies (IR Award winners and first runner-ups) per year excluding financial firms and firms with missing annual reports (before excluding 
industries with less than 6 firms in a year for the earnings management calculation); A1-A35 = IRAWARD categories; A1 = Grand Prix for Best Overall Investor Relations; A2 = Grand Prix for Best 
Investor Relations by a FTSE 250 company; A3 = Grand Prix for Best Smaller Company Investor Relations; A4 = Best Investor Relations officer at a FTSE 100 company; A5 = Best Investor Relations 
officer at a non-FTSE 100 company; A6 = Best Corporate Literature/annual report by a FTSE 100 company; A7 = Best Corporate Literature/annual report by a non-FTSE 100 company; A8 = Best 
Narrative Reporting; A9 = Best Use of the Internet/technology/website for Investor Relations by a FTSE 100 Company; A10 = Best Use of the Internet/technology/website for Investor Relations by a 
non-FTSE 100 Company; A11 = Best Results Meetings and Analyst Briefings by a FTSE100 companies; A12 = Best Results Meetings and Analyst Briefings by a non-FTSE100 companies; A13 = Best 
Communication of Shareholder Value Creation; A14 = Best Crisis Management; A15 = Best Investor Relations During a Takeover/corporate transaction; A16 = Most Progress in Investor Relations by 
a FTSE 100 Company; A17 = Most Progress in Investor Relations by a non-FTSE 100 Company; A18 = Best Disclosure Practice; A19 = Best Corporate Governance; A20 = Best Practice of Corporate 
Social Responsibility; A21 = Best IR by a CEO at a FTSE 100 Company; A22 = Best IR by a CEO at a non-FTSE 100 Company; A23 = Best IR by a CFO at a FTSE 100 Company; A24 = Best IR by a CFO at a 
non-FTSE 100 Company; A25 = Best IR for a New Issue; A26 = Best IR by an AIM Company; A27 = Special award for excellent in IR from a foreign company on AIM; A28 = Best UK Company IR in the 
US market; A29 = Best Use of Virtual Conferencing for Investor Relations; A30 = Best North American IR in the UK Market; A31 = Best use of the internet for investor relations; A32 = Best board 
communication; A33 = Best investor relations to the retail shareholders; A34 = Best communication to the financial media; A35 = Best operating and financial review; B1-B22 = IRAWARD (SECTOR) 
categories- the winners were determined based on total point scores (excluding scores from several awards, e.g. (i) best crisis management, (ii) best IR during a corporate transaction, (iii) best IR by 
an AIM company, (iv) best IR for a new issue, (v) best narrative reporting, (vi) best UK company IR in the US market); B1 = Aerospace & Defence; B2 = Banks/Financial General; B3 = Construction & 
Materials; B4 = Food & Beverages/Tobacco; B5 =Healthcare equipment & services; B6 = House, leisure & personal goods; B7 = Industrial engineering/industrial general/automobiles & parts; B8 = 
Insurance; B9 = Media; B10 = Mining/basic resources; B11 = Oil and Gas; B12 = Real estate; B13 = Retailers; B14 = Support services; B15 = Technology-hardware; B16 =Technology-software & 
services/electronic & electrical equipment; B17 = Telecommunication; B18 = Travel and leisure/ industrial transportation; B19 = Utilities; B20 = chemicals; B21 = engineering and machinery; B22 = 
Leisure goods and gaming; x = This award category was not offered in that particular year. Notes: Population is comprised of all listed and domiciled companies in the UK.  
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Table 3-7: Company breakdown by FTSE group 
 
YEAR 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 WINNERS WINNERS WINNERS WINNERS 
FTSE100 23 26 27 25 
FTSE250 15 14 11 13 
OTHERS* 5 3 4 4 
TOTAL 43 43 42 42 
     
 NON-
WINNERS 
NON-
WINNERS 
NON-
WINNERS 
NON- 
WINNERS 
FTSE100 20 22 24 25 
FTSE250 18 18 14 13 
OTHERS* 5 3 4 4 
TOTAL 43 43 42 42 
WINNERS = Winners and first runner-ups of IR Award; NON-WINNERS = Non-Winners of IR Awards in 
the year 2005-2008 (control firms); * OTHERS includes FTSE ALL SHARE, FTSE AIM ALL SHARE, FTSE 
FLEDGING, FTSE TECHMARK ALL SHARE.  
 
  
Table 3-8: Company breakdown based on industry 
 
SUPERSECTOR NUMBER OF FIRMS 
CONSUMER GOODS 29 
CONSUMER SERVICES 75 
HEALTHCARE 22 
INDUSTRIALS 96 
OIL AND GAS 30 
TECHNOLOGY 37 
TELECOMMUNICATION 19 
UTILITIES 20 
BASIC MATERIAL 12 
TOTAL 340 FIRMS = 170 MATCH PAIRED FIRMS 
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Table 3-9: T-test and Mann-Whitney U test on forward-looking disclosure 
 
   t-test Mann-Whitney U test 
YEAR GROUPS 
(0,1) 
n MEAN 
FLSCORE 
t sig MEDIAN 
FLSCORE 
z sig 
2005 0 
1 
9 
34 
150.77 
109.15 
 
1.5401 
 263.5 
682.5 
 
1.956 
 
2006 0 
1 
14 
29 
127.35 
101.93 
 
1.2185 
 341 
605 
 
0.855 
 
2007 0 
1 
9 
33 
148.33 
146.42 
 
0.0527 
 184.5 
718.5 
 
-0.276 
 
2008 0 
1 
12 
30 
175.25 
120.66 
 
1.6493 
 316 
587 
 
1.615 
 
2005-8 0 
1 
44 
126 
149.5 
119.99 
 
2.0104 
 
 
** 
4264.5 
10270.5 
 
1.788 
 
 
* 
Groups (1,0) = [1 if firms won one IR Award in a year,0 if firms won more than 1 IR Award); n = number 
of samples in each group per year; MEAN FLSCORE = Differences in mean FLSCORE is calculated using 
the t-test; MEDIAN FLSCOREn = Differences in median FLSCORE is calculated using the Mann-Whitney U 
test; FLSCORE is calculated using the number of forward-looking statements in the firm’s annual report; 
sig ** and * denotes that the p-value is significant at 0.05 and 0.010, one-tailed respectively. The tests 
were conducted using 340 firms (170 match paired firms). 
 
 
The present study also checks for the significant difference of the forward-looking 
disclosure score (FLSCORE) between (i) firms that won one IRAWARD in a year and (ii) 
firms that won more than one IRAWARD in a year (see Table 3-9). Therefore, the 
sample was split into two groups. We then performed the t-test and the Mann 
Whitney U-test (see Table 3-9). We find that firms that won more than one award (0) 
consistently show a higher mean of forward-looking score (FLSCORE) compared to the 
firms that won only one award in a year (1), in each individual year, although both 
tests show that the mean differences between these two groups are insignificant. 
When we pool our data (2005-2008), we note that both the t-test and the Mann 
Whitney U-test report a significant difference between the means of the forward-
looking disclosure (FLSCORE) for these two groups at p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively. 
This indicates that firms that won more than one IRAWARD disclose more forward-
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looking information in their annual report than firms that receive only one IRAWARD 
in a year. 
 
3.7.2  Year of observations 
 
Since most of the prior studies are US based (e.g. Jo and Kim, 2007; Zhau and Lobo, 
2001), it is useful to use the UK capital market as the sample in this study as the UK is 
one of the most important capital markets and there have been rigorous efforts by UK 
firms to improve their IR disclosure the past 20 years (Marston, 2008). Although 
Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009) based their research on UK data, their research was 
subject to certain limitations (e.g. a small number of control variables and only one 
single measurement of earnings management). Moreover, the availability of UK data 
makes this research feasible. If the current research had intended to focus on other 
countries (e.g. Malaysia, Egypt or South Africa), the data on analyst forecast accuracy is 
not available or very hard to collect, making the research difficult to carry out. Because 
other countries have no specific databases for research purposes, the data collection 
process would take longer than the timeframe allowed for the completion of this 
study.    
 
This study concentrates on the disclosure quality of UK firms in 2004-2007. These 
specific years of observation have been selected for several reasons. Given that most 
of the data is hand collected (e.g. corporate governance, narrative disclosure in the 
annual report, and earnings management), the years 2004-2007 are the most recent 
to when this research was undertaken and the most practical for our purpose within 
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the limited timeframe of the study. More importantly, the selection of years is 
primarily influenced by the introduction of the Combined Code 2003, which was 
largely based on the Higgs and Smith Report (2003). 2004 was used as a starting point 
for the data collection process since, following the introduction of the Combined Code 
2003, the disclosure of certain firms’ governance information is now required (e.g. the 
number of board meetings and audit committee meetings).  
 
3.7.3 Disclosure quality measures 
 
A manager’s disclosure decision is aimed at reducing the information asymmetry gap 
between agent and principal. Therefore, disclosure quality proxies that are related to 
the financial analyst, namely the IR Magazine Award, the forward-looking statement in 
the annual report and the analyst forecast accuracy, were employed in the current 
study. It has already been noted that financial analysts have been viewed as 
sophisticated users of a company’s disclosure (e.g. Balsam et al., 2002) and an effective 
disseminator of the company’s information (Gavious, 2007).  
 
The IR Magazine Award is an external measure for disclosure quality, as it depends on 
the analyst’s perceptions of a firm’s investor relations activities in a year. By contrast, 
the forward-looking information is mainly based on information from the annual 
report; hence it can be classified as an internal proxy for disclosure quality. The analyst 
forecast accuracy, which is the third proxy for disclosure quality, is indirectly related to 
the first and second proxy, given that an analyst is expected to refer to both the firm’s 
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investor relations activities and forward-looking information when projecting a firm’s 
earnings per share.    
 
Data on the IR Magazine Award was requested from the event organiser at The Cross 
Border Group, while the data on the forward-looking information was traced from the 
companies’ annual reports. The financial data related to the analyst’s forecast accuracy 
and control variables were downloaded from DataStream, while the corporate 
governance attributes were manually collected from the companies’ annual reports. 
 
3.7.3.1 The Investor Relation Awards (IRAWARD) 
 
The IR Magazine Award was used as one of the disclosure quality proxies in this study. 
The IR Magazine Award is an annual event that is organised by Cross Border Group Ltd 
to acknowledge the firms with the best investor relationships throughout the year. 
The Cross Border Group Ltd assigned the task of carrying out the investigation of 
analyst perceptions of firms’ investor relations activities to Mary Maude Research. The 
event was conducted in various regions around the world including the United States, 
Norway, Canada, the UK and Asia. For the purpose of this study, the IR Magazine 
Award from the UK will be used. None of the prior research in this field has used the IR 
Magazine Award in the UK as a proxy for disclosure quality. Only Boesso and Kumar 
(2007) are known to have used the IR Magazine Award in the US as a proxy for 
disclosure quality.  
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The winners of the IR Magazine Award are selected based on who has the highest 
ranking/score from the respondents on the company’s investor relations activities. 
The respondents are comprised of sell-side analysts, buy-side analysts and the 
portfolio managers in the UK. The respondents were asked about their perception of 
the company’s investor relations activities over the last year. In other words, in the 
selection of the IR Magazine Award winners in 2008, the company’s investor relations 
in the year 2007 are to be evaluated (lagged by one year). Therefore, since this study 
focuses on the IR Magazine Award Winners for the years 2008, 2007, 2006 and 2005, 
the data for the respective companies for the years 2007, 2006, 2005 and 2004 were 
taken into account.  
 
For the IR Magazine Award in the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 there were, 
respectively, 648, 742, 632 and 650 respondents. Telephone interviews were 
conducted by Mary Maude Research, each of which took around 10-20 minutes. The 
questionnaire was comprised of three main sections. The first section was about the 
respondent profiles. The second section was related to the issue of the current level of 
disclosure by UK firms. The third section concentrated on the winner nominations. 
Each respondent was requested to nominate three firms for each award by ranking. 
The score was then assigned to the firms that were nominated. The total score for 
each company was then calculated and the winners were determined based on this 
score.  
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There are two main categories in the IR Magazine UK Award. The first award mainly 
focuses upon several aspects of investor relations (between companies and outsiders) 
and the second is The Sector Award, which concentrates on the companies with the 
best investor relations for each sector. The list of IR Magazine Award in the year 2005-
2008 is attached in Appendix 3.  
 
There are several reasons why the current research intends to use the IR Magazine UK 
Award as a proxy for disclosure quality. First and foremost, the IR magazine UK award 
relies on analyst perceptions of a firm’s disclosure policy in determining the winners. 
The analyst is one of the key players in the capital market and understands more 
about the value of the information provided by the company (e.g. Barker, 1998), is 
able to detect earnings management (Yu, 2008; Gavious, 2007; Liu, 2005), has 
expertise in evaluating a firm’s disclosure policy (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 2001; Gavious, 
2007; Lang and Lundholm, 1993) and is potentially effective in reducing information 
asymmetry (e.g. Ali et al., 2008; Roulstone, 2003). The analyst’s ability to process and 
disseminate the information is undeniable. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, it 
is relevant to use their judgement, exercised in nominating the firms with the best 
investor relations, to provide a proxy for disclosure quality.  
 
Secondly, the IR Magazine Award covers many important IR components of the firms 
including narrative reporting; corporate literature; internet reporting; virtual 
conferencing; corporate governance practice; disclosure practice; corporate social 
responsibility practice; annual reports; analyst meetings and briefing; information on 
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the shareholder’s value; the efficiency of the IR officer, the CEO and the CFO with 
respect to the firm’s capability in delivering information; and much more. It is 
important to highlight that most of the annual report awards (e.g. NACRA) or analyst 
ratings (e.g. AIMR Ratings) are solely dependent on the quality of the annual report 
per se as a base of evaluation. Therefore, the IR Magazine Award provides a wider 
scope in assessing the quality of a firm’s disclosure.   
 
Thirdly, the winners of the IR Magazine Award vary considerably; they range from big 
firms in the FTSE 100 to small firms from the FTSE AIM All Share Index. Therefore, this 
proxy is not biased towards large firms. The inclusion of firms from the All Share and 
AIM All Share category creates a balance in the sample because it accounts for the 
behaviour of small firms  
 
Fourthly, the consensus among financial analysts and fund managers (experts in 
companies’ disclosure policy and earnings management) in the selection of The IR 
Award winners is more credible than the self-developed disclosure index, which 
depends on only one researcher’s evaluation and judgement.  
 
Measurement for IRAWARD 
In the current study, the dichotomous method (scoring “1” or 0) has been used to 
differentiate between the IR Magazine Award winners and non-winners. Consistent 
with Bauer and Boritz (2009), the winners have been assigned a score of one (1) and 
the non-winners have been coded as zero (0). 
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3.7.3.2 Forward-looking disclosure (FLSCORE)58 
 
A prior study argues that forward-looking information is one of the value-relevance 
information elements (Morton and Neill, 2001). Using a sample of 106 US firms, 
Morton and Neill (2001) report that forward-looking information is highly relevant 
after a corporate restructuring. Moreover, forward-looking disclosure is value relevant 
in the sense that it is associated to the share price (Lundholm and Myers, 2002) and it 
increases analyst forecast accuracy (Barron et al., 1999). Hence, forward-looking 
disclosure is embedded with predictive information about a company’s activities that 
make it possible to reduce earnings uncertainty in the future (Lundholm and Myers, 
2002; Miller and Piotroski, 2000). Prior research also shows that voluntary disclosure is 
effective in reducing the information asymmetry in the principal-agent relationship 
(Grüning and Ernstberger, 2010).  
 
Agency theory claims that disclosure is one of the agency costs that reduce 
information asymmetry between agents and principles (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Prior studies have highlighted that information asymmetry will be reduced with the 
analyst’s intervention (e.g. Roulstone, 2003; Ali et al., 2008). Therefore, it is important 
to focus on the information that the analyst wants. Deegan and Rankin (1997) and 
Barker (1998) find that analysts favour forward-looking information on the capital 
market, since it is potentially capable of predicting future earnings. Moreover, 
                                                          
58
 Narrative disclosure is treated as a voluntary disclosure, given that such information is based on the 
manager’s discretion (Heitzman et al., 2010; Williamson and Lynch-Wood, 2008), although the 
requirements for narrative disclosure are stated in the Business Review (BR) or Operating and Financial 
Review (OFR).  
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forward-looking information is also viewed as one of the most important items in the 
disclosure index (Francis et al, 2008). In a related vein, Botosan (2000) finds that the 
cost of capital is inversely related to forward-looking disclosure. This signals its 
predictive ability, its potential for reducing information asymmetry and, subsequently, 
its importance in reducing the cost of capital.   
 
The present research focuses on the forward-looking disclosure in the annual report as 
a second proxy for disclosure quality. The use of annual reports as a source for 
ascertaining a firm’s disclosure quality is inspired by Lang and Lundholm (1993) who 
report that the annual report is a reliable proxy for measuring a firms overall 
disclosure policy. Moreover, Botosan (1997) argues that the quality of any forms of 
disclosure by the firms can be generalised to the whole firm’s disclosure pattern.  
 
One may argue about the reliability and accuracy of using forward-looking information 
as a proxy for disclosure quality, since this information is not audited and is voluntary 
in nature. It is important to note that other types of voluntary disclosure proxies in the 
disclosure literature (e.g. AIMR Ratings, CIFAR, management earnings forecast, 
disclosure index) suffer from noise and bias, including credibility and subjectivity 
issues (as discussed in appendix 1). Therefore, it is impossible to find a voluntary 
disclosure which is completely free from bias.  
 
This study also acknowledges that the use of the total number of forward-looking 
statements in the annual report (as a proxy) may raise an issue of quantity versus 
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quality of disclosure. In this instance, we rely on Kent and Stewart (2008, p. 651) who 
state that “more extensive disclosures are likely to be more informative than brief 
disclosures and are, therefore, an indicator of greater transparency”. In the same vein, 
based on Botosan’s (2004) argument that quantity and quality are inseparable and 
hard to measure, Beretta and Bozzolan (2008, p. 335) point out that “the extent of 
disclosure (i.e., quantity) is an adequate measure of the quality of disclosure”. The 
detection of forward-looking sentences in the annual report using computerised 
content method analysis in our study is consistent with Core (2001, p. 452) who 
proposed that “the improvement in disclosure quality also need to be developed by 
importing techniques in natural language processing from fields like computer science, 
linguistic and artificial intelligence”. 
 
Additionally, some may argue that it is not possible to use forward-looking information 
as a proxy for disclosure quality while ignoring other types of disclosure, such as 
environmental disclosure and employee information. In this instance, Botosan (1997) 
argues that one form of company disclosure can be generalised to the whole firm’s 
disclosure policy. However, this factor is taken into account in the FLSCORE validity 
test, which will be explained in this section, given that it is essential to check on the 
reliability and validity of the FLSCORE before using it.  
 
Measurement for FLSCORE 
For the second measure of disclosure quality, the present study focuses on the 
forward-looking disclosures in the annual report. The computerised content method 
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analysis was used, whereby the specific forward-looking keywords were to be 
detected in the companies’ annual reports using N6 Software. The list of keywords 
established by Hussainey et al. (2003) is appropriate to the present study, since the 
keyword selection was developed based on the synonyms of forward-looking 
keywords that are widely used in annual reports and analyst reports.59 See Appendix 4 
for the list of forward-looking keywords suggested by Hussainey et al., (2003)60.  
 
In order to obtain the forward-looking score, all the companies’ annual reports were 
downloaded in PDF format from the northcote.co.uk website. Then, the annual 
reports were manually transformed into text files, since N6 is unable to read the 
documents in PDF format. After that, mandatory disclosure and financial information 
in the annual reports were deleted61 because they are not related to forward-looking 
information (Hussainey et al., 2003). Next, the annual reports were imported to the N6 
programme using the drop down Menu; (Documents - import text file as documents).  
 
Following this, the most appropriate “unit of preference” was chosen. The unit of 
preference determines the unit of analysis that the users want. There are three 
options available; (i) a line, (ii) a sentence or (iii) a paragraph. This function is available 
in the drop down Menu; (Project-Preference-Text unit type). In this instance, 
                                                          
59
 Hussainey et al. (2003) identify the forward-looking keywords by spotting forward-looking keywords 
related to prediction and forecast that commonly used in the annual report. They then searched for the 
synonyms of those forward-looking keywords and measure their association with forward-looking 
information by using manually read 30 random sentences for each forward-looking keyword.     
60
 To name a few of forward-looking keywords used in Hussainey et al. (2003) includes accelerate, 
anticipate, await, envisage, estimate, eventual, expect, forecast, forthcoming, outlook and predict.  
61
 Following Hussainey et al. (2003), several sections in the annual report were deleted including 
corporate governance statement, the table of contents, the financial statements, the notes to the 
accounts and directors report.  
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Hussainey et al. (2003) claim that a sentence is the unit of preference, since the 
intended meaning of forward-looking information is reasonably conveyed in a 
sentence rather than a line or a paragraph. Thus, in line with Hussainey et al. (2003), a 
sentence was chosen as “unit of preference”.   
 
After that, the search function was used and forward-looking keywords were entered 
one-by-one into N6. This function is performed in the drop down Menu; (Documents- 
Text search- All documents). There are three options available in the text search 
function namely; (i) case sensitive (ii) search for whole word only (iii) special function. 
The “search for whole word only” function was selected in order to avoid the selection 
of unintended sentences. For example, when searching for the keyword, “Anticipate”, 
this function prevents N6 from selecting keywords such as “were anticipated” or “was 
anticipated”, which have different meanings and contexts from the original keyword. 
At any one time, only around 40 annual reports can be imported to N6, therefore this 
process was repeated 8 times.  
 
The N6 programme produced a search result for each keyword by company. The score 
for each keyword for each company was then collected and counted. The total score 
represents the number of forward-looking sentences in the companies’ annual report. 
Here, for example, is report for the keyword “Next”, from J Sainsbury PLC’s annual 
report for the financial year 2007: 
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Table 3-10: Example of the report released by N6 Nudist software 
 
+++ Text search for 'next' 
+++ Searching document A37 Sainsbury... 
As a result the number of stores operating this service will reach 200 by March 2010 
and we expect sales to more than double over the NEXT three years.                                                                  
In the NEXT financial year the Group is targeting incremental space growth of 
around two per cent.                                               
In the NEXT financial year the Group expects to deliver an underlying cash flow 
neutral position after adjusting for the reversal of the £150 million working capital 
timing differences.                                   
Capital expenditure is forecast to be in the region of £750 million for the NEXT 
financial year.      
…  
…                                              
+++ 18 text units out of 541, = 3.3% 
 
N6 selects the sentences which contained the word “Next”, and this keyword was 
highlighted using capital letters. At the end of the report for each company, the total 
number of sentences which contain the “Next” keyword is provided. For Sainsbury’s 
2007 annual report, the number of sentences with the “Next” keyword is 18. The total 
number of sentences for all keywords represents the score for forward-looking 
disclosure by the company. For Next PLC, the process of obtaining the score for the 
“Next” keyword in the annual reports was performed manually using a PDF search. 62   
 
Validity test of the forward-looking score 
In the first validity test, a disclosure index, which was comprised of a comprehensive 
set of voluntary disclosures in the annual reports, was developed. The disclosure 
                                                          
62
 The present study acknowledges that one of the limitation in Hussainey et al. (2003) technique in 
detecting forward-looking information in the annual report is when it is failed to consider the tone of 
forward-looking information. Schleicher and Walker (2010) argue that it is crucial to consider the effect 
of different tone of forward-looking disclosure because it is largely subject to manipulation by 
managers. Therefore, forward-looking disclosure can possibly have a positive and negative tone, which 
may contribute to the firm’s economic consequences at different extent.   
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index, which consisted of 101 items, was divided into these categories: (A) General 
corporate information, (B) Company Strategy, (C) Capital Market Data, (D) Financial 
Ratio, (E) Research and Development, (F) Future Prospects, (G) Social Reporting, (H) 
Environmental Reporting, (I) Employee Information, (J) Products or Services 
Information, (K) Supplier Information and (L) Others. This index was developed based 
on the disclosure index that is extensively available in the prior literature (e.g. 
Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) 
as well as in consideration of the firms’ annual reports and current developments in 
voluntary disclosure (e.g. Global Reporting Initiatives).  
  
Forty annual reports were randomly selected from the list of sample firms. The un-
weighted disclosure index was used to score each firm. The disclosure index was cross-
checked with the annual report using traditional content method analysis. The 
dichotomous method was used in the scoring process: the companies obtained a score 
of “1” if they provided the information as stated in the disclosure index, and a score of 
“0” if otherwise.  
 
The Pearson correlation between FLSCORE and Disclosure Index score was calculated 
and the result reveals that the correlation coefficient between these variables is 
67.46%, (p<0.01). Further analysis using Spearman’s correlation reports that the 
correlation between FLSCORE and Disclosure Index score is significant at p<0.01, with 
the correlation coefficient equivalent to 64.51%. The high correlation between these 
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two variables indicates the strong relationship between the FLSCORE and the 
Disclosure Index score.  
 
A reliability test using Cronbach’s Alpha was also performed to measure the internal 
consistency between FLSCORE and Disclosure Index score. In this regard, Pallant 
(2007) claims that a high reliability coefficient (0.60 and above) indicates that there 
are strong internal consistencies between two variables. The reliability coefficient of 
the Cronbach Alpha analysis of FLSCORE and Disclosure Index score was recorded at 
0.7519, which is higher than the cut off point of 0.60 suggested by Pallant (2007).  
 
Henceforth, the comprehensiveness of the forward-looking disclosure in a company’s 
annual report could also be reflected to other types of disclosure, including 
environmental disclosure, employee information, products and services information 
and others. Therefore, the present study assumes that the N6 Score is valid as a proxy 
for disclosure quality since it is strongly correlated to the Disclosure Index Score when 
using the traditional content method analysis and highly reliable according to the 
Cronbach Alpha test. The full list of the disclosure index is available in Appendix 4.  
 
Another test was performed by reading 30 sentences for several keywords that were 
randomly selected from the search results produced by the N6 Software. The result 
shows that 96.60% of the sentences referred to forward-looking information. This test 
confirms the ability of the N6 software to detect forward-looking information in the 
imported documents. Although it is not possible to completely eliminate the bias, it is 
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relatively low (around 3.4%). Moreover, demonstrates that the use of computerised 
content analysis provides a credible score with high comparability and consistency 
when compared to traditional content method analysis (Hussainey et al.2003, p. 276). 
At this stage, this research considered that the total number of forward-looking 
sentences in the annual report, detected using a computerised content method 
analysis, is relevant and reliable as a proxy for disclosure quality in this study. The full 
result is available in the Appendix 6.  
 
1.7.3.3 Analyst forecast accuracy  
 
It is a cornerstone of agency theory that the analyst’s role is important as an effective 
disseminator of information. Therefore, the present study submits that analyst 
forecast accuracy is a reliable proxy for a firm’s disclosure quality, given that it can 
reflect the firm’s disclosure environment. 
 
Prior literature proposes that analyst forecast dispersion can be a proxy for 
information asymmetry (Lang and Lundholm, 1996), and that a high quality of 
disclosure is associated with lower information asymmetry (e.g. Petersen and 
Plenborg, 2006; Brown et al., 2004; Coller and Yohn, 1997; Kim and Verrechia, 1994; 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991); hence, in the presence of a high disclosure quality 
environment, financial analysts will be able to predict earnings accurately (Byard et al., 
2006).  
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A considerable amount of literature has been published on disclosure quality and 
analyst forecast accuracy (e.g. Bhat et al., 2006; Chiang, 2005; Ernstberger et al., 2008; 
Ertimur et al., 2007; Mensah et al., 2004; Barron et al., 1999; Ashbaugh and Pincus, 
2001; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Using AIMR Ratings as a proxy for disclosure quality, 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) demonstrate that firms with high analyst ratings have a 
higher accuracy of analyst forecast. In a related vein, Bhat et al. (2006) document that 
high disclosure settings can also be driven by corporate governance disclosure, which 
subsequently enhances the analysts’ forecast accuracy. Their finding implies that the 
magnitude of corporate governance disclosure is informative in the sense that it 
complements the disclosure environment, which reduces analyst uncertainty in 
predicting firm’s earnings.  
 
The findings of Bhat et al. (2006) are in line with those of McEwen and Hunton (1999) 
and Hope (2003) who report that the use of accounting information improved the 
preciseness of analyst forecasts. Similarly, Ertimur et al. (2007) demonstrate that the 
financial analyst is able to predict earnings accurately for firms with value-relevance 
earnings. Consistent with Ertimur et al. (2007), Mensah et al., (2004) record that high 
accounting conservatism reduces the preciseness of analyst forecast accuracy. In other 
words, credible financial and non-financial disclosure carries a predictable value to the 
analyst forecast.  
 
Ernstberger et al. (2008) highlight that analyst forecast accuracy is a reflection of a 
firm’s disclosure, while Byard et al. (2006) and Roulstone (2003) point out that analyst 
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forecast accuracy is a reliable proxy for a firm’s disclosure quality. Therefore, the level 
of analyst forecast accuracy is proficient in portraying the quality of information, 
supplied by the firms, that is available in the market; hence, it is basically a reliable 
proxy for disclosure quality.  
 
Agency theory recognises the role of financial analyst intervention in disseminating 
company information to institutional and retail investors (Ali et al., 2008); thus, 
signalling that financial analysts are an agent in reducing information asymmetry and 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Given that analysts’ forecasts are one of the 
credible sources of information as far as the investors are concerned (Walther, 1997; 
Clement and Tse, 2003), and considering the expertise that analysts have in extracting 
companies’ disclosure (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 2001; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Byard 
et al., 2006; Balsam et al., 2002), the present study uses analyst forecast accuracy as 
one of the proxies for disclosure quality.  
 
Measurement for analyst forecast accuracy 
The list of options for measuring analyst forecast accuracy is much shorter than that 
for disclosure quality and earnings management. The basic requirement is to calculate 
the gap between the reported earnings per share (EPS) and the median forecast of 
EPS. As this has been widely practiced, is commonly acceptable and reasonably 
constructed in the prior literature, the current study does not attempt to change this 
measure. Following Lang and Lundholm (1996), Hope and Kang (2005) and Hope 
(2003), the analyst forecast accuracy is estimated as follows:   
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Accuracy = (-1) |EPSt - MEPSt| / PRICEt 
Where: EPSt is earnings per share, MEPSt is the median forecast of earnings per share 
and PRICEt is the share price in period t, (share price at the beginning of the year). The 
data for analyst forecast accuracy was downloaded from IBES through DataStream.  
 
3.7.4 Corporate governance measures 
 
3.7.4.1 Audit committee characteristics 
 
Inspired by Zaman et al. (2011), the present study measures audit committee 
characteristics in line with the Smith Report (2003) recommendation. In particular, 
audit committee independence was measured using a dummy; where “1” is coded if all 
of an audit committee’s members are comprised of independent directors, and “0” if 
otherwise.63 Concerning audit committee meetings: “1” is assigned if an audit 
committee meets at least 3 times in a year, and “0” if otherwise. In relation to audit 
                                                          
63
 With regard to the determination of independent directors, The UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010, Para B. 1. 1) stated that:  
“The board should determine whether the director is independent in character and 
judgment and whether there are relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, 
or could appear to affect, the director’s judgement. The board should state its reason if it 
determines that a director is independent notwithstanding the existence of relationships 
or circumstances which may appear relevant to its determination, including if the director:  
- has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years 
- has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the 
company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a 
body that has such a relationship with the company 
- has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a 
director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance-related pay 
scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension scheme 
- has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior employees 
- hold cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through involvement 
in other companies or bodies 
- represent a significant shareholder; or 
- has served on the board for more than 9 years from the date of their first election” (p. 
12-13). 
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committee size, the firm is marked as “1” if the number of audit committee members 
is at least 3, and “0” is coded if the number of audit committee members is less than 3.  
 
In relation to audit committee expertise, the information determining this variable was 
traced in the directors’ profile sections in the annual reports. Following Hoitash et al. 
(2009, p. 848), an audit committee member was determined to be financially literate if 
they hold any of the following (or similar) qualifications/positions: “certified public 
accountant, chief financial officer, principal financial officer, chief accounting officer, 
principal accounting officer, treasurer, auditor or vice president of finance”. Hoitash et 
al. (2009) depend on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Final Rule when 
defining audit committee expertise. The present study believes that this definition of 
audit committee expertise is in line with The UK Corporate Governance Code (Para 
3.C.1) which recommends that “at least one member of the audit committee member 
has recent and relevant financial experience” (p. 19). The UK Corporate Governance 
Code definition is otherwise ambiguous and the utilisation of Hoitash’s definition is a 
fair way of interpreting their recommendations concerning audit committee expertise. 
After the audit committees that had financial expertise had been identified, the data 
was then classified into dummy variables (1 = if the number of audit committee 
members with financial expertise is greater than 1, and 0 = otherwise), in accordance 
with the recommended benchmark defined in the Smith Report (2003).  
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3.7.4.2 Board characteristics 
 
Board independence was measured using the percentages of independent directors on 
the board (excluding the chairman). The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
suggests that half of the board must be comprised of independent directors (excluding 
the chairman)64. Numerous corporate governance studies, including Felo et al. (2003), 
Nelson et al. (2010) and Kent et al. (2010), measure board independence based on the 
percentages of independent directors on the board. With respect to the board meeting 
frequency, it was measured using the number of board meetings held during the year, 
in accordance with Xie et al. (2003) and Nelson et al. (2010). Regarding the board size, 
it was represented by the total number of board members, following Nelson et al. 
(2010). 
 
3.7.5 Earnings management measures 
 
Given that accruals have been shown to be the most popular method of earnings 
management amongst managers (Goncharov, 2005), the measurement of earnings 
management related to accruals was used in the current study. In particular, 
discretionary accrual was estimated using the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 
1995). This approach resembles that of previous research in this area, including 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011), Cornett et al. (2008), Jiraporn et al. (2008), Yu 
(2008) and Mouselli et al. (2011). In the sensitivity analysis, earnings management was 
estimated using the Jones Model (Jones 1991) and Performance-Adjusted 
Discretionary Accruals (Kothari et al., 2005).  
                                                          
64
 Refer footnote 22 to see the determination of independent directors.  
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3.7.5.1 The Modified Jones Model and Jones Model  
 
Discretionary accruals were computed using the cross-sectional Jones and cross-
sectional Modified Jones Models, which are both used by Kothari et al. (2005). The 
total accruals were calculated using the cash flow approach since it is more favourable 
than balance sheet approach, according to Hribar and Collin (2002). Consistent with Jo 
and Kim (2007), total accrual was calculated as follows:  
Total Accruals (TA) = net income after extraordinary items – net cash flow from 
operations 
 
Following Kothari et al. (2005), the equation for non-discretionary accruals for the 
Jones (1991) Model is expressed as follows: 
NDA = α1 (1/LTA) + α2 (ΔREV/LTA) + α3 (PPE/LTA) 
 
Whereby:  
NDA  non discretionary accruals 
LTA = lagged total assets 
ΔREV = Change in Revenues 
PPE = Property, plant and equipment (gross) 
 
The equation for non-discretionary accruals according to the Modified Jones Model 
(1995) is: 
NDA = α1 (1/LTA) + α2 (ΔREV- ΔREC /LTA) + α3 (PPE/LTA) 
 
Whereby:  
NDA = non discretionary accruals 
LTA= lagged total assets 
ΔREV= Change in Revenues 
ΔREC= Change in Receivables 
PPE = Property, plant and equipment (gross) 
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To calculate the NDA using the Jones and Modified Jones Models, it is necessary to 
estimate the coefficients: α1, α2 and α3, for both models. The data for the firms in the 
same industries and years (at least 6 firms in each industry) were gathered and the OLS 
linear regression was used to estimate the coefficient parameters for each industry. In 
similarity to the approach used by Athanasakou et al., (2009), industries with less than 
6 firms were removed from the sample, because of the lack of quorum in calculating 
the coefficient. Each firm’s classification was based on their supersector according to 
the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), created by FTSE Group and Dow Jones 
Indexes, in line with Lemans (2009).  
 
In order to obtain the coefficient, the equation below was regressed using OLS 
regression: 
 
TA/LTA = α1 (1/LTA) + α2 (ΔREV/LTA) + α3 (PPE/LTA) + ε 
 
Whereby:  
TA = Total accruals  
LTA = lagged total assets 
ΔREV = Change in Revenues 
PPE = Property, plant and equipment (gross) 
 
The coefficient from this regression was used to calculate the NDA using the Jones and 
Modified Jones Models. Then, the discretionary accrual was calculated using the 
equation below: 
DA = TA/ LTA-NDA 
Whereby: 
DA = discretionary accruals 
TA = total accruals 
LTA = lagged total assets 
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NDA = non-discretionary accruals 
 
The present study employs the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
earnings management, since this study is not focusing on the direction of earnings 
management.65 The employment of the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(based on the Modified Jones Model) as a proxy for earnings management is in line 
with numerous prior studies, including Mouselli et al. (2011), Yu (2008), Kothari et al. 
(2005), Bartov at al. (2001) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994).  
 
3.7.5.2 The Performance-Adjusted Discretionary Accrual model 
 
Following the approach of Kothari et al. (2005), the Performance-Adjusted 
Discretionary Accrual was calculated by incorporating lagged ROA into the Modified 
Jones Model, as introduced by Dechow et al. (1995). In particular, the NDA was 
estimated as follows:  
  
                                                          
65
 The present study acknowledges that certain studies employed signed discretionary accruals as the 
proxy for earnings management. The use of absolute value of discretionary accruals per se might not be 
able to capture the motives behind earnings management increasing and decreasing. Future research 
could improve this study by using both signed and absolute value of discretionary accruals as proxies for 
earnings management.  
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NDA = α1 (1/LTA) + α2 (ΔREV- ΔREC /LTA) + α3 (PPE/LTA) + α4 (LROA) 
 
Whereby:  
NDA = non discretionary accruals 
LTA = lagged total assets 
ΔREV = Change in Revenues 
ΔREC = Change in Receivables 
PPE = Property, plant and equipment (gross) 
LROA = Lagged Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
To calculate the NDA using Performance-Adjusted Discretionary Accruals, it is 
necessary to estimate the coefficients α1, α2 and α3. The data for the firms in the 
same industries and years (at least 6 firms in each industry) was collected and the OLS 
regression was used to estimate the equation below. In line with UK study, 
Athanasakou et al. (2009) this study also employ six firms in the same industry when 
OLS regression was performed in order to obtain the coefficient. This step is 
particularly important, given that industries with less than six observations cannot be 
used to estimate coefficient parameters.  
 
TA/LTA = α1 (1/LTA) + α2 (ΔREV/LTA) + α3 (PPE/LTA) + α4 (LROA) + ε 
 
Whereby:  
TA = Total accruals  
LTA = lagged total assets 
ΔREV = Change in Revenues 
PPE = Property, plant and equipment (gross) 
LROA = Lagged Return on Asset (ROA) 
 
The coefficient from this regression was used to calculate the NDA using Performance -
Adjusted Discretionary Accruals. Then, the discretionary accruals were calculated using 
the equation below: 
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DA = TA/ LTA-NDA 
 
DA = discretionary accruals 
TA = total accruals 
LTA = lagged total assets 
NDA= non-discretionary accruals 
 
The absolute value of discretionary accruals was used as a proxy for earnings 
management because this study is not focusing on the direction of earnings 
management. Becker et al., (1998) claim that the use of the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is effective in capturing both income-increasing and income-
decreasing effects in earnings management. As mentioned above, the employment of 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management takes 
a similar approach to that taken by Mouselli et al. (2011), Yu (2008), Bartov at al. 
(2001) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994).  
 
3.7.6 Control variables 
 
3.7.6.1 Firm-specific variables 
 
When investigating the relationship between disclosure quality and earnings 
management, several control variables were included in order to ensure that the 
model was not misspecified. Eleven control variables were included in the model; this 
ensured that the model was able to capture the effect of earnings management.  
 
(i) FIRM SIZE (LMCAP) 
Previous research has proved that the relationship between firm size and earnings 
management is mixed. Firm size can be negatively related to earnings management 
181 
 
because large firms are basically under high scrutiny from the investors and this may 
reduce managers’ propensity to manipulate earnings (Lobo and Zhau, 2006; Zhau and 
Elder, 2001). However, a firm’s size can also positively relate to earnings management. 
Moreover, Lobo and Zhau (2006) argue that managers in large firms have greater 
incentives to engage in earnings management, given that the nature of their business 
operations are much more complicated than small firms and this can lead to earnings 
management being less detectable (p. 61). Complexity of information, therefore, 
increases information asymmetry; hence, reducing the monitoring functions of 
investors and analysts. Several studies document a positive link between firm size and 
earnings management (Lobo and Zhau, 2006; Jo and Kim, 2007). Given that firm size 
can potentially influence earnings management in both negative and positive ways, 
the present study predicts that there is a positive or a negative association between 
firm size and earnings management.66 The natural log of market capitalisation is used 
as a proxy for firm size, and this use is consistent with a long line of previous research 
(e.g. Hoitash et al., 2009; Wallace et al., 1999; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Chang et al., 
2008).  
 
(ii) LAGGED PROFITABILITY (LAGGED ROA) 
This study also includes lagged return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for profitability, since 
earnings has been viewed as a measure of ultimate performance by outsiders (Ronen 
and Yaari, 2008). In this regard, Skinner (2003) claims that it is important to control for 
                                                          
66
 The present study admits that the competing view of firm size and earnings management might be 
due to potential non-linearity effects. This is one of the weaknesses in the present study, and it would 
be wise for future research to consider non-linearity effects, between a firm’s size and earnings 
management, in their regression.  
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firms’ performance when earnings management is considered, given that it is 
connected to the investment opportunity. It can be argued that profitability can be 
either positively or negatively related to earnings management. In positive accounting 
theory, political cost hypothesis predicts that firms with high profits tend to choose an 
accounting method that can reduce their earnings in order to mitigate political 
pressures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). For example, high profitability in 
pharmaceutical firms in the US creates incentives for managers to deflate earnings in 
order to alleviate the political pressure to reduce the cost of medicine (Meyer et al., 
2000). Jo and Kim (2007) report that ROA is highly and positively related to earnings 
management, in their US study.  
 
However, high profitability can also be negatively related to earnings management, 
given that companies making high profits are supposed to make no earnings 
management effort in order to reach their earnings threshold. Skinner (2003) 
documents that low ROA firms are more likely to inflate earnings. Due to this 
competing view, the present study predicts that there is both a positive and a negative 
relationship between profitability and earnings management. As in Skinner (2003), 
profitability was measured using Return on Assets ratio (net income divided by total 
assets). Lagged data for ROA was used to control for the effect of endogeneity. In the 
sensitivity analysis section, Return on Sales ratio (net income divided by sales) and 
Return on Equity ratio (net income divided by total number of ordinary shares) were 
employed as alternative proxies for profitability.  
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(iii) NET CASH FLOW FROM OPERATION (NCF/LTA) 
Firms with strong operating cash flow performance are less likely to employ income 
increasing discretionary accruals to boost earnings because these firms are already 
performing well (Lobo and Zhau, 2006, p. 61). Consistent with Becker et al. (1998), 
Bauer and Boritz (2009), Gul et al. (2009) and Lobo and Zhau (2006) the present study 
predicts a negative relationship between net operating cash flow and earnings 
management and it was measured by dividing net cash flow from operation with 
lagged total assets (NCF/LTA) 
 
(iv) ANALYST FOLLOWING (ANALYST) 
Through the theoretical lens, monitoring by financial analysts has the potential to 
reduce the agency cost in the principal-agent relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
through the dissemination of information, which may lead to lower information 
asymmetry between agent and principal (e.g. Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Ali et al., 
2008; Roulstone, 2003). This therefore increases investors’ ability to supervise firms 
and constrain earnings management. Gavious (2007) reports that analysts are 
knowledgeable and able spot earnings management practices; hence, managers will 
be reluctant to manipulate earnings in the presence of a financial analyst (e.g. Yu, 
2008; Ke, 2001).  
 
On the other hand, a large analyst following could also have an adverse effect on 
firms. In particular, a high analyst following increases an analyst’s incentives to be a 
free rider. It has also caused herding among analyst forecasters, given that analysts 
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always consider other analysts’ recommendations or forecasts, for job security 
reasons (e.g. Hong et al., 2000; Welch, 2000). Having said this, it is presumed that 
there are both positive and inverse relationships between analyst following and 
earnings management. Analyst following (ANALYST) data is downloaded from 
DataStream and measured using the number of the analyst following. This method is 
similar to the approach taken by Eng and Mak (2003) and Chang et al., (2008).  
 
(v) TOTAL ACCRUAL (TACF/LTA) 
The absolute value of total accruals is expected to be positively related to earnings 
management, given that high total accruals are strongly connected to high earnings 
management (Becker et al., 1998). Accounting accruals, which represent discrepancies 
between sales and revenue, is one of most popular methods by which managers 
manipulate earnings (Goncharov, 2005). According to Velury, (2003, p. 173), “larger 
(smaller) discretionary accruals suggest the presence of more (less) earnings 
management”. Moreover, Dechow et al., (1996) document that firms that under SEC 
Enforcement Action are prone to have a higher accrual than their counterparts. 
Numerous studies include the absolute value of total accrual as one of the control 
variables that can influence earnings management (e.g. Becker et al., 1998; Jo and 
Kim, 2007; Bukit and Iskandar, 2009; Velury, 2003; Lobo and Elder, 2001). The positive 
relationship between the absolute value of total accrual and earnings management is 
documented in prior studies (e.g. Bukit and Iskandar, 2009; Velury, 2003). Consistent 
with Jo and Kim (2007), the present study included the absolute value of total accrual 
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(net income after extraordinary items minus net cash flow from operations) divided by 
lagged total assets (TACF/ LTA) as one of the control variables in the analysis.  
 
(vi) INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY (PPE/LTA) 
When explaining the relationship between investment opportunity and earnings 
management, Skinner (1993) proposes that firms with high assets in place are trapped 
with high debt, which subsequently increases incentives to manipulate earnings. 
According to Riahi and Arab (2011, p. 50), “firms use the amortisation like a means to 
manage earnings, then firms that invest more in net property, plant and equipment 
have more flexibility to manage earnings” (Riahi and Arab, 2011, p. 50). Based on the 
evidence documented by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Kim et al., (2003) point out 
that “firms with higher current assets or current liabilities provide more room for the 
management to manipulate earnings than firms with lower current assets or current 
liabilities” (p. 13). Using gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) as one of the 
proxies for investment opportunity, Jo and Kim (2007) report a positive link between 
PPE and earnings management. Therefore, the present study predicts that the 
interaction between investment opportunity and earnings management is positive. It is 
measured by dividing gross property, plant and equipment by lagged total assets.  
 
(i) LOSS (LOSS) 
Moreira and Pope (2007) argue that companies with negative earnings (LOSS) tend to 
engage more in earnings management, compared to their counterparts; while Ertimur 
(2004) claims that an unsecured position in loss firms might create incentives for 
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managers to manipulate earnings. Although loss firms only inflate slight amounts of 
income-increasing earnings management, it is still an example of earnings 
management behaviour (Beaver et al., 2000, as cited in Ke, 2001). Hoitash et al. (2009) 
included LOSS as one of the control variables that might influence the disclosure of 
material weaknesses. Therefore, the present study predicts that LOSS is positively 
related to earnings management. In the present study, LOSS was measured in a similar 
way to Krishnan (2003), where a dummy was assigned according to the firm’s income 
before extraordinary items: 1 = negative earnings, 0 = positive earnings.  
 
(ii) CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE (CHGEINSALES).  
Jo and Kim (2007) report that a change in performance is negatively and significantly 
related to earnings management at p<0.01. It is argued that firms with a large change 
in performance are less interested in managing earnings than firms with a low change 
in performance. Therefore, an inverse relationship is predicted. Change in 
performance was measured using change in sales (current year sales minus previous 
year sales divided by lagged total assets).  
 
(iii) LEVERAGE (DTA) 
From another perspective, debt hypothesis, in the context of positive accounting 
theory, argues that highly leveraged firms may aggressively manipulate earnings in 
order to mitigate and alleviate their large debt in the eyes of shareholders (Watt and 
Zimmerman, 1990). Richardson et al. (2002) demonstrate that high leverage results in 
managers being more aggressive in their accounting choices. Moreover, high leverage 
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indicates that a firm is facing financial problems and are more likely to be involved in 
fraud (Chen et al, 2006). Prior studies point out that firms with high leverage have an 
incentive to inflate earnings to avoid debt covenant violation (Becker et al., 1998; 
Velury, 2003) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find evidence of firms that are 
violating debt covenants being engaged in earnings management.  
 
Several studies include leverage as one of the control variables that influences 
earnings management (Bauer and Boritz, 2009; Habbash, 2010; Jo and Kim, 2007; Ke, 
2001; Richardson et al., 2002; Becker et al., 1998). In this regard, the present study 
predicts positive links between leverage and earnings management. Leverage was 
measured using Debt to Asset ratio (DTA), which is determined by dividing total long-
term debt by total assets. The data for DTA is available from DataStream.   
 
(iv) AUDIT QUALITY (BIG4) 
Independent audits are one of the external governance mechanisms that are essential 
in aligning managers and shareholders interests and reducing agency costs by playing a 
role in monitoring and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Auditing process that is 
carried out by independent and credible audit firms is able to hamper “aggressive, 
potentially opportunistic reporting of accruals”, reducing managers’ incentives to 
manipulate earnings (Francis et al., 1999, p. 18). This underlying assumption illustrates 
the inverse relationship between audit quality and earnings management that is 
documented in prior studies including Kent et al. (2010), Becker et al. (1998) and 
Francis et al. (1999). In this instance, large audit firms (Big 4) are viewed as more 
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credible because they are expected to have higher experience and better financial 
knowledge (Velury, 2003; Kent et al., 2010, p. 177). They are also expected to be 
equipped with high-end technology and resources and to possess greater manpower 
than their counterparts. By the same token, Becker et al. (1998, p. 6) point out that: 
Auditing reduces information asymmetries that exist between managers and firm 
stakeholders by allowing outsiders to verify the validity of financial statements. The 
effectiveness of auditing, and its ability to constrain the management of earnings, is 
expected to vary with the quality of the auditor. In comparison to low-quality auditors, 
high-quality auditors are more likely to detect questionable accounting practices and, 
when detected, to object to their use and/or to qualify the audit report. Thus, high-
quality auditing acts as an effective deterrent to earnings management because 
management's reputation is likely to be damaged and firm value reduced if 
misreporting is detected and revealed. 
 
 
Hence, the present study predicts a negative link between audit quality and earnings 
management. Audit quality was measured using a dummy (1 = if firms are audited by a 
Big 4 audit firm, 0 = if otherwise), this approach is consistent with Kent et al. (2010).  
 
(v) INDUSTRY AND YEAR EFFECT (INDUSTRY, YEAR) 
It is argued that the industry type is a crucial influence on managers’ earnings 
management activities. Meyer et al. (2000) find that the pharmaceutical industry 
practices decreasing earnings management in order to avoid the pressures of political 
cost. Erickson and Wang (1999) find clear evidence that manufacturing firms tend to 
manipulate earnings using their inventory, while non-manufacturing firms prefer to 
manipulate earnings by postponing the accounts payable. In the present study, 
industry dummies were used to control for industry effects, given that firms in the 
same industry are normally homogenous in terms of firm characteristics, including 
assets and liability. Industry dummies were classified based on the Industrial 
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Classification Benchmark (ICB) that also has been used by FTSE and London Stock 
Exchange. To control for year effects, year dummies were also included in the model, 
as in Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006).  
 
3.7.7  Model 
 
When examining the relationship between disclosure quality, corporate governance 
and earnings management, the OLS regression equation was expressed using following 
model: 
 
EM = DQ(IRAWARD/FLSCORE/AFA) + BODIND + BODSIZE + BODMEET + ACSIZE + ACIND 
+ ACMEET + ACEXP + LOSS + LEV + ANALYST + TACF /LTA+ NCF/LTA + PPE/LTA + BIG4 + 
LAGGED ROA + SIZE + CHANGE IN SALES + 2007 DUMMIES + 2006 DUMMIES + 2005 
DUMMIES +  OIL & GAS + CONSUMER GOODS + CONSUMER SERVICES +  HEALTHCARE 
+ TELECOMMUNICATION + UTILITIES + TECHNOLOGY + e 
 
Where: 
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Table 3-3: Variable definitions 
 
Variables Measurement 
Earnings 
Management 
(EM) 
Discretionary accrual estimated using  
(i) Cross-sectional Modified Jones Model 
(MJONES)  
(ii) Cross-sectional Jones Model (JONES) 
(iii) Performance-Adjusted Discretionary 
Accrual (PERFORM-ADJ) 
Disclosure 
Quality (DQ) 
(i) IR Award (dichotomous, 1 = winner, 0 = 
non winner) (IRAWARD) 
(ii) The number of forward-looking scores in 
the annual report (FLSCORE)  
(iii) Analyst Forecast Accuracy (AFA) 
BODIND Percentage of independent directors in the board 
(excluding the chairman). 
BODSIZE Total number of board members 
BODMEET Total number of board meetings 
ACIND 1 = if the percentage of independent directors in 
audit committee is 100%, 0 = if otherwise 
ACSIZE 1 = if the number of audit committee member  =/>3, 
0 = if otherwise 
ACMEET 1 = if the number of board meetings in a year is =/>3, 
0 = if otherwise 
ACEXP 1 = if the number of audit committee expertise is 
=/>1, 0 = if otherwise 
SIZE Natural Log of market capitalisation  
LEV Debt to Asset Ratio  
PROFIT Return on Asset ratio  
CHGEINSALES Change in sales. This is a proxy for 
change in performance.  
ANALYST Number of analysts following  
TACF/LTA Absolute value of total accruals. Where total accruals 
is calculated as follow; net income – net cash flow 
from operation/ lagged total assets  
NCF/LTA Net cash flow from operation activities divided by 
lagged total assets 
PPE/LTA Gross property, plant and equipment divided by 
lagged total assets. This is a proxy for investment 
opportunity.  
LOSS Dummy. 1 = firms with negative earnings 0 = firms 
with positive earnings.  
BIG4 Auditor a Big4 firm (Big4 = 1, Non-Big4 = 0) 
YEAR Year Dummies (2007, 2006, 2005). Year 2004 
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excluded from the model.  
INDUSTRY Industry Dummies (Consumer goods, consumer 
services, oil and gas, healthcare, telecommunication, 
technology, and utilities). The industrial dummy is 
excluded from the model.  
 
There is a potential for simultaneity bias between disclosure quality and earnings 
management. Therefore in line with Zhau and Lobo (2001), a simultaneous system of 
equation, based on 2SLS estimation, was used, in which disclosure quality and earnings 
management are treated as endogenous. In order to test the simultaneous 
relationship, two related equations based on the endogenous variables were 
developed. The first was the earnings management equation, which was similar to the 
above mentioned, while the second was the disclosure quality equation, which was 
driven by the findings of prior literature.  
 
In relation to the disclosure quality equation,67 Jans et al. (2005), Shaw (2003) and 
Francis et al. (2008) hypothesised that income smoothing or earnings quality 
(measured using discretionary accrual) are important determinants for disclosure 
quality. Francis et al. (2008) find a complementary relationship between earnings 
quality and disclosure quality. This signals that firms with high earnings quality offer 
better disclosure quality than their counterparts. Moreover, Zhau and Lobo (2001) 
demonstrate, in their US study, that there is negative bi-directional link between 
disclosure quality (measured using AIMR Ratings) and earnings management 
(estimated using the Modified Jones Model).   
 
                                                          
67
 A detailed explanation for each variable in the disclosure quality equation is available in Chapter Five.  
192 
 
Besides that, audit committee characteristics are documented in the prior literature as 
crucial countervailing forces in explaining disclosure quality. Such characteristics 
include audit committee size (Felo et al., 2003; Lin et al., 2006; O’Sullivan et al., 2008), 
audit committee independence (Bradbury et al., 2009; Klien, 2002), frequency of audit 
committee meetings (Karamanao and Vafeas, 2005), audit committee expertise (Felo 
et al., 2003) and audit committee multiple directorship (Beasley, 1996).  In addition, 
previous research also highlights that board characteristics are statistically significant 
in determining the extent of disclosure quality. These include board independence 
(Baek et al., 2009; Klien, 2002; Li et al., 2008; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Conyon et al., 
2002), board meeting frequency (Karamanao and Vafeas, 2005; Chen et al., 2006; 
Vafeas, 1999), board size (Bradbury et al., 2006), non-executive chairmanship (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005), duration of chairman tenure (Chen et al., 2006) and number of 
other directorships held by chairman(Beasley, 1996). Similarly, the monitoring that is 
offered by substantial shareholders (Eng and Mak, 2003) has potential for reducing 
conflict of interest; thereby, improving disclosure quality. Francis et al. (2008) find that 
earnings variability is inversely related to voluntary disclosure. Several control 
variables that count as important in explaining disclosure quality include firm size 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995; Hossain et al., 1994 ), leverage (Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987; Ahmad and Courtis, 1999; Raffournier, 1995; Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et al., 
1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995 ), profitability (Watson et al., 2002; Debreceny and 
Rahman, 2005; Singhvi and Desai, 1971), audit quality (Inchausti, 1997; Raffournier, 
1995), and analyst following (Eng and Mak, 2003 and Chang et al., 2008). Year and 
industry dummies were included in the model to control for year and industry effects 
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in line with Nelson et al. (2010) and Kent and Steward (2008). The equation for 
earnings management and disclosure quality is represented below:  
 
EM = DQ + BODIND + BODSIZE + BODMEET + ACSIZE + ACIND + ACMEET + ACEXP + 
LOSS + DTA + ANALYST + TACF /LTA + NCF/LTA + PPE/LTA + BIG4 + LAGGEDROA 68+ 
LMCAP + CHGEINSALES +2007 DUMMIES + 2006 DUMMIES + 2005 DUMMIES +  OIL & 
GAS + CONSUMER GOODS + CONSUMER SERVICES +  HEALTHCARE + 
TELECOMMUNICATION + UTILITIES + TECHNOLOGY + e----- equation (1) 
 
DQ = EM + BODSIZE + BODMEET + ACSIZE + ACMEET + ACIND + ACEXP + ACMULT + 
CHAIRTEN + CHAIRMULT + CHAIRNONEXE + SUBSHR + NOSUBSHR + ROA + DTA + BIG4 
+ ANALYST + EARNVAR + LMCAP + 2007 DUMMIES + 2006 DUMMIES + 2005 DUMMIES 
+ OIL & GAS + CONSUMER GOODS + CONSUMER SERVICES +  HEALTHCARE + 
TELECOMMUNICATION + UTILITIES + TECHNOLOGY + e----- equation (2) 
 
Where: 
 
 
  
                                                          
68
 Incorporating lagged data for the purpose of controlling endogeneity is not only restricted to ROA but 
also is generic to all types of financial data. The present study acknowledges that failure to include 
lagged financial data is one of the drawbacks in the current research. Lo et al. (2010) employed lagged 
financial data to control for endogeneity stemming from simultaneity bias.   
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Table 3-12: Variable definitions 
 
Variables Measurement 
Earnings 
Management 
(EM) 
Discretionary accrual estimated using the  
(iv) cross-sectional Modified Jones Model 
(MJONES)  
(v) cross-sectional Jones Model (JONES) 
(vi) cross-sectional Performance-Adjusted 
Discretionary Accrual (PERFORM-ADJ) 
Disclosure 
Quality (DQ) 
(iv) IR Award (dichotomous, 1 = winner, 0 = 
non winner) (IRAWARD) 
(v) The number of forward-looking sentences 
in the annual report (FLSCORE)  
(vi) Analyst Forecast Accuracy (AFA) 
BODIND Percentage of independent directors on the board 
(excluding the chairman). 
BODSIZE Total number of board members 
BODMEET Total number of board meeting 
ACIND 1 = if the percentage of independent directors in the 
audit committee is 100%, 0 = if otherwise 
ACSIZE 1 = if the number of audit committee members’ is 
=/>3, 0 = if otherwise 
ACMEET 1 = if the number of board meetings in a year is =/>3, 
0 = if otherwise 
ACEXP 1 = if the number of financial experts on the audit 
committee is =/>1, 0 = if otherwise 
SIZE Natural Log of market capitalisation  
LEV Debt to Asset Ratio  
PROFIT Return on Asset Ratio  
CHGEINSALES Change in sales divided by lagged total 
assets. This is a proxy for change in 
performance.  
ANALYST Number of analysts following  
TACF/LTA Absolute value of total accruals (where total accrual 
is calculated as follow; net income – net cash flow 
from operation activities / lagged total assets)  
NCF/LTA Net cash flow from operation activities divided by 
lagged total assets 
PPE/LTA Gross property, plant and equipment divided by 
lagged total assets. This is a proxy for investment 
opportunity.  
LOSS Dummy 1 = firms with negative earnings, 0 = firms 
with positive earning.  
ACMULT Average number of additional directorships held by 
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audit committee members 
CHAIRNONEXE Status of the board chair (1 = non-executive, 0 = 
executive) 
CHAIRTEN Number of years the chair has held the chair position 
CHAIRMULT Number of additional directorships held by board 
chair 
3%SUBSHR Total percentage of shares held by substantial 
shareholders (i.e. 3% or more) 
NO.SUBSHR Number of substantial shareholders (i.e. 3% or more) 
in a firm 
EARNVAR  Standard deviation of return on sales.  
BIG4 Auditor is a Big4 firm (Big4 = 1, Non-Big4 = 0) 
YEAR Year Dummies (2007, 2006, 2005). Year 2004 
excluded from the model.  
INDUSTRY Industry Dummies (Consumer goods, consumer 
services, oil and gas, healthcare, telecommunication, 
technology, and utilities). The industrial dummy is 
excluded from the model.  
 
In order to run the 2SLS Regression, this present study identifies an instrumental 
variable for each of the endogenous variable, similar to Cornett et al. (2009). According 
to them, the instrumental variable must be “correlated with the endogenous variable 
but is exogenous to the structural equation” (p. 422). When earnings management 
(MJONES) is treated as endogenous, this present study employs absolute value of total 
accruals (TACF/LTA) as the instrumental variable, because it is highly correlated with 
MJONES and not correlated to the error term.69 Becker et al. (1998) and Velury (2003) 
claim that total accrual is supposed to have a positive relationship with earnings 
management because high accruals are strongly connected to high earnings 
management. 
 
                                                          
69
 The pairwise correlation between MJONES and TACF/LTA is 38%. The regression analysis findings 
show a consistent and high t-value for TACF/LTA, indicates a valid and sound instrumental variable for 
MJONES, as suggested by Adkins and Hill (2007).   
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With regard to disclosure quality, this present study identifies audit committee 
meeting (ACMEET) and firm size (LNMCAP) as instrumental variables.70 ACMEET is a 
platform for the audit committee to exercise their professional judgement and 
expertise, hence is expected to be associated with disclosure quality. Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005) found that firms with active audit committee meeting tend to provide 
more quality information on earnings forecast. Prior literature found that firm size 
(LMCAP) is one of the important determinants for disclosure quality (e.g. Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain et al. 1994), because large firms tend to provide more 
disclosure because they have more resources and cash (Buzby, 1975) and subject to 
public scrutiny (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002).  
 
For the purpose of sensitivity analysis, the corporate governance variables were 
redefined in the following way:  
 
Table 3-13: Variable definitions (redefined measures) 
 
Variables Measurement 
ACINDA Percentage of independent directors in the audit 
committee 
ACSIZEA Number of audit committee members 
ACMEETA Number of audit committee meetings in a year 
ACEXPA Percentage of directors with financial expertise in the 
audit committee 
BODINDA 1 = if percentage of independent directors in the 
board is =>50% (excluding chairman), 0 = if otherwise 
BODSIZEA 1 = high board size, 0 = low board size 
BODMEETA 1 = high board meeting, 0 = low board meeting 
                                                          
70
 The pairwise correlation between ACMEET (LNMCAP) to disclosure quality measures are quite high, 
ranging from 19% to 3% (41% to 19%).  The t-value for both ACMEET and LNMCAP are consistently high 
in the regression model, hence suggesting that they are valid instrumental variable for disclosure quality 
(Adkins and Hill, 2007).  
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3.7.8 Statistical analyses71 
 
The analysis for residuals and independent variables for this project were performed 
and the results are reported in Appendix 1. The detailed discussion about the outliers, 
missing data and the determination of the estimation are also discussed in that 
section. In brief, the linearity test, multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity and normality 
were checked using several tests including a QQ plot, variance inflation factor, 
skewness-kurtosis test, RVF plot, White test, Breush-pagan test, Shapiro-Wilk test and 
Shapiro-Francia test. Heteroskedasticity is mild, given that the results for the White 
and Breusch-Pagan tests reveal contradictory results. Heteroskedasticity was, 
therefore, corrected using robust standard error (White, 1890). The model 
specification test was performed using the link test and the Ramsey RESET test. All 
continuous variables were winsorised at the top and bottom 1% in order to reduce the 
effect of outliers, as in Cornett et al. (2009), Dhaliwal et al. (2009) and Biddle et al. 
(2009). The random missing data was replaced by the mean of the valid data as 
suggested by Hair et al. (2008). Concerning the analysis of residuals, the present study 
finds that the residuals for all equations (i.e., when IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA is 
used interchangeably as independent variables), are normally distributed and fully 
comply with other parametric assumptions (i.e., multicollinearity and 
heteroskedasticity). OLS regression was performed in the main analysis while 
additional tests using Tobit, truncated and robust regressions were used in the 
sensitivity analysis to accommodate the nature of non-discretionary accruals data (i.e., 
zero truncated data). Tobit and truncated regression are semi-parametric tests which 
                                                          
71
 The results for analysis of residual and independent variables (e.g. normality test, linearity test, 
heteroskedasticity test) are reported in the Appendix 1.  
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do not fully comply with the assumptions of the parametric test (Powell, 2008), while 
robust regression, which is a non-parametric analysis, neglected all of the assumptions 
in its test. 72  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
72
 Earnings management data and analyst forecast accuracy data are zero truncated. Therefore, the 
present study rescales the earnings management data by multiplying it by 100. A similar procedure was 
carried out by Li (2011), who rescaled the dependent variable by multiplying by 100. Rescaling the data 
helps to produce a more meaningful coefficient in the multivariate analysis. Email discussion with one of 
the leading STATA experts, Prof. Christopher Baum, suggested that the rescaling process is favorable 
because it will not change the p-value and t-statistics, but will help to produce a more meaningful/and 
sensible coefficient.  
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4 Disclosure Quality and Earnings Management: Results 
and Discussions 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the study presents the results from several types of analyses including 
descriptive statistics and the univariate and multivariate tests, which were applied 
using STATA.73 In addition to OLS regression in predicting earnings management, the 
multivariate test was also analysed using 2SLS regression, where both disclosure and 
earnings management are assumed to be endogenous. With respect to sensitivity 
analysis, a series of additional tests were performed in order to test the robustness of 
the findings.  
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4-1 describes the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum percentiles 
and median of the variables used in this study. The descriptive statistics reveal that the 
mean absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the Modified Jones 
Model (MJONES) is 0.0601 and ranges from 0.0005 to 0.4775, while discretionary 
accruals using the Jones Model (JONES) and Performance-Adjusted Discretionary 
Accrual (PERFORM-ADJ) report an average of 0.0605 and 0.0584 respectively. 
                                                          
73
 As well as using STATA, the univariate and multivariate analyses were also randomly executed using a 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The present study noted that the output from STATA and 
SPSS are qualitatively similar.  
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According to these findings, the mean absolute value of discretionary accruals in the 
present study is comparable to that of prior literature in earnings management. For 
example, Rajgopal et al. (1999), in their US study, demonstrate that the average 
absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the Modified Jones Model 
(MJONES) is equal to 0.046, while the mean absolute value of discretionary accruals is 
0.049 in Yu’s (2008) research on analyst coverage and earnings management.  
 
With regard to AFA, the average value in this study is -0.0112, which is qualitatively the 
same to a study by Bhat et al. (2006), which reports a mean AFA equal to -0.019 in 
their UK sample. In this instance, a higher AFA indicates that the analyst’s prediction of 
earnings per share (EPS) is more accurate. Nonetheless, previous US studies show a 
lower mean AFA than has been shown by UK studies. Using data from the years 2000 
to 2002, Byard et al. (2006) in their US study find a mean AFA of -0.0271. Similarly, 
Duru and Reeb (2002) in their US research demonstrate that the average AFA in their 
sample is -0.05, which is very close to Lang and Lundholm (1996), with their mean AFA 
of -0.042. When compared to the results found by Bhat et al. (2006), these findings 
indicate that the accuracy of analysts in their forecasting activities appears to be 
higher in the UK context than in the US.   
 
With respect to the FLSCORE, which represents one of the proxies for disclosure 
quality, the descriptive statistics in Table 4-1 report that the average number of 
forward-looking sentences in the firm’s annual report is 100.12, while the lowest 
number is 6 and the highest is 494. This result is in contrast to Hussainey et al. (2003), 
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whose study on the annual reports of UK firms from 1996 to 1999 reveals that the 
number of forward-looking sentences ranges from 0 to 168. This discrepancy may 
indicate that companies in the UK have become more vigorous in providing forward-
looking information in their annual reports in recent years as compared to several 
years ago. 
 
The mean ACSIZE, ACIND, ACEXP and ACMEET are 0.9517, 0.896, 0.9068 and 0.9517 
respectively, suggesting that the firm’s compliance to the recommended benchmark 
drawn from the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) and the Smith Report (2003) is 
satisfactory Moreover, this result signifies that compliance by UK firms to the 
guidelines of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) and Smith Report (2003) on 
audit committee characteristics has improved over time, given that a study of UK firms 
from 2001 to 2004 (Zaman et al., 2011) reports lower values for ACSIZE (mean = 0.34), 
ACEXP (mean = 0.71) and ACMEET (mean = 0.21), although the study indicates a higher 
mean ACIND (0.97) as compared to the present study.  
 
With regard to alternative measures for audit committees, the average ACSIZEA, 
ACINDA, ACEXPA and ACMEETA found by the present study are 3.62, 97.06%, 35.82% 
and 4.31 respectively. This indicates that the sample UK firms have on average 
between three and four audit committee members, who tend to meet between four 
and five times a year. Moreover, a large majority (97.06%) of the audit committee 
members are independent directors, 35.82% of whom are equipped with relevant 
financial expertise.  
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Concerning BODIND, the mean BODINDA and BODIND are 0.848 and 56.86% 
respectively, hence indicating that 84.8% of the sample complies with the UK Code of 
Corporate Governance’s (2011) provision that the number of independent directors 
must be equal to the number of dependent directors (excluding the chairman). On 
average, the percentage of independent directors on the board as demonstrated by 
BODIND is 56.86%, exceeding the 50% cut-off criteria laid by The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2011). This finding is very similar to the UK study by Zaman et al. 
(2011), which reports that the proportion of non-executive directors on the board of 
FTSE350 firms is 53%.  
 
The BODMEET value found by the present study indicates that boards of directors in 
the UK meet an average of 8.71 times per year and thus more frequently than their US 
counterparts, who meet an average of 7.26 times per year, as reported by Laksmana 
(2008). This is supported by the findings of Zaman et al. (2011), whose study indicates 
that the average number of board meetings per year in UK firms is 8.78. Nonetheless, 
the average BODSIZE in the current sample is 9.49, which is lower than the average 
board size (11.33) in the US as documented by Laksmana (2008).  
 
With regard to the firm-specific characteristics, the average of LMCAP in the sample is 
£7,082,128,000, and the they are normally followed by 14.32 ANALYST, which is 
slightly lower than the figure obtained by Lang and Lundholm (1996) who found the 
average analyst following to be equivalent to 17.6, but higher than that of Byard et al. 
(2006) who cite a mean analyst following of 13.83 in their US studies. Most of the 
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firms are audited by Big Four audit firms, as reflected in the mean of 0.968 for the 
BIG4 variable. Firm’s leverage, which is measured using debt to asset ratio (DTA) 
shows an average of 24.745, hence suggesting that each pound of debt is backed up 
by 24.745 pound of assets. A proxy that controlled for the past performance effects,  
LAGGEDROA, reported a mean of 8.796, with a range of -20.24 to 50.18. The average 
for LOSS is 0.075, while most of the CHGEINSALES for the sample firms is 0.219. 
Furthermore, the descriptive statistics also recorded that the average for PPE/LTA, 
NCF/LTA and TACF/LTA are 0.539, 0.132 and 0.0788 respectively.  
 
 
 
204 
 
Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics74 
 
VARIABLES MEAN STD. DEV MIN MAX 25% PERC 50% PERC  75% PERC 
IRAWARD 0.5 0.5 0 1 0 0.5 1 
FLSCORE 99.16 64.95 9 423 55 87 130 
AFA -0.0112 0.0181 -0.123 -0.00002 -0.0123 -0.0053 -0.00213 
MJONES *75 0.0601 0.0699 0.0005 0.4775 0.0173 0.044 0.08257 
JONES* 0.0605 0.0672 0.0002 0.461 0.0163 0.04336 0.0819 
PERFORM-ADJ* 0.0584 0.0513 0.00153 0.2677 0.0217 0.0461 0.0806 
ACIND 0.896 0.305 0 1 1 1 1 
ACSIZE 0.9517 0.214 0 1 1 1 1 
ACMEET 0.9517 0.214 0 1 1 1 1 
ACEXP 0.9068 0.2911 0 1 1 1 1 
BODSIZEA 0.448 0.498 0 1 0 0 1 
BODMEETA 0.458 0.499 0 1 0 0 1 
BODINDA 0.848 0.359 0 1 1 1 1 
ACINDA 97.06 8.854 66.66 100 100 100 100 
ACSIZEA 3.62 0.924 2 6 3 3 4 
ACMEETA 4.312 1.856 2 13 3 4 5 
ACEXPA 35.82 19.32 0 100 25 33.33 50 
BODSIZE 9.49 2.67 5 18 8 9 11 
BODMEET 8.710 2.921 4 21 7 8 10 
BODIND 56.86 10.345 33.33 80 50 57.14 63.63 
LMCAP 14.574 1.462 9.755 18.603 13.621 14.374 15.747 
LAGGED ROA 8.796 9.53 -20.24 50.18 4.22 7.83 12.83 
 
 
                                                          
74
 The skewness and kurtosis is reported  Appendix 1. All continuous variables were winsorized at the top and bottom at 1%.  
75
 * refers to the absolute value.  
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Table 4-1 Continued 
 
VARIABLES MEAN STD. DEV MIN MAX 25% PERC 50% PERC  75% PERC 
LOSS 0.075 0.265 0 1 0 0 0 
PPE/LTA 0.539 0.504 0.0136 3.301 0.196 0.371 0.866 
NCF/LTA 0.132 0.131 -0.3081 0.675 0.068 0.115 0.177 
TACF/LTA 0.0788 0.0797 0.0013 0.4044 0.0266 0.056 0.104 
DTA 24.745 15.292 0.05 74.14 15.5 22.55 31.28 
BIG4 0.968 0.174 0 1 1 1 1 
CHGEINSALES 0.219 0.866 -0.563 8.129 0.010 0.072 0.218 
ANALYST 14.32 7.57 0 37 9.92 13.29 19 
MCAP £7,082,128,000 £17,500,000,000 £17,240,000 £122,000,000,000 £823,089,000 £1,740,657,000 £6,907,299,000 
YEAR2007 0.241 0.428 0 1 0 0 0 
YEAR2006 0.234 0.42 0 1 0 0 0 
YEAR2005 0.248 0.432 0 1 0 0 0 
TECH 0.134 0.342 0 1 0 0 0 
TELECOM 0.0137 0.117 0 1 0 0 0 
CGOOD 0.0827 0.275 0 1 0 0 0 
CSERV 0.258 0.438 0 1 0 0 1 
HEALTH 0.045 0.207 0 1 0 0 0 
UTILITIES 0.037 0.191 0 1 0 0 0 
OIL AND GAS 0.1034 0.305 0 1 0 0 0 
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4.3 Univariate analysis 
 
4.3.1 T- test and Mann-Whitney U test 
 
Table 4-2: T-test and Mann-Whitney U test 
 
  (A) T-test (B) Mann-Whitney U test 
VARIABLES NON-WIN/ 
WIN 
Mean t p Rank 
Sum 
Z p 
FLSCORE 0 
1 
80.96 
117.34 
-4.96 0.000 
*** 
17958 
24237 
-4.4 0.000 
*** 
AFA 0 
1 
-0.014 
-0.008 
-2.61 0.009 
*** 
14579 
17805 
-2.76 0.006 
*** 
MJONES 0 
1 
0.067 
0.052 
1.91 0.057 
* 
22814 
19386 
2.40 0.016 
** 
JONES 0 
1 
0.067 
0.055 
1.49 0.137 22115 
20080 
1.43 0.154 
PERFORM-ADJ 0 
1 
0.0633 
0.5601 
1.06 0.289 22184 
20012 
1.52 0.128 
ACMEET 0 
1 
0.910 
0.993 
-3.34 0.001 
*** 
20228 
21968 
-3.28 0.001 
*** 
ACIND 0 
1 
0.868 
0.924 
-1.54 0.124 20518 
21678 
-1.54 0.124 
ACEXP 0 
1 
0.896 
0.917 
-0.61 0.546 20880 
21315 
-0.61 0.545 
ACSIZE 0 
1 
0.937 
0.965 
-1.1 0.274 20808 
21388 
-1.1 0.274 
BODIND 0 
1 
0.834 
0.862 
-0.65 0.514 20808 
21388 
-0.65 0.513 
BODSIZE 0 
1 
1.303 
1.593 
-5.17 0.000 
*** 
18053 
24143 
-4.95 0.000 
*** 
BODMEET 0 
1 
0.421 
0.497 
-1.3 0.196 20300 
21895 
-1.29 0.196 
ACMEETA 0 
1 
3.813 
4.806 
-4.72 0.000 
*** 
17227 
24969 
-5.67 0.000 
*** 
ACINDA 0 
1 
96.18 
97.94 
-1.7 0.091 
* 
20493 
21702 
-1.6 0.1091 
ACEXPA 0 
1 
37.48 
34.15 
1.47 0.143 22639 
19557 
2.21 0.027 
** 
ACSIZEA 0 
1 
3.434 
3.793 
-3.36 0.001 
*** 
18794 
23402 
-3.5 0.001 
*** 
BODINDA 0 
1 
55.72 
57.99 
-1.88 0.060 
* 
19968 
22227 
-1.6 0.111 
BODSIZEA 0 
1 
8.66 
10.32 
-5.56 0.000 
*** 
17514 
24682 
-5.1 0.000 
*** 
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Table 4-2 Continued 
  (A) T-test (B) Mann-Whitney U 
test 
VARIABLES NON-
WIN/ 
WIN 
Mean t p Rank 
Sum 
z P 
BODMEETA 0 
1 
8.579 
8.841 
-0.76 0.445 20141 
22055 
-1.35 0.177 
LOSS 
 
0 
1 
0.117 
0.034 
2.69 0.008 
*** 
21968 
20228 
2.66 0.008 
*** 
NCF/LTA 0 
1 
0.131 
0.134 
-0.18 0.859 21036 
21161 
-0.09 0.931 
PPE/LTA 0 
1 
0.585 
0.493 
1.549 0.1224 21874 
20321 
1.087 0.2768 
CHINSALES 0 
1 
0.172 
0.267 
-0.94 0.347 20678 
21517 
-0.59 0.5569 
TACF/LTA 0 
1 
0.0914 
0.066 
2.69 0.0075 
*** 
23034 
19161 
2.712 0.0067 
*** 
LMCAP 0 
1 
£2,242,472,000 
£1,190,000,000,000 
-4.89 0.000 
*** 
15805 
26390 
-7.41 0.000 
*** 
DTA 0 
1 
25.96 
23.53 
1.36 0.1749 22274 
19921 
1.648 0.0993 
* 
ANALYST 0 
1 
10.56 
18.08 
-9.74 0.000 
*** 
14568.5 
27626.5 
-9.15 0.000 
*** 
BIG4 0 
1 
0.965 
0.972 
-0.34 0.736 21025 
21170 
-0.34 0.735 
LAGGEDROA 0 
1 
8.762 
8.83 
-0.06 0.9513 20712 
21483 
-0.54 0.5893 
Note: The calculation for T-test (Mann-Whiney U test) is based on the mean (median).  
*** Significant at one percent level 
** Significant at five percent level 
*Significant at ten percent level 
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Table 4-2 presents the univariate tests using the t-test (Panel A) and the Mann-
Whitney U test (Panel B). The t-test is calculated based on the differences of the mean, 
while Mann-Whitney-U test is based on the differences of the median. The sample is 
divided into two groups: group 1 is for the winners of the the Investor Relations 
Magazine Award and group 0 for the non-winners of the Investor Relations Magazine 
Award.  
 
The analysis, using pooled data as shown in Table 4-2 (Panel A – t-test), reveals that 
there is a significant difference between the means of the two groups (winners and 
non-winners) for FLSCORE, AFA and MJONES. In other words, the winners of the 
Investor Relations Magazine Award (IRAWARD) were firms with a high forward looking 
score (FLSCORE) (p<0.01), high analyst forecast accuracy (AFA) (p<0.01) and low 
discretionary accruals (MJONES) (p<0.05). Generally, these initial findings support the 
hypothesis that there is an inverse relationship between disclosure quality and 
earnings management. These results are also qualitatively similar when the difference 
of median is counted using Mann-Whitney U test in Table 4-2 (Panel B).  
 
The corporate governance variables also exhibit interesting findings. Table 4-2 (Panel 
A) reveals that the winners of the Investor Relations Magazine Award (IRAWARD) were 
firms with higher ACMEET (p<0.01), BODSIZE (p<0.01), ACMEETA (p<0.01), ACINDA 
(p<0.10), ACSIZEA (p<0.01), BODINDA (p<0.10) and BODSIZEA (p<0.01) as compared to 
the non-winners group. Using the Mann Whitney U test similar results were also 
reported.  
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Other control variables in Table 4-2 (Panel A) also report that the winners groups are 
higher in MCAP (p<0.01), ROA (p<0.1) and ANALYST (p<0.01) as compared to the non-
winners group. Nevertheless, TACF/LTA and LOSS are significantly higher for the non-
recipients of IRAWARD as compared to the recipients of IRAWARD.    
 
Table 4-2 shows that the non-winners comprise the companies that suffer from 
negative earnings (LOSS) while most of the winners are the companies with positive 
earnings. These findings are highly significant at p<0.05. This result complements 
Moreira and Pope’s (2007) US study which indicates that companies with negative 
earnings having a higher propensity to manipulate earnings as compared to the firms 
with positive earnings. Moreover, DTA in Table 4-2 also reveals that the non-winners 
group bears higher leverage when compared to the winners group at (p<0.01).  
  
4.3.2 Pairwise correlation 
 
Table 4-3 presents the pairwise correlation for all dependent and independent 
variables used in the regression analysis. Observations for all variables in the 
correlation analysis matrix show that most of the correlation coefficients are below 
80%. A correlation coefficient of more than 80% indicates serious multicollinearity 
(Hair et al., 2008). The maximum correlation coefficient is recorded at 58%, which is 
between analyst following (ANALYST) and the Investor Relations Magazine Award 
(IRAWARD). As such, it can be concluded that the multicollinearity is not detrimental 
to the results of the multivariate analysis.  
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It is interesting to highlight that there are negative correlations between all disclosure 
quality measures (e.g. IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA) and earnings management, as 
estimated using modified Jones Model (MJONES), although only the correlations 
between the Investor Relations Award (IRAWARD) and analyst forecast accuracy (AFA) 
are significant at p<0.05. These results suggest that, firms with high disclosure quality 
are less involved in earnings management activities. These findings corroborate the 
research by Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009), which finds a negative correlation between 
voluntary disclosure and earnings management in the UK. In addition, ANALYST shows 
a significant positive relationship with all disclosure quality proxies (i.e. IRAWARD, 
FLSCORE and AFA), hence suggesting that there is complementary effect between 
ANALYST and disclosure quality.  
 
For the sake of brevity, the correlations for JONES and PERFORM-ADJ are not reported 
in the pairwise correlation table, although the analysis was also performed on each of 
the mentioned variables. The results of the correlations (for JONES and PERFORM-ADJ) 
show very similar coefficients to MJONES, as reported in the table. The correlations 
between each of the earnings management measures are also strong and similar to 
the findings of Leuz et al. (2003).  
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Table 4-3: Pairwise correlation 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1 IRAWARD  1.000 
 
         
2 FLSCORE  0.29 
(0.00) 
1.000         
3 AFA  0.17 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.33) 
1.000        
4 MJONES  -0.14 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.7) 
-0.14 
(0.02) 
1.000       
5 BIG4  0.02 
(0.74) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.84) 
-0.14 
(0.017) 
1.000 
 
     
6 DTA  -0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.47) 
-0.15 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.7) 
-0.23 
(0.00) 
1.000     
7 ACSIZE  0.06 
(0.27) 
0.14 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.41) 
-0.10 
(0.08) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.42) 
1.000 
 
   
8 ACIND  0.09 
(0.12) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.49) 
-0.07 
(0.22) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.76) 
-0.07 
(0.19) 
1.000 
 
  
9 LMCAP  0.48 
(0.00) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.89) 
-0.04 
(0.50) 
0.12 
(0.06) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
0.1 
(0.12) 
1.000  
10 CHSALES 0.06 
(0.34) 
-0.07 
(0.21) 
-0.02 
(0.81) 
0.078 
(0.18) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 
0.038 
(0.52) 
-0.03 
(0.58) 
-0.07 
(0.24) 
0.00 
(0.94) 
1.000 
11 LAGGEDROA  0.004 
(0.95) 
-0.08 
(0.144) 
-0.02 
(0.79) 
0.11 
(0.06) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.48) 
-0.04 
(0.47) 
0.05 
(0.38) 
0.139 
(0.02) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
12 LOSS  -0.17 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.93) 
-0.19 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.51) 
0.06 
(0.36) 
0.03 
(0.62) 
-0.00 
(0.98) 
0.04 
(0.58) 
-0.17 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.42) 
13 PPE -0.07 
(0.26) 
0.05 
(0.37) 
-0.03 
(0.61) 
0.03 
(0.62) 
-0.04 
(0.51) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.26 
(0.00) 
14 NCF  -0.03 
(0.65) 
-0.06 
(0.31) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
-0.08 
(0.21) 
0.04 
(0.49) 
0.01 
(0.92) 
0.05 
(0.41) 
0.01 
(0.82) 
0.37 
(0.00) 
15 ACMEET 0.19 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.60) 
0.01 
(0.91) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.46) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.54) 
0.01 
(0.91) 
16 TACF -0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.14 
(0.02) 
-0.14 
(0.03) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.37) 
0.06 
(0.36) 
-0.00 
(0.99) 
0.06 
(0.35) 
-0.24 
(0.00) 
0.35 
(0.00) 
17 ANALYST  0.58 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(0.82) 
0.07 
(0.27) 
0.04 
(0.48) 
0.06 
(0.35) 
0.66 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.20) 
18 ACEXP 0.04 
(0.55) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.61) 
0.01 
(0.85) 
0.02 
(0.78) 
0.37 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.89) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.67) 
19 BODIND 0.11 
(0.06) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.57) 
0.14 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.31) 
0.2 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
0.279 
(0.00) 
-0.14 
(0.02) 
20 BODSIZE 0.31 
(0.00) 
0.37 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
-0.08 
(0.17) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.29) 
0.2 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.01) 
0.56 
(0.00) 
-0.12 
(0.04) 
21 BODMEET 0.05 
(0.45) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.58) 
0.03 
(0.57) 
0.00 
(0.96) 
0.01 
(0.83) 
0.05 
(0.4) 
-0.07 
(0.19) 
-0.03 
(0.63) 
0.067 
(0.25) 
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  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
11 LAGGEDROA  1.000           
12 LOSS  -0.19 
(0.00) 
1.000          
13 PPE 0.04 
(0.49) 
0.06 
(0.37) 
1.000         
14 NCF  0.31 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
(0.01) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
1.000        
15 ACMEET -0.08 
(0.17) 
-0.06 
(0.33) 
0.07 
(0.21) 
0.08 
(0.15) 
1.000 
 
      
16 TACF 0.11 
(0.06) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.02) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.18) 
1.000      
17 ANALYST  0.07 
(0.19) 
-0.16 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.47) 
-0.00 
(0.96) 
-0.17 
(0.01) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 
1.000     
18 ACEXP -0.06 
(0.31) 
0.05 
(0.43) 
-0.02 
(0.76) 
-0.04 
(0.46) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.23) 
0.11 
(0.05) 
1.000 
 
   
19 BODIND 0.018 
(0.17) 
-0.08 
(0.13) 
-0.07 
(0.22) 
-0.06 
(0.25) 
0.08 
(0.17) 
-0.25 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.47) 
1.000 
 
  
20 BODSIZE -0.05 
(0.44) 
-0.16 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.85) 
-0.06 
(0.28) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
-0.27 
(0.00) 
0.53 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.27) 
1.000 
 
 
21 BODMEET -0.03 
(0.63) 
0.13 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.31) 
-0.01 
(0.92) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.45) 
0.03 
(0.57) 
0.08 
(0.17) 
-0.13 
(0.03) 
1.000 
 
 
Complementary vs. Substitutive test 
There is a lack of research examining the complementary or substitutive nature of disclosure 
quality and corporate governance (Brown et al., 2011). Given that both disclosure and 
governance may be effective monitoring tools, the present study intends to observe the 
basic relationship between these two governance mechanisms. This present study 
performed several tests in this section. Firstly, following Vafeas (2005, p. 1105), a 
complementary link is detected when the correlation shows a positive relationship, while 
substitutive roles are made clear when the direction of the correlation is negative. As can be 
seen from the pairwise correlation table, two disclosure quality proxies, namely IRAWARD 
and FLSCORE constantly show a complementary relationship with audit committee 
characteristics and board characteristics (e.g. ACSIZE, ACIND, ACMEET, ACEXP, BODSIZE, 
BODMEET, BODIND). The complementary effect is also observed between the first and 
second proxy for disclosure quality (i.e. IRAWARD and FLSCORE) and external governance 
(i.e. ANALYST and BIG4). Nonetheless, substitutive relationships are signified between the 
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third proxy for disclosure quality, namely AFA, and internal governance mechanisms. 
Specifically, AFA is substitutive with ACSIZE, ACEXP, ACMEET, BODMEET and BODIND in 
providing monitoring roles over firms, however, AFA offers a complementary relationship 
with ACIND and BODSIZE. With regard to the link between AFA and external mechanisms, a 
complementary relationship is reported between AFA and ANALYST, while a substitutive link 
is documented between AFA and BIG4. 
 
Secondly, this present study includes interaction terms in the regression model to identify 
whether disclosure quality affects the relation between internal governance variables and 
earnings management. Following Zaman et al. (2011), the composite measures for audit 
committee characteristics was used as a proxy for audit committee quality (ACQUALITY). 76 
Dummy variable is used to measure board of director quality (BODQUALITY). 77 Interaction 
variables such as ACQUALITY*BODQUALITY*DQ, ACQUALITY*DQ, and BODQUALITY*DQ are 
then created and included in the regression. 78 These interaction terms are developed to 
examine whether disclosure quality has complementary or substitutive effect to internal 
governance in deterring earnings management. Complementarity between disclosure 
quality and internal governance is presumed when the interaction effects (e.g. 
DQ*BODQUALITY; DQ*ACQUALITY and DQ*ACQUALITY*BODQUALITY) revealed significant 
negative relationship with earnings management, while substitutability is observed when 
the interaction terms (e.g. DQ*BODQUALITY; DQ*ACQUALITY and 
                                                          
76
 ACQUALITY is 1 if Audit committee size is equal or more than 3, percentage of audit committee independent 
is 100%, number of audit committee meeting is equal or more than 3 and at least one of audit committee 
members are having financial expertise, otherwise 0.   
77
 BODQUALITY is 1 if board size is below the median, the percentage of independent directors on the board 
excluding the chairman is more than 50% , the number of board meeting is above the median.  
78
 DQ represent disclosure quality of the firms, and was measured using the IRAWARD, the number of forward 
looking information and the analyst forecast accuracy.  DQ in the interaction terms will be replaced by these 3 
proxies for disclosure quality interchangeably.   
214 
 
DQ*ACQUALITY*BODQUALITY) revealed significant positive relationship with earnings 
management. Given that disclosure quality and internal governance can possibly have a 
substitutive or complementary effect in reducing earnings management, this present study 
will not make any prediction on the sign of the coefficients. The F-test is then conducted on 
the interaction terms to identify whether it make significant contribution to the model. 
Partial of the results are tabulated in Table 4-4.  
 
When IRAWARD is used as a proxy for disclosure quality, it shows that the 
BODQUALITY*ACQUALITY*IRAWARD is insignificant. This demonstrates that there is no 
concrete evidence on the potential complementary or substitutive effect between 
disclosure quality (e.g. IRAWARD) and internal governance (e.g. BODQUALITY and 
ACQUALITY) in reducing earnings management. The F-test also revealed insignificant p-
value, indicating that BODQUALITY*ACQUALITY*IRAWARD does not make significant 
incremental to the model. Variable BODQUALITY*IRAWARD also reported insignificant 
results, hence suggesting that there is no complementary or substitutive relationship 
between BODQUALITY*IRAWARD in reducing MJONES. However, ACQUALITY*IRAWARD 
reported significant negative relationship at p<0.05. This finding indicates that 
ACQUALITY*IRAWARD is negatively related to MJONES, hence suggesting complementary 
relationship between ACQUALITY and IRAWARD in reducing MJONES. When disclosure 
quality is measured using FLSCORE and AFA, it indicates that all interaction terms are 
insignificant, hence revealed insignificant influence the interaction terms in mitigating 
earnings management. 
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Table 4-4 : Partial Results of Interaction Terms 
Variable (a)Main effect (b)Moderating effect (c)F-
test
79 
DV=MJONES Coefficient t p-
value 
Coefficient t p-
value 
 
DQ=IRAWARD        
        
BODQUALITY 1.118 1.52 0.13 -0.224 -0.19 0.84  
ACQUALITY 0.318 0.34 0.733 1.946 1.53 0.127  
IRAWARD -1.67 -2.2 0.02** 0.507 0.40 0.693  
BODQUALITY*AC
QUALITY 
*IRAWARD 
   -0.457 -0.18 0.854 F=0.03, 
p>F=0.8538 
BODQUALITY*IRA
WARD 
   3.276 1.37 0.172 F=1.88, 
p>F=0.1718 
ACQUALITY*IRA
WARD 
   -3.789 -2.61 0.01** F=6.82, 
p>F=0.009*** 
N=290 R
2
=0.4866, F=3.8, p>F=0.000 R
2
=0.5033, F=4.02, p>F=0.000  
        
DQ=FLSCORE        
        
BODQUALITY 1.081 1.47 0.144 -1.65 -0.97 0.33  
ACQUALITY 0.5903 0.61 0.544 1.116 0.68 0.49  
FLSCORE -0.01 -1.7 0.097* -0.004 -0.29 0.773  
BODQUALITY*AC
QUALITY 
*FLSCORE 
   0.008 0.43 0.669 F=0.18, 
p>F=0.66 
BODQUALITY*FLS
CORE 
   0.022 0.93 0.355 F=0.86, 
p>F=0.35 
ACQUALITY*FLSC
ORE 
   -0.008 -0.54 0.58 F=0.3, p>F=0.58 
N=290 R
2
=0.4826, F=3.99, p>F=0.000 R
2
=0.4883, F=3.47, p>F=0.000  
        
DQ=AFA        
        
BODQUALITY 0.446 0.71 0.479 1.35 1.77 0.078  
ACQUALITY -0.281 -0.4 0.718 -0.73 -0.78 0.43  
AFA -0.431 -1.9 0.55 -0.363 -0.84 0.401  
BODQUALITY*AC
QUALITY 
*AFA 
   -1.239 -1.06 0.29 F=2.46, 
p>F=0.118 
BODQUALITY*AF
A 
   1.83 1.57 0.12 F=2.46, 
p>F=0.118 
ACQUALITY*AFA    -0.358 -0.64 0.526 F=0.4, 
p>F=0.52 
N=254 R
2
=0.4809, F=4.32, p>F=0.000 R
2
=0.4875, F=2.89, p>F=0.000  
The regression model for (a) main effect is: MJONES = DQ(IRAWARD/FLSCORE/AFA) + ACQUALITY + BODQUALITY + 
CONTROL VARIABLES + e. While the regression model for the (b) moderating effect is: MJONES = 
DQ(IRAWARD/FLSCORE/AFA) + ACQUALITY + BODQUALITY + INTERACTION TERMS + CONTROL VARIABLES + e.  
 
                                                          
79
 F-test is also known as Wald test and performed in STATA using test command. The Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) for all models is below 10, suggesting no indication of multicollinearity. 
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4.4 Multivariate analysis: DQ and EM are exogenous 
 
Table 4-5: OLS regression of earnings management on disclosure quality, corporate governance and control variables 
 
DV=MJONES Predicted  
sign 
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL 5 
 
MODEL 6 
 
MODEL 7 
 
Disclosure Quality  Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef 
IRAWARD -     -2.158*** 
-2.85 
  
FLSCORE -      -0.014** 
-2.04 
 
AFA -       -0.43** 
-0.26 
Governance Variables         
ACSIZE +/-   -0.75 
-0.42 
-0.98 
-0.53 
-1.350 
-0.77 
-1.14 
-0.60 
-1.99 
-1.14 
ACEXP -   0.55 
0.56 
0.54 
0.54 
0.355 
0.35 
0.76 
0.74 
-0.07 
-0.06 
ACMEET -   5.28*** 
3.13 
5.34*** 
3.03 
6.055*** 
3.32 
5.49*** 
3.13 
5.118*** 
2.65 
ACIND -   -0.38 
-0.35 
-0.501 
-0.48 
-0.536 
-0.51 
-0.25 
-0.24 
-0.78 
-0.78 
BODIND -  0.023 
0.79 
 0.018 
0.69 
0.016 
0.62 
0.029 
1.01 
-0.023 
-0.88 
BODMEET -  0.026 
0.25 
 -0.035 
-0.34 
-0.007 
-0.07 
-0.009 
-0.10 
-0.09 
-0.90 
BODSIZE +/-  0.103 
0.60 
 0.002 
0.02 
0.015 
0.09 
0.079 
0.44 
-0.168 
-1.18 
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Table 4-5 Continued 
 Predicted 
sign 
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 
Firm-specific variables         
LNMCAP +/- 0.843* 
1.17 
0.738 
1.49 
0.96** 
2.16 
0.953** 
2.04 
1.119*** 
2.42 
0.98** 
2.11 
0.88** 
2.02 
DTA + -0.006 
-0.22 
-0.005 
-0.18 
-0.002 
-0.06 
-0.002 
-0.08 
-0.006 
-0.21 
-0.003 
-0.09 
0.013 
0.55 
CHGEINSALES - -0.739 
-1.34 
-0.718 
-1.36 
-0.808 
-1.39 
-0.77 
-1.37 
-0.608 
-1.13 
-0.78 
-1.37 
0.142 
0.27 
LAGGEDROA +/- 0.058 
1.22 
0.057 
1.20 
0.07 
1.50 
0.06 
1.44 
0.059 
1.18 
0.06 
1.22 
0.09** 
2.02 
PPE/LTA + -1.48* 
-1.72 
-1.54* 
-1.72 
-1.649* 
-1.88 
-1.708* 
-1.92 
-1.757* 
-2.03 
-1.84** 
-2.04 
-1.34* 
-1.66 
NCF/LTA - -0.07 
-0.01 
0.236 
0.04 
-0.719 
-0.14 
-0.88 
-0.16 
-1.642 
-0.31 
-0.49 
-0.09 
-8.83* 
-1.71 
ANALYST +/- -0.087 
-1.20 
-0.098 
-1.37 
-0.128* 
-1.81 
-0.129* 
-1.83 
-0.07 
-0.97 
-0.102 
-1.43 
-0.09 
-1.55 
TACF/LTA + 44.48*** 
4.00 
45.13*** 
3.86 
44.69*** 
4.01 
45.35*** 
3.93 
45.181*** 
3.92 
46.55*** 
4.06 
35.22*** 
3.54 
LOSS + -1.592 
-0.90 
-1.67 
-0.96 
-1.88 
-1.07 
-1.88 
-1.08 
-2.175 
-1.25 
-1.88 
-1.07 
-1.60 
-0.94 
BIG4 - 0.67 
0.27 
0.38 
0.15 
-0.126 
-0.05 
-0.045 
-0.02 
-0.906 
-0.36 
-0.165 
-0.07 
-0.39 
-0.13 
YEAR 2007 +/- 0.508 
0.46 
0.489 
0.44 
0.33 
0.31 
0.38 
0.36 
0.349 
0.33 
0.58 
0.55 
0.26 
0.27 
YEAR 2006 +/- 0.572 
0.59 
0.63 
0.66 
0.415 
0.44 
0.41 
0.44 
0.406 
0.44 
0.711 
0.77 
0.47 
0.54 
YEAR 2005 +/- -0.618 
-0.74 
-0.615 
-0.73 
-0.612 
-0.73 
-0.64 
-0.76 
-0.65 
-0.79 
-0.69 
-0.84 
-0.33 
-0.43 
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Table 4-5 Continued 
 Predicted 
sign 
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 
TECHNOLOGY +/- -1.66 
-1.76 
-1.73* 
-1.65 
-1.018 
-1.04 
-1.122 
-1.02 
-0.95 
-0.88 
-1.46 
-1.28 
-0.89 
-0.89 
TELECOM +/- 1.63 
0.50 
1.708 
0.53 
2.15 
0.67 
1.98 
0.62 
1.27 
0.40 
1.82 
0.56 
3.46 
1.18 
OIL AND GAS +/- -0.877 
-0.73 
-1.01 
-0.83 
-0.65 
-0.55 
-0.708 
-0.57 
-1.061 
-0.87 
-0.277 
-0.23 
0.069 
0.07 
CONSGOODS +/- -1.14 
-1.48 
-1.18 
-1.49 
-1.007 
-1.25 
-1.05 
-1.25 
-1.1 
-1.29 
-1.26 
-1.40 
-1.125 
-1.14 
CONSSERVICES +/- 1.36* 
1.69 
1.26 
1.59 
1.57* 
1.84 
1.49* 
1.75 
1.165 
1.38 
1.18 
1.45 
1.37* 
1.76 
HEALTHCARE +/- 17.02*** 
3.82 
17.2*** 
3.84 
18.19*** 
4.22 
18.01*** 
4.08 
17.94*** 
4.18 
18.72*** 
4.27 
21.29*** 
3.65 
UTILITIES +/- -0.114 
-0.11 
-0.142 
-0.13 
-0.216 
-0.21 
-0.06 
-0.06 
-0.47 
-0.45 
0.433 
0.36 
0.103 
0.11 
_cons  -9.28 
-1.22 
-9.908 
-1.27 
-14.53* 
-1.87 
-14.68* 
-1.83 
-15.97 
-1.98 
-16.06*** 
-1.99 
-7.18 
-0.86 
         
N  290 290 290 290 290 290 254 
F(28, 262)  4.02 3.65 4.59 4.19 3.92 4.14 4.26 
PROB>B  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-SQUARED  0.4726 0.4742 0.4951 0.4958 0.5111 0.5052 0.5062 
 
(a) Because the data is non-panel type, the analyses are performed using pooled data. It is worth noting that Toledo (2010), Al-Farooque et al. (2010) and Cornett et al. (2009) use 
cross sectional data or pooled unbalanced data when they run the 3SLS/2SLS estimation to control for endogeneity.  
(b) As a sensitivity analysis, Models Four, Five and Six were rerun excluding all corporate governance variables. Results revealed that, without controlling for corporate governance 
mechanisms, all disclosure quality variables are significantly and negatively related to earnings management, which is measured using the modified Jones Model (result not 
reported).  
(c) p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed for variables with an unidentified sign.  
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Table 4-5 presents the OLS regression for earnings management on disclosure quality and 
corporate governance. Earnings management is measured using MJONES and disclosure 
quality is measured using the IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA. Model One of Table 4-5 presents 
the OLS regression between MJONES and all control variables. The results reveal that 
LMCAP (coef = 0.86, p<0.10) has a bearing on the magnitude of MJONES. This finding, 
however, is contrary to those of Kent et al. (2010), who reported inverse link between firm 
size and earnings management, but in accordance with studies conducted by Lobo and Zhau 
(2006) and Jo and Kim (2007). In this instance, Lobo and Zhau (2006) argue that the 
complexity of operations in large firms leads to weaker earnings management detection 
and, thus, increases managers’ propensity to manipulate earnings. In relation to other 
corporate characteristics, ROA (coef = 0.202, p<0.05), TACF (coef = 43.57, p<0.01) and 
HEALTHCARE (coef = 17.05, p<0.01), all bear significant positive relationships to MJONES. 
This implies that excessive profits and total accruals are associated with higher manipulation 
of earnings. This is consistent with findings reported in Riahi and Arab (2011). In addition, 
the positive relationship between HEALTHCARE and MJONES is in line with the Meyer et al. 
(2000) finding that the pharmaceutical industry uses flexibilities in accounting choices to 
reduce reported earnings due to the fear of the political cost pressure over the high profits 
that they reported in the previous year. The R2 for Model One is 47.26%. With regard to 
other control variables including DTA, CHGEINSALES, LAGGEDROA, LOSS, BIG4, ANALYST, 
NCF/LTA, year dummies and certain industries (e.g. UTILITIES, TECH, TELECOM, OIL&GAS, 
and CONSGOODS) the findings are not statistically significant; therefore, statistically, they 
have no predictive ability in relation to deterring earnings management in UK firms.  
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When board characteristics (i.e., BODMEET, BODIND and BODSIZE) are added in Model Two, 
results show that the R2 slightly increases from 47.26% in Model One to 47.42%. However, 
Model Two shows that the coefficients for BODMEET, BODIND and BODSIZE are not 
statistically significant in respect to constraining earnings management. The result for 
BODIND corroborates the findings of Kent at al. (2010), Park and Shin (2004) and Chtourou 
et al. (2001) who documented an insignificant relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors and earnings management; although this contradicts some other 
studies (e.g. Xie et al., 2003; Kao and Chen, 2004) that signify inverse relationships.  
 
Model Three incorporates audit committee characteristics including ACMEET, ACIND, ACSIZE 
and ACEXP in the regression. Contrary to the hypotheses, Model Three indicates that ACEXP 
and ACMEET are positively related to earnings management, although only the latter is 
significant at p<0.01. As such, these findings demonstrate that compliance with the 
recommended norms in the UK Corporate Governance (2010) and Smith Recommendation 
2003 in relation to ACMEET and ACEXP has an adverse effect on constraining managers’ 
propensity to manipulate earnings. This finding contradicts some of the prior studies (e.g. 
Kent et al., 2010) and could be explained in several ways:  
 
(i) Some of the literature argues that high compliance with the UK Corporate Governance 
code is merely due to “ticking the box” activities, while at the same time highlighting the 
importance of considering the various unique needs of each firm’s governance system 
(Arcot et al., 2010; Siregar and Utama, 2008; Arcot and Bruno, 2006).  
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(ii) It is acknowledged that the definitions of good and bad governance practices are still 
vague (Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010; Heitzman et al., 2010), hence it is not surprising 
to see contradictory findings with regard to the predictive ability of corporate 
governance in curbing earnings management. For example, having a high number of 
audit committee members is not necessarily good because it also makes the committee 
vulnerable to the free-rider issue.  
 
(iii) The effectiveness of an audit committee primarily depends on the effectiveness of the 
board of directors. Given that BOD characteristics (e.g. BODIND, BODSIZE, BODMEET) 
are insignificant in curbing earnings management (the R2 increases only 0.0016%), it is 
suggested that audit committees are not able to offer effective monitoring roles in the 
absence of the serious roles of the BOD in constraining earnings management; even 
though their composition, number of meetings, expertise and size are in compliance 
with the Smith Recommendation (2003) and the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). 
In other words, when monitoring by a board of directors is not helpful in reducing 
earnings management, it is not surprising to see that audit committees also fail to carry 
out effective monitoring functions, given that the latter is a subset to the former.  
 
(iv) Audit committees (where the majority of them are entirely comprised of external 
directors) mainly rely on the information prepared for them in order to provide 
necessary monitoring. They, therefore, have less information advantage as compared to 
the internal directors (Adams et al., 2009). It is very unlikely that internal directors will 
let external directors know that they have been engaged in in earnings management 
(Armstrong et al., 2010). This would make it nearly impossible for external directors to 
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detect earnings management. For that reason, the compliance with audit committee 
characteristics as recommended by the Smith Report (2003) and the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) might be, to some extent, useful in helping companies in 
structuring their internal governance system; however, it is only marginally beneficial in 
constraining earnings management.  
 
The results when both audit committee and board characteristics were combined in one 
regression are presented in Model Four. After controlling for audit committee and board 
characteristics, the results show that the R2 increases to 49.58%, as compared to 47.26% 
when only variables for firm-characteristics were controlled in Model One. All audit 
committee characteristics revealed insignificant result, except ACMEET which reported 
significant positive association to MJONES at p<0.01.  
 
The first proxy for disclosure quality, namely the receipt of the Investor Relations Magazine 
Award (IRAWARD), is then added to the regression and the result is laid out in in Model Five. 
After controlling IRAWARD, the result reveals that IRAWARD is significantly and negatively 
related to earnings management at p<0.01 (coef = -2.158, t-stat =-2.85). This finding 
indicates that IRAWARD provides stronger complementary roles than corporate governance 
in reducing managers’ propensity to manipulate earnings. Results for corporate governance 
variables remain unchanged, as in Model Four, after IRAWARD is included in the model. The 
R2 increases to 51.11%, as compared to 49.58% in Model Four, hence implying that 
IRAWARD carries a greater predictive ability in improving the goodness of fit of the model. 
Similar results are also reported when FLSCORE is employed as a proxy for disclosure 
quality. Model Six recorded an inverse association between FLSCORE and MJONES at 
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p<0.05, with the coef = -0.014 and t-statistics = -2.04. The R2 is 50.52%, which is higher than 
49.58% R2 reported in Model Four. Consistent with the findings in Models Five and Six, 
Model Seven also reveal that increases in AFA result in lower earnings management at 
p<0.05, with the R2 equivalent to 50.62%. This finding implies that firms with high analyst 
forecast accuracy engage less in earnings management. By and large, these findings are 
consistent with those of Jo and Kim (2007) and Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006) who reported 
an inverse relationship between disclosure and earnings management in the US and Swiss 
context.  
 
With regard to the relationship between ANALYST and MJONES, ANALYST appears to show a 
significant link in Model Three and Model Four, where audit committee characteristics 
(according to the recommended norm in the Smith Report (2003)) are controlled. This 
implies that analyst following has a stronger influence in curbing earnings management in 
the presence of a credible audit committee, as analysts might have access to more private 
information. Nonetheless, the significant link between ANALYST and MJONES disappears 
when disclosure quality is controlled for in the model, thus signalling that disclosure quality 
has more effect than analyst following in controlling earnings management.  
 
Overall, based on the results in Table 4-5, it can be concluded that high disclosure quality 
(using IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA as proxies) is effective in reducing managers’ propensity 
to manipulate earnings, especially in a weak governance environment. In contrast to the 
prediction, ACMEET is consistently found to be positively related to earning management in 
Model Three to Model Seven at p<0.01. It is possible that firms in financial distress carry out 
more meetings and thus have more opportunity to plan earnings management. 
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4.4.1 Additional analyses 
 
Several additional analyses were performed employing (i) different estimations, (ii) 
alternative measures for earnings management, (iii) redefined measures for corporate 
governance, (iv) a reduced sample (small vs. large sample), (v) another reduced sample (test 
sample vs. control sample), and (iv) other factors necessary to provide reasonable assurance 
for the current findings as well as to tackle several minor issues. 80  
 
(i) Tobit, truncated and robust estimations81 
The current study recognises that the use of OLS estimation in the primary findings may 
cause bias, given that the nature of MJONES, which has been used as dependent variable, is 
zero truncated. Tobit or truncated regressions are therefore suitable for the purposes of the 
study, and this is consistent with Gul et al. (2009). Other alternatives include the robust 
regression, which is a non-parametric test that completely disregards the four main 
assumptions in the OLS estimation: normality, heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity and 
autocorrelation.82 Models Five, Six and Seven were rerun using Tobit regression, truncated 
regression and robust estimation. 
 
Using Tobit regression, results show that all DQ measures (i.e., IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA 
are significantly and negatively related to MJONES at p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.01 
respectively, resembling the main results from OLS estimation. None of the governance 
                                                          
80
 Given that a simultaneous relationship is expected in this project, undermining the OLS findings, for the sake 
of brevity the full results for additional tests are not reported but are available from the author upon request.  
81
 Tobit, truncated and robust regressions were performed using the following commands in STATA: (i) Tobit 
dependent variable independent variable, ll ul robust (ii) truncreg dependent variable independent variable, 
robust (iii) rreg dependent variable independent variables.  
82
 An autocorrelation test was not performed because the dataset used in the current study is not a panel 
type.  
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variables show significant results except for ACMEET, which shows a consistent positive 
relationship with MJONES. This is consistent with the primary findings reported in Table 4-4. 
Models Five, Six and Seven were also rerun using truncated regression and robust 
regression. Results are qualitatively unchanged. It can be concluded that the OLS results in 
Table 4-4 are robust and not driven by specific estimation method.  
 
(ii) Alternative measures for earnings management  
As well as using MJONES as reported in Table 4-4, another test was performed using the 
Jones Model (JONES) and Performance-Adjusted Discretionary Accruals (PERFORM-ADJ) as 
proxies for earnings management. The results are qualitatively similar when JONES is used 
as a proxy for earnings management. IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA are all inversely related 
to JONES at p<0.05, p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively. Similarly, the frequency of audit 
committee meetings is the only governance variable that is positively and significantly 
related to earnings management. With regard to the PERFORM-ADJ variable, all disclosure 
quality measures reveal that is has a negative relationship with earnings management, 
although none of the relationships are significant. Nevertheless, in addition to ACMEET, that 
consistently reports a significant positive relationship with earnings management when 
PERFORM-ADJ is employed, ACIND also reports a significant negative relationship to 
earnings management at p<0.1, p<0.1 and p<0.05 respectively when IRAWARD, FLSCORE 
and AFA are used interchangeably in the model. This implies that, when PERFORM-ADJ is 
used as a proxy for earnings management, the predictive ability of disclosure quality in 
respect to deterring earnings management is less powerful than that of ACIND. In addition, 
the result demonstrates that compliance with the recommended benchmark for audit 
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committee independence is influential in reducing managers’ propensity to manipulate 
earnings.  
 
(iii) Redefined corporate governance measures 
Models Five, Six and Seven of Table 4-4 were rerun using redefined corporate governance 
measures, which included the following: 
(a) BODIND = 1 if the percentage of independent directors (excluding chairman) is 
more than 50%, 0 = if otherwise 
(b) BODSIZE = 1 = high board size, 0 = low board size; the cut off is based on the 
median for the number of board members 
(c) BODMEET = 1 = high board meeting frequency, 0 = low board meeting frequency; 
the cut off is based on the median of number of board meetings per year 
 
Additionally, the original Models Five, Six and Seven in Table 4-4 were rerun using 
alternative measures for audit committee, as follows:  
(a) ACSIZE = number of audit committee members 
(b) ACIND = percentage of independent directors in audit committee 
(c) ACMEET = number of audit committee meeting in a year 
(d) ACEXP = percentage of audit committee member with financial expertise 
 
Moreover, in another round of sensitivity analyses, board and audit committee measures 
are redefined in Models Five, Six and Seven:  
(a) BODIND = dummy, 1 = if the percentage of independent directors (excluding 
chairman) is more than 50%, 0 = if otherwise  
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(b) BODSIZE = dummy, 1 = high board size, 0 = low board size; the cut off is based on 
the median for number of board members. 
(c) BODMEET = dummy, 1 = high board meeting frequency, 0 = low board meeting 
frequency; the cut off is based on the median of number of board meetings per 
year.  
(d) ACSIZE = number of audit committee members 
(e) ACIND = percentage of independent directors in audit committee 
(f) ACMEET = number of audit committee meeting in a year 
(g) ACEXP = percentage of audit committee members with financial expertise  
 
The results show that the use of these alternative governance definitions causes no major 
alterations to the primary results, except that the significant link in ACMEET disappears 
when ACMEET is redefined using ACMEETA, suggesting that the positive relationship 
between ACMEET and MJONES is not robust.83 More importantly, this finding highlights that 
compliance with the Smith Report (2003) recommendations for the frequency of audit 
committee meetings is detrimental to the reduction of earnings management, but that the 
actual number of meetings does not have any significant effect on MJONES. Consistent with 
the main findings in Table 4-4, all disclosure quality proxy variables (i.e., IRAWARD, FLSCORE 
and AFA) show negative relationships with MJONES,  
 
                                                          
83
 The reasons for using a dummy for audit committee characteristics in the primary findings (Table 4-4) are as 
follows: (i) the dummy for audit committee characteristics is regulatory driven (i.e. determined by the 
recommendations in the Smith Report, 2003); (ii) the transformation of data to dummies solves the issue of 
outliers; (iii) the use of dummies does not change the result and the additional tests using alternative 
measures for audit committee characteristics and board characteristics show no alteration to the results, 
highlighting that the result are not derived from the specific measures of Corporate Governance; (iii) the 
contribution made by this project is more apparent when the measurement is derived based on specific 
recommendations in the UK Corporate Governance Code or the Smith Report (2003), hence conclusions can be 
made in light of the UK corporate governance environment.  
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In addition to the above mentioned tests, following Zaman et al. (2011), the present study 
also tries to construct composite measures for audit committee quality (ACQUALITY) as 
recommended by the Smith Report (2003): audit committee quality (ACQUALITY) is 1 if 
ACSIZE>=3, ACIND>=1, ACEXP>=1 and ACIND>=1, 0 if otherwise. Using this composite 
measure of audit committee quality, this study finds that audit committee quality 
(ACQUALITY) is insignificant in influencing earnings management. However, this result is in 
contrast to Kent et al. (2010) who demonstrated a significant negative association between 
composite measures of audit committee variables and discretionary accruals. 84 
 
(iv) Reduced sample 
Models Five, Six and Seven were also re-run using reduced sample forms including (i) large 
and small firms (based on the median of log market capitalisation) and (ii) test and control 
samples. Using large firms as sample, results show that two disclosure quality proxies 
(IRAWARD and FLSCORE) are negatively related to earnings management, although none of 
them show significant relationships. Nevertheless, the third proxy for disclosure quality, 
namely AFA, is positively related to MJONES. It is worth noting that the positive relationship 
between AFA and MJONES might be due to the potential reverse causality in these two 
variables, because some studies found that the accuracy of analyst forecasts are due to 
earnings management activities (Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009; Hunton et al., 2006). 
Concerning corporate governance variables, similar to the main analysis, ACMEET is 
associated with higher earnings management in a company.  
                                                          
84 Kent et al. (2010) developed a composite measure for audit committee as follows: 1 is scored if ACIND 
=100%, ACSIZE =>3, ACMEET=> sample mean of audit committee meeting, or ACEXP =>1, otherwise 0 is 
scored. The composite measure used by Kent et al. (2010) is largely similar to the one used by Zaman et al. 
(2011), except that Zaman et al. (2011) measure ACMEET =>3, which is similar to the recommended 
benchmark set by the Smith Report (2003).  
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In relation to small firms, all disclosure quality proxies show inverse relationships with 
MJONES although only the IRAWARD and AFA are significant at p<0.05 and p<0.1 
respectively. At this stage, this study finds that the negative relationship between disclosure 
quality and earnings management is stronger in small firms than in large firms, indicating 
that the results are not biased towards large firms only.  
 
Additional tests using test samples and control samples were also performed. The test 
sample is the group of the winners of the Investor Relations Magazine Award (IRAWARD), 
while the control sample group consists of the non-winners of the Investor Relations 
Magazine Award (IRAWARD). Replicating Models Six and Seven, both test sample and 
control sample groups show that both FLSCORE and AFA are negatively associated with 
MJONES although none of them show significant results. ACIND was found to be negatively 
related to MJONES in the test sample group at p<0.05 (coef =-4.49) and p<0.05 (coef = -
4.47) when FLSCORE and AFA are respectively used in the model. However, ACIND reports 
an insignificant relationship in the control sample group.  
 
(v) Others 
In addition to the abovementioned tests, the present study also uses alternative measures 
for control variables, replacing, for example,  ROA with ROE and ROS; DTA with DTE and 
LMCAP with LSALES in Models Five, Six and Seven. It is important to note that the results are 
qualitatively similar in that disclosure quality remains significantly and negatively related to 
earnings management, while corporate governance variables are affected to a greater 
extent by this change.  
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Given that the sample is unique per year, but non-unique per period, the present study is 
concerned over the stickiness issue of disclosure and corporate governance data (Brown et 
al., 2011). A firm’s pattern of disclosure and corporate governance practices may not change 
every year, thus the significant relationship between disclosure quality and earnings 
management might be derived from the inclusion of the same firms over a few years. 
Although the sample is non-panel type (hence the stickiness issue is obviously not very 
apparent as compared to panel data type), the present study performs an additional test 
using unique samples only. In the case that more than one firm is involved in the sample, 
the present study retains only the data for the most recent year, while the data for the 
other years is deleted. Results reveal that IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA are negatively 
related to MJONES, although only the first (IRAWAWRD) shows a significant relationship at 
p<0.01. In similarity to the primary findings, all other governance variables offer insignificant 
relationships with MJONES except for ACMEET, which shows a significant positive 
relationship with MJONES.  
 
The current study also acknowledges that a bias might exist in the results, given that the 
winners for IRAWARD in corporate governance (A19) and IRAWARD for corporate social 
responsibility (A20) are included in the sample.85 In this regard, an additional test was 
performed excluding the firms in A19 and A20 and their respective matched-pairs. Again, 
the results are largely similar to the primary findings that IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA 
consistently show negative relationships with MJONES, while ACMEET is documented as 
having a significant positive association with MJONES in all models.  
                                                          
85
 Detail for the Investor Relations Award category breakdown is available in Chapter 3.  
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The present study also recognises that some of the literature examines the relationship of 
managerial shareholding (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Chtourou et al., 2001; Vafeas, 2005) and 
blockholders (e.g. Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca, 2007; Vafeas, 2005) to earnings 
management. Director’s shareholding is one of the classical tools suggested by agency 
theory for the alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In this case, managers are prone to exercise independent judgement, given that all of 
a firm’s decisions have an impact on their wealth (Minow and Bingham, 1995). Beasley 
(1996) finds that non-executive director shareholding is influential in reducing financial 
fraud in US firms. Blockholders also have the potential to play monitoring roles over firms, 
given that they have voting power to determine who will be on the board (Ronen and Yaari, 
2008, p. 223). This subsequently reduces the conflict of interest and deters earnings 
management. Given that the number of samples in the present study is 290, while the 
number of variables currently included in the model is 28, there would be concern over the 
degree of freedom if additional variables are included in the model. Therefore, as an 
additional test, the present study reruns Models Six, Seven and Eight incorporating 
SUBSOWN & NOSUBSOWN variables. Other results are qualitatively similar to the main 
findings. However, SUBSOWN and NOSUBSOWN are both found to be insignificant in these 
three models. In addition, the present study also makes an attempt to include BODSHR and 
ACSHR in Models Five, Six and Seven. The results demonstrate that disclosure quality, 
corporate governance and control variables are qualitatively unchanged, while BODSHR 
consistently reports a negative association with MJONES at p<0.05 in Models Five and Six. In 
relation to ACSHR, it offers no significant relationships in Models Five and Six, but shows an 
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inverse relationship to MJONES at p<0.05 in Model Seven. BODSHR also shows an 
insignificant relationship with MJONES in Model Seven.  
 
In relation to another issue, according to Morck et al. (1988) the effects of incentives and 
entrenchment could possibly lead to a non-linear relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. This notion is also supported by the findings of Farooque 
et al. (2007b). The same concern is also shared in respect to blockholder ownership and has 
been discussed by Lo et al. (2010) in their earnings management study. With regard to 
blockholder ownership, Lo et al. (2010, p. 232) argue that the incentives to manipulate 
earnings will be reduced in the presence of high blockholder ownership, given that 
blockholders feel they are extorting their own wealth. On the other hand, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) point out that concentrated ownership creates incentives for large 
shareholders to distort the minority shareholders’ interests. Having created a squared 
variable for SUBSHR, NOSUBSHR, ACHSR and BODSHR, a non-linear regression was rerun for 
Models Five, Six and Seven. The results indicate that there are concave relationships 
between normal and squared variables, where the original variables show a negative 
relationship with earnings management and the squared variables show a positive 
relationship. However, none of them show significant results. Therefore, managerial 
ownership and blockholders do not have any non-linear impact on earnings management. 
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4.5 Simultaneity between disclosure and earnings management: two-stage least square (2SLS) regression  
 
Table 4-6: 2SLS regression of earnings management 
 
 Panel (A) 
DQ = IRAWARD 
Panel (B) 
DQ= FLSCORE 
Panel (C) 
DQ = AFA 
 
 
MODEL1 
MJONES 
MODEL2 
DQ(IRAWARD) 
MODEL1 
MJONES 
MODEL2 
DQ(FLSCORE) 
MODEL1 
MJONES 
MODEL2 
DQ(AFA) 
Endogenous Variables       
MJONES (fitted value)  -0.45*** 
-4.86 
 -0.034*** 
-2.77 
 -0.29*** 
-3.68 
DQ (IRAWARD) (fitted value)  -8.272*** 
-4.19 
     
DQ (FLSCORE) (fitted value)   -0.1*** 
-2.82 
   
DQ (AFA) (fitted value)     -9.058*** 
-12.03 
 
       
Exogenous Variables       
ACSIZE  -2.53 
-1.55 
-2.95** 
-2.35 
-2.36 
-1.30 
-0.186 
-1.04 
-1.642 
-1.19 
-0.66 
-1.24 
ACEXP  -0.17 
-0.18 
-1.03 
-1.31 
2.32* 
1.78 
0.242** 
2.07 
-5.55*** 
-5.72 
-0.66** 
-2.33 
ACMEET  8.25*** 
4.37 
5.99*** 
3.95 
6.62*** 
3.64 
0.397*** 
3.23 
1.56 
1.02 
0.83* 
1.69 
ACIND  -0.615 
-0.61 
-0.04 
-0.06 
1.17 
0.89 
0.193 
1.61 
0.15 
0.21 
-0.002 
-0.01 
ACMULT  0.344* 
1.82 
 0.011 
0.55 
 0.151** 
2.02 
BODIND  0.001 
0.05 
-0.014 
-0.71 
0.076** 
2.17 
0.004 
1.42 
-0.283*** 
-9.65 
-0.04*** 
-2.70 
BODMEET  0.08 
0.71 
0.166** 
2.02 
0.193 
1.52 
0.025*** 
3.04 
0.03 
0.38 
0.031 
0.73 
BODSIZE 0.031 
0.21 
0.063 
0.63 
0.513** 
1.98 
0.038** 
2.41 
-0.593*** 
-5.34 
0.127** 
-2.50 
CHAIRNONEXE  0.242 
0.43 
 0.105 
1.38 
 0.192 
0.60 
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CHAIRTEN  -0.11*** 
-2.71 
 -0.006 
-1.10 
 -0.013 
-0.82 
CHAIRMULT  0.246** 
2.08 
 0.04** 
2.46 
 0.04 
0.78 
SUBSHR  0.01 
0.49 
 -0.001 
-0.27 
 0.01 
1.29 
NOSUBSHR  0.068 
0.55 
 0.006 
0.31 
 0.018 
0.36 
EARNVAR  -0.563*** 
-2.97 
 0.013 
0.76 
 0.0002 
0.00 
Firm-specific variables       
LNMCAP 1.54*** 
3.47 
1.26*** 
4.66 
1.19*** 
2.67 
0.043 
1.39 
4.414*** 
9.91 
0.71*** 
3.99 
ROA  0.05 
1.46 
 0.002 
0.46 
 0.017 
0.95 
LAGGED ROA 0.06 
1.27 
 0.06 
1.47 
 0.028 
0.76 
 
DTA -0.01 
-0.4 
-0.014 
-1.00 
-0.006 
-0.25 
-0.0004 
-0.19 
-0.15*** 
-7.87 
-0.011 
-1.4 
CHGEINSALES -0.613 
-1.20 
 -0.79 
-1.46 
 -0.206 
-0.64 
 
PPE/LTA -2.042** 
-2.41 
 -1.518* 
-1.87 
 -1.81*** 
-2.77 
 
NCF/LTA -1.596 
-0.30 
 0.174 
0.04 
 0.69 
0.19 
 
ANALYST 0.1009 
1.10 
0.137*** 
2.93 
0.05 
0.61 
0.009* 
1.69 
0.155*** 
3.10 
-0.014 
-0.59 
TACF/LTA 39.65*** 
3.53 
 43.95*** 
4.23 
 16.95** 
2.22 
 
LOSS -1.384 
-0.86 
 -1.69 
-0.99 
 -1.06 
-0.95 
 
BIG4 -3.92 
-1.44 
-3.33** 
-2.24 
-0.036 
-0.01 
0.393** 
2.28 
0.396 
0.15 
-0.314 
-0.45 
YEAR 2007 0.347 
0.35 
-0.64 
-1.11 
1.78 
1.54 
0.11 
1.36 
4.362*** 
5.90 
0.153 
0.57 
YEAR 2006 0.455 
0.51 
-0.05 
-0.09 
2.52** 
2.14 
0.24*** 
2.92 
3.099*** 
4.76 
0.3008 
1.10 
YEAR 2005 -0.564 -0.2005 -1.06 -0.072 -1.932*** -0.347 
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-0.7 -0.37 -1.31 -0.88 -3.63 -1.04 
TECHNOLOGY -0.652 
-0.60 
0.452 
0.64 
-2.93** 
-2.36 
-0.265** 
-2.21 
0.04 
0.05 
-0.133 
-0.44 
TELECOMMUNICATION 0.309 
0.11 
-1.43 
-0.71 
2.149 
0.73 
0.116 
0.42 
-54.33*** 
-10.74 
-4.962 
-1.59 
CONSUMERGOODS -1.33 
-1.59 
-0.948 
-1.23 
-2.66*** 
-2.74 
-0.213* 
-1.81 
-4.49*** 
-5.71 
-0.748* 
-1.81 
CONSUMERSERVICES 0.255 
0.31 
-0.683 
-1.14 
-0.747 
-0.74 
-0.156* 
-1.68 
2.94*** 
4.87 
0.376 
1.49 
HEALTHCARE 17.49*** 
4.32 
8.49*** 
4.06 
23.18*** 
4.62 
0.939*** 
3.65 
14.86*** 
7.32 
5.28*** 
2.98 
UTILITIES -1.876* 
-1.76 
-3.263*** 
-3.21 
2.51* 
1.72 
0.053 
0.50 
2.39*** 
3.01 
-0.44 
-0.77 
OIL AND GAS -1.96 
-1.57 
-2.28*** 
-2.74 
2.31 
1.39 
0.154 
1.54 
-3.493*** 
-4.07 
-0.515 
-1.26 
_cons -18.137** 
-2.24 
-18.43*** 
-4.41 
-24.61*** 
-2.92 
1.89*** 
4.07 
-43.09*** 
-6.50 
-6.419*** 
-3.26 
       
N 290 290 290 290 290 254 
F-stat/ LR Chi2 5.18 202.23 4.57 361.11 11.42 1.91 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
R-sq/ Pseudo r2 0.5465 0.5030 0.5372 0.4189 0.7824 0.1188 
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Table 4.6 reports the 2SLS regression of earnings management on corporate governance 
and disclosure quality, with an assumption that disclosure quality (IRAWARD, FLSCORE and 
AFA) and earnings management (MJONES) are endogenous86. This analysis is performed to 
examine whether a simultaneity relationship exists between disclosure quality and earnings 
management. In the case of simultaneity, 2SLS regression is viewed as more robust, superior 
and consistent when compared to the results from the OLS regression. In Panel A of Table 
4.5, IRAWARD is used as a proxy for disclosure quality, while panel B and C respectively 
employed FLSCORE and AFA to represent disclosure quality. Model One refers to the 
earnings management equation (MJONES is the dependent variable) while Model Two 
refers to the disclosure quality equation (i.e. IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA as dependent 
variables). Variables MJONES, IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA are replaced with their fitted 
value drawn from the first stage regression when they are located at the right side of the 
equation (being the independent variables).87  
 
When IRAWARD is used as a proxy for disclosure quality (refer to Panel A) the MJONES 
equation (Model One, Panel A) reveals significant negative effects between IRAWARD and 
MJONES (coef=-8.272; t=-4.19) at p<0.01. Consistent with the OLS results in Table 4.4, this 
finding indicates that the recipients of IRAWARD are less, and the non-recipients are more, 
engaged in earnings management. At the same time, in the IRAWARD equation, (Model 2, 
Panel A), the MJONES variable has an inverse impact on IRAWARD (coef = -0.45; t=-4.86) at 
                                                          
86
 Inspired by Cornett et al. (2009) and Athanasakou and Hussainey (2010), the present study performs a 
Durbin-Wu Hausman test to detect for endogeneity. However, no indication of endogeneity is reported. 
Nonetheless, a reliance on the Durbin-Wu Hausman test alone might be insufficient, given that a simultaneity 
relationship might exist. Correspondingly, the 2SLS regression is undertaken to see the potential impact of a bi-
directional relationship between disclosure and earnings management. 
87
 For the sake of brevity, the first stage regressions are not reported in this thesis though they are available 
upon request from the author. It is also important to note that prior literature typically does not report the 
first stage regression: Chang et al. (2008) and Cornett et al. (2009), for example.  
237 
 
p<0.01. This implies that firms with high earnings management tend to disclose low quality 
information, as measured using IRAWARD. Hence, findings from Panel A suggest that 
causality can run in both directions between disclosure quality and earnings management 
and that both of them are endogenously determined. In other words, disclosure quality is 
one of the forces that influence earnings management, and earnings management is also a 
plausible factor in the determination of disclosure quality.  
 
Similar to the OLS findings in Table 4.5, corporate governance variables did not show strong 
effects in reducing earnings management. In the earnings management equation (refer to 
Panel A, Model One), although ACSIZE, ACIND and ACEXP are negatively related to MJONES 
they are insignificant in the model. ACMEET, on the other hand, reports a contradictory 
result and a significant positive association with MJONES is documented.  
 
With regard to the disclosure quality equation (Panel A, Model 2), several governance 
variables including ACMEET, ACMULT, and BODMEET demonstrate significant positive 
influences on the IRAWARD variable. In other words, audit committee meetings more than 
three times in a year, audit committee additional directorship and higher frequencies of 
board meetings are predictors of increasing disclosure quality. Contrastingly, a significant 
negative association between ACSIZE and IRAWARD is recorded at p<0.05. In the same vein, 
ACMULT, CHAIRTEN and CHAIRMULT also demonstrate results that divert from the 
prediction. By and large, IRAWARD is also determined by MJONES, governance factors and 
other corporate characteristics variables.  
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The simultaneous relationship between disclosure and earnings management also detected 
when disclosure quality is measured using FLSCORE (refer to panel B) and AFA (refer to 
panel C). When IRAWARD is replaced with FLSCORE, the earnings management equation 
(Model One, Panel B) reveals that FLSCORE is negatively related to MJONES at p<0.01 (Coef 
= -0.1, t=-2.82). This result is corroborates the findings from the OLS regression in Table 4-5: 
firms with a high FLSCORE will engage less in earnings management, and firms with a low 
FLSCORE will engage more in earnings management. The disclosure quality equation (Panel 
B, Model 2) reports that MJONES is significantly and negatively related to FLSCORE at 
p<0.05, indicating that firms with high earnings management tend to disclose less forward 
looking information than their counterparts. In this instance, firms that engage in earnings 
management probably choose to disclose less in order to make earnings management 
harder to detect and less visible to the public. This finding is consistent with that of 
Athanasakou and Hussainey (2010) who report that a firm’s forward looking disclosure in 
the annual report increases with the firm’s earnings quality.  
 
In relation to AFA, Panel C reveals that AFA is negatively related to MJONES at p<0.01 in the 
MJONES equation (Model One, Panel C) and that MJONES also reports a significant negative 
relationship with AFA at p<0.01 in the AFA equation (Model 2, Panel C). This finding suggests 
that firms with high AFA, as a proxy for a firm’s disclosure environment, engage less in 
earnings management than firms with low AFA (Model One, Panel C). Moreover, the 
findings from the AFA equation (Model 2, Panel C) also indicate that higher earnings 
management lowers AFA. Contrary to Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009), this study finds that UK 
firms did not manage earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts.  
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One important finding is also shown in Model One, Panel C. While the OLS regression in 
Table 4-5 reports that ACMEET is positively related to MJONES at p<0.01 when AFA is used 
as a proxy for disclosure quality, this result disappears in the 2SLS regression. In addition, 
ACEXP that was insignificant in the OLS regression now reported a significant negative 
relationship with MJONES at p<0.01 (coef = -5.55). The inverse link indicates that a high 
ACEXP has adverse effects on earnings management. However, excessive ACEXP increases 
MJONES at p<0.1 (coef=2.32), when FLSCORE is included in the model (refer to Model One, 
Panel B), while this result is not statistically significant in Model Six, Table 4-5.   
  
Overall, the 2SLS regression supports the hypothesis that there is an inverse bi-directional 
association between disclosure quality and earnings management. This finding is in line with 
that of Zhau and Lobo (2001) who recorded a negative simultaneous link between 
disclosure quality (measured using AIMR Ratings) and earnings management. Similar to the 
findings of the OLS regression (refer to Table 4-5), corporate governance variables measures 
do not show an improving effect on earnings management although an exception applies to 
ACEXP, which reports a negative relationship with MJONES at p<0.01 (refer to Model One, 
Panel C, Table 4-6). It is undeniable that some corporate governance variables show 
negative associations to MJONES; however, their coefficients are very weak, leading to 
insignificant results. This corroborates the findings of Basiruddin (2011) who reports an 
insignificant relationship between board and audit committee characteristics and earnings 
management in UK firms. As an additional sensitivity analysis, the present study also 
performs an IV regression in controlling for simultaneity as suggested by Li (2011) and by 
Roberts and Whited (2011). The findings generally corroborate the result of the 2SLS 
regression, where the ability of disclosure to deter earnings management is maintained 
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after controlling for simultaneity bias. Further detail about this test is available in the 
appendices. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
In general, the first project reveals several important findings: 
1. The finding revealed that the interaction terms ACQUALITY*IRAWARD revealed a 
significant negative relationship with MJONES, hence suggesting that ACQUALITY and 
IRAWARD are complementary each other in reducing earnings management. However, 
the interaction terms are insignificant when AFA and FLSCORE were used as proxies for 
disclosure quality.  
2. The OLS regression consistently reveals that disclosure quality (measured using 
IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA) shows constantly outweighs other corporate governance 
mechanisms in deterring earnings management.  
3. Board and audit committee characteristics provide a weak influence on earnings 
management. Given that both governance and disclosure prospectively reduce 
information asymmetry, the present study finds that both corporate governance and 
disclosure contribute to deterring earnings management to different extents. No perfect 
substitutive relationship is, therefore, offered within this system of governance. 
Corporate governance is probably more effective in reducing other forms of agency cost 
but not  earnings management. This resembles the manifestation of agency conflict 
outlined by John and Senbet (1998, p. 376) who suggest that managers are “(i) 
expanding a span of control in the form of “empire building” at the expense of capital 
contributors or owners, and (b) for unduly conservative investments in form of seeking 
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safe but (inferior) projects to maintain the safety of wage compensation and their own 
tenure”.  
4. Analyst following is more effective in constraining earnings management when a firm 
posses a credible audit committee that meets the recommendations in the Smith Report 
(2003).  
5. The 2SLS regressions confirm that disclosure quality and earnings management are 
endogenously determined, and that causality can run in both directions in the equation. 
Reverse causality is recorded, which implies that firms with high earnings management 
tend to disclose less information, probably to make earnings management less visible to 
the public.  
6. The findings provide a better understanding of the implications of flexibility in disclosure 
choice and regulatory concerns regarding corporate governance for earnings 
management. Future research will have to control for disclosure quality when examining 
the link between corporate governance and earnings management.  
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5 Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
High disclosure quality is beneficial to firms in the sense that it has potential for reducing 
the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Lev, 1992; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) and the cost of 
debt (Sengupta, 1998), and for increasing the share price (Lang and Lundholm, 2000; 
Welker, 1995; Healy et al., 1999). Nevertheless, firms will not enjoy all of these benefits if 
the information provided by managers is flawed. Due to the incentives for managers’ to 
provide opportunistic voluntary disclosure, it is likely that the release of disclosure 
information is subject to distortion (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Poor disclosure 
information leads to the misallocation of resources in the capital market because it causes 
investors to rely on inaccurate information in making economic decisions. In this instance, 
sound corporate governance is viewed as having potential for reducing managerial 
opportunistic behaviour, and enhancing disclosure quality (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007).  
 
The present study empirically examines whether internal governance mechanisms (i.e., 
board characteristics and audit committee characteristics) are associated with disclosure 
quality. Moreover, the influence of audit committee effectiveness (measured using the 
recommended norm from The Smith Report (2003) and The Blue Ribbon Recommendation 
(1999)) on disclosure quality will also be examined in this study. In addition, given that the 
association between internal governance mechanisms can either be complementary or 
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substitutive, this research tries to investigate such relationships in the light of the potential 
cost and benefit of the implementation of corporate governance. Furthermore, considering 
that internal governance mechanisms are basically interlinked and interrelated, the present 
study also takes into account the potential of a simultaneous relationship between the 
number of independent directors and disclosure quality that is highlighted in the prior 
literature. It is hoped that the findings will provide a better understanding of the impact of 
corporate governance on disclosure quality, especially in the UK context.   
 
5.2 The theoretical framework of corporate governance and disclosure quality 
 
Since disclosure is linked to a cost89 and benefit90 trade-off (Nelson et al., 2010; Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Healy and Palepu, 2001), managers have an incentives to 
distort a firm’s disclosure information (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Beaver, 1998) and/or 
withhold some of a company’s information (Christensen and Feltham, 2004, p. 511). In 
other words, management views cost and benefit analysis as crucial in determining what 
types of information to disclose (Nelson et al., 2010). On the one hand, a manager’s 
disclosure decision is hoped to reduce the information asymmetry between agent and 
principal (Cheng et al., 2006; Peterson and Plenborg, 2006; Brown et al., 2004; Welker, 
1995; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). On the other hand, a manager’s disclosure decision may 
depend on the various incentives that are tied to their personal benefits (Brockman et al., 
2011; Rogers, 2008; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Berger and Hann, 2007). Rogers (2008) finds 
that managers provide high disclosure in accordance with their plan to sell the firm’s shares, 
                                                          
89 According to Christensen and Feltham (2004, p. 511), the cost of disclosure includes “the cost of verifying 
and transmitting the manager’s message” as well as “other costs that stem from actions of others such as 
competitors”. They agree with Darrough and Stoughton (1994), who point out that disclosure entails both 
proprietary and litigation costs. Prior studies document that managers provide low quality disclosure when the 
proprietary cost is high (Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Bamber and Cheon, 1998).  
90
 See section 2.2 for detail discussions on the benefits of increased disclosure.  
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and low disclosure when planning to buy the shares.91 Berger and Hann (2007, p. 3) point 
out that managers tend to withhold information on low geographic earnings from investors 
and competitors in order to avoid extra monitoring and to portray companies as having no 
“unresolved agency problems”. By the same token, managers also tend to hide bad news 
because it undermines their “managerial ability” (Langberg and Sivaramakrishnan, 2010, p. 
606) and they wish to protect their careers (Kothari et al., 2009). Hope and Thomas (2008) 
find that managers hide segmental earnings disclosure when a firm’s performance is poor. 
Nelson et al. (2010) suggest that managers tend to withhold sensitive information on 
remuneration, which potentially leads to excessive managerial compensation. These types 
of managerial opportunistic behaviours are the manifestation of a misalignment of interest, 
which creates an agency cost (i.e., residual loss).   
 
These shortcomings occur due to the separation of ownership and control which creates 
agency problems such as information asymmetry and conflict of interest in the principal and 
agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Conflict of interest increases managers’ 
“non-value maximising behaviour” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988, p. 8), which subsequently 
increases agency costs and reduces a firm’s value (Barako et al., 2006). In this instance, 
investors need adequate information in order to reduce the gap of information asymmetry 
(Cheng et al., 2006; Peterson and Plenborg, 2006; Brown et al., 2004; Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991), to understand corporate affairs, provide adequate monitoring on firms 
and reduce agency costs (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Bushman and Smith, 2001). They also 
need such information in order to understand the impact of managerial decisions on a firm’s 
performance (Lombardo and Pagano, 2002, as cited in Hope and Thomas, 2008, p. 596).  
                                                          
91
 Kothari et al. (2009) claim that a firm’s disclosure reduces information asymmetry and that this is reflected 
in the firm’s share price.  
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Sound corporate governance is one of the potential means to control a manager’s 
opportunistic behaviour by preventing them from distorting a company’s disclosure 
(Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Cormier and Martinez, 2006; Shen and Chih, 2007; Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti, 2007; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Bonazzi and Islam, 
2007; Maher and Andersson, 2000; Baek et al., 2009). Corporate governance helps to 
strengthen the function of the board by dampening the manager’s self interest, thus 
preventing them from providing poor quality information to investors and reducing 
information asymmetry (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). Internal governance mechanisms, such 
as the board of directors and audit committee, are expected to be influential in improving 
disclosure quality (Brown et al., 2011). In particular, a board of directors is considered 
essential to an overall governance system (Short et al., 1999) due to the power they have to 
make decisions on behalf of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). An audit committee is 
also expected to play significant roles in handling firm financial affairs (e.g. Engel et al., 
2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2010). 92 
 
It has been established that disclosure is costly to managers; however, internal governance 
mechanisms are also not without cost. In ensuring that the cost of implementing internal 
governance does not exceed the cost of a firm’s disclosure, it is imperative to know whether 
internal governance mechanisms are complementary or substitutive in relation to each 
other. Brown et al., (2011) described this relationship as “obscure”. A sound audit 
                                                          
92
 Although prior literature (e.g. Kent et al., 2008; Nelson et al., 2010) views corporate governance as valuable 
in terms of improving a firm’s disclosure quality, Kanagaretnam et al., (2007) point out that corporate 
governance may also have an adverse impact on disclosure quality; hence, suggesting that the association 
between corporate governance and disclosure quality is obscure.  
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committee actually originates from a sound board of directors. This suggests that internal 
governance mechanisms are basically interlinked (Vafeas, 2005), are complementary 
(Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007), and that they act to various extents in improving the 
quality of reporting. In particular, “…each governance mechanism plays a complementary 
role that is specifically effective in certain aspects or stages of agency problem solving” 
(Iwasaki, 2008, p. 533).  
 
Contrastingly, if the roles of internal governance mechanisms are substitutive for one 
another, companies may concentrate on only one of them, to the expense of the other 
(Rediker and Seth, 1995, p. 88), in order to reduce the cost of implementation. These 
competing views are expected, given that each corporate governance mechanism is 
generally interrelated and endogenously determined (Brick et al., 2008, p. 3; Cornett et al., 
2009) and that one mechanism may outweigh the other (Holm and Schøler, 2010; Brick et 
al., 2008)93in terms of their influence on disclosure quality. The need to investigate this 
potential relationship is more apparent in the context of the “comply and explain” approach 
that is taken in the UK. This approach allows more flexibility for managers to make a 
judgement in light of their unique needs, as compared with the needs of their counterparts, 
and the necessity for designing a governance system specifically for their firms (Holm and 
Schøler, 2010; Vafeas, 2005)94 .   
 
5.3 Literature review of corporate governance and disclosure quality 
 
                                                          
93
 In order to capture the potential simultaneity between governance mechanisms (i.e., disclosure quality and 
independent directors), the present study will use a system of simultaneous equation. More discussion about 
the potential endogenous link takes place in section 5.4 of this chapter.  
94
 The mandatory approach to corporate governance has been criticized by prior literature because it was 
largely “redundant and costly” (Vafeas, 2005), and provides ambiguous benefit to the firms (Arcot and Bruno, 
2006a).  
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Extensive research has examined the relationship between disclosure quality and the 
components of corporate governance in various countries including the United States (Felo 
et al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Wright, 1996), United Kingdom (Song and 
Windram, 2000; Li et al., 2008), Australia (e.g. Goodwin et al., 2009; Nelson et al., 2010; 
Kent and Stewart, 2008; Bassett et al., 2007), Malaysia (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali 
and Weetman, 2006), Hong Kong (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001), Singapore 
(Eng and Mak, 2003; Cheng and Courtney, 2006) and Kenya (Barako et al., 2006).  
 
It is worth mentioning that some prior research relies on a single measure for disclosure 
quality (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) and that the most 
popular measures used in prior studies include voluntary disclosure in the annual report 
(e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Lim et al., 2007) followed by AIMR ratings (e.g., Felo et al, 2003; Wright, 1996), 
management earnings forecast accuracy (e.g. Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 
2005) and analyst forecast accuracy (e.g. Byard et al., 2006; Beekes and Brown, 2006).  
 
Prior studies also tend to focus on a limited number of corporate governance components, 
thus suggesting that their models suffer from a serious misspecification bias. By the same 
token, strong board characteristics, per se, are unlikely to improve disclosure quality 
without a strong contribution from the audit committee, to whom the responsibility of 
financial matters is delegated. For instance, Forker et al. (2002) do not control for board 
characteristics when examining the links between managerial ownership, CEO duality, audit 
committee and stock option disclosure. Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) focus on board 
characteristics but, at the same time, they neglect the potential for audit committees to 
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influence intellectual capital disclosure. Thus, they ignore the fact that a board also 
delegates responsibilities, with regard to disclosure and transparency, to the audit 
committee.  
 
The shortcoming in Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) is also shared by Chen and Jaggi (2000) 
and Eng and Mak (2003) who only control for independent directors and ownership 
structures in their models and, thus, fail to count the audit committee’s effect on disclosure. 
Hidalgo et al. (2011) do not include any other audit committee related variables (apart from 
audit committee size) in their research model on corporate governance and intellectual 
capital disclosure by Mexican firms. Therefore, they completely disregard other important 
aspects such as audit committee independence (which ensures independent decisions), 
audit committee meetings (that provide a platform for them to meet and convey ideas and 
judgements) and audit committee expertise (which is useful for detecting financial 
irregularities).  
 
In a related vein, other studies concentrate on composite measures of corporate 
governance:  the corporate governance index (e.g. Beekes and Brown et al., 2006).95 Nelson 
et al. (2010) transform individual measures of corporate governance into factors using the 
method of principal components analysis, while Kent and Stewart (2008) and Goodwin et al. 
(2009) use individual measures of corporate governance in their study. The present study 
integrates both composite and individual measures of audit committee variables, in line 
with Zaman et al. (2011). It is also worth mentioning that some studies employ cross-
                                                          
95
 The issues in corporate governance measurement is discussed in Chapter 2.   
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sectional data (e.g. Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Baek et al., 2009; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Bassett et al., 2007) which could be improved by using longitudinal data.  
 
Prior studies also tend to focus on certain aspects of disclosure such as intellectual capital 
(e.g. Li et al., 2008; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007), share option disclosure (e.g. Forker et 
al., 2002) mandatory disclosure (e.g. Baek et al., 2009; Song and Windram, 200496) and 
compensation disclosure (Laksmana, 2008). The present study is different from previous 
research because it focuses on broader, multifaceted and reliable disclosure quality 
measures such as IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA, which intend to capture both internal and 
external disclosure as well as offering more certainty regarding the controversial issue of 
suitable proxies for disclosure quality.97  
 
Moreover, prior literature also recognises that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms and practices vary from country to country (Doidge et al., 2007). Country 
specific characteristics play a significant role in ensuring the effectiveness of corporate 
governance. In support of this view, a meta-analysis by García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta 
(2010), using 27 empirical studies, highlights the need for strong regulatory roles. Their 
findings document that voluntary disclosure increases with the number of independent 
directors, particularly in countries that are highly protective of investor’s rights. 
Contrastingly, and in light of their findings, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) claim that firms 
                                                          
96
 Song and Windram (2004) use the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) enforcement which was released 
to the firms that did not comply with mandatory requirements such as The Companies Act and the accounting 
standard.  
97
 The present study assumed that FLSCORE is one form of internal disclosure and AFA is one form of external 
measure, while IRAWARD is possibly in between internal and external disclosure.  
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determine their corporate governance practices based solely on the cost and benefit trade-
off and see regulatory requirement as less important.  
 
More importantly, most of the prior studies neglect the potential for reverse causality 
between disclosure quality and corporate governance (e.g. Kent and Stewart, 2008; Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Wright, 1999). Although few studies such as Lim et al. 
(2007), Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Gul and Leung (2007) consider the endogeneity 
factor, using 2SLS regression, their research is based on other countries such as Australia 
and Singapore; where generalisation to the UK might be inappropriate, given that both 
corporate governance practices and their effectiveness vary depending on the country in 
which the firms operate (Doidge et al., 2007)98. Failure to consider this issue will hamper the 
model and render the OLS regression findings inconsistent.  
 
Regarding the US capital market, prior studies document significant monitoring roles on the 
part of boards of directors and audit committees. In previous research in the US, there is 
supportive evidence that audit committee characteristics have a positive effect on 
disclosure (e.g. Felo et al., 2003; Wright, 1996 and Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Felo et al. 
(2003) investigate the relationship between disclosure quality and corporate governance in 
the US. Using AIMR ratings as a measurement of disclosure quality, alongside several 
corporate governance characteristics, they find that the percentage of audit committee 
members with financial or accounting literacy and the size of the audit committee are both 
important factors that influence the quality of disclosure.  
 
                                                          
98
 Doidge et al. (2007) demonstrated that country-specific characteristics had a stronger effect on corporate 
governance practices than firm-specific characteristics.  
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Wright (1996) finds that the number of shareholding audit committee members and the 
proportion of independent audit committee members are significantly related to the quality 
of disclosure, which is measured using AIMR ratings and Securities and Exchange 
Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases for US firms. In their US study, 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) show that firms with active boards and audit committees 
tend to update their earnings forecasts more frequently and accurately than firms without 
active board and audit committee members. Their study employed the management 
earnings forecast as a proxy for disclosure quality and the analysis was conducted on a 
sample of 275 firms in the years 1995-2000.  
 
Recently, a strand of research demonstrates that disclosure quality increases with more 
independent boards, in the US market (e.g. Baek et al., 2009; Ajinkya et al., 2005; Byard et 
al., 2006 and Laksmana, 2008). Based on 374 US firms listed in the S&P 500 Index, Baek et 
al. (2009) examine the relationship between corporate governance and disclosure quality, 
which is measured using the S&P Transparency and Disclosure survey. The S&P 
Transparency and Disclosure survey scores the firms based on 98 disclosure items that are 
reported in the firms’ annual reports.99 Using data from the year 2000, Baek et al. (2009)  
find that the presence of outside directors and institutional ownership were positively 
related to the S&P Transparency and Disclosure score. A negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and the S&P Transparency and Disclosure score is also documented.  
 
Similarly, Ajinkya et al. (2005) examine how the numbers of independent directors and 
institutional investors relate to the management earnings forecast. They reveal that the 
                                                          
99
 Baek et al. (2009) noted that it is mandatory to disclose some of the 98 attributes.  
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percentage of outside directors and the level of institutional ownership are positively 
related to the frequency and accuracy of the management earnings forecast. Byard et al. 
(2006) investigate the association between corporate governance variables and analyst 
forecast accuracy. They document that firms with a greater number of independent 
directors consistently report a significant positive relationship to analyst forecast accuracy 
and that board size and CEO duality are negatively related to analyst forecast accuracy. 
More recently, Laksmana (2008) examines the influence of board and compensation 
committee characteristics on the disclosure of compensation practices. She finds that 
greater compensation disclosure reduces information asymmetry (measured by bid-ask 
spread and return volatility) and that independent boards provide more details about 
compensation practices. 
 
The number of studies from the UK capital market is limited in comparison to the number of 
US studies. In the UK, both the board and the audit committee are viewed as important 
mechanisms to enhance disclosure quality. Li et al. (2008) investigate the association 
between corporate governance and intellectual capital disclosure using 100 UK listed 
companies from March 2004 to February 2005. Using a disclosure index of intellectual 
capital items, the total number of intellectual capital words as well as the percentage of 
total words as proxies for disclosure quality, their multivariate analysis reports that board 
independence, size of audit committee and frequency of audit committee meetings were 
found to be positively related to disclosure quality. They also record a negative relationship 
between ownership structure and disclosure quality. A further study by Donnelly and 
Mulcahy (2008) documents that voluntary disclosure increases with the number of 
independent directors and non-executive chairman, in the Irish capital market.  
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Song and Windram (2000) focus on the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) 
enforcement which is imposed to those firms which do not comply with The Companies Act 
and accounting standards as a measurement of good quality reporting. Using a match-
paired sample, which comprised 54 UK firms in the year 1990-2000, they find that board 
size, proportion of non-executive directors, audit committee financial literacy, number of 
audit committee meetings and level of audit committee independence are all important 
factors in explaining the quality of financial statements. Forker (1992) empirically examines 
the relationship between employee share option scheme (ESOS) disclosure and corporate 
governance in the UK capital market. Based on the 100 largest and 100 smallest UK firms 
from 1987 to 1988, he finds that the quality of ESOS disclosure declines when the position 
of CEO and chairman are held by the same person. 
 
In relation to European countries, very limited research is available in the literature. Based 
on biotechnology firms in Europe, Cerbioni and Parbonetti’s (2007) study examines the 
association between board characteristics and intellectual capital disclosure, without 
controlling for any audit committee variables. They reveal that independent directors have a 
complementary effect on intellectual capital information. However, intellectual capital 
disclosure decreases with board size and board structure (measured as “1” if compensation, 
audit and nominating committee are dominantly comprised of independent directors). In 
light of these conflicting findings, they conclude that “the association between corporate 
governance and disclosure is complex and multifaceted” (p. 818). In describing the 
association between voluntary disclosure of earnings and corporate governance, Lakhal 
(2003) uses data from 117 listed firms in France from 1998 to 2001. She demonstrates that 
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the ownership structure, institutional investor ownership, and the utilisation of ESOS as one 
form of compensation are positive influences on the extent of voluntary disclosure of 
earnings. In contrast, she shows that CEO duality negatively influences the degree of 
voluntary disclosure of earnings. It seems that, when the CEO and chairman’s position is 
held by the same person, the quality of voluntary disclosure of earnings is decreased.  
 
From the Australian viewpoint, no consensus result is documented with regard to the 
association between governance and disclosure. Nelson et al. (2010) examine the 
association between corporate governance and stock option disclosure. They find that 
board independence is negatively related to stock option disclosure, while audit committee 
independence and effectiveness and compensation committee independence and 
effectiveness show a positive link with stock option disclosure. Using 127 Australian firms, 
Goodwin et al. (2009) empirically test the association between corporate governance and 
management forecast accuracy on the AIFRS transition. They find that CEO tenure is 
positively related to forecast error and that blockholder tenure is negatively related to 
forecast error. Bassett et al. (2007) examine the relationship between the 
comprehensiveness of ESOS disclosure and corporate governance characteristics. Using data 
from 500 listed firms in Australia for the year 2003, they document that CEO duality and the 
quality of auditors are the main determinants of the level of ESOS disclosure.  
 
Another Australian study, Kent and Stewart (2008) examine the association between board 
and audit committee characteristics and the disclosure related to the transition of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). They show that the frequency of board 
meetings and audit committee meetings, and auditor quality, are positively related to 
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disclosure. Kent and Stewart (2008) study employ OLS regression in their multivariate 
analysis, while it is more appropriate to use Poisson regression when the dependent 
variable is count data (e.g. Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). Beekes and Brown (2006) 
examine the relationship between corporate governance quality and various measures of 
disclosure informativeness including disclosure timeliness, analyst forecast bias and 
accuracy. They use the Horwath Report 2002 corporate governance rankings as a proxy for 
corporate governance quality.100 They find that firms with sound governance quality are 
associated with greater disclosure informativeness. An Australian study by Lim et al. (2007) 
examines the relationship between board composition and voluntary disclosure using 181 
Australian companies. They reveal a positive relationship between board independence and 
voluntary disclosure in their 2SLS regression.  
 
Studies on corporate governance and disclosure quality have also been undertaken in Asian 
settings such as Malaysia (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006), Hong 
Kong (e.g. Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Ho ang Wong, 2001) and Singapore (e.g. Eng and Mak, 
2003; Cheng and Courtney, 2006). In 2002, Haniffa and Cooke empirically examined the 
influence of culture and corporate governance on the extent of disclosure quality. Using 
annual reports from 1995, 167 listed firms in Malaysia were analysed. They find that non-
executive chair members, proportion of family members on the board and the percentage 
of son of the soil directors are important in determining the extent of disclosure quality. 
Another piece of Malaysian research by Ghazali and Weetman (2006) investigates the 
association between disclosure quality and corporate governance. Based on 87 listed firms 
                                                          
100
 The Horwath Report 2002 released corporate governance rankings on corporate governance and related 
party disclosures in the year 2001 annual reports of the top 250 firms in Australia (Beekes and Brown, 2006, p. 
428). 
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in Bursa Malaysia in the year 2001, they discovered that director ownership was the only 
variable that was found to be significant in explaining the extent of disclosure quality.  
 
Chen and Jaggi (2000) document evidence that board of director independence is crucial in 
influencing the level of good quality reporting by Hong Kong firms based on data collected 
during 1993 and 1994. From the same country, Ho and Wong (2001) use a weighted 
disclosure index to measure the extent of disclosure quality from listed firms in Hong Kong. 
They reveal that the presence of an audit committee and the proportion of family members 
on the board are important factors in explaining the variation of disclosure quality practices.  
 
In explaining the relationship between disclosure quality and corporate governance, Eng 
and Mak (2003) show that having a larger proportion of outside directors and a smaller 
percentage of managerial shareholders are each negatively related to voluntary disclosure. 
Conversely, the presence of a large government shareholding is positively related to the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. Eng and Mak’s (2003) analysis is based on listed firms in 
Singapore in the year 1995. A more recent study by Cheng and Courtney (2006) provides 
contradictory results to Eng and Mak (2003). Specifically, Cheng and Courtney (2006) 
document a significant positive association between the proportion of independent 
directors and the extent of disclosure quality in 104 firms in the year 2000.  
 
In determining the influence of good quality reporting and corporate governance, Barako et 
al. (2006) focus upon the Kenyan context and based their study on data from 1992 to 2001. 
Their findings reveal that audit committee presence, foreign ownership, institutional 
ownership, firm size and leverage positively influence the level of disclosure by Kenyan 
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firms. However, board composition and shareholder concentration are negatively related to 
the quality of disclosure. The Mexican study, by Hidalgo et al. (2011), reports that board size 
is the only governance variable that determines the extent of intellectual capital disclosure.  
 
In spite of the extensive research on corporate governance and disclosure quality, none of 
the prior studies have tried to employ IRAWARD and FLSCORE as proxies for disclosure 
quality. In the absence of alternative disclosure quality measures and in light of the 
previously discussed recklessness in handling endogeneity (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), 
it is premature to jump to the conclusion that current corporate governance practices really 
help to improve disclosure quality. The employment of various alternative measures for 
disclosure quality may increase the robustness of the findings (e.g. Cooke, 1998, p. 209).  
 
It can be observed that the findings of the above mentioned studies are mainly 
contradictory and inconsistent. For instance, even though Hong Kong and Singapore are 
known to share a similar background, worldview and culture, the results from Chen and 
Jaggi (2000), Ho and Wong (2001) and Eng and Mak (2003) lead to differing conclusions. 
Corporate governance literature acknowledges that the conflicting findings might be 
attributed to endogeneity such as omitted variables, simultaneity or measurement error 
(e.g. Renders and Gaeremynck, 2000; Börsch-Supan and Köke, 2002). Therefore, the present 
study will consider the potential endogenous link between disclosure quality and corporate 
governance using a simultaneous system of equation.  
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5.4 Literature review on simultaneity between disclosure quality and board 
independence 
 
It is acknowledged that there are possible endogeneity biases in this study, given the 
abundance of corporate governance literature that highlights this issue (e.g. Brown et al., 
2011; Armstrong et al, 2010; Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010; Lim et al., 2007). Although 
most prior studies completely ignore the potential for endogeneity when examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and disclosure quality (e.g. Patelli and Prencipe, 
2007; Li et al., 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003), exception should be 
given to a small number of studies including Lim et al. (2007). The present study 
acknowledges that the BODIND variable has a potentially endogenous nature. This is 
because (i) the “comply and explain approach”, which is currently practiced in the UK, 
provides more space for managers to use their own discretion, especially when they are 
dealing with policy concerning independent directors, and (ii) reverse causality between the 
independence of directors (BODIND) and disclosure might exist since it is possible that a 
firm’s high disclosure environment will attract more independent directors to join them. 
Moreover, based on their review of findings from the prior literature, Armstrong et al (2010, 
p. 191) conclude that outside directors function well in high disclosure environments, thus 
highlighting a reverse causality between a firm’s disclosure and the presence of 
independent directors.  
 
It is important to note that plenty of research in corporate governance highlights the 
endogenous nature of board independence from different perspectives (e.g. Cornett et al., 
2009; Lehn et al, 2009; Adams et al., 2009; Hay et al, 2008; Brick et al., 2006; Adams and 
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Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Boone et al., 2007)101. Following Lim et al. (2007) in 
their study on board composition and voluntary disclosure, we treated board independence 
(BODIND) as endogenous in our study.102 The present study focuses on BODIND and 
disregards other governance variables because board independence (BODIND) is “identified 
as important in providing corporate governance”, according to Chenhall and Moers (2007, p. 
179).103 Moreover, Boone et al. (2007) find that a steady increase in board size is influenced 
by an increase in the number of independent directors in a company.  
 
5.5 Hypothesis development 
 
As a matter of fact, there is no consensus on what really constitutes a sound corporate 
governance practice. It remains an unanswered myth (Brickley and Zimmerman (2010). 
Point number 3 in the preface section of the UK Corporate Governance Code acknowledges 
the limitation of the code itself, admitting that it is not always successful in mitigating 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour, hence signalling that the effect of corporate governance 
on disclosure quality is vague. In particular:   
Nearly two decades of constructive usage have enhanced the prestige of the Code. Indeed, it 
seems that there is almost a belief that complying with the Code in itself constitutes good 
governance. The Code, however, is of necessity limited to being a guide only in general 
terms to principles, structure and processes. It cannot guarantee effective board behaviour  
because the range of situations in which it is applicable is much too great for it to attempt 
to mandate behaviour more specifically than it does. Boards therefore have a lot of room 
within the framework of the Code to decide for themselves how they should act (The UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2010, p. 2; emphasis added).  
 
                                                          
101
 In examining the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management, Cornett et al. 
(2009) also treated board independence as endogenous (measured using interaction terms between board 
size and independent directors), while other board characteristics (e.g. board meeting, CEO tenure) and audit 
committee characteristics (e.g. audit committee size, audit committee meeting) are assumed to be 
endogenous.  
102
 The study by Lim et al. (2007) focuses on the influence of board composition (board independence) on 
voluntary disclosure. They treat board composition as endogenous and they employ 2SLS regression. They find 
that board composition is related positively to voluntary disclosure.  
103
 The present study admits that BODIND is not the only corporate governance variable that is subject to the 
endogeneity issue. Lehn et al. (2009) consider board size to be endogenous as well. This is considered as a part 
of the weaknesses in the current study.  
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Relying on the main components of governance, as highlighted in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) and in the empirical literature, the present study considers that 
variables relating to the board of directors, chairman and audit committee are of particular 
interest to the investigation. The present study, although not perfect, acknowledges that 
issues of measurement in corporate governance research are not uncommon. Moreover, 
the quality of a board of directors is perceived as an essential element in internal 
governance, as it is mainly responsible for monitoring and disseminating a higher quality of 
information (e.g. Kent and Steward, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010; Vafeas, 2005; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) and for improving the effectiveness of corporate governance (e.g. Cohen et 
al., 2004). Boards of directors delegate the power to monitor financial and transparency 
matters to audit committees, who are responsible to maintain the credibility of financial 
information and disclosure. Hence, audit committees play significant roles in governing the 
“process” of firms’ financial reporting (Engel et al., 2010, p. 136; Archambeault et al., 2008; 
Bédard et al., 2004).  
 
5.5.1 Audit committee quality (ACQUALITY and ACQUALITYBR) 
 
Research evidence suggests that audit committees can have a direct influence on the scope 
of external audits and the monitoring of financial reporting (Beasley et al., 2009; Cohen et 
al., 2004; Klein, 2002) and that they play important roles in overseeing a firm’s financial 
reporting process (Engel et al., 2010; Klein, 2002; Archambeault et al., 2008; Bédard et al., 
2004). In order to carry out their duty effectively, audit committees need to be equipped 
with several relevant criteria,104 which are defined in various ways in the prior literature. 
Bronson et al. (2009) demonstrate that an audit committee will only function effectively if 
                                                          
104
It is acknowledged that the ideal criteria for audit committee effectiveness are obscure.  
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all of its members are comprised of independent directors. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) argue that 
the effectiveness of audit committee with accounting expertise is dependence on their 
independence, share ownership, multiple directorship and tenure. Other studies 
concentrate on important audit committee criteria such as independence, diligent financial 
expertise and size (Zaman et al., 2011; Kent et al., 2010; Rainsbury et al., 2008; Nelson et al., 
2010; Bédard et al., 2004), background and the level of experience of the audit committee 
chairperson (Engel et al., 2010), or on broader aspects of effectiveness such as audit 
committee knowledge and expertise in their industry (Cohen et al., 2008). From the analysis 
of prior literature, Bédard and Gendron (2010) summarise that there is a relative lack of 
supporting evidence for the influence of audit committee size and audit committee meeting 
frequency on financial reporting quality, as compared to other characteristics such as the 
independence, the competency and the formation of the audit committee in a company.   
 
Due to the presence of several options of proxies for audit committee quality provided by 
previous literature, the measures used by Zaman et al. (2011) are favoured for the purposes 
of the current research. These measures are based on the regulatory recommendations in 
the UK and are in accordance with the expressions of agency theory.105 Following Zaman et 
al., the composite measures for audit committee quality (ACQUALITY and ACQUALITYBR) is 
constructed, in accordance with the Smith Report (2003) and the Blue Ribbon 
Recommendation (1999). Specifically, four characteristics will be examined including audit 
committee independence, diligence, size and expertise. With respect to these 
characteristics, the Smith Report (2003) states that audit committees must be comprised 
entirely of independent directors, should meet at least three times a year, must include at 
                                                          
105
 It is important to note that the Zaman et al. (2011) study is different from the current study, given that they 
focus on the association between corporate governance variables and audit fees and non-audit services.  
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least one member with relevant financial expertise and have minimum of three members. In 
order to construct the composite measure of audit committee quality (ACQUALITY), firms 
are assigned a score of “1” if they fulfil all the criteria mentioned above and “0” if otherwise. 
Concerning the audit committee measure of ACQUALITYBR, it is qualitatively similar to 
ACQUALITY except that the number of meetings should be conducted at least four times in a 
year, in accordance to the Blue Ribbon Recommendation (1999) in the US. The present 
study expects ACQUALITY and ACQUALITYBR to be associated with higher disclosure quality. 
Thus, the hypotheses are: 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between audit committee quality 
(ACQUALITY) and disclosure quality. 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between audit committee quality 
(ACQUALITYBR) and disclosure quality. 
 
5.5.2 Audit committee independence (ACIND) and board independence (BODIND)  
 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), the board of directors is the main force for 
monitoring and control over firms, due to the power they have in determining a firm’s 
decisions. In order for the board to perform their monitoring effectively, prior literature 
(e.g. Bhagat and Black, 2002; Borokhovich et al., 2006; Aggarwal and Williamson, 2006; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Byrd and Hickman, 1992) and regulators (e.g. the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2010; Sarbanes Oxley Act) recognise the need for independent 
directors on boards as watchdogs to ensure that board decisions are always aligned with 
shareholder’s interests and to control opportunistic behaviour by managers. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) highlight that independent directors have a greater capability for making 
independent judgements on board decisions, compared to non-independent directors. From 
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the regulatory viewpoint, the independent director’s role has received significant attention. 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) stipulates that 50% of the board must be 
comprised of independent directors (excluding the chairman) while all audit committees 
must be composed of independent directors.  
 
Within agency theory, independent directors are considerably more credible than non-
independent directors when it comes to monitoring firms. Because they are an external 
officer (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008), they are viewed as a check and balance in a firm’s 
governance system (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002); they function as supervising mediators in 
reducing the conflict of interest within firms (Bathala and Rao, 1995, p. 59; Fama, 1980, p. 
293); they are supposed to behave like “professional referees”, as their decisions are 
without external compulsion from the non-independent directors (Bathala and Rao, 1995, p. 
60); they are more likely to act on behalf of shareholders (Felo et al., 2003); they increase a 
board’s integrity and effectiveness by dampening conflicts of interest among the managers 
(Fama, 1980); they consist of a group of “professional managers with expertise in decision 
control and they are expected to be more trustworthy in handling sensitive governance 
issues such as director’s remuneration or the appointment of new managers (Lim et al., 
2007, p. 558); they improve disclosure transparency (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) and they 
reduce the information asymmetry between the firms and stakeholders by promoting high 
standards of disclosure quality (Eng and Mak, 2003, p. 327). Lower conflict of interest in the 
board (where the goal of the shareholders and managers is identical) will prevent managers 
from disseminating low quality information to the investors (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007).  
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According to Dhaliwal et al. (2010, p. 793), independent directors (with accounting literacy) 
on audit committees “may have lower economic incentives to collude with top managers 
and are more likely to objectively monitor management performance”. While dependent 
directors are more specialised in the “overall strategic guidance” of the firms, the non-
independent directors are a group of professionals with a vast and diverse experience. They 
are mainly responsible to “monitor the board’s activities and financial reporting quality” 
(Brown et al., 2011, p. 112). 
 
However, some studies question the capability of independent directors to improve the 
effectiveness of a firm’s governance and quality of disclosure. It is suggested that 
independent directors might impair the board if it is largely comprised of independent 
directors who may have previously worked in firms with dissimilar industry specialisations 
(Bathala and Rao, 1995). Moreover, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996, p. 394) maintain that the 
appointment of external directors might be influenced by “political reasons, perhaps to 
include politicians, environmental activists, or consumer representatives.” This could be 
seen to compromise the independent characteristics of external directors. 
 
Previous research has illustrated that the relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
independent directors is mixed. Some studies demonstrate a positive association between 
independent boards and disclosure quality (e.g. Song and Windram, 2000; Chen and Jaggi, 
2000). Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) report a significant positive link between the 
percentage of independent directors and the voluntary disclosure score in Ireland. Beasley 
et al. (1996) reveal that financial statement fraud decreases with a higher proportion of 
independent directors on the board. Cornett et al. (2008) also find that the quality of a 
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firm’s earnings improves in the presence of outside directors. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) report a 
positive association between the presence of an independent audit committee with 
financial expertise and accrual quality. From the US viewpoint, Baek et al. (2009) find a 
positive link between the proportion of independent directors and disclosure related to 
management activities. Using a sample from Malaysia and Singapore, Bradbury et al. (2004) 
find that earnings quality is better when audit committees are comprised of independent 
directors. Moreover, Klien (2002) discovers a positive relationship between a high quality of 
reporting and audit committee and board independence. From the UK perspective, Li et al. 
(2008) find a positive link between the proportion of independent directors and intellectual 
capital disclosure.  
 
Contrastingly, Eng and Mak’s (2003) Singaporean study documents a negative relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Additionally, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) demonstrate that a firm’s performance decreases 
with the number of outside directors. Few pieces of research, however, have established 
that the link between independent directors and voluntary disclosure is insignificant (e.g. Ho 
and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). With regard to audit committee independence, 
Felo et al. (2003) find that the percentage of independent audit committee members was 
insignificant in influencing disclosure quality.  
 
The previous paragraph might question the potential positive effect of independent 
directors (whether on the board or audit committee) in relation to disclosure quality. 
Nonetheless, the studies mentioned suffer from a few drawbacks. For example, Eng and 
Mak (2003) fail to control for board size, audit committee size and audit committee 
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independence when examining the relationship between board independence and 
voluntary disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). Having a large board could possibly increase the 
problem of free riders, which may weaken a board’s independence. More importantly, there 
is poor consideration of the reverse causality issue in the prior literature (e.g. Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003) and a lack of use of lagged variables in the models to cater 
for simultaneity bias. Hence, based on agency theory, which views independent directors as 
one of the agents for monitoring and improving disclosure quality, the present study 
hypothesises that: 
H2c: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between board independence 
(BODIND) and disclosure quality. 
H2d: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between audit committees 
independence (ACIND) and disclosure quality.  
 
5.5.3 Audit committee meeting (ACMEET) and board meeting (BODMEET) 
 
Having a high number of independent directors with vast knowledge and expertise on the 
board and audit committee is of no use, to firms, if they only meet very infrequently. Board 
meetings and audit committee meetings are seen as a platform for directors to exercise 
their expertise and to discharge their duties in terms of solving company issues, including 
that of disclosure transparency. “Boards of directors need to be active to meet their 
corporate governance commitments, particularly in ensuring high-quality, transparent 
reporting in annual reports” (Kent and Stewart, 2008, p. 653). Moreover, the effort that a 
board gives to performing their responsibilities can be measured based on how frequently 
they meet (Ronen and Yaari, p. 25).  
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In the light of the above discussion, prior research that fails to control for audit committee 
meeting and/or board meeting frequencies (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Baek et al., 2009) may 
suffer from model misspecification. Moreover, the frequency of board and audit committee 
meetings has been found to be associated with high disclosure quality in prior studies. 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that firms with active board and audit committees tend 
to update their earnings forecasts more frequently and accurately than their counterparts. 
Menon and William (1994) state that board and audit committee meetings are crucial as a 
monitoring mechanism in a company’s financial affairs. Similarly, Collier and Gregory (1999) 
imply that the number of meetings and their length is indicative of the vigour and 
dedication of the audit committee in monitoring a company’s financial reporting. 
Furthermore, Hoitash et al. (2009, p. 844) point out that the level of audit committee 
“diligence” can be captured using the number of audit committee meetings in a year.  
 
On the other hand, Chen et al. (2006) find a positive relationship between the number of 
board meetings and the incidence of fraud in China. They argue that the positive link might 
be influenced by the board’s attempts to solve the fraud case. Bédard and Gendron’s (2010) 
review of findings from prior literature concludes that there is a lack of supporting evidence 
for the association between the frequency of audit committee meetings and financial 
reporting quality. Given that a higher frequency of meetings will be expected to increase an 
audit committee’s effectiveness in checking financial reports, thus increasing the quality of 
disclosure, this study predicts that: 
H2e: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between audit committee 
meetings (ACMEET) and disclosure quality 
268 
 
H2f: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between board meetings 
(BODMEET) and disclosure quality. 
 
5.5.4 Audit committee size (ACSIZE) and board size (BODSIZE) 
 
In relation to the number of board members, paragraph B.1 of The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010, p.12) states that the board “should not be so large as to be 
unwieldy”. This implies that regulators acknowledge the disadvantages of having a large 
number of board members. With regard to this, prior studies offer two competing views. On 
one hand, a large board is favourable, given that it may offer greater expertise, effort, 
knowledge and manpower; hence, it is expected to improve the extent of a firm’s disclosure 
quality. According to Lehn et al. (2009, p. 749), large board size represents “greater 
collective information that the board possesses about factors affecting the value of firms 
such as product markets, technology, regulation, mergers and acquisitions, and so forth”. 
On the other hand, a small board is favourable as there are less likely to be free riders 
(Yermack, 1999; Lehn et al., 2009); it provides more monitoring (Dey, 2008); there is less of 
a coordination problem (Lehn et al., 2009; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) and members are more 
focused on their duties (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). With these competing views, it is 
predicted that board and audit committee size may have both positive and negative impacts 
on disclosure quality.  
 
In the UK setting, Li et al. (2008) record a significant positive link between audit committee 
size and intellectual disclosure. A positive relationship between audit committee size and 
the quality of financial reporting is also documented by most prior studies (e.g. Felo et. al, 
2003; Lin et al., 2006; Song and Windram, 2004; O’Sullivan et al., 2008). Nevertheless, using 
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262 UK listed companies, Magena and Pike (2005) fail to find any relationship between audit 
committee size and interim disclosure. However, based on an extensive review of audit 
committee studies, Bédard and Gendron (2010) conclude that there is a lack of evidence for 
the association between audit committee meeting frequencies and financial reporting 
quality. Hence, the present study hypothesises that: 
H2g: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive or negative relationship between audit 
committee size (ACSIZE) and disclosure quality. 
H2h: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive or negative relationship between board size 
(BODSIZE) and disclosure quality. 
 
5.5.5 Audit committee expertise (ACEXP) 
 
Prior studies recognise that corporate governance is one of the potential forces for reducing 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour (e.g., Abbott et al., 2002; Efendi et al., 2004; Carcello et 
al., 2006; Xie et al., 2003; Beasley, 1996; and Klein, 2000). The expertise of the audit 
committee can function as a mechanism to detect and mitigate any irregularities and 
financial misstatements in financial reporting (Kent et al., 2010; Abbott et al., 2004; Beasley, 
et al., 2009; Cohen et al, 2004; Klein, 2002). Audit committees are formed by the board of 
directors. They have a specialised capability for ensuring financial reporting quality (Brown 
et al., 2011) and they are equipped with financial expertise to ensure their effectiveness 
(Bédard and Gendron, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Within agency theory, an audit 
committee is viewed as one of the monitoring agents within a company that is instrumental 
in improving the quality of financial reporting (Piot, 2004; Vafeas, 2005) and useful in 
reducing agency cost (Archambeault et al., 2008). The importance of an audit committee’s 
financial expertise is also supported by regulators in Paragraph C.3.1 of The UK Corporate 
270 
 
Governance Code (2010), which stipulates that “at least one member of audit committee 
members has recent and relevant financial experience”.  
 
Several studies report a positive relationship between an audit committee’s expertise and 
disclosure quality (e.g. Song and Windram, 2000; Felo et al., 2003; Qin, 2007; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2006; Zhang et al., 2007). Dhaliwal et al. (2010) report that an audit 
committee’s expertise increases their effectiveness in improving accrual quality. Moreover, 
Xie et al. (2003) demonstrate that an audit committee’s financial literacy is inversely related 
to earnings management, while Abbott et al. (2002) find a negative relationship between an 
audit committee’s financial expertise and the occurrence of accounting restatements. Using 
AIMR Ratings as a proxy for disclosure quality, Felo et al. (2003) document that the 
percentage of audit committee members with financial or accounting literacy and audit 
committee size are important elements in influencing the quality of disclosure. Thus, the 
present study hypothesises that: 
H2i: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between audit committee 
financial literacy (ACEXP) and disclosure quality 
 
5.5.6 Audit committee multiple directorship (ACMULT) and chairman multiple 
directorship (CHAIRMULT) 
 
Multiple directorships by audit committee members and chairmen have the potential to 
contribute a positive effect on disclosure quality, but they might also carry a negative 
implication for the quality of a firm’s disclosure. Some previous literature suggests that 
multiple directorship is favourable in the sense that it equips the directors with multiple 
skills, expertise and knowledge that could be beneficial to the company (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
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2006; Ferris et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2010); it increases a director’s competency in 
“networking” and consultancy, which is developed through handling multiple directorships 
in various companies (Voordeckers et al., 2008, p. 5; Ronen and Yaari, 2008, p. 256). 
According to Dhaliwal et al. (2010, p. 794), audit committees (with accounting expertise) 
and “multiple directorships may be more vigilant monitors if they are concerned about their 
reputational losses”. In favour of chairman directorship, Haniffa and Cooke (2002, p. 323) 
point out that; 
[W]hen a chairperson has cross-directorships, insight can be offered on disclosure of 
information based on experiences derived from personal knowledge of other companies. 
Furthermore, being the chairperson of the board enables influence to be exerted on certain 
issues, including disclosure of information in annual reports (p.323). 
 
Contrastingly, agency theory views multiple directorships as unfavourable (Zheng, 2008), 
given that it increases the burden of a director’s responsibilities and, thereby, impairs their 
monitoring function (Ahn et al., 2009; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Ferris et al., 2003; Song 
and Windram, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, audit committee members are expected to devote significant amounts of 
“time and effort” to attending audit committee meetings. They are unlikely to be effective if 
they are holding multiple directorships (Dhaliwal et al., 2010, p. 795). Moreover, multiple 
directorships also create incentives for interlocking relationships which might compromise 
board independence (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  
 
Prior literature offers a mixed view with regard to the predictive ability of multiple 
directorships for improving a firm’s disclosure. In their seminal work in the Belgian capital 
market, Voordeckers et al. (2008) document the positive link between multiple directorships 
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and a firm’s performance. Another seminal work by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
demonstrates that a director’s involvement in handling multiple firms leads to poor 
corporate governance; while Beasley (1996) reveals that high multiple directorships are 
associated with high levels of financial fraud. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) report a negative 
association between expert audit committees with multiple directorships and accruals 
quality. Haniffa and Cooke’s (2002) study find that multiple directorships for both directors 
and chairmen are insignificant in influencing voluntary disclosure in Malaysia. Therefore, 
due to these competing views, the present study expects that audit committee multiple 
directorship and chairman multiple directorship can have a positive or a negative 
relationship to disclosure quality. Thus, the next hypotheses are as follows: 
H2j: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive or negative relationship between audit 
committee multiple directorships (ACMULT) and disclosure quality.  
H2k: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive or negative relationship between chairman 
multiple directorships (CHAIRMULT) and disclosure quality.  
 
5.5.7 Non-executive chairman (CHAIRNONEXE) 
 
The variable of non-executive chairman (CHAIRNONEXE) is of interest, given that it has 
received considerable attention from regulators and prior literature in respect to reducing 
agency costs. From the regulatory point of view, having a non-executive chairman is more 
favourable than having an executive chairman. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), 
Paragraph A.3.1, stipulates that the chairman must be an independent director on the date 
of appointment. Within agency theory, the presence of a non-executive chairman might be 
viewed as more credible, especially when handling important matters such as “monitoring, 
disciplining and compensating senior managers” (Barako et al., 2006, p. 111). Non executive 
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chairmen are supposed to be more influential in enhancing the quality of a firm’s disclosure 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p. 339).106 Non-executive chairmen play an important role on 
boards by “ensuring the board activities are carried out with due diligence and information 
is provided to directors on a timely basis” (Brown et al., 2011, p. 113). In order to perform 
such roles, “the Higgs Report (Higgs, 2003) and the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (2003) recommend that the chairman is an independent nonexecutive director 
in order to minimise the possible abuse of CEO power” (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008, p. 
419).  
 
Given that non-executive chairmen are responsible for working closely with shareholders 
during shareholder’s meetings and listening to their opinions, and that they hold power 
during board meetings that discuss matters related to a firm’s disclosure policy as stated in 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), it is expected that the presence of a non-
executive chairman increases the quality of a firm’s disclosure.  
 
Prior literature offers mixed results with regard to the association between non-executive 
chairmen and disclosure quality. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) report that having a non-
executive chairman increases voluntary disclosure in Ireland, while Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) find a negative relationship between having a non-executive chairman and disclosure 
quality in the Malaysian context. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) further suggest that a non-
executive chairman’s independence might be affected if they are “making a private gain” 
                                                          
106
 Haniffa and Cooke (2002) rely on the argument for CEO/chairman duality when constructing their 
hypothesis for the non-executive chairman varable (p. 321). It is worth noting that, although non-executive 
chairman and CEO duality measure different aspects, they share the same construct to certain extent. A similar 
situation can also be observed in Donelly and Mulcahy (2008) which completely relies on the CEO Duality 
argument when developing a hypothesis for the chairman non-executive variable.  
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over the undisclosed information (p. 343). Based on the assumption in agency theory, this 
study hypothesises that:  
H2m: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between non-executive 
chairman (CHAIRNONEXE) and disclosure quality.  
 
5.5.8 Chairman tenure (CHAIRTEN) 
 
The role of chairman is viewed as vital in a firm’s governance system, given that it has 
received significant attention from the regulator. Several parts of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) highlight the responsibilities and provide guidelines for chairmen 
in carrying out their duties. In particular, Paragraph A.3 in the Main Principal part (The UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2010, p. 10) states that “the chairman is responsible for 
leadership of the board and ensuring its effectiveness on all aspects of its role”, while in the 
Supporting Principle part, it mentions that:  
The chairman is responsible for setting the board’s agenda and ensuring that adequate time 
is available for discussion of all agenda items, in particular strategic issues. The chairman 
should also promote a culture of openness and debate by facilitating the effective 
contribution of nonexecutive directors in particular and ensuring constructive relations 
between executive and non-executive directors. The chairman is responsible for ensuring 
that the directors receive accurate, timely and clear information. The chairman should 
ensure effective communication with shareholders.” (The UK Corporate Governance Code, 
2010, p. 10).  
 
In relation to a firm’s disclosure policy, Paragraph B.5 (p. 16) of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) states that: 
The chairman is responsible for ensuring that the directors receive accurate, timely and 
clear information. Management has an obligation to provide such information but directors 
should seek clarification or amplification where necessary (emphasis added). 
 
Under the direction of the chairman, the company secretary’s responsibilities include 
ensuring good information flows within the board and its committees and between senior 
management and nonexecutive directors, as well as facilitating induction and assisting with 
professional development as required. The company secretary should be responsible for 
advising the board through the chairman on all governance matters (emphasis added). 
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This implies that the role of the chairman is not only crucial to ensuring the effectiveness of 
the board meeting but also to ensuring that all directors receive relevant and sufficient 
information, adequate time and a platform to contribute ideas and knowledge during the 
exercising of their power. Correspondingly, chairman need to be equipped with expertise 
and experience that is relevant to the carrying out of their duties.  
 
According to prior literature, long chairman tenure can have both a positive and a negative 
impact. On the one hand, long tenure by chairman potentially increases their expertise, 
knowledge and experience, which subsequently improves the extent of a firm’s disclosure. 
According to Dhaliwal et al. (2010, p. 795), “if effective monitoring is an internally acquired 
skill, then accounting experts with greater tenure (length of service) are likely to offer more 
effective monitoring of financial reporting relative to those with lower tenure”. Ronen and 
Yaari (2008) point out that “tenure allows directors more familiarity with the firm’s normal 
business and resources, which facilitates their monitoring” (p. 258). Since an independent 
chairman is a representative of shareholders (Galbraith, 2009, p. 66), the chairman should 
be proactive in board meetings to encourage more response and opinion from the directors 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007), thus promoting higher quality in a firm’s disclosure 
policy. Chen et al. (2006) point out that if a chairman is only recently appointed to the 
board, he/she might not be very familiar with the firm’s operations and his/her ability to 
prevent fraud is, therefore, impaired. 
 
On the other hand, prior studies suggest that chairman independence might be 
compromised the position is held for a long period. Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007) find 
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that longer tenures improve the friendship between chairman and insider directors, 
enabling them to understand and respect each other and to work together in harmony for 
the success of the firm. This is in line with Beasley (1996) who maintains that longer outside 
director’s tenures build stronger managerial relationships. Taken together, a long and close 
relationship between a chairman and insider management might gradually impair chairman 
independence. This argument is echoed by Niskanen (2005) who believes that long director 
tenure in Enron is one of the factors that contributed to the firm’s failures. In a related vein, 
Schwenk (1993) conclude that long top management tenure is associated with lower firm 
performance as managers become less transparent about a firm’s “strengths and 
weaknesses” (p. 455). Goodwin et al. (2009) reveal that forecast error increases with the 
length of CEO tenure and they suggest that CEOs with longer tenures will be less careful in 
monitoring the accounting data. In addition, Chen et al. (2006, p. 432) argue that chairmen 
might become “over-confident” when they are dealing with fraud cases, due to long years of 
service in the company.107 
 
Using a multinational sample from the US, UK and Australia, Kakabadse and Kakabadse 
(2007) find that chairman tenure is positively related to firm performance. Moreover, Chen 
et al. (2006) find a negative relationship between the duration of chairman tenure and the 
number of fraud cases. The negative relationship between the duration of outside director’s 
tenure and financial statement fraud has also been documented by Beasley (1996) in his US 
study. Due to the mixed views on chairman tenure, the current study predicts that the 
relationship can either be positive or negative. As such, the next hypothesis is:  
                                                          
107
 Future research should consider the potential effects of non-linearity between chairman tenure and 
disclosure quality.  
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H2l: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive or negative relationship between chairman 
tenure (CHAIRTEN) and disclosure quality.  
 
5.5.9 Blockholders (SUBSHR) and number of blockholders (NOSUBSHR) 
 
As set out in the Disclosure Transparency Rules (DTR) 5.8.4 (Procedures for the notification 
and disclosure of major shareholdings), it is stated that firms should disclose the parties 
with 3% or more of a firm’s voting rights. Prior literature documents that blockholders can 
contribute both positively and negatively to disclosure quality. On the one hand, the 
presence of blockholders creates incentives to control and monitor managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour as well as to encourage and demand better disclosure. The power that 
blockholders have to demand better transparency is promising. In particular, they have the 
power to determine who will be elected onto the board (Ronen and Yaari, 2008); they have 
better access to a firm’s private information (Heflin and Shaw, 2000); they are effective in 
monitoring managers’ opportunistic behaviour (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997); they have the 
authority to replace managers that do not perform well according to the expectations of the 
larger shareholders (Andres, 2008, p. 432) and they increase a firm’s value (Seifert et al., 
2005). Moreover, “large investors have incentives to monitor the manager and, if necessary, 
intervene to correct value-destructive actions” (Edmans and Manso, 2011) and “shape the 
nature of corporate risk-taking activity” (Wright et al., 1996, p. 442). According to Farooque 
et al. (2010, p. 175), large shareholders can resolve moral hazard and free-rider problems, 
having outright control over firms and their management. They can internalise both the 
costs and benefits of monitoring. They have economic incentives and enough voting power 
to monitor effectively and to put pressure on, or even to oust, management through a proxy 
fight or a takeover.  
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Using 21 countries in Asia and Europe as sample, Attig et al. (2008) document that 
monitoring by substantial shareholders results in lower costs of capital and information 
asymmetry. Prior research has also proven that high concentrations of ownership increase a 
firm’s quality of earnings (e.g. Chung et al., 2005; Velury and Jenkins, 2006; Koh, 2003; 
Rajgopal et al., 1999). 
 
On the other hand, blockholders also have an incentive to exploit company resources via 
private benefits of control and risk aversion. Excessive monitoring by blockholders also has 
the potential to increase the agency cost. Boubaker and Labégorre (2008, p. 963) suggest 
that large shareholders will use their power and influence to shape and manipulate timing 
and disclosure patterns in order to protect “their private benefits extraction activities” from 
the outsider. Hence, the quality of information offered by these companies is basically low. 
Moreover, Wright et al. (1996), find that, in the presence of growth investment 
opportunities, insider blockholders with high ownership tend to be more risk averse than 
their counterparts. With these competing views, it is unclear how disclosure quality is 
influenced by blockholders.  
 
In addition, the extent of a blockholder’s monitoring effect is dependent on whether they 
are an insider or outsider in relation to a firm. Within agency theory, high managerial 
ownership is expected to reduce the misalignment of interest between agent and principal 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wright et al., 1996). Managers with significant shareholdings 
are expected to improve disclosure quality, given that they are in a position of better access 
to internal information and that they are presumed to act on behalf of the shareholders. 
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Alternatively, although inside managers hold large ownership in firms, they may also have 
incentives to make decisions that advance their career or result in other personal benefits 
(Wright et al., 1996).108 With regard to external blockholders, as previously discussed, their 
presence is expected to be beneficial in terms of monitoring managers’ behaviour (Edmans 
and Manso, 2011), but incentives to exploit company resources may also be present 
(Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008).  
 
Khurshed et al. (2011) find that institutional blockholders and director’s ownership are 
substitutive to each other. Heflin and Shaw’s (2000) US study, however, documents that 
both internal and external blockholders are effective in reducing information asymmetry 
and market liquidity in a firm, thus suggesting that blockholders, regardless of type, have 
the effect of improving disclosure quality.109 The present study relies on Heflin and Shaw’s 
(2000) findings and considers that both inside and outside blockholders are potentially 
influential in enhancing the extent of disclosure quality. 110 
 
Empirical findings reveal mixed results. Goodwin et al. (2009) document a negative 
association between external blockholders and forecast error. Eng and Mak (2003) report 
that blockholder ownership is statistically insignificant in influencing voluntary disclosure. 
                                                          
108
 Wright et al. (1996, p. 443) discuss that ”when corporate insiders lack appropriate incentives, they may 
reduce corporate risk taking in order to lower the personal costs of such decisions. Included among these costs 
would be the potential loss of employment, the extra effort required to master new technologies or manage 
new ventures and the anxieties inherent in higher-risk corporate undertakings”.  
109
 The present study realizes that Tribo et al. (2007) report mixed results on the relationship between 
blockholder types and R&D investment. In their study, blockholders are categorised into financial companies, 
non-financial companies and individuals. Other studies that concentrate on institutional shareholders include 
Wright et al. (1996), Wahal and McConnell (2000) and Chung et al. (2003). Due to the limited timeframe and 
lack of proper data, the present study intends to focus on the blockholders ownership and the number of 
blockholders per se, while acknowledging that the impact of other shareholder types on disclosure quality is a 
very interesting topic for future research.  
110
 The present study believes that future research should consider the potential effect of both inside and 
outside blockholders.  
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However, Heflin and Shaw (2000) demonstrate that blockholders, in general, are effective in 
reducing information asymmetry.  
 
Beside the percentages of blockholder’s ownership, the number of blockholders in a firm 
also has important implications for effective monitoring. From the point of view of classical 
theory, it is assumed that single large blockholders function better than multiple 
blockholders in monitoring and controlling managers’ opportunistic behaviour (Edmans and 
Manso, 2011, p. 2). Edmans and Manso (2011, p. 2) also claim that “a large number of small 
blockholders invites a free-rider problem and each of them are not able to bear high cost of 
monitoring by their own”. In support of this view, Tribo et al. (2007) find an inverse 
relationship between the number of blockholders and research and development (R&D) 
investment, hence suggesting that lower numbers of block holders are more likely to take 
risks in R&D investment.  
 
Multiple blockholders could also exercise better monitoring. Prior literature reveals that 
having multiple blockholders increases a firms performance (Gallagher et al., 2010), 
improves liquidity (Bharath et al., 2010) and increases blockholder effectiveness by 
competing on trading (Edmans and Manso, 2011). Correspondingly, they claim that 
“multiple blockholders therefore serve as a commitment device to reward or punish the 
manager ex post for his actions” (Edmans and Manso, 2011, p. 2). This suggests that 
cooperation among blockholders leads to more effective in monitoring of managers’ 
behaviour.  
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The present study argues that blockholders ownership alone might not be a good 
monitoring mechanism, because high blockholder ownership will be seen as less credible as 
a monitoring tool when the ownership is circulated among few hands. Similarly, the 
exploitation of a firm’s resources could be more pronounced when it is conducted by one 
large blockholder. Blockholder ownership and the number of blockholders are expected to 
go hand in hand in hand, influencing disclosure quality in a complimentary way. Thus, the 
next hypotheses are:  
H2n: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive or negative relationship between 
blockholders ownership (SUBSHR) and the extent of disclosure quality.  
H2o: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive or negative relationship between number of 
blockholders (NOSUBSHR) and the extent of disclosure quality.  
 
5.5.10 Simultaneity between disclosure quality and board independence 
 
With regard to the association between board independence and disclosure quality, the 
majority of prior literature hypothesises that a higher percentage of independent directors 
is associated with better disclosure (e.g. Kent and Stewart, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010). 
Nonetheless, this assumption does not work in all circumstances. Reverse causality might 
occur when independent directors are attracted to join firms with sound disclosure quality 
because it implies that those firms are strong, healthy and less problematic. Moreover, 
Armstrong et al. (2010) point out that outside directors are able to provide better 
monitoring in a high disclosure environment where they can perform their duty equipped 
with relevant and timely information. They also argue that independent directors (i.e., 
outsiders with less informational advantage) are not able to work effectively in firms with 
low quality of information. Thus, causality can either run from independent directors to 
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disclosure quality or from disclosure quality to independent directors. In the light of above 
discussion, the present study hypothesises that: 
H2p: There is an interaction relationship between board independent (BODIND) and 
disclosure quality.  
 
5.6 Research methodology 
 
5.6.1 Sample, year and measurement for disclosure quality 
 
Information related to the sample selection process, years of observation and measurement 
for disclosure quality is similar to that explained in Chapter Three (refer to the Research 
methodology section). For the sake of brevity, the same discussion will not be presented 
here.  
 
5.6.2 Corporate governance measurements  
  
5.6.2.1 AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS 
Audit committee effectiveness, namely ACQUALITY and ACQUALITYBR are composite 
measures based upon specific regulatory recommendations. ACQUALITY was coded as “1” if 
all the following criteria are met: (i) the audit committee is comprised of at least 3 members 
(ii); the committee meets at least 3 times a year (iii); the committee is entirely comprised of 
independent directors and (iv) the committee includes at least 1 member with financial 
expertise. A code of “0” was allocated if otherwise. This is in accordance with the Smith 
Report (2003) recommendations. ACQUALITYBR shares similar criteria as ACQUALITY except 
that the number of audit committee meetings must be at least 4 times a year, following the 
US Blue Ribbon Recommendation (1999). These measures have been used by prior studies, 
including Zaman et al. (2011).  
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The audit committee multiple directorship variable was calculated by dividing the total 
directorship by all audit committee members with the number of audit committee members 
in a firm, following Razman and Iskandar (2002). This information was obtained by manually 
reading the directors profiles in the annual report. With regard to other audit committee 
characteristics, such as audit committee size, audit committee meeting frequency, audit 
committee independence and audit committee expertise, the measurements were 
consistent with the data used in Project One (refer to Chapter Three).  
5.6.2.2 BOARD CHARACTERISTICS 
Board related variables such as board independence, board meeting frequency and board 
size were measured in a similar way to the data used in the first project (refer to Chapter 
Three).  
5.6.2.3 CHAIRMAN CHARACTERISTICS 
In accordance with the recommendations in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), the 
dichotomous method was employed to code whether the Chairman is an executive (0) or 
non-executive (1) at the date of appointment as chairman. 111 Following Chen et al., (2006), 
chairman tenure was calculated based on the number of years the chairman had held that 
position in a given company. The chairman data for multiple directorships was based on the 
                                                          
111
 Chairman and audit committee multiple directorships are of interest in the current study for the following 
reasons: (a) the chairman is viewed as a key role in corporate governance by the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2010); (b) the audit committee is one of the main committees in a firm that are entrusted with handling 
issues related to financial and disclosure transparency; (c) chairmen (on the date of appointment) and audit 
committees are supposed to be comprised of independent non-executive directors, as suggested by the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010). Hence, it is wise to focus on multiple directorships of independent 
directors rather than non-independent directors. Non-independent directors are subject to certain limitations 
of directorship in Paragraph B.3.3, which states that executive directors are restricted to have no more than 
one directorship in other FTSE100 companies.  
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number of directorships held by each chairman in other companies. All the chairman related 
data was collected from the chairman’s profiles in the annual report.  
5.6.2.4 BLOCKHOLDERS 
In the UK, it is compulsory for the firms to disclose the percentage of ownership held by 
significant blockholders (3% and above) in the annual report. Large blockholders are 
presumed to be able to monitor and correct managers’ opportunistic behaviour (Edmans 
and Manso, 2011). In addition, the number of blockholders is important in the monitoring of 
firms, given that higher numbers of blockholders might be able to carry out monitoring roles 
more effectively than their counterparts. Following Marston (2008), the total percentage of 
shareholders ownership with 3% and more shareholdings (NOSUBSHR) has been used as a 
proxy for significant shareholdings. As well as using the 3% and above criterion for 
determining large shareholders, as in the studies by Renneboog (2000) and Thomsen et al. 
(2006), the present study also used the percentage of substantial shareholders ownership 
with 5% and more shareholdings (5%SUBSHR). The 5%SUBSHR was employed in the 
sensitivity analysis section.  
 
5.6.3 Control variables 
 
In determining the relationship between corporate governance and disclosure quality, 
several control variables were used: the firm size, leverage, profitability, growth, audit 
quality, analyst following and firm-level risk, as well as year and industry dummies. Prior 
studies confirm that the level of disclosure quality is highly associated with the firm’s 
characteristics (e.g. Hossein et al, 1995; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; 
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McNally et al., 1982; Wallace et al., 1999; Inchausti, 1997; Cooke, 1989; Raffournier, 1995; 
Cooke, 1992).  
5.6.3.1 FIRM SIZE (MCAP) 
Firm specific characteristics, like firm size, have the potential to increase managers’ 
incentives to provide a high quality of disclosure. Through the lens of agency theory, Watson 
et al. (2002, p. 297) extend Buzby’s (1975) argument that high public scrutiny motivates 
large firms to reveal higher quality information, which subsequently reduces agency cost. 
Large firms have a greater tendency to provide better disclosure transparency than small 
firms because they have more cash and resources (Buzby, 1975), they are in need of more 
external capital to attract potential investors (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008, p. 420; Choi, 
1973), they are subject more rigorous public and regulatory scrutiny (Camfferman and 
Cooke, 2002; Wallace and Naser, 1995; McNally et al., 1982) and they are supposed to 
collect more information for internal use. Hence, there is a reduced the cost for large firms 
to provide a higher quality of public disclosure (Raffournier, 1995). In addition, due to the 
greater number and diversity of a large firm’s projects and operations, they “have more 
demand for information” (Lehn et al. 2009, p. 750).  
 
Prior literature consistently reports a positive link between firm size and disclosure quality 
(e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain et al., 1994; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Inchausti, 
1997). Prior studies that control for firm size in their regression models include Beekes and 
Brown (2006), Nelson et al. (2010) and Goodwin et al. (2009). Hence, the present study 
expects that a positive relationship exists between firm size and disclosure quality. 
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In measuring firm size, the natural log of market capitalisation (LMCAP) is favourable 
because total assets have been used as one of the criteria in the selection of the control 
sample. Consistent with prior literature on disclosure quality (e.g. Wallace and Naser, 1995; 
Hossain et al., 1994) the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (LMCAP) was used as a 
proxy for size.  
 
5.6.3.2 PROFITABILITY (ROA) 
Prior studies recognise that profitability potentially creates incentives for managers to 
provide more disclosure (e.g. Nelson et al., 2010; Debreceny and Rahman, 2005; Watson et 
al., 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Managers in highly profitable firms are encouraged to 
provide better disclosure, given that profitable firms have more information to disclose 
about the projects they are involved in (Li et al., 2008). Higher levels of disclosure also signal 
that a firm is performing well and may, therefore, influence managers’ remuneration and 
future career in a positive way (Singhvi and Desai, 1971).  
 
Previous literature offers inconclusive findings on the associations between profitability and 
disclosure. While some studies report a positive relationship (e.g. Watson et al., 2002; 
Debreceny and Rahman, 2005; Singhvi and Desai, 1971), other studies recorded insignificant 
relationships (e.g. Inchausti, 1997; Wallace et al., 1999). As in Eng and Mak’s (2003) study, 
profitability was measured by dividing net profit with total assets (Return on Assets), and 
this data was downloaded from the DataStream database.  
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5.6.3.3 AUDIT QUALITY (BIG4) 
Agency theory views auditors as one of the monitoring agents that play a role in achieving 
greater disclosure quality (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Credible external auditors are 
supposed to carry out sound audit processes and to provide relevant advice, which will 
influence managers to be more transparent. Reputable external auditors are supposed to be 
more resourceful, to have expertise in accounting and auditing standards, and to have more 
experience in handling audit work. As such, large audit firms are more competent in 
consulting their clients and providing higher quality information in their annual report 
(Wallace et al., 1994). The appointment of a large audit firm as an external auditor is also an 
indication of sound corporate governance (Cohen et al., 2002). Numerous studies control 
for audit quality when examining the association between corporate governance and 
disclosure quality (e.g. Ajinkya et al., 2005; Bassett et al., 2007; Nelson et al., 2010; Goodwin 
et al., 2009; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Several studies document a positive association 
between audit quality and disclosure quality (e.g. Inchausti, 1997; Raffournier, 1995). As a 
result, the current study predicts a positive link between audit quality and disclosure quality. 
Consistent with Lim et al. (2007), Carcello et al. (2006) and Frye and Wang (2010), a dummy 
was used in measuring audit quality (where Big 4 audit firms = 1, Non-big 4 audit firms = 0).  
5.6.3.4 ANALYST FOLLOWING (ANALYST) 
Agency theory views analysts as one of the monitoring tools that help to reduce agency cost 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this regard, Yu (2008) argues that analysts motivate firms to 
supply accurate information to users. As such, monitoring by financial analysts has the 
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potential to influence managers to provide better quality disclosure. 112Moreover, Langberg 
and Sivaramakrishnan (2010, p. 604) note that “analysts’ expertise and experience make 
them a valuable source of information for managers”. In addition, Baginski and Hassell 
(1997) report that monitoring by financial analysts increases the accuracy of management 
earnings forecasts.  
 
In support of this view, Marston (2008) documents that high analyst following is positively 
associated with higher investor relation activities by the UK firms. Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) report a positive link between analyst following and disclosure quality, while Lang 
and Marfett (2011) employ analyst following as a proxy for a firm’s disclosure quality 
environment. Nonetheless, Chang et al. (2008) report a significant inverse relationship 
between analyst following and investor relations activities. Studies that consider analyst 
following as one of the determinants for disclosure quality include Chang et al. (2008), Lang 
and Lundholm (1993), Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Beekes and Brown (2006). Analyst following 
was measured using the number of analysts that follows each firm, and this is similar to the 
approach taken by Eng and Mak (2003) and Chang et al., (2008).  
5.6.3.5 LEVERAGE (LEV) 
Leverage could either induce or reduce incentives for managerial disclosure decisions. On 
the one hand, agency conflict is likely to occur in high leverage firms (e.g. Tsuji, 2011; Dey, 
                                                          
112
 The present study acknowledges that there is a potential reverse causality issue in association between 
disclosure and analyst variables. Langberg and Sivaramakrishnan (2010), Lang et al. (2004) and Boubaker and 
Labogerre (2008) discuss this issue, whereby a firm’s disclosure policy determines the number of analysts 
following, given that (i) analysts largely depend on the information supplied by the management to make 
forecasts and analysis and (ii) they tend to uncover firms with a high concentration of ownership, where the 
blockholders have a lot of power. One of the possible solutions to this reverse causality issue is to use a 
simultaneous system of equation. Nonetheless, due to the limited timeframe and lack of proper data, such a 
test will not be performed. Nonetheless, this would be an interesting topic for future research.    
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2008; Leftwich et al., 1981). Agency theory holds that the agency cost in high leverage firms 
will be higher than in low leverage firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The debt hypothesis 
of positive accounting theory suggests that high leverage firms tend to make income-
increasing accounting choices in order to mitigate the high leverage in the eyes of 
shareholders (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In addition, Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) 
report that firms with high leverage are more likely to manipulate earnings in order to avoid 
debt violation cost. Taken together, these models suggest that high leverage potentially 
increases agency cost and, thereby, reduces the quality of a firm’s disclosure.  
 
On the other hand, leverage could also be a useful tool to discipline managers (Brown et al., 
2011). Creditors are very concerned if they cannot get back what they have lent because 
managers have failed to spend their money wisely (Armstrong et al., 2010, p. 182). High 
leverage can limit managerial opportunistic behaviours such as investment in projects with 
high uncertainty (Myers, 1977) or empire building activities (Hope and Thomas, 2008), 
because firms have to use their cash to cover the debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Moreover, firms with high leverage tend to produce higher quality information in order to 
mitigate their condition in the eyes of their creditors (Wallace and Naser, 1995). Dey (2008) 
finds that high leverage positively influences a firm’s governance system.  
 
Numerous empirical studies have hypothesised that leverage is one of the factors that will 
influence disclosure quality (e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Ahmad and Courtis, 1999; 
Raffournier, 1995; Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995). 
Nevertheless, mixed findings are reported. The present study argues that leverage could 
have either a positive or a negative effect on disclosure quality. Consistent with Dey (2008), 
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leverage was measured, in this study, using the debt to asset ratio (long term debt divided 
by total assets). Prior studies that recognise leverage as one of the determinants of 
disclosure include Nelson et al. (2010), Eng and Mak (2003), Hossain et al. (1995), 
Raffournier et al. (1995) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002).  
5.6.3.6 EARNINGS VARIABILITY (EARNVAR) 
Earnings variability is a proxy for “firm level risk” (Farooque et al., 2010, p. 180). It measures 
the volatility of a firm’s operating income (Kent et al., 2010) or of a “firm’s operating 
environment and business model” (Francis et al., 2005, p. 297). According to Engel et al. 
(2010, p. 139), “the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process is high when a 
firm has complex business operations and is subject to great risk of financial misstatement.” 
Dey (2008) reports that high operating risk increases the effectiveness of a firm’s 
governance. Hence, the present study presumes that there is a positive link between 
earnings variability and disclosure quality. Consistent with Farooque et al. (2005, 2010), it 
was measured using the standard deviation of the operating income scaled by sales. This 
approach is also closely similar to that taken by Kent et al. (2010) who use the standard 
deviation of operating revenue divided by lagged total assets.  
5.6.3.7 INDUSTRY AND YEAR EFFECTS 
Boone et al. (2007) claim that controlling for industry effects is able to cater for the 
heterogeneity factor, given that each industry shares “similar production technology and 
market conditions” (p. 76). Moreover, firms have a tendency to follow their peers when 
they are contemplating a disclosure decision. Hence, industry level information significantly 
influences a firm’s disclosure environment (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). In addition, 
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Legitimacy Theory suggests that high political, public or regulatory pressures, and scrutiny 
over the firms in certain industries, can also increase or decrease incentives for disclosure 
between different industries. For example, Tilt and Symes (1999) reveal that firms in the 
mining and chemical industry are more thorough in environmental disclosure when 
compared to other industries, while Tilling and Tilt (2010) report that Rothmans increased 
corporate social responsibility disclosure acts as a defensive wall against attacks from the 
media regarding health. Highly regulated industries such as oil and gas (Whittred and 
Zimmer, 1990) and banking are presumed to provide better disclosure patterns than firms in 
less regulated industries. The pharmaceutical industry tends to manipulate their financial 
disclosure due to political pressure from governments to reduce the cost of medicine 
(Meyer et al., 2000). Therefore, in the current study, industry variation was captured using 
industry dummies, as in Beekes and Brown et al. (2006), Goodwin et al. (2009) and Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002). To control for the variation of year effects, a year dummy was also 
introduced in the model, as in Nelson et al. (2010) and Zaman et al. (2011).  
 
 
5.6.4 Model presentation 
 
DQ = BODIND + BODSIZE + BODMEET + ACSIZE + ACMEET + ACIND + ACEXP + ACMULT + 
CHAIRTEN + CHAIRMULT + CHAIRNONEXE + SUBSHR + NOSUBSHR + ROA + DTA + BIG4 + 
ANALYST + EARNVAR + LMCAP + 2007 DUMMIES + 2006 DUMMIES + 2005 DUMMIES + OIL 
& GAS + CONSUMERGOODS + CONSUMERSERVICES + HEALTHCARE + 
TELECOMMUNICATION + UTILITIES + TECHNOLOGY----- [equation 2] 
 
5.6.4.1 Simultaneity between disclosure quality and board independence 
 
Assuming that simultaneity exists between corporate governance and disclosure quality, the 
present study employs a simultaneous system of equation based on the 2SLS regression. In 
this instance, disclosure quality and board independence are assumed to be endogenous, as 
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in Lim et al. (2007) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006). Disclosure quality and board 
independence (BODIND) equations are presented below: 
 
DQ = BODIND + BODSIZE + BODMEET + ACSIZE + ACMEET + ACIND + ACEXP + 
ACMULT + CHAIRTEN + CHAIRMULT + CHAIRNONEXE + SUBSHR + NOSUBSHR + ROA 
+ DTA + BIG4 + ANALYST + EARNVAR + LMCAP + 2007 DUMMIES + 2006 DUMMIES + 
2005 DUMMIES + OIL & GAS + CONSUMER GOODS + CONSUMER SERVICES + 
HEALTHCARE + TELECOMMUNICATION + UTILITIES + TECHNOLOGY + e ----- [equation 
2a].  
 
BODIND = DQ + BODSIZE + BODSHR + NOSUBSHR + SUBSHR + LREM + LMCAP + DTA 
+ ROA + MTBV + PROFVAR + 2007 DUMMIES + 2006 DUMMIES + 2005 DUMMIES + 
OIL & GAS + CONSUMER GOODS + CONSUMER SERVICES + HEALTHCARE + 
TELECOMMUNICATION + UTILITIES + TECHNOLOGY + e ----- [equation 2b].  
 
Where: 
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Table 5-1: Measurement for the disclosure quality equation 
 
Disclosure Quality Equation 
DISQ = Disclosure Award (1=Winner, 0=non-winner); Forward Looking Score 
ACQUALITY = 1 [if ACSIZE =/> 3, ACIND=1, ACEXP=/>1 and ACMEET=/>3], 0 
otherwise 
ACQUALITYBR = 1 [if ACSIZE=/>3, ACIND=1, ACEXP=/>1 and ACMEET=/>4], 0 otherwise 
ACMEET = Audit committee meetings [1 = if audit committee meetings =>3, 0 = if 
otherwise] 
ACIND = Audit committee independence [1 = if all audit committee members 
are independent, 0 = if otherwise] 
ACEXP = Audit committee members with expertise [1 = if audit committee 
members with financial literacy is =/> 1, 0 = if otherwise] 
ACMULT = Average of additional directorships held by audit committee members 
ACSIZE = Number of audit committee member [1 = if audit committee 
members =/>3, 0 = if otherwise] 
BODSIZE = Number of board members 
BODMEET= Number of board meetings held during the year 
BODIND = Percentage of independent directors on the board [excluding 
chairman] 
CHAIRNONEXE= Status of the board chair [1 = non-executive, 0 = executive] 
CHAIRTEN = Number of years the chair has held the chair position  
CHAIRMULT = Number of additional directorships held by board chair 
SUBSHR = Total percentage of shares held by substantial (i.e. 3%/+) shareholders  
NOSUBSHR = Number of substantial shareholders (i.e. 3%/+) in a firm 
EARNVAR= Standard deviation of return on sales 
ROA = Return on assets 
LEV = Debt to asset ratio 
ANALYST = Number of analysts following 
SIZE = Natural log of market capitalisation 
BIG4 = Auditor a Big4 firm [Big4=1, Non-Big4=0] 
MTBV = Market to book value ratio  
YEAR = Year dummies 
INDUSTRY = Industry dummies 
ε = Error term  
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Table 5-2: Measurement for the board independence equation 
 
Board Independence Equation 
DISQ = Disclosure Award [1 = Winner, 0 = non-winner]; Forward Looking 
Score; Analyst forecast accuracy.  
BODSIZE = Number of board members  
BODIND = Percentage of independent directors on the board (excluding the 
chairman). 
BODSHR = Percentage of ordinary shares held by board members 
LREM = Log of total director’s remuneration  
PROFVAR = Standard deviation of return on asset.   
SUBSHR = Total percentage of shares held by substantial (i.e. 3%/+) shareholders  
NOSUBSHR = Number of substantial shareholders (i.e. 3%/+) in a firm 
ROA = Return on assets 
DTA = Debt to asset ratio 
ANALYST = Number of analyst following 
LMCAP = Natural log of market capitalisation 
BIG4 = Auditor a Big4 firm (Big4 = 1, Non-Big4 = 0) 
MTBV = Market to book value ratio  
YEAR = Year dummies  
INDUSTRY = Industry dummies  
ε = Error term  
 
 
It is worth noting that the disclosure quality equation 2a (above) is identical to equation 2. 
The BODIND equation is a new equation introduced into this system of equation, and it was 
constructed based on arguments and findings in the prior literature. Consistent with Lim et 
al. (2007) BODSIZE is controlled in the BODIND model because increases in the number of 
board members will potentially increase or decrease the percentage of independent 
directors serving in the board.  
 
Relying on the proposition that audit committee ownership increases audit committee 
independence (Magena and Pike, 2005), board ownership (BODSHR) is expected to 
encourage managers to be more independent. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find that board 
ownership can be a good trigger to improving a firm’s overall governance system. 
Specifically, they claim that: 
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Corporate boards have the power to make, or at least ratify, all important decisions including 
decisions about investment policy, management compensation policy, and board governance 
itself. It is plausible that board members with appropriate stock ownership will have the 
incentive to provide effective monitoring and oversight of important corporate decisions 
noted above; hence board ownership can be a good proxy for overall good governance” (p. 
271).  
 
Thus the present study assumes that BODSHR could potentially improve BODIND. Consistent 
with Farooque et al. (2005), BODSHR was measured using the total percentage of ordinary 
shares held by the directors. Monitoring by blockholders (SUBSHR and NOSUBSHR) may also 
influence the percentage of independent directors on the board (BODIND). Bhagat and Black 
(2002) find a positive association between the number of blockholders and board 
independence, suggesting that monitoring by a high number of blockholders increases the 
percentage of independent directors on board.   
 
“According to agency theory, the aim of compensation contracts is to reward managers in 
such a way that they strive to maximise firm performance and shareholder’s wealth” 
(Doucouliagos et al., 2007, p. 1364). Doucouliagos et al. (2007) further argue that 
compensation “should be based on the observable outcomes and that contract should be 
designed to motivate the agents’ best performance” (p. 1365). As such, compensation 
contracts are one of the monitoring tools that reflect a board’s independence in their 
decision making. It is supposed that board independence increases with remuneration. The 
present study controlled for director’s remuneration (LREM), measured using the natural log 
of total director’s remuneration, following Doucouliagos et al. (2007). PROFVAR, which is a 
proxy for firm-specific business risk is also included in the model. According to Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), monitoring in highly volatile firms is hard and this creates a risk of the moral 
hazard problem. It is argued that a high volatility of income (as a proxy for a firm’s level of 
risk) could reduce board independence, given that such a situation is likely to induce agency 
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conflict. In this study, PROFVAR was measured using the standard deviation of net income 
divided by total assets.  
 
Firm size is also one of the potential determinants for BODIND, given that large firms can 
more easily afford to appoint a greater number of independent directors than small firms. 
Moreover, the complexities of business operation in large firms increase the necessity for 
more independent directors with a variety of knowledge and experience (Linck et al., 2008). 
Large firms are also involved in more diverse business operations than small firms (Lehn et 
al., 2009) and they therefore require more members on the board for the purposes of 
monitoring, supervising and consulting. Boone et al. (2007) propose that large firms need 
more independent directors because they are exposed more to agency problems in 
comparison to small firms. Firm size is measured using the natural log of market 
capitalisation (LMCAP). Bhagat and Black (2002) report a significant positive association 
between firm size and the presence of independent directors. High leverage (DTA) in a firm 
has potential to restrict the appointment of independent directors to the board (BODIND) 
due to a lack of cash. The percentage of independent directors on the board (BODIND) can 
also be influenced by the profitability of the firms (ROA), where more profitable firms can 
afford to employ more independent directors on the board.113  
 
According to Lehn et al. (2009, p. 750):  
Firms with higher growth opportunities generally require nimbler governance structures. 
Since these firms tend to operate in more volatile business environments than low-growth 
firms, they require governance structures that facilitate rapid decision making and 
redeployment of assets. By more volatile business environments, we refer to markets 
                                                          
113
 The potential for reverse causality between firm performance and independent directors is acknowledged, 
where the presence of independent directors on a board also has potential for increasing a firm’s 
performance. This issue is taken into account in Project Three, which deals with the co-determination between 
disclosure quality, earnings management, board independence and corporate performance.  
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characterized by frequent technological change, unstable market shares, rapidly changing 
relative prices, and so forth.  
 
Therefore, growth is viewed as one of the important determinants of board independence. 
Bhagat and Black (2002) find a significant positive link between a firm’s growth and board 
independence, while Lehn et al. (2009) report a significant inverse relationship between 
growth opportunity and board characteristics (i.e., board size). Coles et al. (2008) find a 
similar result to Lehn et al. (2009), by using market to book value ratio as a growth proxy. 
These findings indicate that a firm’s growth may have an influence on board independence. 
Therefore, the present study employed Market-to-book value ratio as a proxy for future 
market expectation growth. This approach is similar to that taken by Coles et al. (2008), 
Debreceny and Rahman, (2005), Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Marston (2008). 
 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1999) report a significant link between industry type and board 
composition. Year and industry effects were controlled using dummies, after Beekes and 
Brown (2006), Nelson et al. (2010) and Goodwin et al. (2009). Boone et al. (2007, p.76) 
suggest that firms in the same industry share “similar production technologies and market 
condition”. Therefore, the unobserved industry effects can be controlled using industry 
dummies.  
 
In order to run 2SLS regression, this present study employed an instrumental variable for 
each endogenous variable, consistent with Cornett et al. (2009). Two general assumptions 
of the instrumental variable are (i) it is correlated with the endogenous variable (ii) it is not 
correlated with error term (Cornett et al. 2009). When disclosure quality is treated as 
endogenous, firm size (LMCAP) has been chosen as an instrumental variable. Firm size found 
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to be strongly correlated to disclosure quality hence fit to the general assumption of a 
sound instrumental variable. 114 Large firms tend to disclose more because they have more 
cash and resources (Buzby, 1975), are in need of external capital (Donelly and Mulcahy, 
2008) and subject to public scrutiny (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). When board 
independent (BODIND) is treated as endogenous variable, BODSIZE is used as instrumental 
variable BODIND given that the increase or decrease of BODIND depends on the BODSIZE 
(Lim et al. 2007). 115 
 
5.6.5 Data and statistical analyses 
 
Several pieces of missing data are acknowledged (there are less than five overall) for 
corporate governance variables (e.g. duration of chairman tenure and audit committee 
multiple directorships). In this case, the missing data was replaced by the mean of the valid 
data, as suggested by Hair et al. (2006). 116 
 
Before the regression test is conducted, for the normality of the data were checked using 
the Shapiro-Wilk test and the Shapiro-Francia test.117. The linearity is observed using the Q-
Q Plot, and linear relationships is found in most of our variables. The Variance Inflation 
factor (VIF) and we concluded that multicollinearity is not an issue, given that the maximum 
                                                          
114
 The correlation coefficient between LNMCAP and IRAWARD, FLSCORE and AFA are 41%, 40% and 19% 
respectively.  
115
 In the regression analysis, the t-value for both instrumental variables (i.e., LNMCAP and BODSIZE) are 
generally more than 3, which indicates a valid instrumental variable, according to Adkins and Hill (2007).  
116
 The present study retains a few companies with missing data by replacing the missing value with the mean 
of the valid data, as suggested by Hair et al. (2008). The missing value cases are random and only affect a few 
firms (i.e., overall, less than 5 have missing data). The option of deleting firms with missing data was not 
chosen, to avoid sample reduction.  
117
 The present study found that the value of “w” in most of the data is around 0.9, which indicates normality. 
However, we acknowledge that some of the data is not normally distributed. Firm size (LMCAP) is transformed 
to natural log to normalise the data and all continuous variables were winsorized at 1% top and bottom to 
reduce the effect of outliers, as in Cornett et al. (2009).  
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VIF is below 4, in the case of firm size (SIZE)118. The Breush-Pagan test and the White test 
were performed to check for heteroskedasticity and we noted that the heteroskedasticity is 
mild, given that the result for both test contradict each other. We corrected 
heteroskedasticity using robust standard error in all of our models (except in Logistic 
regression). We also performed a similar analysis to the residual in our data (refer to the 
Appendix 2). We found that our residual is normally distributed and largely fit for the 
parametric test, thus it is assumed that parametric test is suitable for our data. 
 
  
                                                          
118
 Although Allison (1999) notes that a VIF of more than 2.5 is critical especially in the case of logistic 
regression, we argue that the exclusion of firm size (SIZE) will introduce misspecification bias which is a 
relatively more serious issue than multicollinearity. Therefore firm size (LMCAP) is to be retained in our model.  
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6 Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality: Results 
and Discussion 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the results from a series of tests including descriptive statistics, pairwise 
correlation, the univariate test and the multivariate test will be presented. The findings will 
also be explained. Finally, the conclusion will summarise the findings of the project.119 
  
6.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 6-1 presents the descriptive statistics for disclosure quality, such as FLSCORE, 
IRAWARD, and AFA as well as the variables for governance and firm-characteristics.120 The 
descriptive statistics show that the mean (median) of FLSCORE is 99.16 (87) with a range 
from 9 to 423. In this study, the high forward looking disclosure indicates that the extent of 
forward looking disclosure has substantially increased over time. Given that the IRAWARD 
variable is dichotomous (1 = winner, 0 = non-winner), the mean is 0.5. The mean (median) 
for AFA is recorded at -0.0112 (-0.0053).  
 
                                                          
119
 Some explanation of the descriptive statistics, Pairwise correlation, t-test and Mann-Whitney U test has 
been provided in Chapter Four, namely in respect to disclosure quality, corporate governance and earnings 
management: Results and discussions. To avoid repetition, only a brief explanation is provided in this section.  
120
 Given the limited number of words allowed in the present study, in this chapter variables will be referred to 
using their respective abbreviations.  
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Table 6-1: Descriptive statistics121 
 
VARIABLES MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX 25%PCTILE 50% PCTILE 75% PCTILE 
FLSCORE 99.16 64.95 9 423 55 87 130 
IRAWARD 0.5 0.5 0 1 0 0.5 1 
AFA -0.0112 0.0181 -0.123 -0.00002 -0.0123 -0.0053 -0.00213 
ACQUALITY 0.779 0.415 0 1 1 1 1 
ACQUALITYBR 0.565 0.496 0 1 0 1 1 
ACIND 0.896 0.305 0 1 1 1 1 
ACEXP 0.9068 0.2911 0 1 1 1 1 
ACMEET 0.9517 0.214 0 1 1 1 1 
ACSIZE 0.9517 0.214 0 1 1 1 1 
ACINDA 97.06 8.854 66.66 100 100 100 100 
ACEXPA 35.82 19.32 0 100 25 33.33 50 
ACSIZEA 3.62 0.924 2 6 3 3 4 
ACMEETA 4.312 1.856 2 13 3 4 5 
ACMULT 2.378 1.15 0.3 6.3 1.6 2.3 3 
BODSIZE 9.49 2.67 5 18 8 9 11 
BODSIZEA 0.448 0.498 0 1 0 0 1 
BODIND 56.86 10.345 33.33 80 50 57.14 63.63 
BODINDA 0.848 0.359 0 1 1 1 1 
BODMEET 8.710 2.921 4 21 7 8 10 
BODMEETA 0.458 0.499 0 1 0 0 1 
CHAIRNONEXE 0.862 0.345 0 1 1 1 1 
CHAIRTEN 5.82 5.91 1 34 2 4 7 
CHAIRMULT 2.35 1.804 0 8 1 2 3 
SUBSHR 30.72 16.33 37 77.17 18.95 29.13 40.27 
NOSUBSHR 4.78 2.166 1 11 3 5 6 
PROFIT 7.21 6.64 -17.72 32.87 3.61 6.8 10.2 
LEV 24.745 15.292 0.05 74.14 15.5 22.55 31.28 
                                                          
121
 All continuous variables (except SIZE) were winsorised at the top and bottom 1%. The descriptive statistics for year and industry dummies are not reported.  
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ANALYST 14.32 7.57 0 37 9.92 13.29 19 
BIG4 0.968 0.174 0 1 1 1 1 
GROWTH 3.74 6.12 -44.7 21.59 2.23 3.37 4.4 
LMCAP 14.57 1.46 11.09 18.52 13.6 14.36 15.75 
SIZE  £7,082,128,000 £17,500,000,000 £17,240,000 £122,000,000,000 £823,089,000 £1,740,657,000 £6,907,299,000 
EARNVAR 0.838 1.35 0 7.16 0 0.28 1.14 
FLSCORE = the total number of forward looking statement in the annual report; IRAWARD = 1 [IR Magazine Award winners], 0 = Non-winners; ACQUALITY = 1 [if ACIND = 1, 
and ACMEET => 3 (as suggested in the UK CG Code), and ACEXP => 1, and ACSIZE => 3], otherwise = 0; ACQUALITYBR = 1 [if ACIND = 1, and ACMEET => 4 (as suggested in 
the Blue Ribbon recommendation), and ACEXP = 1, and ACSIZE => 3], 0 = otherwise; ACSIZE = (1 = if the number of audit committee members is equal to or more than 3, 0 
= if otherwise); ACEXP = (1 = if the number of audit committee members with financial literacy is equal to or more than 1, 0 = if otherwise); ACMEET = number of audit 
committee meetings per year; ACIND = 1 [if all audit committee members are independent], 0 = otherwise; ACMULT = the average number of additional directorships held 
by audit committee members; CHAIRNONEXE = (1 = if the chairman is non-executive, 0 = if otherwise); CHAIRMULT = the total number of chairmen holding multiple 
directorships; CHAIRTEN = the number of years the chairman has been holding the position; SUBSHR = the total percentage of substantial shareholders who own 3% or 
more; NOSUBSHR = the total number of substantial shareholders who own more than 3% of the shareholdings; BODIND = (1 = if the percentage of independent directors 
over the total number of directors (excluding chairman) is equal to or more than 50%, 0 = if otherwise); BODMEET = the number of board meetings per year BODSIZE = the 
total number of board members; LMCAP = the natural log of market capitalisation; SIZE = the absolute value for market capitalisation; LEV = the debt to asset ratio; 
GROWTH = the Market to Book value ratio; PROFIT = The Return on Assets ratio; ANALYST = the number of analysts following; BIG4 = 1 [if the firm is audited by BIG4 audit 
firms], 0 = if otherwise; ACIND
A 
= the percentage of independent audit committee members; ACEXP
A 
= the percentage of audit committee members with financial literacy; 
ACSIZE
A 
= the total number of audit committee members; ACMEET
A 
= 1 [if the frequency of audit committee meetings is =>3 per year,] Otherwise = 0; BODSIZE
A 
= (1 = large 
board size, 0 = small board size); BDIND
A 
= the percentage of independent directors in a company [excluding chairman]; BODMEET
A 
= (1 = high board meeting frequency, 0 
= low board meeting frequency); EARNVAR = the standard deviation of return on sales.  
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With respect to the audit committee characteristics of the firms in the sample, the mean 
(median) for ACINDA is 97.06% (100%), which indicates that compliance with the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) is high. The average (median) ACMULT is 2.37 (2.3), 
which is somewhat similar to the US findings of Laksmana (2008) who report an average of 
2.51. The audit committees in the sample meet on average (ACMEETA) 4.312 times a year. 
This result is higher than the mean of 3.70 reported by Li et al (2008) in their UK study. 
However, it is in contrast with the mean of 8.40 reported for a 2004 sample of US firms by 
Hoitash et al. (2009). This indicates that audit committees in the less regulated, ‘comply or 
explain’, environment in the UK meet less frequently than their US counterparts. The mean 
(median) for audit committee quality, measured using (ACQUALITY), is 0.779 (1). This signals 
that large numbers of companies comply with the recommended norm in the UK. When 
ACMEET is redefined following the Blue Ribbon recommendation (1999), ACQUALITYBR 
reports a mean (median) of 0.565 (1).   
 
The average for BODIND is 56.86%, suggesting that more than half of the boards are 
comprised of independent directors as proposed by the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010). This is marginally higher than the 47% reported by Li et al (2008) for the UK. 
However, this figure is lower when compared to Laksmana (2008) who reports that 79% of 
boards are comprised of independent directors in US firms in the year 2002. Laksmana 
(2008) also finds that the mean number of board meetings is 8.74. This compares closely 
with the mean for BODMEET of 8.710 in the present study and indicates that the frequency 
of board meetings in the US and UK is quite similar. On average the chairman has served on 
the board (CHAIRTEN) for 5.82 years and the mean number of additional directorships held 
by the board chair (CHAIRMULT) is 2.35. About 86% of the sample companies are chaired by 
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a non-executive director (CHAIRNONEXE). The mean (median) percentage of substantial 
shareholdings (SUBOWN) is 30.72% (29.13) and this is higher than the mean of 19.48% 
blockholder ownership reported by Kim (2010) for the US. EARNVAR, which is a proxy for 
firm-level risk, reports an average of 0.838, with a range from 0 to 7.16. This is slightly 
higher than the findings of Farooque et al. (2010) who report a range from 0 to 5.384 in 
their Australian study.  
 
6.3 Univariate analysis 
 
6.3.1 T-test and Mann-Whitney U test 
 
Table 6-2 presents the results from the univariate tests, namely, the t-test (Panel A) and the 
Mann-Whitney U test (Panel B). The univariate test using pooled data reveals that FLSCORE 
is higher for the winners group compared to the non-winners group (p<0.01). This indicates 
that winners of the IRAWARD disclose more forward looking information compared to non-
recipients of the award.  
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Table 6-2: T-test and Mann-Whitney U test122 
  (A) t-test (B) Mann-Whitney U 
test 
VARIABLES NON-
WINNERS/ 
WINNERS 
Mean t p Rank 
Sum 
z p 
FLSCORE 0 
1 
80.96 
117.34 
-4.96 0.000 
*** 
17958 
24237 
-4.4 0.000 
*** 
AFA 0 
1 
-0.014 
-0.008 
-2.61 0.0097 
*** 
14579.5 
17805.5 
-2.76 0.0059 
*** 
ACMEET 0 
1 
0.910 
0.993 
-3.34 0.0010 
*** 
20227.5 
21967.5 
-3.28 0.001 
*** 
ACIND 0 
1 
0.868 
0.924 
-1.543 0.1238 20517.5 
21677.5 
-1.54 0.1236 
ACEXP 0 
1 
0.896 
0.917 
-0.605 0.5460 20880 
21315 
-0.61 0.545 
ACSIZE 0 
1 
0.937 
0.965 
-1.094 0.274 20807.5 
21387.5 
-1.1 0.274 
BODINDA 0 
1 
0.834 
0.862 
-0.653 0.5143 20807.5 
21387.5 
-0.65 0.5134 
BODSIZEA 0 
1 
1.303 
1.593 
-5.17 0.000 
*** 
18052.5 
24142.5 
-4.95 0.000 
*** 
BODMEETA 0 
1 
0.421 
0.497 
-1.295 0.1961 20300 
21895 
-1.29 0.1956 
ACMEETA 0 
1 
3.813 
4.806 
-4.719 0.000 
*** 
17226.5 
24968.5 
-5.67 0.000 
*** 
ACINDA 0 
1 
96.18 
97.94 
-1.696 0.091 
* 
20493 
21702 
-1.6 0.1091 
ACEXPA 0 
1 
37.48 
34.15 
1.47 0.1427 22638.5 
19556.5 
2.21 0.027 
** 
ACSIZEA 0 
1 
3.434 
3.793 
-3.363 0.0009 
*** 
18793.5 
23401.5 
-3.5 0.0005 
*** 
BODIND 0 
1 
55.72 
57.99 
-1.88 0.060 
* 
19968 
22227 
-1.6 0.1109 
BODSIZE 0 
1 
8.66 
10.32 
-5.563 0.000 
*** 
17513.5 
24681.5 
-5.1 0.000 
*** 
BODMEET 0 
1 
8.579 
8.841 
-0.763 0.445 20140.5 
22054.5 
-1.35 0.1766 
ACQUALITY 0 
1 
0.731 
0.827 
-1.989 0.048 
** 
20082.5 
22112.5 
-1.98 0.0478 
** 
ACQUALITYBR 0 
1 
0.414 
0.717 
-5.456 0.000 
*** 
17907.5 
24287.5 
-5.2 0.000 
*** 
ACMULT 0 
1 
2.203 
2.55 
-2.63 0.009 
*** 
19405.5 
22789.5 
-2.8 0.0176 
** 
CHAIRNONEX 0 
1 
0.807 
0.917 
-2.75 0.0063 
*** 
19937.5 
22257.5 
-2.72 0.0065 
*** 
                                                          
122
 All continuous data (except SIZE) were winsorised at 1% top and bottom. The t-test for industry and year 
dummies is not reported.  
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CHAIRTEN 0 
1 
6.910 
4.73 
3.186 0.0016 
*** 
23635 
18560 
3.57 0.0003 
*** 
CHAIRMULT 0 
1 
1.958 
2.74 
-3.79 0.0002 
*** 
18562 
23633 
-3.61 0.0003 
*** 
SUBSOWN 0 
1 
35.58 
25.86 
5.301 0.000 
*** 
24626.5 
17568.5 
4.942 0.000 
*** 
NOSUBSHR 0 
1 
5.165 
4.4 
3.0529 0.0025 
*** 
23093 
19102 
2.827 0.0047 
*** 
GROWTH 0 
1 
3.896 
3.587 
0.429 0.667 20311.5 
21883.5 
-1.1 0.271 
LMCAP 0 
1 
13.97 
15.17 
-7.63 0.000 
*** 
15805 
26390 
-7.4 0.000 
*** 
MCAP 0 
1 
£2,242,472,000 
£1,190,000,000,000 
-4.886 0.000 
*** 
15805 
26390 
-7.41 0.000 
*** 
DTA 0 
1 
25.96 
23.53 
1.36 0.1749 22274 
19921 
1.648 0.0993 
* 
ANALYST 0 
1 
10.56 
18.08 
-9.739 0.000 
*** 
14568.5 
27626.5 
-9.15 0.000 
*** 
BIG4 0 
1 
0.965 
0.972 
-0.337 0.736 21025 
21170 
-0.34 0.735 
ROA 0 
1 
6.525 
7.89 
-1.76 0.079 
* 
19926.5 
22268.5 
-1.64 0.1010 
EARNVAR 0 
1 
1.057 
0.636 
2.585 0.01 
** 
22826 
19369 
2.449 0.014 
** 
 
Concerning the corporate governance variables, the t-test indicates that IRAWARD winning 
firms have audit committees which are active, large and independent (ACMEET, p<0.01; 
ACMEETA, p<0.01; ACSIZEA, p<0.01; ACINDA, p<0.1). Their boards also tend to be larger 
(BODSIZE, p<0.01; BODSIZEA, p<0.01) and chaired by a non-executive director 
(CHAIRNONEXE, p<0.01), with the chairman holding shorter tenure than in the non-winners 
(CHAIRTEN, p<0.01). Also, both the audit committee members and the board chair of 
winning firms tend to hold additional multiple directorships (ACMULT, p<0.01; CHAIRMULT, 
p<0.01). However, substantial shareholding (SUBSHR, p<0.01) and the number of substantial 
shareholders (NOSUBSHR, p<0.01) of the IRAWARD recipients are significantly low 
compared to the non-winners group. The audit committee quality proxies, ACQUALITY 
(p<0.01) and ACQUALITYBR (p<0.01), are higher in the IRAWARD winners group when 
compared to the non-winners group. This indicates that most of the firms in the winners 
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group comply with the recommended norms in the UK. Other variables including ACIND, 
ACEXP, ACSIZE, BODMEET, ACEXPA and BODINDA show no significant difference between the 
mean for the winners group and that for the non-winners group. However, in the Mann-
Whitney U test results (refer Panel B), the non-winners group reports a higher ACEXPA 
(p<0.05) than the winners group. This indicates that the compliance to the recommended 
norm with regard to audit committee financial expertise is higher in the non-winners group 
than in the winners group. Other variables reported qualitatively similar findings to the t-
test.   
 
6.3.2 Pairwise correlation 
 
Table 6-3 presents the Pairwise correlation for the dependent and independent variables 
used in the regression analysis. This analysis was carried out to observe the negative or 
positive relationship among all the variables and to check for multicollinearity. A correlation 
coefficient (of above 0.9 and variance inflation factor (VIF) more than 10  indicates that 
multicollinearity is present (Hair et al., 2008) and this might lead to accidental significant 
results. Correlation coefficients in Table 6-3 show that the highest correlation is 0.65, which 
is between ANALYST and LMCAP. Further tests reveal that VIF is below 10 for all variables, 
thus confirming that multicollinearity is not an issue. 
 
In brief, the correlations provide support for hypotheses; relating to the influence of both 
audit committee and board of director characteristics on disclosure quality. With respect to 
the first proxy for disclosure quality, which is IRAWARD, Table 6-3 documents a positive 
significant association between IRAWARD and ACQUALITY (p<0.05), ACQUALITYBR (p<0.01), 
ACMEET (p<0.01), BODIND (p<0.1), CHAIRNONEXE (p<0.01), BODSIZE (p<0.01), CHAIRMULT 
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(p<0.01) and ACMULT (p<0.01). As with FLSCORE, the present study also documented that 
SUBSHR (p<0.01) and NOSUBSHR (p<0.01) are negatively correlated with IRAWARD. Besides 
that, control variables such as LMCAP and ANALYST also record positive significant 
associations with the receipt of IRAWARD. 
 
This study also finds that FLSCORE, as one of the three measures for disclosure quality, has 
a positive significant association with ACQUALITY (p<0.01), ACQUALITYBR (p<0.01), ACMEET 
(p<0.01), ACIND (p<0.01), ACEXP (p<0.01), ACSIZE (p<0.05), BODMEET (p<0.05), BODIND 
(p<0.01), CHAIRNONEXE (p<0.01), CHAIRMULT (p<0.01) and BODSIZE (p<0.01). 
Nevertheless, the pairwise correlation also documents that SUBSHR (p<0.01) and 
NOSUBSHR (p<0.01) are significantly and negatively correlated with FLSCORE. With respect 
to the control variables, this study finds that LMCAP (p<0.01), BIG4 (p<0.01) and ANALYST 
(p<0.01) also have significant positive associations with FLSCORE. In relation to the third 
proxy for disclosure quality, which is AFA, the pairwise correlation reports that BODIND is 
negatively correlated with AFA, while ACMULT and CHAIRMULT are positively related to 
AFA at p<0.1 and p<0.1 respectively.  
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Table 6-3: Pairwise correlation 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.  IRAWARD 
 
 1.00            
2.  FLSCORE 
 
 0.28 1.00           
3.  AFA 0.16 0.16 0.13 1.00          
4.  ACMEET 
 
 0.19 0.18 -0.03 1.00         
5.  ACIND 
 
 0.09 0.18 0.04 0.19 1.00        
6.  ACEXP 
 
 0.04 0.19 -0.09 0.2 0.01 1.00       
7.  ACSIZE 
 
 0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.17 -0.07 0.37 1.00      
8.  BODMEET 
 
 0.05 0.12 -0.03 0.16 -0.07 0.03 0.05 1.00     
9.  BODIND 
 
 0.11 0.21 -0.11 0.08 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.08 1.00    
10.  CHAIRNONEX 
 
 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.0 1.00   
11.  CHAIRTEN 
 
 -0.18 -0.13 0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.24 -0.22 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 1.00  
12.  ACMULT 
 
 0.15 0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.0 1.00 
13.  SUBSOWN 
 
 -0.29 -0.24 -0.06 -0.13 -0.13 -0.05 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.19 -0.1 
14.  CHAIRMULT 
 
 0.22 0.23 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.0 0.28 -0.2 0.21 
15.  BODSIZE 
 
 0.31 0.37 0.09 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.2 -0.1 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.0 
16.  NOSUBSOWN  -0.17 -0.16 -0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.07 -0.08 0.04 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 
17.  LMCAP 
 
 0.41 0.4 0.19 0.04 0.14 0.11 0.2 -0.0 0.27 0.14 -0.0 -0.0 
18.  BIG4 
 
 0.02 0.17 -0.01 0.24 0.2 0.01 0.24 0.0 0.14 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 
19.  ANALYST 
 
 0.49 0.4 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.11 0.28 -0.0 0.27 0.15 -0.2 0.03 
20.  PROFIT 
 
 0.1 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.1 0.1 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 
21.  LEV 
 
 -0.08 -0.05 -0.14 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.13 -0.0 -0.1 
22.  EARNVAR  -0.15 0.03 -0.12 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.21 0.13 0.06 -0.1 -0.0 
23.  ACQUALITY 
 
 0.12 0.29 -0.05 0.42 0.61 0.6 0.4 -0.0 0.19 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 
24.  ACQUALITYBR 
 
 0.31 0.34 -0.02 0.22 0.39 0.36 0.26 0.13 0.21 0.0 -0.2 0.1 
 
310 
 
Table 6-3: Continued 
 
   13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1 IRAWARD 
 
             
2 FLSCORE 
 
             
3 AFA              
4 ACMEET 
 
             
5 ACIND 
 
             
6 ACEXP 
 
             
7 ACSIZE 
 
             
8 BODMEET 
 
             
9 BODIND 
 
             
10 CHAIRNONEX 
 
             
11 CHAIRTEN 
 
             
12 ACMULT 
 
             
13 SUBSOWN 
 
 1.00            
14 CHAIRMULT 
 
 0.0 1.00           
15 BODSIZE 
 
 -0.0 -0.2 1.00          
16 NOSUBSOWN  0.56 0.0 -0.3 1.00         
17 LMCAP 
 
 -0.4 0.07 0.56 -0.4 1.00        
18 BIG4 
 
 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.1 1.00       
19 ANALYST 
 
 -0.4 0.11 0.5 -0.3 0.65 0.27 1.00      
20 PROFIT 
 
 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 1.00     
21 LEV 
 
 0.03 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 1.00    
22 EARNVAR  0.0 -0.0 0.07 0.06 -0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.00   
23 ACQUALITY 
 
 -0.2 0.07 0.23 -0.1 0.22 0.28 0.24 0.0 0.1 0.06 1.00  
24 ACQUALITYBR 
 
 -0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.31 0.2 0.29 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.59 1.00 
Notes: Figures in bold, italics and underlines indicates that the coefficient is significant at p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively. Correlation coefficient for year and industry dummies not reported. 
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6.3.3 Complementary vs. substitutive tests 
 
The pairwise correlation can be used to observe the basic complementary or substitutive link 
between two variables (Vafeas, 2005). The present study intends to understand the nature of 
the relationship between governance variables, given that both internal and external 
governance might have complementary or substitutive effects on monitoring activities (Brown 
et al., 2011; Vafeas, 2005; Doidge et al., 2007). With regard to the substitutive and 
complementary roles between internal governance systems (i.e., board and audit committee 
characteristics), there is a positive correlation between audit committee characteristics (e.g. 
ACMEET, ACIND, ACEXP, ACSIZE) and board characteristics (e.g. BODMEET, BODIND, 
CHAIRNONEXE, CHAIRMULT, ACMULT and BODSIZE). This confirms the complementary nature 
of the roles of an audit committee and a board of directors in improving disclosure quality. 
Exceptions appear in the case of (i) BODMEET and ACIND, (ii) ACMULT and ACMEET, and (iii) 
CHAIRNONEXE and ACIND, which reveal negative correlations, hence indicating substitutive 
relationships.  
  
Another interesting finding is in respect to the complementary or substitutive nature of internal 
governance (i.e., board and audit committee characteristics) in relation to external governance 
(i.e., substantial shareholding, analyst following and audit quality) in providing monitoring and 
advice. A complementary link is detected between (i) NOSUBSHR and ACMEET, and (ii) 
NOSUBSHR and BODMEET, thus signalling that the number of substantial shareholders has an 
incremental effect with board meeting frequency when it comes to enhancing disclosure 
quality. The rest of the results show that SUBSHR and NOSUBSHR consistently reports negative 
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correlations with internal governance variables (i.e., audit committee characteristics and board 
characteristics). In particular, the inverse correlation of SUBSHR and NOSUBSHR with audit 
committee characteristics (e.g. ACMEET, ACIND, ACEXP, and ACSIZE) reveal that SUBSHR and 
NOSUBSHR have a substitutive effect on audit committee characteristics in respect to 
improving disclosure quality. Moreover, the result reveals that audit committee characteristics 
(e.g. ACMEET, ACIND, ACEXP, ACSIZE) are positively related to other external governance 
mechanisms (e.g. BIG4 and ANALYST). This preliminary finding implies that audit committees 
play complementary roles to boards of directors and external governance in respect to 
improving a firm’s disclosure quality, especially where a weak monitoring environment is 
provided by blockholders (SUBSOWN & NOSUBSOWN).  
 
With regard to the incremental effects of the external components of corporate governance 
(i.e., SUBSHR, NOSUBSHR, ANALYST, BIG4), the pairwise correlation shows a clear 
complementary relationship between BIG4 and ANALYST. However, both of these variables are 
substitutive to SUBSHR and NOSUBSHR. Overall, the present study demonstrates that both 
complementary and substitutive interactions within internal governance and external 
governance systems are observable.  
 
This present study also tries to use interaction terms to test the complementary or substitutive 
effect of board quality and audit committee quality in improving firm’s disclosure quality. This 
present study create an interaction terms BODQUALITY*ACQUALITY to be included in the 
regression model. BODQUALITY is a composite measure for board characteristics, where firms 
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will be tagged as 1 if BODSIZE is below the median, the chairman is non-executive director and 
the BODIND (excluding chairman) is more than 50%, otherwise 0.123 ACQUALITY is a composite 
measure for audit committee quality, where firms will be coded as 1, if firms ACSIZE is equal or 
more than 3, ACEXP is at least one, ACMEET is equal or more than 3, and ACIND is 100%, 
otherwise 0, following Zaman et al. (2011). If the interaction terms BODQUALITY*ACQUALITY 
revealed significant positive relationship with disclosure quality, this suggest that BODQUALITY 
and ACQUALITY are complementary each other in increasing firms disclosure quality, while 
substitutive relationship between BODQUALITY and ACQUALITY is recorded when the 
interaction terms BODQUALITY*ACQUALITY revealed a significant negative relationship.  
Table 6-4: Results of the Interaction Terms124 
 (a) Main effect (b) Moderating 
effect 
(c) F-test/Wald test 
DV= IRAWARD coef t p coef t p  
        
Bodquality -0.63 -1.73 0.08* -1.25 -1.54 0.122  
Acquality 0.068 0.15 0.883 -0.168 -0.31 0.755  
Bodquality*Acquality    0.76 0.87 0.386 Chi
2
=0.75, p>Chi
2
=0.3863 
N=290 LR Chi
2
=151.20, p>Chi2=0.000, 
Pseudo R
2
 =0.3761 
LR Chi
2
=151.96, 
p>Chi2=0.000, Pseudo R
2
 
=0.3780 
 
        
DV=FLSCORE coef t p coef t p  
        
Bodquality -0.08 -1.47 0.141 -0.112 -0.77 0.443  
Acquality 0.253 2.91 0.004 0.241 2.17 0.03  
Bodquality*Acquality    0.033 0.22 0.829 Chi
2
=0.05, p>Chi
2
=0.8285 
N=290 Wald Chi
2
=251.48, 
p>Chi2=0.000, Pseudo R
2
 
=0.3774 
Wald Chi
2
=251.64, 
p>Chi2=0.000, Pseudo R
2
 
=0.3774 
 
        
                                                          
123
 This present study had also tried to redefine BODQUALITY by including BODMEET (that is the BODMEET must be 
above the median). However, the regression result of the interaction terms of new redefined BODQUALITY also 
shown insignificant result.  The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all models is below 10, suggesting no indication 
of multicollinearity. 
124
 In (a) main effect and (b) moderating effect, other variables including blockholders characteristics, chairman 
characteristics and related control variables are included in the model, but the full results are not reported.     
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DV=AFA coef t p coef t p  
Bodquality 0.285 1.37 0.173 0.94 2.46 0.01**  
Acquality -0.47 -1.9 0.06* -0.15 -0.46 0.64  
Bodquality*Acquality    -0.83 -1.82 0.07* F=3.31, p>F=0.07 
N=254 F=1.85, p>F=0.012, Pseudo R
2
 
=0.0739 
F=1.78, p>F=0.015, 
Pseudo R
2
 =0.075 
 
 
Results for the regression with and without interaction terms are tabulated in Table 6-4. When 
IRAWARD and FLSCORE are used as a proxy for disclosure quality in Table 6-4, results revealed 
that BODQUALITY*ACQUALITY are insignificant. This suggests that ACQUALITY has no 
complementary or substitutive effect with BODQUALITY in improving disclosure quality. This 
result also supported with insignificant Wald test, hence signalling that 
BODQUALITY*ACQUALITY make no significant contribution to the model. However, when AFA is 
employed as a proxy for disclosure quality, BODQUALITY*ACQUALITY revealed a significant 
negative relationship at p<0.1. This finding demonstrate that BODQUALITY and ACQUALITY are 
substitutive each other in increasing firms disclosure quality. Another point worth mentioning is 
that, the negative coefficient of ACQUALITY that was significant (before the inclusion of the 
interaction terms) becomes insignificant to the model (after the inclusion of the interaction 
terms). This suggests that the interaction terms BODQUALITY*ACQUALITY is one of the omitted 
variables that should be included in the model to reduce model misspecification bias and to 
improve conflicting result. To support this view, the BODQUALITY also change from insignificant 
(prior to the inclusion of interaction terms) to a significant positive relationship with AFA at 
p<0.05. The significant F-test statistics at p<0.1 also indicates that BODQUALITY*ACQUALITY is 
making a significant incremental effect to the model.  
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6.4 Multivariate analysis 
 
The present study reports the results for three measures of disclosure quality: IRAWARD, 
FLSCORE and AFA in Tables 6-5, 6-6 and 6-7 respectively. There are six models available for 
each table. Model One only covers specific control variables, while Model Two includes board 
of directors characteristics and Model Three includes audit committee characteristics 
separately. Both board characteristics and audit committee characteristics are included in 
Model Four. In Model Five, the individual audit committee variables are replaced with a 
composite measure (ACQUALITY) as a proxy for audit committee strength. In Model Six 
ACQUALITY is replaced with ACQUALITYBR, which shares the same criteria as ACQUALITY 
except that the frequency of audit committee meetings must be at least four times a year. In 
the following sections, the present study will first discuss the results for our first measure of 
disclosure quality, IRAWARD. Thereafter, the results for the second measure, which is FLSCORE, 
will be covered, followed by a discussion of the third measure for disclosure quality, which is 
AFA. Finally, the various additional tests that were conducted to ensure the robustness of the 
results will be presented followed by the findings from 2SLS regression.   
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Table 6-5: Logistic regression of the Investor Relations Award on corporate governance 
and control variables 
 
  (A) IRAWARD 
 sign MODEL1 
 
MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
ACQUALITYBR +      0.85** 
2.34 
ACQUALITY +     -0.026 
-0.06 
 
ACSIZE  -   -1.78* 
-1.88 
-2.211** 
-2.08 
  
ACIND  +   0.069 
0.12 
0.064 
0.10 
  
ACEXP  +   -0.69 
-1.02 
-1.038 
-1.46 
  
ACMEET  +   3.85*** 
2.93 
3.277** 
2.54 
  
ACMULT -/+   0.45*** 
2.85 
0.36** 
2.15 
0.312** 
2.00 
0.29* 
1.85 
CHAIRNONEXE +  0.459 
0.93 
 0.29 
0.57 
0.47 
0.95 
0.413 
0.82 
CHAIRMULT -/+  0.27*** 
2.74 
 0.248** 
2.33 
0.24** 
2.36 
0.25** 
2.36 
CHAIRTEN -/+  -0.059 
-1.62 
 -0.08** 
-2.18 
-0.06 
-1.65 
-0.043 
-1.19 
BODSIZE _  0.152* 
1.78 
 0.153* 
1.68 
0.153* 
1.75 
0.097 
1.07 
BODIND +  -0.0002 
-0.01 
 0.00 
0.05 
-0.001 
-0.05 
-0.007 
-0.41 
BODMEET +  0.133** 
2.11 
 0.087 
1.26 
0.119* 
1.85 
0.092 
1.41 
SUBSHR -/+  -0.018 
-1.09 
-0.016 
-0.91 
-0.006 
-0.31 
-0.015 
-0.92 
-0.017 
-0.98 
NOSUBSHR -/+  0.108 
1.05 
0.09 
0.86 
0.06 
0.56 
0.09 
0.90 
0.112 
1.03 
LNMCAP + 0.5*** 
3.15 
0.51*** 
2.63 
0.70*** 
3.71 
0.73*** 
3.26 
0.54*** 
2.67 
0.52** 
2.53 
EARNVAR + -0.42*** 
-2.93 
-0.53*** 
-3.35 
-0.47*** 
-3.04 
-0.57*** 
-3.33 
-0.53*** 
-3.31 
-0.5*** 
-3.42 
ROA + -0.22 
-0.88 
-0.01 
-0.50 
-0.037 
-1.36 
-0.03 
-1.09 
-0.013 
-0.47 
-0.02 
-0.72 
DTA -/+ -0.017 
-1.61 
-0.015 
-1.36 
-0.012 
-1.07 
-0.013 
-1.05 
-0.013 
-1.08 
-0.01 
-1.19 
BIG4 + -2.04** 
-2.08 
-1.73 
-1.55 
-2.82** 
-2.30 
-2.46* 
-1.85 
-1.58 
-1.34 
-1.72 
-1.54 
ANALYST + 0.2*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.2*** 
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5.76 4.41 5.19 4.47 4.32 4.38 
DUMMY2007 -/+ -0.05 
-0.12 
-0.409 
-0.82 
-0.209 
-0.43 
-0.48 
-0.92 
-0.404 
-0.8 
-0.39 
-0.77 
DUMMY2006 -/+ -0.07 
-0.16 
0.09 
0.19 
-0.14 
-0.29 
0.004 
0.01 
0.122 
0.25 
0.137 
0.27 
DUMMY2005 -/+ -0.07 
-0.17 
0.06 
0.14 
-0.122 
-0.26 
-0.04 
-0.08 
0.04 
0.09 
0.061 
0.13 
TECHNOLOGY -/+ 0.611 
1.24 
0.79 
1.43 
0.89 
1.54 
0.67 
1.10 
0.82 
1.37 
0.92 
1.56 
CONSGOODS -/+ -0.223 
-0.38 
-0.27 
-0.43 
-0.06 
-0.1 
-0.22 
-0.32 
-0.26 
-0.40 
-0.26 
-0.41 
CONSERVICES -/+ -0.82** 
-1.97 
-0.845* 
-1.72 
-1.14** 
-2.31 
-1.29** 
-2.36 
-0.964* 
-1.89 
-0.75 
-1.48 
TELECOM -/+ -1.913 
-1.08 
-1.7 
-0.95 
-1.5 
-0.69 
-2.8 
-1.29 
-1.7 
-0.90 
-1.46 
-0.77 
OIL AND GAS -/+ -0.714 
-1.18 
-1.4** 
-2.05 
-0.96 
-1.50 
-1.68** 
-2.29 
-1.46** 
-2.12 
-1.28* 
-1.80 
HEALTHCARE -/+ 0.313 
0.36 
0.636 
0.66 
0.104 
0.11 
0.38 
0.34 
0.217 
0.22 
0.19 
0.20 
UTILITIES -/+ -1.008 
  -1.25 
-2** 
-2.23 
-1.225 
-1.45 
-2.1** 
-2.27 
-1.9** 
-2.21 
-2.01** 
-2.25 
_cons  -6.82*** 
-2.85 
-10.1*** 
-3.29 
-11.5*** 
-3.65 
-13.1*** 
-3.76 
-11.3*** 
-3.48 
-10*** 
-3.14 
        
N  290 290 290 290 290 290 
LR chi2 (29)  121.86 148.43 150.31 168.82 152.52 158.09 
PROB>chi2  0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-SQUARED  0.3031 0.3692 0.3739 0.4199 0.3794 0.3932 
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Table 6-6: Poisson regression of disclosure quality on corporate governance and control 
variables 
 
  (A) FLSCORE  
 sign MODEL 
1 
MODEL 
2 
MODEL 
3 
MODEL 
4 
MODEL 
5 
MODEL 
6 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
ACQUALITYBR +      0.16** 
2.44 
ACQUALITY +     0.213** 
2.47 
 
ACSIZE  -   -0.04 
-0.28 
-0.115 
-0.73 
  
ACIND  +   0.21* 
1.69 
0.194 
1.56 
  
ACEXP  +   0.26** 
2.20 
0.233** 
2.00 
  
ACMEET  +   0.34*** 
3.01 
0.223** 
2.11 
  
ACMULT -/+   0.028 
1.35 
0.01 
0.50 
0.014 
0.67 
0.013 
0.62 
CHAIRNONEXE +  0.089 
1.19 
 0.099 
1.28 
0.105 
1.35 
0.08 
1.11 
CHAIRMULT -/+  0.05*** 
2.89 
 0.05*** 
2.65 
0.05*** 
2.62 
0.1*** 
2.72 
CHAIRTEN -/+  -0.005 
-0.98 
 -0.003 
-0.66 
-0.004 
-0.65 
-0.003 
-0.58 
BODSIZE _  0.05*** 
2.06 
 0.04*** 
2.63 
0.05*** 
2.79 
0.04** 
2.53 
BODIND +  0.007** 
2.17 
 0.006* 
1.85 
0.005* 
1.82 
0.006* 
1.84 
BODMEET +  0.02** 
2.57 
 0.02*** 
2.75 
0.02*** 
2.96 
0.02** 
2.14 
SUBSHR -/+  -0.002 
-0.55 
-0.003 
-0.59 
-0.002 
-0.48 
-0.002 
-0.54 
-0.002 
-0.52 
NOSUBSHR -/+  0.009 
0.43 
0.013 
0.53 
0.007 
0.33 
0.009 
0.41 
0.013 
0.55 
LNMCAP + 0.06*** 
2.15 
0.009 
0.32 
0.06** 
2.25 
0.011 
0.41 
0.006 
0.21 
0.003 
0.11 
EARNVAR + 0.018 
1.01 
0.0004 
0.02 
0.012 
0.67 
-0.001 
-0.04 
-0.002 
-0.11 
-0.005 
-0.26 
ROA + -0.006 
-1.22 
-0.003 
-0.58 
-0.006 
-1.07 
-0.003 
-0.56 
-0.002 
-0.46 
-0.003 
-0.69 
DTA -/+ -0.001 
-0.52 
-0.0004 
-0.18 
-0.001 
-0.38 
-0.0003 
-0.16 
-0.001 
-0.23 
-0.001 
-0.21 
BIG4 + 0.53*** 
2.76 
0.48** 
2.37 
0.44** 
2.36 
0.44** 
2.29 
0.387* 
1.76 
0.45** 
2.14 
ANALYST + 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
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4.38 2.78 3.50 2.74 2.79 2.91 
DUMMY2007 -/+ 0.199** 
2.26 
0.144* 
1.72 
0.157* 
1.77 
0.113 
1.13 
0.121 
1.44 
0.132 
1.58 
DUMMY2006 -/+ 0.211** 
2.28 
0.24*** 
2.86 
0.207** 
2.29 
0.23*** 
2.68 
0.23*** 
2.68 
0.2*** 
2.67 
DUMMY2005 -/+ -0.06 
-0.78 
-0.05 
-0.53 
-0.063 
-0.73 
-0.04 
-0.50 
-0.042 
-0.51 
-0.058 
-0.7 
TECHNOLOGY -/+ -0.29*** 
-2.84 
-0.31*** 
-2.71 
-0.2* 
-1.77 
-0.25** 
-2.11 
-0.25** 
-2.08 
-0.3*** 
-2.64 
CONSGOODS -/+ -0.154 
-1.18 
-0.175 
-1.45 
-0.155 
-1.22 
-0.175 
-1.45 
-0.178 
-1.49 
-0.167 
-1.42 
CONSERVICES -/+ -0.25** 
-2.41 
-0.27*** 
-3.07 
-0.176* 
-1.66 
-0.22** 
-2.41 
-0.22** 
-2.4 
-0.3*** 
-2.69 
TELECOM -/+ -0.17 
-0.71 
-0.07 
-0.25 
-0.05 
-0.23 
-0.05 
-0.19 
-0.03 
-0.12 
-0.05 
-0.19 
OIL AND GAS -/+ 0.24*** 
2.72 
0.144 
1.50 
0.28*** 
3.09 
0.168* 
1.77 
0.179* 
1.95 
0.172* 
1.86 
HEALTHCARE -/+ 0.224* 
1.69 
0.25* 
1.8 
0.29** 
2.18 
0.3** 
2.12 
0.28** 
1.97 
0.234* 
1.66 
UTILITIES -/+ 0.29*** 
2.85 
0.142 
1.33 
0.26*** 
2.64 
0.127 
1.21 
0.133 
1.25 
0.152 
1.38 
_cons  2.83*** 
6.71 
2.53*** 
5.63 
2.18*** 
4.37 
2.10*** 
4.75 
2.53*** 
5.54 
2.7*** 
5.84 
        
N  290 290 290 290 290 290 
LR chi2 (29)  175.36 230.08 260.06 298.90 245.36 240.91 
PROB>chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-SQUARED  0.327 0.3860 0.3566 0.4019 0.3967 0.3960 
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Table 6-7: Tobit regression of disclosure quality on corporate governance and control 
variables 
 
  (A) AFA 
 sign MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
ACQUALITYBR +      -0.23 
-0.97 
ACQUALITY +     -0.36 
-1.47 
 
ACSIZE  -   -0.26 
-0.55 
-0.003 
-0.01 
  
ACIND  +   -0.09 
-0.23 
0.03 
0.08 
  
ACEXP  +   -0.69*** 
-2.65 
-0.76** 
-2.25 
  
ACMEET  +   -0.407 
-1.05 
-0.35 
-0.94 
  
ACMULT -/+   0.172** 
2.18 
0.168** 
2.15 
0.167** 
2.15 
0.172** 
2.19 
CHAIRNONEXE +  0.23 
0.66 
 0.207 
0.59 
0.207 
0.59 
0.263 
0.75 
CHAIRMULT -/+  0.08 
1.51 
 0.08 
1.35 
0.08 
1.39 
0.078 
1.39 
CHAIRTEN -/+  0.01 
0.81 
 0.004 
0.29 
0.01 
0.66 
0.009 
0.62 
BODSIZE _  -0.06 
-1.26 
 -0.048 
-0.99 
-0.055 
-1.12 
-0.05 
-1.07 
BODIND +  -0.03* 
-1.66 
 -0.027* 
-1.75 
-0.03 
-1.62 
-0.03 
-1.65 
BODMEET +  0.001 
0.02 
 -0.003 
-0.08 
-0.006 
-0.14 
0.002 
0.05 
SUBSHR -/+  0.003 
0.35 
0.01 
0.84 
0.005 
0.65 
0.004 
0.51 
0.004 
0.51 
NOSUBSHR -/+  0.013 
0.24 
0.005 
0.09 
0.017 
0.31 
0.016 
0.30 
0.009 
0.18 
LNMCAP + 0.31*** 
2.87 
0.42*** 
3.04 
0.35*** 
2.92 
0.44*** 
2.96 
0.46*** 
3.18 
0.47*** 
3.15 
EARNVAR  + -0.07 
-0.72 
-0.05 
-0.58 
-0.056 
-0.58 
-0.04 
-0.41 
-0.04 
-0.5 
-0.039 
-0.44 
ROA + -0.002 
-0.17 
-0.005 
-0.38 
-0.007 
-0.54 
-0.008 
-0.59 
-0.007 
-0.49 
-0.005 
-0.37 
DTA -/+ -0.02** 
-2.17 
-0.02** 
-2.26 
-0.02** 
-2.04 
-0.02** 
-2.09 
-0.02** 
-2.08 
-0.02** 
-2.17 
BIG4 + 0.05 
0.09 
0.577 
0.88 
0.06 
0.10 
0.44 
0.65 
0.75 
1.1 
0.66 
0.98 
ANALYST + 0.02 
1.23 
0.028 
1.22 
0.034 
1.40 
0.03 
1.31 
0.03 
1.13 
0.023 
1.03 
DUMMY2007 -/+ 0.48 
1.51 
0.358 
1.23 
0.439 
1.44 
0.36 
1.20 
0.35 
1.20 
0.333 
1.16 
DUMMY2006 -/+ 0.337 0.26 0.296 0.27 0.27 0.281 
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1.11 0.88 1.01 0.9 0.94 0.97 
DUMMY2005 -/+ -0.16 
-0.42 
-0.12 
-0.31 
-0.226 
-0.59 
-0.157 
-0.42 
-0.17 
-0.46 
-0.13 
-0.35 
TECHNOLOGY -/+ 0.197 
0.64 
0.194 
0.61 
-0.106 
-0.36 
-0.3 
-0.1 
0.056 
0.19 
0.165 
0.52 
CONSUMERGOODS -/+ -0.43 
-0.82 
-0.38 
-0.84 
-0.48 
-0.92 
-0.44 
-0.93 
-0.45 
-0.97 
-0.43 
-0.95 
CONSUMERSERVICES -/+ 0.19 
0.89 
0.178 
0.77 
-0.089 
-0.39 
-0.019 
-0.08 
0.018 
0.08 
0.07 
0.30 
TELECOMMUNICATION -/+ -6.85* 
-1.84 
-0.69** 
-1.99 
-7.27** 
-2.03 
-7.13** 
-2.15 
-7.09** 
-2.11 
-7.03** 
-2.09 
OIL AND GAS -/+ -0.47 
-0.96 
-0.52 
-1.15 
-0.56 
-1.12 
-0.56 
-1.25 
-0.62 
-1.37 
-0.59 
-1.29 
HEALTHCARE -/+ -0.66 
-1.00 
-0.71 
-1.10 
-1.05* 
-1.69 
-0.97 
-1.65 
-0.86 
-1.33 
-0.75 
-1.16 
UTILITIES -/+ 0.27 
0.55 
0.179 
0.35 
0.23 
0.47 
0.178 
0.34 
0.156 
0.30 
0.132 
0.26 
_cons  -5.61 
-3.69 
-6.23*** 
-3.37 
-5.483 
-3.06 
-5.78*** 
-2.83 
-7.05*** 
-3.50 
-7.32*** 
-3.60 
        
N  254 254 254 254 254 254 
LR chi2 (29)  1.82 1.80 1.71 1.64 1.73 1.84 
PROB>chi2  0.0289 0.015 0.0253 0.025 0.019 0.01 
Pseudo R-SQUARED  0.0628 0.0725 0.0709 0.0797 0.0770 0.0763 
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Logistic regressions were carried out on IRAWARD and corporate governance variables, the 
results are reported in Table 6-5. Model One (refer to Table 6-5) shows that the control 
variables account for the receipt of the Investor Relations Magazine Award (IRAWARD) up to 
30.31%. Four control variables, BIG4 (p<0.05), EARNVAR (p<0.01), ANALYST (p<0.01) and 
LMCAP (p<0.01), have a significant association with the receipt of IRAWARD, the latter two 
variables being positive, while the former two are negative. PROFIT and DTA do not have a 
significant association with the receipt of IRAWARD. The positive association between 
analyst following and quality of disclosure is consistent with the findings of Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) and Vanstraelen et al. (2003).  
 
Regression results for Model Two show that when board of director characteristics are 
included the R2 increases for the receipt of IRAWARD to 36.92%. In addition, the results also 
show that additional directorships held by the board chair (CHAIRMULT, p<0.01) have a 
positive significant association with IRAWARD. This suggests that firms with a higher number 
of additional directorships held by their board chair are associated with the receipt of 
IRAWARD. Furthermore, other board characteristic variables (e.g. board meeting (BODMEET, 
p<0.05) and board size (BODSIZE, p<0.1)) are also found to be positively associated with the 
receipt of IRAWARD.  
 
In relation to Model Three, when audit committee related variables are added into the 
model, together with the control variables, the R2 (for Model Three) increases to 37.39%. 
This is slightly higher than the result for Model Two, in which R2 was 36.92%; hence 
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suggesting that audit committee characteristics have a stronger effect on the receipt of 
IRAWARD when compared with the effect of board characteristics. ACIND, ACMEET and 
ACMULT have positive associations with the receipt of IRAWARD, although only the latter 
two variables are significant at p<0.01 and p<0.01 respectively. Contrastingly, ACSIZE (p<0.1) 
is negatively associated with IRAWARD. This finding is similar to that of Kent and Stewart 
(2008), who reported a negative link between audit committee size and disclosure. When 
both board characteristics and audit committee characteristics are included, in Model Four, 
the R2 increases to 41.99%. This is relatively higher than the result from Lim et al. (2007), 
whose highest reported R2 is merely 35%. Reflecting the findings from Models Two and 
Three, ACSIZE, ACMEET, ACMULT, CHAIRMULT, CHAIRTEN and BODSIZE are statistically 
significant in respect to their influence on the receipt of IRAWARD. Nonetheless, the 
significance of BODMEET in Model Two disappears after controlling for audit committee 
characteristics in Model Four. This suggests that BODMEET becomes less important in the 
presence of monitoring by an audit committee.   
 
Model Five also provides support for the association between audit committee 
characteristics and disclosure. Specifically, there is a positive association between the 
receipt of IRAWARD and ACQUALITY, with an R2 of 37.94%. 125 When ACQUALITY126 is 
                                                          
125
 Given that all other audit committee variables (except ACMULT) are regulator driven, the present study 
chooses not to include ACMULT in defining ACQUALITY and ACQUALITYBR. The UK Corporate Governance Code 
is silent with regard to the issue of audit committee multiple directorship. Moreover, the current study is 
uncertain over the direction of relationship. Competing theories explaining the effects of multiple directorships 
are widely acknowledged. In brief, agency theory favours lower numbers of additional directorships in order to 
enable directors to spend longer hours and to put more effort into one company, while labour market theory 
encourages multiple directorships as they can improve a director’s levels of knowledge and competency 
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replaced with ACQUALITYBR, Model Six reports that ACQUALITYBR has a positive and 
significant association with the receipt of IRAWARD (coefficient of 0.745; p<0.01). Hence, 
Models Four, Five and Six document that audit committee characteristics play 
complementary roles to board of director characteristics in respect to the receipt of 
IRAWARD.  
 
In relation to the second proxy for disclosure quality, FLSCORE, the Poisson regression was 
carried out. This follows Cerbioni and Parbonetti’s (2007) approach, in light of the fact that 
FLSCORE is a count integer.127 The multivariate analysis of the relationships between all 
control variables and FLSCORE (Model One, Table 6-6) shows that most of the control 
variables are significantly related to FLSCORE (R2 is 32.07%). ANALYST, LMCAP and BIG4 are 
all positively associated with FLSCORE at p<0.01, p<0.01 and p<0.01 respectively. This 
implies that monitoring by external governance mechanisms, including financial analysts and 
auditors, is crucial in improving disclosure quality. Nevertheless, the models reveal that DTA 
and EARNVAR are insignificant in relation to disclosure quality. Both LMCAP and BIG4 have a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Zheng, 2008). Having said this, the present study is in agreement with Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) who 
highlight that researchers so far have not been knowledgeable enough or have failed to define "good" or "bad" 
corporate governance practice (i.e., ACMULT) when developing governance indexes. In this regard, we are 
concerned that the inclusion of ACMULT may lead to a wrongful classification, given that all of the other audit 
committee measures are based on the recommended benchmark in the UK Corporate Governance Code. The 
present study exercises caution by not incorporating ACMULT in the composite ACQUALITY & ACQUALITYBR 
measures. 
126
 The present study follows Zaman et al. (2011) in constructing measures of audit committee effectiveness. 
The composite measures for audit committee quality are relevant for the current study, given that they are 
based on the recommended benchmark (i.e., the Smith Report 2003) for corporate governance practices in the 
UK.  
127
 Poisson estimation using pooled data was conducted in STATA using the command: poisson dependent 
variable independent variables control variables, robust. “Robust” is included in the command to correct for 
heteroskedasticity in the dataset.  
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positive significant association with FLSCORE, indicating that firms which are large and which 
are audited by a Big4 auditor tend to disclose more forward looking information when 
compared to their counterparts.  
 
When variables related to board of director characteristics are added to the control variables 
in Model Two, the present study notes that the R2 increases to 38.60%, as compared with 
32.7% in Model One. Firms with a high FLSCORE tend to have larger boards, more 
independent directors on their boards, have more frequent board meetings and have boards 
that are chaired by directors with high number of additional directorships. These 
characteristics, therefore, appear to have additional effects on disclosure quality. 
Specifically, BODMEET (p<0.05), BODSIZE (p<0.01), BODIND (p<0.05) and additional 
directorships being held by the board chair (CHAIRMULT, p<0.01) appear to have positive 
associations with forward looking disclosure.  
 
In Model Three, board characteristics are replaced with audit committee characteristics. The 
R2 in Model Three is 35.66%, which is slightly higher than the R2 in Model One (R2 = 32.7%). 
This suggests that audit committee characteristics have an incremental effect on FLSCORE. In 
particular, ACIND (coef = 0.21, p<0.1), ACEXP (coef = 0.26, p<0.05) and ACMEET (coef = 0.34, 
p<0.01) have significant positive associations with FLSCORE. These results imply that firms 
acting in accordance with the recommended benchmark set by regulators in relation to audit 
committee characteristics provide better FLSCORE than their counterparts. However, 
ACMULT and ACSIZE are statistically insignificant in the model. When both audit committee 
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and board characteristics are combined in Model Four, regression analysis reveals that audit 
committee characteristics make an incremental contribution to board characteristics in 
enhancing FLSCORE.  The R2 increases to 40.19% and reflects the predictive ability of board 
and audit committee characteristics in respect to FLSCORE. This can be compared with the 
lower R2 of 32.7% obtained in Model One. In Model Four, significant positive relationships 
are recorded for ACEXP (p<0.05), ACMEET (p<0.05), CHAIRMULT (p<0.01), BODSIZE (p<0.01), 
BODIND (p<0.1) and BODMEET (p<0.01) with respect to FLSCORE.  
 
The tests for FLSCORE and audit committee effectiveness are carried out in Models Five and 
Six. The regression analysis reports that ACQUALITY (p<0.5) (refer to Model Five) and 
ACQUALITYBR (p<0.05) (refer to Model 6) make a significant positive contribution to 
FLSCORE. In other words, compliance with the recommended benchmarks for audit 
committee characteristics, drawn from the Smith Report (2003), has significant incremental 
effects alongside the characteristics of the board of directors in improving disclosure quality. 
The R2s for Models Five and Six are 39.67% and 39.60% respectively. This study also found 
that substantial shareholding (SUBSOWN) in Models Two, Three, Four, Five and Six 
consistently reported negative relationships with FLSCORE. Taken together, the findings 
indicate that audit committees roles in improving FLSCORE is stronger, especially when the 
monitoring by substantial shareholders is weak.  
 
With regard to the third proxy for disclosure quality, which is AFA, Models One to Six were 
re-run using the Tobit estimation and the result is presented in Table 6-7. In Model One, 
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LMCAP reports a positive link with AFA at p<0.01 and DTA reports a negative link with AFA at 
p<0.05, with an R2 of 6.28%. This indicates that firm size and leverage are important 
determinants of AFA. When board characteristics are included in the regression (refer to 
Model Two), contradictory to the hypothesis, BODIND has a negative influence on AFA (coef 
= -0.03, p<0.1). This corroborates the findings of Eng and Mak’s (2003) Singaporean study. 
The R2 slightly increases from 6.28% in Model One (when only corporate characteristics are 
included in the model) to 7.25% in Model Two (when board characteristics are added to the 
regression). Other board characteristics, however, are statistically insignificant. In Model 
Three, where audit committee characteristics are embedded into the regression, the result 
reveals that firms with higher ACEXP tend to have lower AFA (p<0.01), hence suggesting that 
this variable has adverse effects. This finding contradicts the hypothesis and suggests that 
firms with lower AFA have a greater propensity to comply with the recommended 
benchmark for audit committee financial expertise. Another findings reveal that ACMULT 
has a significant positive relationship with AFA at p<0.05. This supports labour theory, which 
holds that higher numbers of multiple directorships are favourable because they increase 
manager’s competency and knowledge and, thereby, improve disclosure quality. The R2 is 
7.09%, which is slightly lower than that for Model Two (which controls for board 
characteristics), thus signalling that boards have a stronger monitoring effect than audit 
committees in respect to enhancing analyst forecast accuracy.   
 
In Model Four, both audit committee characteristics and board characteristics are combined 
in one model, together with the control variables. Significant results for BODIND (in Model 
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Two) and ACEXP and ACMULT (in Model Three) are still maintained. The results for Model 
Four reflect that audit committees have a small incremental effect together with boards of 
directors in enhancing AFA; although, the R2 in Model Four is only slightly higher than that in 
Model Two, increasing from 7.25% to 7.97%. It is also important to note that most audit 
committee characteristics in Model Four have negative coefficients (e.g. ACSIZE, ACEXP and 
ACMEET), suggesting that there is a substitutive relationship. In Models Five and Six, where 
individual audit committee characteristics are replaced with composite measures of audit 
committee effectiveness, ACQUALITY and ACQUALITYBR, results indicate that ACQUALITY 
and ACQUALITYBR, as well as all board characteristics, are statistically insignificant in their 
effect on AFA. Consistent insignificant relationships between audit committee strength and 
AFA, as reflected in Models Five and 6, demonstrate that compliance with the Smith Report 
(2003) recommendations on audit committee characteristics is effectively substitutive to 
board of directors characteristics in increasing a firm’s AFA. The only variable that influences 
AFA, according to Models Five and 6, is ACMULT, with a coefficient of 0.167 at p<0.05 and a 
coefficient of 0.172, at p<0.05, respectively.  
 
The present study recognises that AFA as a proxy probably does not fully capture disclosure 
quality, as it reports consistent insignificant and conflicting findings as well as a constantly 
lower R2 than other proxies for disclosure quality (i.e., IRAWARD, FLSCORE). 128 There could 
be several reasons for these findings. Firstly, AFA is probably not a direct measure of 
                                                          
128
 This type of limitation is not uncommon. Prior research recognizes the impossibility of defining and 
constructing a perfect proxy for disclosure quality (e.g. Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007, Debreceny and Rahman, 
2005; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Cooke and Wallace, 1989).  
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disclosure quality, and it may be located in between of a firms’ disclosure and analysts, 
hence, it is not a very good proxy for a firm’s overall disclosure quality. Secondly, analyst 
forecasts are subject to several controversial issues: for example (i) analysts tend to follow 
their peers when they make forecasts (Hong et al., 2000; Welch, 2000) and (ii) analysts are 
not always viewed as an independent external party, given that they try to maintain good 
relationships with management and try not to disappoint them by providing negative 
recommendations (Agrawal and Chen, 2006; Francis and Soffer, 1997; Dechow et al., 2000). 
The credibility of a forecast issued by an analyst might, therefore, be questionable. AFA 
could be the outcome of clandestine collaboration between analysts and management and 
this could lead to conflicting findings. 129   
 
6.4.1 Sensitivity analysis130  
 
Several sensitivity analyses were performed to check the robustness of the findings. 
Regressions were also re-run using increased and reduced samples, different measurements 
for corporate governance and alternative estimations. For the sake of brevity, full results for 
the sensitivity analyses are not reported, but are available upon request.  
 
                                                          
129
 Given that AFA tends to offer perplexing results, only the additional tests which were deemed to be 
beneficial will be performed in the sensitivity analysis.  
130
 According to Sadka (2011), the global financial crisis in 2008-2009 that lead to the collapse of several 
financial institutions in the UK lead to an increasing interest in the link between disclosure transparency and 
stock liquidity. The present study considers that the sample (for the year 2007) may be partially affected by the 
onset of the global financial crisis. In light of this, the firm data for the most recent years (i.e., 2007) was 
removed and the main model was re-run. Findings show that all results are similar except that the level of 
significance is slightly affected. It is, therefore, assumed that the primary results are not affected by the 
financial crisis issue and the slight decrease in the level of significance is due to the smaller size of sample that 
was used in the sensitivity test. The primary test is based on larger sample.   
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6.4.1.1 Using increased samples 
 
The usable final sample for Project Two is actually 340 firms (170 match-paired). 131 This 
figure is slightly different from Projects One and Three, in which the final sample comprised 
290 firms (145 match-paired) because they employed earnings management data, where 
industries with fewer than six firms were excluded. 132 In order to maintain consistency and 
to enable a fair comparison between Projects One, Two and Three, the statistical analyses in 
the current project were also conducted using 290 firms. Therefore, as an additional test, 
Models Four, Five and Six in Tables 6-4 and 6-5 were re-run using 340 firms. The results 
show that all findings are qualitatively similar to the primary results reported in Tables 6-4 
and 6-5.  
 
6.4.1.2 Alternative estimations and definitions133 
 
As an additional test, this study also re-ran Model Four using different estimations. Using the 
probit estimation (for IRAWARD), the negative binomial regression (for FLSCORE) and the 
truncated regression (for AFA), the findings are largely similar to those presented in Model 
                                                          
131
 Refer to Chapter Three for a detailed breakdown of the sample.  
132
 At least six firms in each industry are required in order to obtain valid coefficient parameters in the earnings 
management calculations, such as the Modified Jones (1995) model. Detailed discussion with regard to 
earnings management measurement and calculation is available in the Chapter 3.    
133
 There are several reason why dummy variables are used to measure audit committee characteristics in the 
primary analysis: (i) dummies for most of the corporate governance variables, like ACSIZE, ACMEET, ACEXP and 
ACIND, are basically regulator driven, based on the recommendations in the Smith Report (2003); (ii) the 
transformation of data to dummies solves the issue of outliers; (iii) the use of dummies does not change the 
results, as the additional tests using alternative measures for corporate governance reveal that results for DQ, 
CG and control variables are qualitatively unchanged, highlighting that the results are not derived by specific 
measures for CG and (iii) the contribution made by this project will be more apparent when the measurements 
are derived from specific recommendations in the UK Corporate Governance Code, hence conclusions can be 
made in light of the UK regulatory benchmarks.  
331 
 
Five. Overall we conclude that our results are primarily consistent and not derived from 
specific estimations. 134 
 
Governance variables were also redefined using several alternative measures. Specifically, 
ACSIZE, ACIND, ACMEET, ACEXP, BODMEET, BODIND and BODSIZE were redefined as 
ACSIZEA, ACINDA, ACMEETA, ACEXPA, BODMEETA, BODINDA and BODSIZEA.  
 
When all redefined variables are included in Model Four in Table 6-5 (where disclosure 
quality is measured using IRAWARD), it is observed that ACEXPA offers substitutive effects to 
IRAWARD, suggesting that receipts of IRAWARD tend to have lower percentages of audit 
committee members with financial expertise. Other results are similar. With regard to 
FLSCORE, when redefined variables (as mentioned above) are used in the model, all findings 
are similar except that BODINDA and ACEXPA become insignificant in relation to FLSCORE. 
These findings suggest that compliance with the recommended benchmark on audit 
committee expertise (measured using ACEXP) increases FLSCORE, while firms with a high 
percentage of independent board members (BODIND) have higher FLSCORE than those that 
merely comply with the recommendation for equal proportions of independent and 
dependent directors on the board (excluding the chairman) (i.e., BODINDA). In relation to the 
third proxy for disclosure quality, AFA, the use of redefined measures for audit committee 
                                                          
134
 This study winsorized all continuous variables at 1%, top and bottom, in order to reduce the effects of 
extreme values in our models, as in Cornett et al. (2008). As a sensitivity analysis, the regression was re-run 
incorporating extreme values in the models and it was found that the results are robust to the treatment of 
outliers in our dataset.   
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and board characteristics reveals results that are similar to those reported in Model Four of 
Table 6-7.  
 
6.4.1.3 Reduced sample tests.  
 
6.4.1.3.1 Large firms vs. small firms 
Several additional tests are carried out using a reduced sample. 135 Linck et al. (2008) find 
that board structure differs according to a firm’s size. The sample is, therefore, split into 
large and small firms based on the median of size and Model Four of Tables 6-5, 6-6 and 6-7. 
In small firms, when IRAWARD is used as a proxy for disclosure quality, ACEXP and ACSIZE 
report significant negative results at p<0.1 and p<0.05 respectively. This implies that ACEXP 
and ACSIZE have substitutive monitoring effects in small firms. In relation to FLSCORE, 
contrary to the primary findings in Model Four of Table 6-6, SUBSHR shows a significant 
negative relationship with FLSCORE at p<0.01, suggesting a substitutive relationship. 
Moreover, ACMEET has a statistically insignificant controlling effect on FLSCORE, suggesting 
that ACMEET is not relevant to FLSCORE in small firms. Concerning AFA, results indicate that 
ACEXP is significantly negatively related to AFA at p<0.05 and CHAIRMULT is significantly 
positively related to AFA at p<0.1. This signals that AFA increases with CHAIRMULT and 
                                                          
135
 The sample may be affected by the global financial crisis. Firms in the year 2008 (which appeared to be the 
year of the commencement of the crisis) were excluded and Models Four, Five and Six of the primary model in 
Table 10 were re-run. The results show a slight reduction in the level of significance. Using forward looking 
information (FLSCORE) as a dependent variable, it is found that only ACMEET (coef = 0.25; p<0.05) is significant 
in Model Four, while Models Five and Six reveal that ACQUALITY (coef = 0.177) and ACQUALITYBR (coef = 
0.167) are significant at p<0.1 and p<0.05 respectively. When the receivers of the Investor Relations Award 
(IRAWARD) are used in Model Four, it is found that the results for ACSIZE (coef = -2.249; p<0.1) and ACMEET 
(coef = 4.53; p<0.05) are significant. Models Five and Six show that ACQUALITY is insignificant, while 
ACQUALITYBR (coef = 0.71) shows a significant positive association with IRAWARD at p<0.1. The minor changes 
in the results are probably due to the reduced size of the sample used in the sensitivity analysis, while our 
primary analysis is based on broader set of samples.  
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decreases with ACEXP in small firms. This finding corroborates that of Kent and Stewart’s 
(2008) Australian study, which reported a negative link between audit committee financial 
literacy and disclosure on IFRS transition.  
 
With regard to large firms, when IRAWARD is used as a proxy for disclosure quality, 
CHAIRNONEXE shows a positive significant association with IRAWARD at p<0.05. When 
IRAWARD is replaced with FLSCORE, poisson regression shows that firms with high FLSCORE 
tend to have higher ACEXP, BODSIZE, BODIND and CHAIRMULT. Concerning AFA, the Tobit 
regression demonstrates that higher AFA is associated with higher ACSIZE, lower BODSIZE, 
smaller BODIND and shorter CHAIRTEN. Overall, the findings indicate that corporate 
governance reacts differently in large and small firms. 136  
 
 
6.4.1.3.2 Winners vs. non-winners groups 
The sample is also divided into winner and non-winner of IRAWARD groups, and Model Four 
is re-run again using FLSCORE and AFA as proxies for disclosure quality. In the non-winners 
group, firms with high FLSCORE tend to have higher ACIND, BODSIZE, BODIND, BODMEET, 
                                                          
136 There is potential for a non-linear association between SUBSHR, NOSUBSOWN and CHAIRTEN and 
disclosure quality, given that SUBSHR and CHAIRTEN tend to interact differently in large and small firms. The 
present study extends the analysis by introducing a quadratic form specification into the model in order to 
examine whether a concave relationship exists between the normal and squared variables. In the forward 
looking score (FLSCORE) model, it was found that a non-linear relationship does not exist between chairman 
tenure (BDCTEN) and FLSCORE as that the sign of relationship for both BDCTEN and BDCTENSQ is negative. In 
addition, it is noted that SUBSOWN (NOSUBSOWN) and SUBSOWNSQ (NOSUBSOWNSQ) report positive 
(negative) and negative (positive) relationships respectively, suggesting that a concave relationship exists 
between these two variables. Nevertheless, none of them are significant to the model, indicating that the 
concave relationships between SUBSOWN and NOSUBSOWN are merely weak in the context of UK firms. The 
same test was also performed using IRAWARD as a dependent variable and similar results were found.  
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CHAIRMULT, CHAIRNONEXE, and NOSUBSHR; while in the winners group, FLSCORE increases 
with higher ACMEET, BODSIZE, BODIND, and CHAIRMULT and with lower NOSUBSHR. The 
findings highlight that BODSIZE, BODIND and CHAIRMULT consistently have complementary 
monitoring effects in both the winners and non-winners group. However, NOSUBSHR has 
both complementary and substitutive effects in the different sample groups.  
 
When AFA is used as a proxy for disclosure quality, none of the governance variables show a 
statistically significant influence on AFA in the winners group. However, in the non-winners 
group, CHAIRMULT and SUBSHR show significant positive relationships with AFA at p<0.05 
and p<0.05 respectively, suggesting a complementary relationship. 137 
 
 
 
                                                          
137
 The use of a non-unique sample for the years 2005-2008 may introduce bias into the findings, given that the 
“stickiness” issue of corporate governance data might become more apparent. Although the data is of non-
panel type, (thus stickiness is not as serious as in the case of panel data), as a sensitivity analysis Models Three, 
Four and Five are re-run using unique firms per period (result not reported). Data is selected from the most 
recent year if a firm is a winner of the Investor Relations Award in more than one year. The result for unique 
samples per period is qualitatively similar to those for unique samples per year and only slight differences 
occur (e.g. the level of significance is slightly lower) when forward looking disclosure (FLSCORE) is used as 
dependent variable. When ACQUALITY and ACQUALITYBR are substituted for audit committee quality in 
Models Four and Five, the results are similar to the main findings. Both of them are highly significant at p<0.01 
and p<0.01 respectively. Therefore, the significant relationships between audit committee characteristics and 
forward looking score (FLSCORE) are not derived from non-unique samples in our study. However, the results 
are slightly different when the receipt of the Investor Relation Award (IRAWARD) is employed as a dependent 
variable. Concerning the strength of audit committees, which is measured using ACQUALITY and 
ACQUALITYBR, there is a qualitatively similar result to our main findings in Models Four and Five, where 
ACQUALITY and ACQUALITYBR are positively related to IRAWARD and only the latter is significant at p<0.05.  
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6.5 Simultaneity between disclosure quality and board independence 
 
Table 6-8: 2SLS regression 
 
 Panel A 
DQ = IRAWARD 
Panel B 
DQ= FLSCORE 
Panel C 
DQ = AFA 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
MODEL1 
IRAWARD 
MODEL2 
BODIND 
MODEL1 
FLSCORE 
MODEL2 
BODIND 
MODEL1 
AFA 
MODEL2 
BODIND 
Endogenous Variables       
DQ (IRAWARD)  0.829 
0.32 
    
DQ (FLSCORE)    0.165*** 
6.59 
  
DQ (AFA)      -11.79*** 
-9.92 
BODIND -0.008 
-0.14 
 0.063*** 
4.47 
 -0.323*** 
-3.92 
 
       
Exogenous  
Variables 
      
ACSIZE  -2.22** 
-2.10 
 0.001 
0.01 
 -0.598 
-1.37 
 
ACEXP  -1.03 
-1.45 
 0.157 
1.16 
 0.117 
0.30 
 
ACMEET  3.27** 
2.54 
 0.181* 
1.68 
 -0.124 
-0.33 
 
ACIND  0.06 
0.10 
 0.182 
1.62 
 -0.232 
-0.74 
 
ACMULT 0.36** 
2.14 
 0.04** 
2.03 
 0.063 
1.01 
 
BODMEET  0.08 
1.28 
 0.013* 
1.86 
 0.0012 
0.03 
 
BODSIZE  0.147 
1.54 
-0.532* 
-1.96 
0.076*** 
4.45 
-1.413*** 
-5.38 
-0.317*** 
-3.55 
-1.005*** 
-3.98 
CHAIRNONEXE 0.297 
0.57 
 0.07 
0.94 
 0.295 
0.91 
 
CHAIRTEN -0.08** 
-2.20 
 -0.001 
-0.15 
 -0.0045 
-0.32 
 
CHAIRMULT 0.248** 
2.33 
 0.026* 
1.92 
 0.079 
1.58 
 
SUBSHR -0.006 
-0.34 
-0.07 
-1.36 
0.0017 
0.53 
0.0049 
0.11 
-0.17* 
-1.81 
-0.057 
-1.33 
NOSUBSHR -0.072 
0.58 
0.602 
1.60 
-0.02 
-1.45 
0.312 
0.90 
-0.162** 
2.60 
0.70** 
2.30 
PROFVAR   1.809*** 
3.53 
 1.63*** 
3.35 
 0.67 
1.56 
EARNVAR -0.56*** 
-3.02 
 -0.051** 
-2.34 
 0.134** 
2.17 
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LREM  -1.63* 
-1.78 
 -2.385** 
-2.56 
 0.67 
0.94 
BODSHR  -0.183*** 
-3.51 
 -0.121*** 
-3.27 
 -0.156*** 
-3.38 
Firm-specific variables       
LMCAP 0.76*** 
2.65 
2.68*** 
4.23 
-0.129*** 
-3.14 
1.613*** 
2.88 
1.148*** 
4.42 
7.43*** 
9.99 
ROA -0.033 
-1.09 
 -0.005 
-0.95 
 0.007 
0.48 
 
DTA -0.01 
-1.03 
0.018 
0.46 
-0.001 
-0.53 
0.022 
0.59 
-0.021*** 
-2.87 
-0.233*** 
-5.35 
MTBV  -0.148* 
-1.83 
 -0.123* 
-1.68 
 -0.144* 
-1.73 
ANALYST 0.194*** 
4.46 
 0.012** 
2.43 
 0.027 
1.38 
 
BIG4 -2.47* 
-1.85 
 0.513** 
2.26 
 0.678 
0.89 
 
YEAR 2007 -0.474 
-0.90 
1.536 
0.87 
0.058 
0.81 
-1.58 
-0.94 
0.441 
1.64 
6.01*** 
3.99 
YEAR 2006 0.006 
0.01 
0.286 
1.67 
0.208*** 
3.08 
-3.783** 
-2.24 
0.202 
0.76 
3.54** 
2.47 
YEAR 2005 -0.03 
-0.07 
1.74 
1.01 
-0.1 
-1.24 
2.18 
1.37 
0.603 
1.45 
-0.29 
-0.21 
TECH 0.67 
1.11 
1.26 
0.61 
-0.3008** 
-2.52 
3.76* 
1.86 
0.761** 
2.02 
5.12*** 
2.81 
TELECOM -2.81 
-1.27 
-4.469 
-0.73 
0.09 
0.27 
-7.325 
-1.20 
-3.751* 
-1.88 
-80.54*** 
-9.07 
CONSGOODS -0.202 
-0.29 
1.87 
0.96 
-0.286*** 
-2.73 
4.68** 
2.58 
0.598 
1.27 
-3.153* 
-1.76 
CONSSERVICES -1.28** 
-2.36 
1.97 
1.13 
-0.336*** 
-3.92 
5.35*** 
3.30 
0.832** 
2.21 
4.54*** 
3.17 
HEALTHCARE 0.394 
0.35 
-0.007 
-0.00 
0.175 
1.43 
-8.243*** 
-3.32 
0.815 
1.09 
-3.769 
-1.59 
UTILITIES -2.13** 
-2.27 
-0.157 
-0.06 
0.231** 
2.46 
-5.82** 
-2.37 
0.827 
1.52 
3.63 
1.43 
OIL AND GAS -1.665** 
-2.26 
2.173 
1.11 
0.0749 
0.83 
-2.755* 
-1.90 
0.179 
0.40 
-3.38** 
-2.05 
_cons -12.91*** 
-3.54 
43.36*** 
3.41 
0.833 
1.48 
62.57*** 
11.98 
2.33 
0.95 
-63.05*** 
-4.56 
       
N 290 290 290 290 254 254 
F-stat/ LR Chi2 168.84 4.33 599.78 8.30 2.37 10.17 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-sq/ pseudo r2 0.4200 0.2041 0.4829 0.3130 0.1459 0.4386 
Note: The figures in italics are the t-statistics, while figures in normal font are the coefficients.  
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Table 6-8 above, presents the results from the 2SLS regression after taking into account the 
potential for an endogenous relationship between disclosure quality and the percentage of 
independent directors. Model Four (in Tables 6-5, 6-6 and 6-7) consistently shows the 
highest R2 when compared with other models, thus, in the 2SLS regression, Model Four is re-
run together with the board independence equation. In 2SLS regression, it is expected that 
causality can run in both directions between disclosure quality and board independence, 
hence both of these variables are endogeneously determined by each other. Panel A in Table 
6-8 reports the 2SLS regression for IRAWARD, while Panel B and C present the 2SLS 
regression for FLSCORE and AFA respectively. 
 
With regard to Panel A, the IRAWARD equation shows that BODIND is not significantly 
related to IRAWARD, while the BODIND equation also reported no significant relationship 
between IRAWARD and BODIND. This implies that there is no simultaneous relationship 
between IRAWARD and BODIND. Nevertheless, when FLSCORE is employed as a proxy for 
disclosure quality, consistent with Grüning (2010), Panel B of Table 6-7 documents a 
significant positive relationship between BODIND and FLSCORE at p<0.01 (in the FLSCORE 
equation) and FLSCORE is also one of the important determinants for BODIND (in the 
BODIND equation) at p<0.01, signalling that there is a bi-directional relationship between 
FLSCORE and BODIND. A plausible explanation for this finding is that high BODIND is 
associated with high FLSCORE, and high FLSCORE also has the effect of increasing the 
percentage of BODIND in the company. Contrastingly, with regard to the third proxy for 
disclosure quality, AFA, Panel C reports significant simultaneous associations between 
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BODIND and AFA, but the direction of the relationship is negative. Specifically, in the AFA 
equation BODIND is found to be negatively related to AFA at p<0.01, while AFA is also 
negatively associated with BODIND in the BODIND equation at p<0.01. This finding indicates 
that a high percentage of BODIND in a firm will reduce AFA, while firms with low AFA tend to 
have a higher percentage of BODIND. However, these findings corroborate those of Lim et 
al. (2007) who document largely similar results. Specifically, they found that “not all types of 
voluntary disclosure are driven by board composition, but only those that represent key 
decisions made by the board. The disclosure of descriptive information or historical financial 
information is not related to board composition” (Lim et al., 2007, p. 557).  
 
In relation to other variables in the disclosure quality equation, when IRAWARD is used as a 
proxy for disclosure quality in the 2SLS regression, Model One (refer to Panel A), the findings 
are largely similar to those from the logistic regression reported in Model Four (refer to 
Table 6-5). To be specific, ACSIZE (coef = -2.22, p<0.05), ACMEET (coef = 3.72, p<0.05), 
ACMULT (coef = 0.36, p<0.05), CHAIRTEN (coef = -0.08, p<0.05) CHAIRMULT (coef =0.248, 
p<0.05), LMCAP (coef=0.76, p<0.01) and EARNVAR (coef = -0.56, p<0.01) are significantly 
related to IRAWARD. Nonetheless, the weak significant positive link between BODSIZE 
(p<0.1) and IRAWARD (refer to Model Four, Table 6-5) disappeared in the 2SLS regression.   
 
With regard to other determinants for FLSCORE, Model One of Table 6-8 also demonstrates 
that the findings of the 2SLS regressions are similar to those of the Poisson regression 
reported in Model Four of Table 6-6. However, ACEXP is no longer significant in the 2SLS 
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regression (it previously showed a significant positive association at p<0.05 in Model Four, 
Table 6-7) and ACMULT becomes positively significant in its influence on FLSCORE at p<0.05 
(It previously showed an insignificant result in Model Four, Table 6-6). ACMEET, BODMEET, 
BODSIZE, BODIND and CHAIRMULT remain significant in this model as in the previous results 
for Model Four, Table 6-6.   
 
Concerning the AFA equation (refer to Model One, Panel C), the findings reveal that SUBSHR 
(coef = -0.17, p<0.1), NOSUBSHR (coef = -0.162, p<0.05), BODIND (coef = -0.323, p<0.01) and 
BODSIZE (coef = -0.317, p<0.01) are significantly and negatively related to AFA. Contrary to 
the hypotheses, these findings indicate that AFA increases with lower numbers of 
substantial shareholders, less ownership by substantial shareholders, smaller board sizes 
and a smaller percentage of independent directors on the board. These imply that SUBSHR, 
NOSUBSHR, BODIND and BODSIZE provide substitutive effects to AFA. Negative relationships 
between BODIND and disclosure quality are also documented by Eng and Mak (2003) in their 
Singaporean study. The plausible explanation for this is that independent directors are less 
informed (compared to the internal directors) and largely dependent on information 
received from internal directors for the performance of their monitoring activities (check 
references). Moreover, large substantial shareholders and shareholdings might impair the 
ability of managers to convey credible information to the external party, given a firm’s 
information system could be controlled by substantial shareholders (Boubaker and 
Labégorre, 2008). Another interesting finding is that ACMULT is not statistically significant in 
the 2SLS regression, although a positive relationship with AFA is previously reported at 
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p<0.05 (refer to Table 6-7); signalling that this finding is not robust after endogeneity is 
controlled for using 2SLS regression.  
 
With respect to the BODIND equation (refer to Model Two of Panels A, B and C) the result 
reveals that disclosure quality is not the only predictor that determines BODIND. In 
particular, high BODIND is associated with lower BODSIZE (Panel A, p<0.1; Panel B, p<0.01; 
Panel C, p<0.01), lower LREM (Panel A, p<0.1; Panel B, p<0.05), smaller BODSHR (Panel A, 
p<0.01; Panel B, p<0.01 and Panel C, p<0.01) and higher PROFVAR (Panel A, p<0.01; Panel B, 
p<0.01). Firm-specific characteristics such as LMCAP (MTBV) consistently reported significant 
positive (negative) associations with BODIND in Model Two of Panels A, B and C, signalling 
that firms with a high percentage of independent directors tend to be larger in size and 
lower in market expected growth.  
 
Concerning external governance mechanisms, Table 6-8 also demonstrates that IRAWARD 
and FLSCORE increase with higher ANALYST, signalling a complementary relationship. BIG4, 
however shows a substitutive relationship with IRAWARD and a complementary relationship 
with FLSCORE at p<0.1 and p<0.05 respectively. In addition, SUBSHR and NOSUBSHR are not 
statistically significant in the IRAWARD and FLSCORE equations, but they contribute a 
substitutive effect to AFA at p<0.1 and p<0.05 respectively. An additional test on reverse 
causality is also conducted using IV regression (result not reported). In brief, the IV 
regression reports that the primary results in Tables 6-6, 6-7 and 6-8 are largely unaffected 
by any endogeneity bias.   
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
There are several important findings revealed in this chapter. Specifically, 
1. Audit committee effectiveness, measured using ACQUALITY and ACQUALITYBR (which is 
drawn from the recommended benchmark set by the Smith Report (2003) and the US 
Blue Ribbon recommendation (1998)) is significant in improving FLSCORE, while only 
ACQUALITYBR appears to affect the receipt of IRAWARD. These findings provide support 
to the view that compliance with the recommended norm set by regulators improves a 
firms’ governance process and subsequently increases disclosure quality.  
2. Board related variables such as BODSIZE, BODMEET, BODIND and CHAIRMULT also have 
a positive influence on disclosure quality (measured using FLSCORE). The importance of 
board characteristics in explaining FLSCORE is also demonstrated in the 2SLS regression, 
signalling that these findings are robust to the endogeneity issue.  
3. With regard to the 2SLS regression, the potential endogenous relationship between 
BODIND and disclosure quality offers mixed findings, depending on the types of 
disclosure quality proxies that are used. No simultaneous relationship between BODIND 
and IRAWARD is reported; while FLSCORE and BODIND show that positive simultaneous 
relationships exist. When AFA is used as a proxy for disclosure quality, this study finds 
that BODIND and AFA are endogenously determined but negatively related to each 
other.  
4. In relation to other BODIND determinants in the 2SLS regression, Model Two of Table 6-8 
indicates that BODIND increases with lower BODSIZE, higher PROFVAR and lower LREM.  
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5. Results for IRAWARD and FLSCORE (in Model Four of Tables 6-5 and 6-6) are largely 
unaffected after controlling for simultaneity bias using the 2SLS regression. However, 
there are significant changes in the 2SLS regression results in relation to the AFA 
variable. Specifically, BODSIZE, SUBSHR and NOSUBSHR report significant relationships 
with AFA although they are insignificant in Model Four of Table 6-7. In the presence of 
endogeneity, it is argued that the 2SLS regression results outperformed the previous 
multivariate test in Table 6-7. 
6. With respect to the potential complementary or substitutive effect between board of 
director and audit committee in imporving firms disclosure quality, the result revealed 
insignificant relationship between interaction terms and disclosure quality when 
disclosure quality is measured using IRAWARD and FLSCORE. However, when AFA is 
employed as a proxy for disclosure quality, BODQUALITY*ACQUALITY revealed a 
significant negative relationship at p<0.1. This finding demonstrate that BODQUALITY 
and ACQUALITY are substitutive each other in improving firms disclosure quality. Overall, 
this research contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms by providing evidence of the substitutive relationship of ACQUALITY and 
BODQUALITY to the improvement of disclosure quality (measured using AFA) in the 
relatively less regulated “comply and explain” environment of the UK.  
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7 Conclusion 
 
This thesis comprises two main projects. The first project examines the influence of 
disclosure quality on earnings management by controlling for corporate governance vectors. 
While the second project investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
disclosure quality.  
 
7.1 First project: disclosure quality and earnings management 
 
The first project intends to examine the relationship between disclosure quality and earnings 
management, by controlling for internal governance mechanisms. The complementary or 
substitutive relationships between internal governance factors and disclosure quality are 
also investigated. The present study also considers the potential for a simultaneous 
relationship between disclosure quality and earnings management. The sample is comprised 
of the winners and non-winners of the IR Magazine Award during the years 2005 to 2008. 
Disclosure quality is measured using the IR Magazine Award, the number of forward looking 
items in the annual report and the analyst forecast accuracy, while earnings management is 
measured using the Modified Jones (1995) Model.  
 
The results for all disclosure quality proxies are generally very similar. Disclosure quality 
(measured using the IR Magazine Award, forward looking information and the analyst 
forecast accuracy) consistently outweighs corporate governance in deterring earnings 
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management in all the models. Corporate governance shows a weak relationship to earnings 
management, although audit committee meeting frequencies consistently show a positive 
relationship to earnings management. This indicates that firms with a greater number of 
audit committee meetings are more likely to engage in earnings management. The present 
study also documents substitutive relationship between audit committee effectiveness 
(ACQUALITY) and disclosure quality (measured using IRAWARD) in deterring earnings 
management (measured using MJONES). ACQUALITY*IRAWARD reported significant 
negative relationship at p<0.05. This finding demonstrates that there is a complementary 
relationship between ACQUALITY and IRAWARD in reducing MJONES. The F-test also 
demonstrate that the interaction terms provides significant contribution to the model, given 
that the p-value is significant at p<0.01. However, when other proxies for disclosure quality 
is used (e.g. FLSCORE and AFA), the interaction terms are insignificant.  
 
The 2SLS regression reveals that there is a negative simultaneous relationship between 
disclosure quality (measured using the IR Magazine Award, forward looking score and 
analyst forecast accuracy) and earnings management, signalling that causality can go in both 
directions as predicted in the hypothesis. Corporate governance may be effective in reducing 
information asymmetry and conflict of interest, but it is not able to eliminate it.  
 
This finding supports the theoretical view that disclosure reduces information asymmetry 
and makes for better informed investors. It is acknowledged, however, that no direct test for 
the relationship between disclosure and information asymmetry is performed in this study. 
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In brief, regulators need to review current governance practices and to consider the cost and 
benefit of compliance.  
 
7.2 Second project: corporate governance and disclosure quality 
 
With regard to the second project, the present study investigates the implication of 
corporate governance variables for disclosure quality. The influence of audit committee 
effectiveness on disclosure quality is also examined. The possible complementary or 
substitutive link between audit committees and boards of directors is also observed. In line 
with prior research that discusses the endogenous nature of independent directorships (e.g. 
Lim et al., 2007), the simultaneous relationship between disclosure quality and independent 
directors is taken into account. This issue has been addressed using a simultaneous equation 
approach.  
 
When the IR Magazine Award is used as a proxy for disclosure quality, logistic regression 
reveals that the IR Magazine Award is influenced by audit committee size, audit committee 
meeting frequency, audit committee multiple directorships, board size, length of chairman 
tenure and the number of additional directorships being held by the chairman. Firms that 
received the IR Magazine Award have a high level of audit committee effectiveness, 
measured using ACQUALITYBR (p<0.05). There is clear evidence for the incremental effect of 
audit committee characteristics in influencing the receipt of the IR Magazine Award, since 
the R2 increased from 36.92% to 41.99% after controlling for audit committee variables. 
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Nonetheless, audit committee characteristics appear to provide both complementary and 
substitutive effects to board characteristics in influencing receipt of the IR Magazine Award.   
 
With regard to the second measure for disclosure quality, the amount of forward looking 
information in the annual report, the Poisson regression shows that audit committee 
independence, audit committee expertise, audit committee meeting frequency, board size, 
number of chairman additional directorships and board meeting frequencies are significantly 
and positively related to the amount of forward looking information. Compliance with the 
recommended benchmark on audit committee effectiveness, outlined in the Smith Report 
(2003) and the Blue Ribbon Recommendation (1999) and measured using ACQUALITY and 
ACQUALITYBR, reports clear positive associations with the amount of forward looking 
information.  
 
Regarding the third proxy for disclosure quality, that is analyst forecast accuracy, the Tobit 
regression revealed contradict results, whereby, audit committee expertise and board 
independence are significantly negatively correlated to analyst forecast accuracy.  
 
The second project also demonstrates that there is a significant substitutive effect between 
board characteristics and audit committee characteristics in enhancing disclosure quality 
(measured using analyst forecast accuracy). This suggests that firms should focus on either 
board characteristics or audit committee characteristics, and at the same time enjoy greater 
benefit of monitoring at a relatively lower cost.  
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With regard to the potential reverse causality between disclosure quality and independent 
directors, the results document mixed findings. While no simultaneous relationship is 
reported for the number of independent directorships and the receipt of the IR Magazine 
Award, simultaneity is reported between the number of independent directors and the 
amount of forward looking information. Independent directorships and forward looking 
information are, therefore, positively determined. Although the number of independent 
directors and the analyst forecast accuracy show a bi-directional relationship, it is 
documented that the number of independent directors and the analyst forecast accuracy 
are negatively determined. This provides a contradictory result to the expectation.   
 
7.3 Overall conclusion: disclosure quality, board independence and earnings 
management.  
 
Overall, the present study highlights that the interrelationship between disclosure quality, 
earnings management and corporate governance are far more complex than the 
complementary relationship that is assumed in the prior literature (e.g. Healy and Wahlen, 
1999). On the one hand, the present study reveals that corporate governance fails to show 
strong effects on reducing earnings management. This implies that the corporate 
governance code, so far, is not very effective in constraining earnings management. The 
results are also robust after controlling for endogeneity using 2SLS. On the other hand, 
corporate governance variables play partially significant roles in enhancing disclosure 
quality. On the other hand, audit committee effectiveness provides significant effects on 
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improving forward looking disclosure and performance in the Investor Relations Awards; 
however, the result does not apply to analyst forecast accuracy. When these results are 
taken together, it can be stated that the internal mechanisms of corporate governance may 
be partially successful in improving disclosure quality, but that they are not helpful in 
mitigating earnings management. This conclusion is not surprising, given that large 
companies like Enron had sound corporate governance practices while at the same time 
being involved in a huge corporate scandal.144 These results suggest that that a revision of 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) is necessary in order to ensure that all firms 
benefit from the cost of corporate governance compliance. This present study also 
demonstrates that disclosure quality outperformed corporate governance in deterring 
earnings management. 
 
  
                                                          
144
 A corporate scandal involving Olympus came to light in 2011 and is still under investigation. This large firm 
hid losses of 1.3 billion US dollars from the balance sheet and this is obviously an earnings manipulation 
activity.  
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7.4 The contribution of the study   
 
The present study makes several main contributions:  
1. This study could benefit corporate governance bodies that are considering corporate 
governance reforms over the current best practices. In particular, this study finds that 
audit committee meeting frequency appears to be positively related to earnings 
management. This finding corroborates that of Bédard and Gendron (2010) whom claim 
that the majority of prior studies found that audit committee meeting frequency is one 
of the least important variables in respect to improving financial quality. Given that audit 
committee meetings are a very important platform for audit committees to discuss and 
share their expertise, it is awkward when it they are viewed as a less credible internal 
governance mechanism. As stated before, audit committee independence and expertise 
is of no use to the firm if the committee finds it difficult to meet frequently. Regulators 
and other standard setters will have to look further into this issue. 
2. The findings of this study will be largely beneficial to the shareholders, management and 
members of the public who are concerned about the detrimental effects of earnings 
management. In the light of a recent corporate scandal in 2011 involving Olympus, 
whose top management are currently being investigated for hiding losses of 1.3 billion 
US dollars from the balance sheet, the finding from this study stresses the importance of 
firms providing sufficient monitoring and sound information in order to keep investors 
and analysts well informed.  
3. This study is generally useful for researchers who are investigating the implications of 
corporate governance and disclosure in deterring earnings management. As this study 
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found that the effects of disclosure outweigh those of corporate governance in reducing 
earnings management, future research should control for disclosure quality as one of the 
determinants of earnings management. Moreover, this study is the first (so far) that 
considers a comprehensive set of internal governance variables in the model when 
examining the relationship between disclosure quality and earnings management. 
4. The present study will also be useful to academics in that it takes into account the 
potential for simultaneous relationship in the first project (disclosure quality and 
earnings management), the second project (disclosure quality and board independence) 
as well as the third project (disclosure quality, board independence, earnings 
management and corporate performance). It is important to highlight that the causality 
issues addressed in these three projects have been neglected in the prior literature. 
5. Consistent with Arcot and Bruno (2006b)145 and Basiruddin’s (2010) findings, the present 
study suggests that not all of the UK Corporate Governance Code recommendations are 
effective when it comes to preventing earnings management. While some evidence is 
documented, it is still very limited. Given that the UK Corporate Governance Code is 
costly to implement, it is important to ensure that it is effective in mitigating agency cost. 
 
7.5 Limitations of the current research 
 
The same caveats apply in the current study as to all prior studies in corporate governance, 
earnings management, disclosure quality and corporate performance:   
                                                          
145
 Arcot and Bruno (2006b) find that compliance with the UK corporate governance code is not associated with 
higher performance.  
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1. The corporate governance definition of good best practices is still ambiguous and 
unresolved (Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010). Hence, it is important to acknowledge that 
the internal and external governance measures that are used in the present study might 
also suffer from measurement bias.  
2. Given that present study only focused on the absolute value of (unsigned) discretionary 
accruals, it is imperative that future research uses both positive and negative signed 
discretionary accruals as proxies for earnings management in order to provide a better 
understanding of the motives for income increasing and income decreasing activities.  
3. Future research should consider other types of earnings management proxies. Although 
Dechow et al. (2010) claim that the Modified Jones (1995) model is still the best, it is 
important to note that accrual-based models alone might not be able to capture overall 
earnings management.    
4. The potential simultaneity between disclosure quality and financial analysts is not 
properly captured in the current study and lies outside the scope of this thesis. To be 
specific, future research could investigate these relationships using a simultaneous 
system of equation. This type of research is particularly important in providing a better 
understanding of the interplay between disclosure and financial analysts. It is also 
important to note that the present study has no suitable data to cater for this issue; 
hence, it is not being investigated in this thesis.  
5. It is important to highlight that endogeneity is a highly subjective topic and to note that 
researchers currently do not have enough knowledge to resolve this issue. It is highly 
uncertain to what extent this problem is actually solved in the model. Although the 
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current study finds that the results support the hypothesis, they may also be highly 
sensitive to the choice of instrumental variables or methods that are used by the 
researcher. The use of lagged endogenous variables has a high (definite) potential to 
produce similar results to the OLS, but it cannot be claimed that “endogeneity has been 
solved”, given that the lagged endogenous variables also suffer from similar (or possibly 
worse) biases when compared to the contemporaneous endogenous variables. 
Moreover, without any specific theoretical, empirical and logical considerations, the 
choice of instrumental variables has no basis.   
6. The N6 Software that has been used to detect forward looking statements in the annual 
reports may not be able to detect the relevant keywords if there are spelling errors. For 
example, if “forecast” is spelled “forecsat”, then it is not counted in the forward looking 
score. The present study does not attempt to check the spelling of the narratives in the 
annual reports. Given that annual reports are lengthy documents that are addressed to 
various types of users, the present study presumes that such minor spelling mistakes are 
very rare.   
7. Due to a lack of proper data, the present study only controls for lag of return on assets 
(ROA) in the earnings management equation. More lagged dependent variables and/or 
lagged independent variables should be included in future models in order to cater for 
the problem of simultaneity bias, as suggested by Li (2011).  
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8. It is acknowledged that the measurements for disclosure quality that are used in the 
present study are also subject to controversy.146 FLSCORE is based on the number of 
forward looking disclosures, which is itself subject to a quantity vs. quality issue. 
Moreover, AFA is viewed in some of the literature (e.g. Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009) as a 
disclosure quality proxy that increases managers’ propensity to manipulate earnings. In 
addition, the IRAWARD variable blankets the issue of how serious the analysts are when 
selecting the winners. The current study makes several efforts to mitigate these 
problems (i) by performing a validity test on the forward looking information proxy, (ii) 
by considering the potential for reverse causality between analyst forecast accuracy and 
earnings management and (iii) by using a control sample of the non-winners of IRAWARD 
to mitigate sample bias.     
9. Moreover, the forward looking disclosure (FLSCORE) proxy, replicated from Hussainey et 
al. (2003), fails to anticipate bias in the tone of good vs. bad forward looking information, 
because both types of disclosure may lead to different economic consequences. 
Schleicher and Walker (2010) argue that it is crucial to consider the effect of the differing 
tones of forward looking disclosures because they are subject to manipulation by 
managers. 
10. Some other variables should also be treated as endogenous. There are claims in the prior 
literature (e.g. Lehn et al., 2009; Cornett et al., 2009) that the size of the board (BODSIZE) 
is endogenous. Firm size and leverage are also widely cited as endogenous variables in 
                                                          
146
 The problems with measurements for disclosure quality proxies are common in the prior literature (Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti, 2007).   
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the prior literature. Future research should also take into account the possible 
endogenous nature of this financial data. Leverage is one form of governance 
mechanism that is treated as endogenous in prior studies (e.g. Toledo, 2010). The 
percentage of shares held by the board of directors (BODSHR) is also treated as 
endogenous in the studies by Farooque et al. (2007) and Coles et al. (2007).  
11. Caution should be exercised when interpreting the 2SLS regression results. Although 
simultaneous equation is a very popular method for solving the simultaneity issue, Coles 
et al. (2007) and Lent (2007) claim that the available solutions to endogeneity so far 
(including the simultaneous system of equation, instrumental regressions and fixed-
effects) all fail to provide a pure solution to the problem of endogeneity.  
12. The economic crises during the years 2007-2008, which witnesses the collapse of large 
banks in the UK, might affect the findings of this study. Although an adequate test for 
robustness has been conducted, it is possible that a bias was introduced from other 
sources that are not accounted for.  
 
7.6 Recommendations for future research 
 
Several recommendations for future research are outlined below: 
a. Given that endogeneity is one of the central problems in research on disclosure quality, 
earnings management, corporate governance and performance, future research should 
consider using lagged data for all financial data. Li (2011) and Lo et al. (2010) claim that 
the use of lagged data controls for endogeneity.  
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b. Research which examine the potential simultaneity in the relationship between 
disclosure quality and financial analysts is worthy of exploration, given that there is a lack 
of this type of research. Such research, using a simultaneous system of equation, will 
provide a better understanding of the interplay between disclosure and analysts.   
c. The blockholder effect on disclosure quality and earnings management is also an 
interesting topic that could be addressed in future research. There is a lack of evidence 
for how internal and external blockholders react with disclosure quality and earnings 
management, although it is generally understood that both of them have a monitoring 
function in firms. Different types of blockholding (i.e., in institutions, in financial firms, in 
non-financial firms, and by individuals) may also have differing effects on a firm’s 
disclosure quality or earnings management, especially when the potential for non-linear 
relationships are considered.  
d. Future research should focus on the implications of disclosure quality for deterring 
earnings management using different measures, datasets and countries. There is still a 
lack of this type of research. More research on the complementary and substitutive links 
between governance variables is necessary because the information that is currently 
available is far from perfect and these relationships are extremely complicated.  
e. Moreover, it is crucial to focus on the implication of compliance vs. non-compliance with 
the UK Corporate Governance Code for reducing managers’ opportunistic behaviours. In 
the light of the current findings, it is essential to incorporate disclosure quality as one of 
the control variables in the earnings management equation.  
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f. Recently, studies on audit committee effectiveness have concentrated on audit 
committee financial literacy, multiple directorships, audit committee ownership and the 
knowledge and expertise of audit committee members in specific industries. Although 
these characteristics are worthy of exploration, it is important to note that other audit 
committee characteristics, such as audit committee meeting frequency, have been 
ignored. Bédard and Gendron (2010) point out that most prior studies show that the 
frequency of audit committee meetings does not influence financial reporting quality. 
This is a serious issue, given that it is unhelpful to have highly independent directors with 
vast experience as audit committee members, if they are unable to have the optimal 
number of audit committee meetings. Audit committee meetings are the only platform 
that audit committee members have to seriously discuss a firm’s financial matters. 
Hence, it is crucial to investigate what constitutes an effective audit committee meeting 
and how its effectiveness can be improved.  
g. Brickley and Zimmerman (2011) emphasise that research in corporate governance and 
disclosure should control for product market competition “because various 
characteristics of the financial reporting system such as transparency, timeliness and 
conservatism likely affect both the ability of the board and shareholders to monitor 
managers and entry by potential competitors” (p. 243). The present study has neglected 
to control for product market competition and it is suggested that future studies should 
incorporate this variable in order to avoid the issue of omitted variables.  
h. While it is hoped that the findings of this research will be of benefit to policymakers 
charged with revising and considering the current standard of corporate governance and 
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disclosure, the information asymmetry between academic research and business 
practice tends to result in policymakers being less appreciative of the value of research 
(Singleton-Green, 2010). The present study considers that tackling this issue should be a 
priority.   
i. Recently, a few studies have examined the impact of religion on mitigating earnings 
management (e.g. McGuire et al., 2011; Callen et al., 2011). This is very encouraging, 
given that all current solutions to earnings management carry a cost to the firms. It 
would be worthwhile to investigate less costly remedies for earnings management such 
as religion, culture and belief. It is alarming that corporate governance mechanisms are 
not always successful in preventing agency cost, as the present study finds, and that 
board and audit committees are not effective in reducing earnings management. It is 
assumed that religious belief increases an individual’s propensity to act rightly, because 
their mindset is towards pleasing God rather than fulfilling the desires that are 
determined by capitalism and media-driven consumerism in society. The control of 
desire reduces greediness for worldly gain and could be expected to mitigate managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours.  
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Appendices 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Analysis of Independent Variables and 
Residual for first project: Disclosure quality and 
earnings management (Annex to Chapter 3) 
ANALYSIS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
To ensure that the data is fit to the estimation used in this study, we performed several tests 
on the independent variables including linearity, normality, heteroskedasticity and 
multicollinearity.  
 
Linearity 
 
This present study perform qqplot test to check for the linearity of the data. We found that 
our data indicates linear relationship. Few examples are shown below.  
  
(a) qqplot between FLSCORE (horizontal) and MJONES (vertical)  
 
 
(b) qqplot between LMCAP (horizontal) and MJONES (vertical) 
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(c) qqplot between ANALYST (horizontal) and MJONES (vertical)  
 
 
(d) qqplot between TACF/LTA (horizontal) and MJONES (vertical) 
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Normality 
 
Several tests were performed including histogram (with normal curve), s-k test, Shapiro-wilk 
and Shapiro-francia. s-k test (skewness-kurtosis test) is similar to Kolmogrov Smirnov test 
although the latter is more suitable for large data (n>2000) (Park, 2008). We reported few 
examples below. We acknowledge that few data are skewed and not normally distributed, 
and we can spot the presence of outliers. This problem, however, is very common in the 
research on disclosure quality, earnings management and corporate governance. To 
alleviate this problem, we winsorised the top and bottom 1% of each continuous data similar 
to Cornett et al. (2008). We also transform market capitalisation data into natural 
logarithms. This step is expected to be able to mitigate the normality problem at certain 
extent.151   
 
We also reported the skewness and kurtosis. The normal range of skewness and kurtosis is 
between -2 and +2. Overall, the results for skewness and kurtosis are quite sensible except 
just for few cases. As such, we rely on Tabachick and Fidell (1989) that the skewness and 
kurtosis problems are likely to be problematic to the standard error and it will bring no 
significant changes to the result. As a remedy to this problem, robust standard error will be 
applied in all models. In particular, we include “robust” at the end of the command to 
control for robust standard error in STATA program.  
 
We also performed Shapiro-wilk, Shapiro-francia and S-K test to check for normality. We 
found that most the value of “w” in our Shapiro-Wilk results is close to 9, which indicates 
normality.  
 
(a) Histogram with normal curve (MJONES variable)  
 
 
                                                          
151
 We also tried to rerun our primary regression models by deleting outliers, and we found that it did not alter 
our results. 
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(b) Histogram with normal curve (FLSCORE variable)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Histogram with normal curve (AFA)   
 
 
 
 
Table: Skewness and Kurtosis  
 
VARIABLES SKEWNESS KURTOSIS 
IRAWARD 0 1 
FLSCORE 2.059 10.04 
AFA -4.149 23.85 
MJONES (AV)152 3.346 18.16 
JONES (AV) 2.844 13.539 
PERFORM-ADJ (AV) 1.618 6.12 
ACIND -2.604 7.782 
                                                          
152 AV refers to absolute value 
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ACSIZE -4.21 18.76 
ACMEET -4.214 18.76 
ACEXP -2.8006 8.843 
BODSIZE 0.208 1.043 
BODMEET 0.166 1.028 
BODIND -1.941 4.769 
ACINDA -2.79 9.11 
ACSIZEA 0.811 3.201 
ACMEETA 2.63 11.69 
ACEXPA 0.392 3.531 
BODSIZEA 0.710 3.329 
BODMEETA 1.307 6.129 
BODINDA 0.098 2.56 
LMCAP 0.274 3.49 
ROA 0.323 6.456 
LOSS 3.203 11.264 
PPE/LTA 2.142 10.78 
NCF/LTA 0.859 7.379 
TACF/LTA (AV) 2.116 8.119 
DTA 0.972 4.279 
BIG4 -5.41 30.25 
CHGE IN ROA 1.335 10.802 
ANALYST 0.496 3.309 
MARKET CAP 4.7918 27.165 
BODINDA 0.113 2.594 
D2007 1.208 2.461 
D2006 1.25 2.57 
D2005 1.165 2.358 
TECH 2.143 5.591 
IND 0.718 1.515 
CGOOD 3.028 10.173 
CSERV 1.102 2.215 
HEALTH 4.399 20.355 
UTILITI 4.837 24.403 
LROA 0.848 7.17 
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  technology      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
telecommun~n      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
   utilities      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
   oilandgas      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
  healthcare      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
consumerse~s      290      0.0000         0.0000        47.67         0.0000
consumergo~s      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
   dummy2005      290      0.0000         0.0015        43.22         0.0000
   dummy2006      290      0.0000         0.0826        41.78         0.0000
   dummy2007      290      0.0000         0.0156        41.99         0.0000
cheinsales~r      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
      lnmcap      290      0.0575         0.0993         6.19         0.0452
   laggedroa      290      0.0000         0.0000        48.07         0.0000
        big4      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
         ppe      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
         ncf      290      0.0000         0.0000        49.45         0.0000
        TACF      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
     analyst      290      0.0008         0.2384        11.21         0.0037
         dta      290      0.0000         0.0015        35.37         0.0000
     loss1cv      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
      acindD      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
     acmeetD      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
      acexpD      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
     acsizeD      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
     bodmeet      290      0.0000         0.0000        61.00         0.0000
perbodindc~r      290      0.4857         0.0723         3.74         0.1543
     bodsize      290      0.0000         0.2179        18.81         0.0001
     n6score      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
                                                                             
    Variable      Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality
397 
 
 
 
 
. 
  technology      290    0.96068      8.130     4.911    0.00000
telecommun~n      290    0.99988      0.024    -8.754    1.00000
   utilities      290    0.84798     31.429     8.080    0.00000
   oilandgas      290    0.94534     11.302     5.683    0.00000
  healthcare      290    0.86953     26.973     7.721    0.00000
consumerse~s      290    0.98731      2.624     2.261    0.01187
consumergo~s      290    0.92956     14.563     6.277    0.00000
   dummy2005      290    0.98605      2.884     2.482    0.00653
   dummy2006      290    0.98421      3.265     2.773    0.00278
   dummy2007      290    0.98515      3.069     2.628    0.00429
cheinsales~r      290    0.28570    147.677    11.706    0.00000
      lnmcap      290    0.98390      3.329     2.819    0.00241
   laggedroa      290    0.90638     19.355     6.944    0.00000
        big4      290    0.79663     42.046     8.762    0.00000
         ppe      290    0.81259     38.745     8.570    0.00000
         ncf      290    0.88168     24.461     7.492    0.00000
        TACF      290    0.77846     45.802     8.962    0.00000
     analyst      290    0.97998      4.140     3.329    0.00044
         dta      290    0.93520     13.396     6.081    0.00000
     loss1cv      290    0.92263     15.995     6.497    0.00000
      acindD      290    0.95052     10.230     5.450    0.00000
     acmeetD      290    0.87480     25.885     7.625    0.00000
      acexpD      290    0.94308     11.768     5.778    0.00000
     acsizeD      290    0.87480     25.885     7.625    0.00000
     bodmeet      290    0.92317     15.884     6.481    0.00000
perbodindc~r      290    0.99674      0.674    -0.925    0.82256
     bodsize      290    0.96774      6.670     4.447    0.00000
     n6score      290    0.84334     32.389     8.150    0.00000
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
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Heteroskedasticity 
 
We perform rvfplot as well as Breush pagan test and White test to check for 
heteroskedasticity. We found that the result from Breush pagan test and White test are 
contradicted each other. White test found that there is no heteroskedasticity problem while 
Breush pagan test indicated that there is a presence of heteroskedasticity. We assume that 
the heteroskedasticity is mild in our case. We corrected for heteroskedasticity using robust 
standard error.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
  technology      290    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
telecommun~n      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
   utilities      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
   oilandgas      290    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
  healthcare      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
consumerse~s      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
consumergo~s      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
   dummy2005      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
   dummy2006      290    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
   dummy2007      290    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
cheinsales~r      290    0.27921    161.549    10.770    0.00001
      lnmcap      290    0.98351      3.696     2.769    0.00281
   laggedroa      290    0.90349     21.631     6.511    0.00001
        big4      290    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
         ppe      290    0.80985     42.617     7.948    0.00001
         ncf      290    0.87833     27.270     7.002    0.00001
        TACF      290    0.77959     49.399     8.261    0.00001
     analyst      290    0.98287      3.839     2.850    0.00219
         dta      290    0.93567     14.419     5.652    0.00001
     loss1cv      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
      acindD      290    1.00000      0.000   -56.281    1.00000
     acmeetD      290    1.00000      0.000   -55.736    1.00000
      acexpD      290    1.00000      0.000   -54.445    1.00000
     acsizeD      290    1.00000      0.000   -55.736    1.00000
     bodmeet      290    0.92438     16.948     5.995    0.00001
perbodindc~r      290    0.99580      0.942    -0.127    0.55044
     bodsize      290    0.97241      6.183     3.859    0.00006
     n6score      290    0.84093     35.652     7.570    0.00001
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W'          V'        z       Prob>z
                  Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
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Rvfplot between MJONES and FLSCORE 
 
 
 
. hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of mjones 
 
         chi2(1)      =   320.07 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
 
 
Multicollinearity 
 
We checked for multicollinearity by manually observe the correlation coefficient for each 
independent variables. We found that none are more than 80%. We also check for the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The general rule is that the VIF must not more than 10 (Hair 
et al. 2008).  
 
By using FLSCORE as a proxy for disclosure quality, we ran the OLS regression and we check 
the VIF. We found that the highest VIF is 2.91 (result reported below), which is belonging to 
the LMCAP. We conclude that this is acceptable given that we are not able to delete LMCAP 
from the model as to avoid model misspecification. Thus, to ensure that the model is well 
specified, we retain LMCAP in our model. We also tried to replace FLSCORE with AFA, and 
we re-ran the VIF test, we found that the maximum VIF is LMCAP = 3.46, with the mean VIF = 
1.66 (full result not reported). This is still below the threshold of 10. When we employed 
IRAWARD as a proxy for disclosure quality, we found that the maximum VIF is LMCAP = 2.98, 
with the mean VIF =1.64 (full result not reported).  
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We also tried to use condition index as another test for multicollinearity. However, we found 
that the results reported by condition index and VIF are contradict. The condition index 
reported that the condition number is 96, which is higher than the normal accepted level, 
that is 30. We note that multicollinearity detected in condition index is possibly due to the 
inclusion of year and industry dummies in the model. Wissmann et al. (2007, p. 10) stated 
that “dummy variables can cause multicollinearity problem”. Given that VIF is widely used as 
a measurement for multicollineaity, we assume that contradict results between VIF and 
condition index shown that multicollinearity is mild. As precaution, we tried to rerun the 
models with and without industry and year dummies. We found that our results (especially 
related to disclosure quality, earnings management and firm characteristics) are largely 
unaffected. Hence, we conclude that multicollinearity is not an issue in our case.   
 
 
 
 
 
    Mean VIF        1.64
                                    
     bodmeet        1.26    0.796792
consumergo~s        1.27    0.786433
         dta        1.29    0.777380
      acindD        1.32    0.759490
   utilities        1.32    0.759200
perbodindc~r        1.33    0.752643
      acexpD        1.35    0.739290
     acmeetD        1.36    0.737547
   laggedroa        1.37    0.730082
telecommun~n        1.43    0.698040
     acsizeD        1.45    0.691484
  healthcare        1.46    0.685430
cheinsales~r        1.50    0.667771
   oilandgas        1.55    0.647191
        big4        1.58    0.634182
   dummy2005        1.60    0.623895
  technology        1.62    0.615454
   dummy2007        1.65    0.606165
   dummy2006        1.68    0.596332
     loss1cv        1.70    0.587056
     n6score        1.71    0.585575
consumerse~s        1.77    0.566536
         ncf        1.87    0.534965
         ppe        1.87    0.534653
     bodsize        2.11    0.473034
        TACF        2.12    0.471943
     analyst        2.50    0.400542
      lnmcap        2.91    0.343864
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. estat vif
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Collinearity Diagnostics 
 
                           Cond 
        Eigenval          Index 
--------------------------------- 
    1    15.9015          1.0000 
    2     1.6045          3.1481 
    3     1.3969          3.3740 
    4     1.1993          3.6413 
    5     1.0913          3.8172 
    6     1.0752          3.8457 
    7     1.0391          3.9119 
    8     0.9584          4.0732 
    9     0.8423          4.3450 
    10     0.7834          4.5053 
    11     0.7171          4.7089 
    12     0.6583          4.9149 
    13     0.4692          5.8213 
    14     0.3701          6.5549 
    15     0.3261          6.9832 
    16     0.2638          7.7634 
    17     0.2264          8.3813 
    18     0.1859          9.2488 
    19     0.1625          9.8911 
    20     0.1434         10.5308 
    21     0.1277         11.1584 
    22     0.1046         12.3287 
    23     0.0920         13.1477 
    24     0.0820         13.9234 
    25     0.0669         15.4219 
    26     0.0420         19.4501 
    27     0.0318         22.3709 
    28     0.0217         27.0723 
    29     0.0147         32.8551 
    30     0.0017         96.3347 
--------------------------------- 
 Condition Number        96.3347  
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept) 
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.000 
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Outliers and missing data 
 
As mentioned before, we winsorized all continuous variables at the top and bottom 1%, 
consistent with Cornett et al. (2009) to mitigate outliers issue. This study tends not to delete 
the outliers (to achieve normality) because it will reduce the number of sample, and the 
deletion of outliers will create new outliers. This study observes that the outliers in our data 
are genuine (in the sense that they are not affected by human error/ mistake during data 
key in or others). The outliers were randomly checked and it appears that they are correct 
and drawn from reliable sources. For example, the total accrual (TACF/LTA) for Avanti Screen 
Media is extremely high as compared to other firms in the sample. We rechecked/trace back 
the sources of the data from the annual report and they are the correct data. We traced 
back the data from the original source and we found that the data is correct. In this instance, 
we rely on Hair et al. (2008) that the deletion of outliers is not favourable unless if there is a 
strong justification based on researchers evaluation and judgement. As stated before, we 
winsorized all continuous data at the top and bottom 1% to avoid the effect of extreme 
value of outliers. Several missing data exist and we replace the missing data with the mean 
of the valid data of that particular variable (Hair et al., 2008). This missing data are random 
and we found it involved less than 10 cases.  
 
 
Model Specification Test 
 
Using Ramsey RESET test, we check the model specification. 153We found that the p-value is 
0.000, thus indicated that there is an omitted variables. Given that the number of 
independent variables used in the model is already high (28 variables) and the number of 
sample is 290, we decided not to add more variables in the model since we are concerned 
about the degree of freedom. The desirable ratio of independent variable to sample size is 
1:15, although 1:10 is still acceptable, according to (Hair et al. 2008). Park (2008) notes that 
Ramsey RESET test is a weak, but popular test for omitted variables. We argue that the R2 
probably need to be very high (e.g. 90%) to ensure no omitted variables, which is nearly 
impossible in this type of research. Given that the R2 in this present study is among the 
highest as compared to the literature in this area, we argue that different types of research 
subject to different diversity. It is very common to see high R2 in researches on audit quality 
and corporate governance, which the R2 is about 70%-80% (which probably indicates no 
omitted variables), but it is something weird in the disclosure quality research with majority 
of them reported R2 within the range of 20%-40%. We controlled for governance variables 
(while past researched failed to account for this when they examining the link between DQ 
and EM), and included a comprehensive set of firms specific characteristics. To add more 
                                                          
153
 Ramsey RESET test was performed using ovtest command in STATA.  
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variables will reduce the degree of freedom and also may not feasible in terms of the data 
collection process vis-a-vis the timeframe of the study. Further analysis using linktest also 
performed. 154 
  
ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of modifiedjones100winsor 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 258) =     13.01 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
. linktest 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     290 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   287) =  179.08 
       Model |  7860.44603     2  3930.22301           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   6298.5886   287  21.9463018           R-squared     =  0.5552 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5521 
       Total |  14159.0346   289  48.9931994           Root MSE      =  4.6847 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
modifiedjo~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   .3149385   .1475097     2.14   0.034     .0246003    .6052766 
      _hatsq |    .029692    .005936     5.00   0.000     .0180083    .0413757 
       _cons |   2.296716   .6284803     3.65   0.000     1.059701    3.533732 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Ovtest, rhs 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the independent variables 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                F(31, 231) =      3.97 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
Regression Estimation 
 
OLS Regression 
We noted that most of prior research in earnings management (where the dependent 
variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals) employed OLS estimation in their 
                                                          
154
 Linktest is performed using ‘linktest’ command in STATA.  
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multivariate analysis (e.g. Peasnell et al. 2000). Although the nature of dependent variable is 
zero truncated, discussion with statistician155 revealed that the types of data appropriate for 
OLS estimation are arbitrary. Hence it is not surprising to see that some study employed OLS 
regression. While compliance to the main assumptions in OLS is necessary, some research 
employed OLS estimation although their data are not normally distributed. Hence, we 
conclude that mild violations to OLS assumptions are normal in practice, specifically in the 
researches on disclosure quality, earnings management and corporate governance. 
Moreover, for the purpose of comparison, we believe that it is crucial for us to use the same 
estimation as in the majority of researches in this area. We therefore, employed OLS 
regression in our analyses. We pooled the data and we performed OLS regression to our 
model. 156  
 
Robust Regression 
We also noted that robust regression is also suitable to be used as one of the alternative 
estimator. Robust regression, by it name is robust across outliers and the data is not comply 
with any specific assumptions in OLS regression. We performed robust regression in the 
sensitivity analysis. 157 
  
Tobit Regression and Truncated Regression 
Given that the nature of dependent variable is truncated to zero, we noted that Myers et al. 
(2003) and Gul et al. (2009) employ truncated regression approach. Specifically, we 
performed Tobit regression and truncated regression. We performed Tobit regression and 
truncated regression in the sensitivity analysis. 158  
 
 
ANALYSIS OF RESIDUALS  
 
We also perform similar test to the residuals. We regress the model, and we obtain the 
residuals using predict ehat, resid command in STATA. We draw the histogram with normal 
curve for residuals in STATA. We found that from graphical point of view, our residuals 
shown normally distributed result. We also calculate for the skewness and kurtosis, and we 
found that the skewness is 1.24 and the kurtosis is 9.77. The skewness is within the range of 
-2 and +2, which indicates normality, while kurtosis is slightly beyond the normal range.  
 
 
                                                          
155
 The statistician mentioned here is Prof. Christopher Baum, a leading STATA expert.  
156
 We run OLS regression using following command in STATA ‘regress dependent variable independent 
variables, robust’.  
157
 We used ‘rreg’ command in STATA.   
158
 We performed Tobit and truncated regressions using ‘tobit’ and ‘truncreg’ command in STATA with robust 
standard error.  
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The Shapiro-wilk and Shapiro-francia indicates that the residual is close to normal, given that 
the “w” is about 0.9. Nevertheless, the sktest reveal that the data is not normally 
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-20 -10 0 10 20 30
Residuals
99%     14.85012       27.55852       Kurtosis       9.770366
95%      7.20721       27.26777       Skewness       1.248064
90%     5.544529       14.85012       Variance       23.69482
75%     2.317975       14.54628
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      4.867732
50%    -.6377428                      Mean          -7.66e-09
25%    -2.633967      -11.94691       Sum of Wgt.         290
10%    -4.791577      -13.56835       Obs                 290
 5%    -6.854295       -13.7292
 1%    -13.56835      -14.44539
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                          Residuals
. 
        ehat      290    0.90368     21.587     6.507    0.00001
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W'          V'        z       Prob>z
                  Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
. sfrancia ehat
        ehat      290    0.90881     18.853     6.882    0.00000
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk ehat
        ehat      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
                                                                             
    Variable      Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality
. sktest ehat
406 
 
distributed. This present study assume that the residuals is close to normal given that there 
is contradict result between Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-Francia and sktest. The contradiction 
might happened because (i) the sktest is more strict test than Shapir-wilk and Shapiro-
francia, which is normally be more meaningful when the data is large (e.g. more than 2000) 
given that it is similar to Kolmogrov-Smirnov test. Haniffa and Cooke (2002, p. 337) stated in 
the footnote that “if the error terms is normally distributed, the dependent variable will also 
be normally distributed”. This study revealed that the residuals is very close to normal 
distribution, hence indicates that the dependent variables distribution are also close to 
normal, based on Haniffa and Cooke (2002) suggestion before.  
 
This study also performed rvpplot between residuals and FLSCORE. The graph is tabulated as 
below. Given that the graph shown no clear pattern, this suggested that there is no 
relationship between error term and FLSCORE. If there is a relationship between any 
regressors and error terms, it implies that endogeneity exist. Note that random checking 
with other regressors also shown that the error term is not related to regressors.  
 
rvpplot  between FLSCORE and Residuals  
 
 
 
This present study extends the test by substituting FLSCORE with AFA in the equation. The 
residual is then created after regress command. The histogram for residuals is as follow: 
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This study found that the residual is close to normal. The relationship between residuals and 
regressor is then examined using rvpplot. As below, the rvpplot is between residuals and the 
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Residuals
99%     10.04168       21.36615       Kurtosis       6.797795
95%     7.010758       12.16514       Skewness       .3871456
90%     5.532596       10.04168       Variance       17.31613
75%     1.844063       9.908197
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      4.161266
50%    -.4068129                      Mean           6.74e-09
25%    -2.360818        -10.194       Sum of Wgt.         254
10%    -3.957629      -10.83097       Obs                 254
 5%    -5.759082       -14.1566
 1%    -10.83097      -17.51723
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                          Residuals
. summarize ehatafa, detail
     ehatafa      254    0.94081     11.830     5.188    0.00001
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W'          V'        z       Prob>z
                  Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
. sfrancia ehatafa
     ehatafa      254    0.94739      9.676     5.285    0.00000
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk ehatafa
     ehatafa      254      0.0122         0.0000        27.60         0.0000
                                                                             
    Variable      Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality
. sktest ehatafa
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test variable that is AFA. Based on the figure below, there is no specific pattern of 
relationship between residuals and AFA, thus indicates that no endogeneity between 
residuals and AFA.  
 
 
The avplot is also performed to see the relationship between dependent variable and 
regressor. The x-axis is the regressor x “after controlling for its relationship with other 
regressor”, while y-axis is the dependent variable “after controlling its relationship with 
remaining regressor” (Hill, n.d, p. 24). Command avplot X is used, where X is any regressor in 
the equation. As for below, command avplot afa is used. The avplot between MJONES and 
AFA shown that there is a negative relationship between these two variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
We performed several test on independent variables including normality, linearity, 
heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. We found that our variables are linear and suffered 
mild multicollinearity issue (due to contradict result from VIF and Collinearity index). We also 
found contradict results for heteroskedasticity test (Breush pagan and White test) and we 
mitigate this issue by using robust standard error. We also checked for normality, and we 
found that several data are not normally distributed. We winsorised the top and bottom 1% 
to control for extreme value and we transform market capitalisation data into natural 
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logarithms. At this point, we conclude that our data is satisfactory to fit with the OLS 
assumption. We also performed the same test to the residuals, and we found that residuals 
are substantially complying with the OLS assumption. We acknowledge that mild violation of 
OLS assumption exists, but this is not uncommon in the research on disclosure quality, 
corporate governance and earnings management. We decided to use OLS Regression as our 
main estimation, and we also use Tobit regression, truncated regression and robust 
regression as our additional test. 159 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
159
 We found that our results are largely unaffected by the different estimation used.  
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Appendix 2: Analysis of Independent Variables and 
Residuals for second project: Corporate 
governance and disclosure quality (Annex to 
Chapter 5) 
 
ANALYSES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
Similar to appendix 4, we also performed several test on our independent variables based on 
the OLS assumptions that is linearity, normality, heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity.  
 
Linearity 
 
 
We report some result for qqplot, and we found linear relationship exist for almost all data.  
 
(a) Qqplot between ACMEET and FLSCORE 
 
 
(b) Qqplot between BODSIZE and FLSCORE 
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(c) Qqplot between 3%SUBSHR and FLSCORE 
 
 
(d) Qqplot between CHAIRTEN and FLSCORE 
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(e) Qqplot between BODMEET and FLSCORE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Normality 
 
Similar to the Appendix 2, we also create a histogram (with normal curve) to check the 
normality of our data. We found mixed results - some data are normally distributed and 
some are not. We extend our test using S-K test, Shapiro-wilk and Shapiro-francia tests. 
When we look at the Shapiro-wilk results, we found that most of our “w” value is close to 
0.9, which indicates normality. Thus, as to ensure that the model fit with OLS estimation, we 
transform firm size (measured using market capitalization) into natural log as to transform 
the distribution to normal. Similar to Cornett et al. (2008), we winsorized all of the 
continuous data at top and bottom 1% to mitigate outliers effect.   
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. 
  technology      290    0.96068      8.130     4.911    0.00000
telecommun~n      290    0.99988      0.024    -8.754    1.00000
   utilities      290    0.84798     31.429     8.080    0.00000
   oilandgas      290    0.94534     11.302     5.683    0.00000
  healthcare      290    0.86953     26.973     7.721    0.00000
consumerse~s      290    0.98731      2.624     2.261    0.01187
consumergo~s      290    0.92956     14.563     6.277    0.00000
   dummy2005      290    0.98605      2.884     2.482    0.00653
   dummy2006      290    0.98421      3.265     2.773    0.00278
   dummy2007      290    0.98515      3.069     2.628    0.00429
      lnmcap      290    0.98390      3.329     2.819    0.00241
       sdros      290    0.70232     61.545     9.655    0.00000
     analyst      290    0.97998      4.140     3.329    0.00044
        big4      290    0.79663     42.046     8.762    0.00000
         dta      290    0.93520     13.396     6.081    0.00000
         roa      290    0.93349     13.751     6.143    0.00000
   nosubshre      290    0.98025      4.083     3.297    0.00049
      subshr      290    0.97324      5.532     4.009    0.00003
    chairten      290    0.72112     57.656     9.502    0.00000
  chairnonex      290    0.96736      6.748     4.474    0.00000
   chairmult      290    0.97116      5.963     4.185    0.00001
      acindD      290    0.95052     10.230     5.450    0.00000
     acmeetD      290    0.87480     25.885     7.625    0.00000
      acexpD      290    0.94308     11.768     5.778    0.00000
     acsizeD      290    0.87480     25.885     7.625    0.00000
     bodmeet      290    0.92317     15.884     6.481    0.00000
perbodindc~r      290    0.99674      0.674    -0.925    0.82256
     bodsize      290    0.96774      6.670     4.447    0.00000
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
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 . 
  technology      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
telecommun~n      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
   utilities      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
   oilandgas      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
  healthcare      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
consumerse~s      290      0.0000         0.0000        47.67         0.0000
consumergo~s      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
   dummy2005      290      0.0000         0.0015        43.22         0.0000
   dummy2006      290      0.0000         0.0826        41.78         0.0000
   dummy2007      290      0.0000         0.0156        41.99         0.0000
      lnmcap      290      0.0575         0.0993         6.19         0.0452
       sdros      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
     analyst      290      0.0008         0.2384        11.21         0.0037
        big4      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
         dta      290      0.0000         0.0015        35.37         0.0000
         roa      290      0.0246         0.0000        27.34         0.0000
   nosubshre      290      0.0006         0.7318        10.69         0.0048
      subshr      290      0.0004         0.6512        11.28         0.0035
    chairten      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
  chairnonex      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
   chairmult      290      0.0000         0.2329        19.30         0.0001
      acindD      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
     acmeetD      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
      acexpD      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
     acsizeD      290      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
     bodmeet      290      0.0000         0.0000        61.00         0.0000
perbodindc~r      290      0.4857         0.0723         3.74         0.1543
     bodsize      290      0.0000         0.2179        18.81         0.0001
                                                                             
    Variable      Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality
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Heteroskedasticity 
 
We create rvfplot to check for heteroskedasticity. We found that heteroskedasticity is 
present in our data.  
 
(a) rvfplot between AFA and Corporate governance variables (including control 
variables) 
. 
  technology      290    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
telecommun~n      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
   utilities      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
   oilandgas      290    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
  healthcare      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
consumerse~s      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
consumergo~s      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
   dummy2005      290    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
   dummy2006      290    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
   dummy2007      290    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
      lnmcap      290    0.98351      3.696     2.769    0.00281
       sdros      290    0.72375     61.916     8.739    0.00001
     analyst      290    0.98287      3.839     2.850    0.00219
        big4      290    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
         dta      290    0.93567     14.419     5.652    0.00001
         roa      290    0.92913     15.884     5.857    0.00001
   nosubshre      290    0.98592      3.155     2.434    0.00748
      subshr      290    0.97288      6.077     3.822    0.00007
    chairten      290    0.73106     60.276     8.682    0.00001
  chairnonex      290    1.00000      0.000   -54.399    1.00000
   chairmult      290    0.98373      3.646     2.740    0.00307
      acindD      290    1.00000      0.000   -56.281    1.00000
     acmeetD      290    1.00000      0.000   -55.736    1.00000
      acexpD      290    1.00000      0.000   -54.445    1.00000
     acsizeD      290    1.00000      0.000   -55.736    1.00000
     bodmeet      290    0.92438     16.948     5.995    0.00001
perbodindc~r      290    0.99580      0.942    -0.127    0.55044
     bodsize      290    0.97241      6.183     3.859    0.00006
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W'          V'        z       Prob>z
                  Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
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(b) rvfplot between FLSCORE and Corporate governance variables (including control 
variables) 
 
 
 
 
(c) rvfplot between IRAWARD and Corporate governance variables (including control 
variables)  
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We perform other test for heteroskedsticity including Breush pagan test and White Test. We 
found that the result from Breush pagan test and White test is contradicted. Breush pagan 
test indicates heteroskedasticity (the p-value is significant), while White test reported no 
heteroskedasticity (the p-value is insignificant). We assume that mild heteroskedasticity 
exist. Heteroskedasticity will give an influence to the standard error per se, and not to the 
results. We corrected heteroskedasticity using robust standard error using ‘robust’ 
command in the STATA at the end of regression command (e.g., regress y x1 x2 x3, robust).  
 
 
 
hettest  
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of afa100winsor 
 
         chi2(1)      =   239.53 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     282.42    267    0.2471 
            Skewness |      34.29     25    0.1019 
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            Kurtosis |       5.78      1    0.0162 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     322.49    293    0.1137 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Multicollinearity 
 
We checked for multicollinearity by manually observe the correlation coefficient for each 
independent variables. We found that none are more than 70%. We also check for the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), and we found that the maximum VIF is 2.85, which we 
considered as normal. Given that the largest VIF belong to firm size, we believe that 
exclusion of firm’s size will increase model misspecification problem. The general rule is that 
the VIF must not more than 10 (Hair et al. 2008). When we employ FLSCORE as dependent 
variable, we found that the maximum VIF is 2.85, while the mean VIF is 1.55 (refer result 
below). When we used AFA (IRAWARD) as dependent variable, we found that the maximum 
VIF is belong to LMCAP with a value of 3.44 (2.85), and the mean VIF is 1.58 (1.55). We 
consider that multicollinearity is not a problem to our data.  
 
We extend our multicollinearity test using Condition index. In this test, however, it indicates 
that multicollinearity is present due to the high value of condition number. As discussed 
before, this problem could occur due to high number of dummies in the model. We tried to 
exclude our dummies one by one from the regression, and we found that our results are 
qualitatively similar. We then assume that multicollinearity is basically mild and not 
detrimental to our findings.  
419 
 
 
 
 
Results for Condition Index 
 
                           Cond 
        Eigenval          Index 
--------------------------------- 
    1    17.8183          1.0000 
    2     1.1280          3.9744 
    3     1.1215          3.9859 
    4     1.0853          4.0518 
    5     1.0649          4.0905 
    6     1.0253          4.1688 
    7     1.0107          4.1987 
    8     0.9459          4.3402 
    9     0.9385          4.3573 
    10     0.6153          5.3814 
    11     0.5511          5.6862 
. 
    Mean VIF        1.55
                                    
       sdros        1.14    0.878849
         dta        1.21    0.823910
   chairmult        1.24    0.806439
   utilities        1.24    0.805667
     bodmeet        1.26    0.792972
  chairnonex        1.27    0.788508
consumergo~s        1.28    0.782836
perbodindc~r        1.29    0.774046
      acindD        1.29    0.773804
         roa        1.31    0.765663
  healthcare        1.31    0.765306
telecommun~n        1.33    0.752049
     acmeetD        1.35    0.740906
    chairten        1.38    0.724800
      acexpD        1.39    0.718799
        big4        1.40    0.716434
   oilandgas        1.42    0.705087
     acsizeD        1.48    0.677100
  technology        1.55    0.644064
   dummy2005        1.62    0.618738
   dummy2006        1.71    0.584178
   dummy2007        1.79    0.558802
   nosubshre        1.79    0.557669
consumerse~s        1.91    0.523928
     bodsize        2.00    0.500484
      subshr        2.12    0.471495
     analyst        2.57    0.389229
      lnmcap        2.85    0.351175
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. estat vif
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    12     0.3882          6.7752 
    13     0.3595          7.0403 
    14     0.3309          7.3384 
    15     0.2806          7.9685 
    16     0.2286          8.8283 
    17     0.1924          9.6232 
    18     0.1610         10.5211 
    19     0.1252         11.9295 
    20     0.1138         12.5120 
    21     0.1036         13.1148 
    22     0.0891         14.1427 
    23     0.0844         14.5313 
    24     0.0792         15.0000 
    25     0.0502         18.8356 
    26     0.0459         19.6954 
    27     0.0299         24.4063 
    28     0.0193         30.3861 
    29     0.0115         39.3266 
    30     0.0018         99.5436 
--------------------------------- 
 Condition Number        99.5436  
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept) 
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0018 
 
 
 
Outliers and missing data 
 
We treat outliers and missing data similar to the one discussed in Appendix 1.  
 
 
Model Specification Test 
 
Using Ramsey RESET test, we check the model specification. We found that the p value is 
0.000, thus indicated that there is an omitted variables. Given that the number of 
independent variables used in the model is already high (28 variables) and the number of 
sample is 290, we decided not to add more variables in the model since we are concerned 
about the degree of freedom. We extend our analysis using linktest and we also found that 
the omitted variables exist.  
 
ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of afa100winsor 
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       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 261) =     18.02 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
 
Further analysis using linktest also performed. Linktest is performed using ‘linktest’ 
command in STATA.  
 
. linktest 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     294 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   291) =   55.17 
       Model |  280.021698     2  140.010849           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  738.441138   291  2.53759841           R-squared     =  0.2749 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2700 
       Total |  1018.46284   293  3.47598238           Root MSE      =   1.593 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
afa100winsor |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |  -.2610928   .2565721    -1.02   0.310    -.7660652    .2438795 
      _hatsq |  -.4803158   .0880293    -5.46   0.000    -.6535706    -.307061 
       _cons |  -.4810571   .1811915    -2.65   0.008    -.8376691   -.1244451 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF RESIDUALS  
 
The residuals for the dependent variables are generated in STATA using command   predict 
ehat, resid after the regress function using FLSCORE as dependent variables. Then, several 
analyses of residuals were performed.  
 
 
Normality of Residuals 
. histogram  ehat, normal 
(bin=18, start=-138.27893, width=20.855329) 
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The histogram above shown that the residual tabulation is normally distributed, although we 
can observe few outliers exist.  
 
 
The descriptive statistics above shown that the skewness of the residuals is 0.867 and the 
kurtosis is 5.896. 
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Residuals
99%     137.1664        237.117       Kurtosis       5.896318
95%     78.61076       219.8472       Skewness       .8679866
90%     51.91164        189.759       Variance       2406.113
75%     24.53749       137.1664
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      49.05214
50%     -2.33028                      Mean           9.18e-09
25%     -30.7614      -101.4401       Sum of Wgt.         340
10%    -58.87793      -106.9752       Obs                 340
 5%    -74.07306      -114.6163
 1%    -101.4401      -138.2789
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                          Residuals
. summ ehat, d
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The kolmogrov smirnov test to check for normality shown that the combines K-S test p-value 
is 0.000, which is lower than p<0.01, thus indicates that the residuals is not normally 
distributed. However, it is important to note that kolmogrov smirnov is usually suitable for 
large data (i.e. more than 2000) according to Park (2008). Therefore, we also performed 
other normality tests as below.  
               11                  N6SCOREWINSOR                       401
          +----------------------------------------------------------------+
-138.279 +              *
         |  *   *     *          *
         | **** **            *
         | *   ***** *                **
         |   ********* * **   *
         | **** *************    *  * *
    s    | ********** *********  ***       *
    l    | *********************** * **
    a    |   *     *** **************  ** ***
    u    |   *    *  *  * *  **********    * *      **
    d    |                    * * *    * *  * *
    i    |                         *     *    *                  *
    s    |                                *   *      *     **    *
    e    |                             *                           *      *
    R    |  
         |  
         |                                                                *
         |  
         |                                                                *
         |                                                                *
 237.117 +  
. plot ehat  n6scorewinsor
 Combined K-S:       0.4962    0.000      0.000
 Cumulative:        -0.4567    0.000
 ehat:               0.4962    0.000
                                               
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected
           normprob(ehat)
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution
. ksmirnov ehat = normprob(ehat)
424 
 
 
 
In the Shapiro-wilk (swilk) and Shapiro-francia (sfrancia) test, the value for “w” is around 
0.9, which indicates normality. It is important to note that it is a nature of accounting data 
not to have a perfect normality. We assume that our data is close to normal. When 
IRAWARD is used as a dependent variable, the same test was also performed. After logit 
command is used, the residuals is created using predict ehat, resid. Following this, the 
normality distribution is checked.  
 
 
The descriptive statistics are performed. The Kurtosis is very high, thus indicates that the 
data is not normally distributed.  
        ehat      340    0.95441     11.732     5.269    0.00001
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W'          V'        z       Prob>z
                  Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
. sfrancia ehat
        ehat      340    0.95698     10.243     5.494    0.00000
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk ehat
        ehat      340      0.0000         0.0000        48.18         0.0000
                                                                             
    Variable      Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality
. sktest ehat
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Further analyses using sktest, swilk and sfrancia indicates that the residuals are not 
normally distributed. Values for “w” for Shapiro wilk and Shapiro francia is around 0.6, which 
is lower than 0.9.  
 
Note that by using IRAWARD as dependent variable, the residuals are not normally 
distributed. However, it is important to note that IRAWARD is a dummy, hence such result is 
very normal. Therefore, the Logistic Regression using logit will be used when IRAWARD is 
employed as a proxy for disclosure quality. When AFA is used as a proxy for disclosure 
quality, the analysis of residuals was also performed. The histogram for the residuals is as 
below:  
99%     4.195753       15.01333       Kurtosis       60.49868
95%      1.32442       7.280182       Skewness       5.308549
90%     .9453233       5.237091       Variance       1.642263
75%     .4388369       4.195753
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      1.281508
50%    -.0110577                      Mean           .0562952
25%    -.4742087      -2.221178       Sum of Wgt.         340
10%    -.8780436      -3.057152       Obs                 340
 5%    -1.157534       -3.69966
 1%    -2.221178      -4.648979
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                      Pearson residual
. summarize ehat, detail
        ehat      340    0.63192     94.728     9.739    0.00001
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W'          V'        z       Prob>z
                  Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
. sfrancia ehat
        ehat      340    0.64358     84.867    10.487    0.00000
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk ehat
        ehat      340      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
                                                                             
    Variable      Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality
. sktest ehat
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Residuals
99%     2.345006       3.328808       Kurtosis        18.8735
95%      1.72741       2.752144       Skewness      -3.315331
90%      1.40201       2.345006       Variance       2.778119
75%     .8461489       2.325172
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      1.666769
50%     .2376373                      Mean          -8.71e-11
25%    -.3727265      -9.068247       Sum of Wgt.         294
10%    -1.328916      -9.209321       Obs                 294
 5%    -2.249302      -9.950324
 1%    -9.209321      -10.14372
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                          Residuals
. summarize ehatafa, detail
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When AFA is used as dependent variables, the analyses such as sktest, swilk and sfrancia 
shown that the residuals are not normally distributed. Hence highlighting that the utilisation 
of OLS estimation is not suitable for this case. In this instance, this study employs Tobit 
regression when AFA is dependent variable, which is considered as semi-parametric test. In 
other words, the normality assumptions in the Tobit regression is not as strict as in OLS.  
  
 
Regression Estimation 
 
 
Tobit Regression and Truncated Regression 
Given that the nature of analyst forecast accuracy data is truncated to zero, we noted that 
Myers et al. (2003) and Gul et al. (2009) employ truncated regression approach. Specifically, 
we performed Tobit regression and truncated regression, when analyst forecast accuracy 
(AFA) is used as dependent variable. We use ‘Tobit’ and ‘truncreg’ command in STATA with 
‘robust’ to correct for heteroskedasticity in the standard error. 160  
 
Poisson Regression 
Given that the data for forward looking information (FLSCORE) is a count data, as suggested 
by Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007), the most suitable estimation is Poisson regression. We 
use ‘poisson’ command in STATA with robust standard error 
 
                                                          
160
 We also tried to transform AFA by ranked it according to its quantile and we perform Ordinal Logistic 
regression. To perform ordinal logistic regression, we used ‘ologit’ command with robust standard error. 
. 
     ehatafa      294    0.70437     67.051     8.916    0.00001
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W'          V'        z       Prob>z
                  Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
. sfrancia ehatafa
     ehatafa      294    0.70892     60.914     9.637    0.00000
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk ehatafa
     ehatafa      294      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000
                                                                             
    Variable      Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality
. sktest ehatafa
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Logistic regression 
With regard to the IRAWARD, since it is measured using dummy (1,0) thus it is most 
appropriate to use Logistic regression. We pooled the data and we use ‘logit’ command in 
STATA to perform logistic regression.   
 
Additional Estimations 
Besides of using all of these estimations, we also employ a robustness check using OLS 
estimation and robust estimation and we found that the change in estimation basically did 
not alter our results.  
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Appendix 3 (Annex to Chapter 3) 
 
List of IR Magazine Award  
Grand Prix for Best Overall Investor Relations  
Grand Prix for Best Investor Relations by a FTSE 250 company 
Grand Prix for Best Smaller Company Investor Relations  
Best investor relations officer at a FTSE 100 company 
Best Investor Relations officer at a non-FTSE 100 company 
Best Corporate Literature by a FTSE 100 company 
Best Corporate Literature by a non-FTSE 100 company 
Best Narrative Reporting 
Best Use of the Internet for Investor Relations by a FTSE 100 Company 
Best Use of the Internet for Investor Relations by a non-FTSE 100 Company 
Best Use of Virtual Conferencing for Investor Relations  
Best Results Meetings and Analyst Briefings 
Best Communication of Shareholder Value Creation 
Best Crisis Management 
Best Investor Relations During a Takeover 
Most Progress in Investor Relations by a FTSE 100 Company 
Most Progress in Investor Relations by a non-FTSE 100 Company 
Best Disclosure Practice 
Best Corporate Governance 
Best Practice of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Best IR by a CEO at a FTSE 100 Company 
Best IR by a CEO at a non-FTSE 100 Company 
Best IR by a CFO at a FTSE 100 Company 
Best IR by a CFO at a non-FTSE 100 Company 
Best IR for a New Issue 
Best IR by an AIM Company 
Best North American IR in the UK Market 
Best UK Company IR in the US market 
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The Sector Award 
Aerospace & Defence 
Banks/ Financial General 
Chemicals 
Construction & Materials 
Food & Beverages/ Tobacco 
Healthcare equipment & services/ Pharmaceuticals & biotech 
House, leisure & personal goods 
Industrial engineering/ industrial general/ automobiles & parts 
Insurance 
Media 
Mining/ Basic Resource 
Oil & Gas 
Real Estate 
Retailers 
Support Services 
Technology/ hardware 
Technology- software & services/ electronic & electrical equipment 
Telecommunications 
Travel & leisure/ industrial transportation 
Utilities 
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Appendix 4 (Annex to Chapter 3) 
Forward Looking Keywords
161
 
Key Words 
 
Accelerate 
Look ahead, Look forward 
Anticipate Next 
Await Novel 
Coming [financial] year[s] Optimistic 
Coming months Outlook 
Confidence, Confident Planned, Planning 
Convince Predict 
Current [financial] year Prospect 
Envisage Remain 
Estimate Renew 
Eventual Scope for, Scope to 
Expect Shall 
Forecast Shortly 
Forthcoming Should 
Hope Soon 
Intend, Intention Will 
Likely, Unlikely Well placed, Well positioned 
 Year[s] ahead 
 2007/2008, 2007–2008 
 2008, 2009, 2010 … 2017 
  
  
Source: Hussainey et al. (2003, p. 277).  
 
 
 
                                                          
161
 Similar to Hussainey et al. (2003, p.277), ‘2007/2008’ and ‘2007–2008’ “refers to a firm’s next financial 
year” and additional keywords like “‘during’, ‘for’, ‘in’, ‘into’, ‘of’, ‘through’ and ‘throughout’” is alternately 
used along with the year ‘2008’ to ‘2017. For the verbs like “accelerate” several additional keywords were 
employed including “accelerate, accelerates, is accelerated, are accelerated, is accelerating, and are 
accelerating”. The year “2007/2008, …” and “2008, 2009…” in the list above are dissimilar to Hussainey et al. 
(2003) given that it changes is necessary to suit the year that used in the current dataset.  
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Appendix 5 (Annex to Chapter 3) 
 
Validity test for forward looking score 
 INDEX LIST 
    
  A. GENERAL CORPORATE INFORMATION 
1 Information on company history/ profile  
2 Statement of company vision and mission 
3 Explanation about main projects/ activities/ operation 
    
  B. COMPANY STRATEGY 
1 Firms general strategy/ goal/ objectives  
2 Firms financial strategy/goal /objectives 
3 Firms marketing strategy/goal/objectives 
    
  C. CAPITAL MARKET DATA 
1 Listing information/ name of Stock Exchanges  
2 Information about share price  
3 Home and overseas shareholdings 
4 The types of shareholders and their shareholdings  
5 Market capitalisation  
    
  D. FINANCIAL RATIO 
1 Leverage ratio 
2 Profitability ratios 
3 Liquidity ratios 
4 Dividend per share 
5 Earnings per share 
    
  E. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
1 New product/ service invention/ development 
2 Link between R&D cost and firms profitability/ performance 
3 Explanation about the firms R&D projects 
    
  F. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
1 Explanation about future trend in industry 
2 Qualitative forecast 
3 Forecast assumptions 
4 Budget forecast 
5 Earnings forecast 
6 Industry forecast/industry growth forecast 
7 Growth in units sold (or growth in other output measure e.g. production) 
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8 Growth in investment (expansion plans, number of outlets, etc) 
9 Forecasted market share/growth/trend 
10 Sales forecast/future revenue growth 
11 Profit forecast 
    
  G. SOCIAL REPORTING 
1 Firms sponsorships activities 
2 Contribution to community and government 
3 Information about child labour avoidance/elimination 
4 Programs that manage the impacts of operations on communities 
    
  H. ENVIRONMENTAL 
1 Energy consumption 
2 Information about recycled activities 
3 Direct energy consumption 
4 Indirect energy consumption 
5 Information about energy saving 
6 Initiatives for energy-efficient or renewable energy 
7 Initiatives to reduce energy consumption 
8 Total water withdrawals 
9 Water recycled and reused 
10 Biodiversity area 
11 Initiatives to manage impact on biodiversity 
12 Total greenhouse gas emissions 
13 Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas 
14 Quality of water discharge 
15 Waste management/ disposal method 
16 Initiatives to mitigate environmental impact 
17 Percentage of product sold and their packaging materials that are reclaimed 
18 Info on sanction and non sanctions with environmental laws and regulations 
19 Initiatives to reduce water waste 
20 How to reduce water usage 
21 Environmental policies 
22 Environmental protection information/expenses 
23 Information about climate change 
24 Environmental pollution 
25 Information on sustainability  
    
  I. EMPLOYEE INFORMATION 
1 Employees appreciation 
2 Number of employees 
3 Breakdown of employees by line of business 
4 Breakdown of employees by level of qualification/exec vs. non-execs 
5 Breakdown of employees by ethnic origin 
6 Breakdown of employees per category according to gender, age group 
7 Training on ethics, values for employees 
8 Total workforce by employee type, employment contract and region 
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9 Total number and rate of employee turnover by age group, gender and region 
10 
Accident rate (rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days and absenteeism, fatalities by 
region) 
11 
Training and counselling, prevention and risk-control program for employees, their families or 
community members 
12 Health and safety topic covered in formal agreements 
13 Training per year per employee by employee category 
14 Programs for training/skills management and lifelong learning 
15 Employees receiving regular performance and career development reviews 
16 Disable employee 1 
17 Employee involvement 
18 Employee communication 
19 Action/training in reducing corruption/bribery/ethics 
20 Employee equality/ opportunity/ discrimination policy  
    
  J. PRODUCTS OR SERVICE INFORMATION 
1 Discussion of major types of products/ services/ projects 
2 Improvement/information about product quality 
3 Improvement in customer service 
4 Distribution of marketing network for finished products 
5 Presentation of new products/services 
6 Time to market of new products/strategies (forecast) 
7 Information about product/service safety  
8 Potential products/services 
    
  L. SUPPLIER INFORMATION 
1 Information on supplier 
2 Audit on supplier  
3 Supplier plan/ program  
4 Spend/info on local supplier 
    
  L. OTHERS 
1 
Information of fines (non-fines) or sanctions (non-sanctions) for noncompliance (compliance) 
with laws and regulations/  
2 Information about company's website 
3 Investors/ shareholders information 
4 Information on Key Performance Indicator (KPI) 
5 Information about supply chain  
6 Analysis of shareholdings 
7 Awards and media ratings 
8 Information on additional report (e.g. CSR, sustainability report)  
9 Information about consumer demand  
10 Information on cost savings  
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Appendix 6 (Annex to chapter 3) 
 
 
Validity test of FLSCORE by randomly reading 30 forward looking sentences 
produced by N6 Software 
Keywords of Forward Looking Score Score 
Await 30/30 
Coming financial year 30/30 
Coming months 30/30 
Convince 30/30 
Current financial year 30/30 
Envisage 24/30 
Forthcoming 30/30 
Novel 26/30 
Optimistic 30/30 
Outlook 26/30 
Eventual 30/30 
Look ahead/ Look forward 30/30 
Planned/ Planning 28/30 
Prospect 29/30 
Scope for/ scope to 30/30 
Shortly 29/30 
Year(s) ahead 29/30 
During, for, in, into, of, through and 
throughout (used in conjunction with 
Years) 
30/30 
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Appendix 7 
Control variables not included in the analyses 
(1) International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 
The IFRS has been introduced to the UK firms in 2005. Given that the period of observations 
in this study is from the year 2004-2007, therefore it is difficult to drastically measure the 
impact of IFRS to earnings management or disclosure quality since it is still at infancy and/or 
transition stage. Moreover, some literature to date has been proved that IFRS is not 
significant in reducing earnings management (e.g. Thomas and Hervé, 2008; Van Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen, 2005). A comparative seminal work by Thomas and Hervé, (2008) who 
using UK, Australia and France data reported that that the IFRS adoption has no impact to 
the magnitude of earnings management. Another European studies by Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005), who concentrated on 636 firms in Germany’s capital market highlighted 
that the firms with IFRS have no significant different with the firms using German GAAP 
when earnings management is concern. Moreover, using UK data for the year 2003-2006 
Habbash (2010) found that there is no significant relationship between IFRS and earnings 
management.   
 
(2) The changes in Operating and Financial Review (OFR) and Business Review (BR)   
Williamson and Lynch-Wood (2008) argue that the OFR is basically voluntary in nature since 
the information released by the firms pertaining to OFR is subject to managers discretions. 
The OFR and BR controversy in the UK legislation happened during the year 2004-2007 
consecutively, therefore it is argue that all years (used in this present study) are 
homogenous in nature.   
 
(3) Disclosure Frequency  
Jo and Kim (2007) found that disclosure frequency is capable in reducing earnings 
management. This present study exclude disclosure frequency as one of the control 
variables since it has incorporated the number of analyst following which proxy for the firm’s 
publicly available information in the market as one of the control variables in the regression 
analysis. Moreover, Gu and Li (2007) suggest the number of analyst following represent the 
extent of firm’s information asymmetry.  
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